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

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CONTENTS OF VOL. XIX.

ARTICLES.

	PAGE.
BAILLIE, J. B. The Dramatic and Ethical Elements of Experience....	60
BAX, E. BELFORT. A Socialist's Interpretation of Ethical Evolution..	340
BENN, ALFRED W. The Morals of an Immoralist—Friedrich Nietzsche. I.	1
BENN, ALFRED W. The Morals of an Immoralist—Friedrich Nietzsche. II.	192
BROOKS, ROBERT C. Attempted Apologies for Political Corruption....	297
DAVIDSON, THOMAS. Savonarola.....	23
GILMAN, BRADLEY. The Ethical Element in Wit and Humor.....	488
GRANGER, FRANK. The Meaning of Experience for Science and for Religion	320
HEATH, CARL. Crime and Social Responsibility.....	233
HOFFMAN, FRANK SARGENT. The Right of Property.....	477
HUGHES, W. R. An Experiment in Social and Religious Education—The Alpha Union.....	362
HUSBAND, MARY GILLILAND. Women as Citizens.....	466
MACGREGOR, D. H. Some Ethical Aspects of Industrialism.....	284
MACKENZIE, J. S. Moral Education, The Task of the Teacher.....	399
MACKENZIE, J. S. The Late Dr. Edward Caird.....	155
MACKENZIE, MILLICENT. Moral Education: The Training of the Teacher	419
SADLER, M. E. The International Congress on Moral Education.....	158
SALTER, WILLIAM MACKINTIRE. A New Type of Naturalism—Montgomery	90
SCHROEDER, H. H. Self-Esteem and the Love of Recognition as Sources of Conduct	172
SPENCER, ANNA GARLIN. Problems of Marriage and Divorce.....	443
STAWELL, F. MELIAN. The Modern Conception of Justice.....	44
STEWART, HERBERT L. Some Criticisms of the Nietzsche Revival....	427
SUPER, CHARLES W. Ethics and Law.....	75
THILLY, FRANK. Friedrich Paulsen's Ethical Work and Influence....	141
URBAN, WILBUR M. The Will to Make-Believe.....	212
WILDE, NORMAN. The Meaning of Evolution in Ethics.....	265

Digitized by Google

REVIEWS.

PAGE.

ADAMS, JOHN. *Moral Instruction and Training in Schools*, by M. E. Sadler 239
AINSWORTH, A. R. *The Will to Doubt*, by Alfred H. Lloyd..... 259
BARKER, ERNEST. *The Schools of Hellas*, by Kenneth J. Freeman.... 243
BERTAUD, ALFRED. *Anti-Pragmatisme*, by Albert Schinz..... 394
BIRCHENOUGH, C. *Suggestion in Education*, by M. W. Keatinge.... 518
COHEN, MORRIS R. *The Concept of Philosophy*, by Alexander Thomas Ormond 385
COLE, PERCIVAL R. *The Concepts of Equality in the Writings of Rousseau, Bentham and Kant*, by Alfred Tuttle Williams..... 254
EASTWOOD, M. LIGHTFOOT. *The Town Child*, by Reginald R. Bray.... 256
EASTWOOD, M. LIGHTFOOT. *The Science and Philosophy of the Organism*, by Hans Driesch..... 383
GRANGER, FRANK. *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, by William McDougall 512
HUSBAND, MARY GILLILAND. *Woman, Her Position and Influence in Ancient Greece and Rome, and Among the Early Christians*, by James Donaldson 241
HUSBAND, MARY GILLILAND. *Cours de Morale Théorique et Pratique*, par L. Dugas..... 371
HUSBAND, MARY GILLILAND. *National and Social Problems*, by Frederic Harrison 504
HUSBAND, MARY GILLILAND. *Realities and Ideals*, by Frederic Harrison 504
LEUBA, JAMES H. *The Precinct of Religion in the Culture of Humanity*, by Charles Gray Shaw..... 250
LILLEY, A. L. *The Key to the World's Progress*, by C. S. Devas..... 126
LINDSAY, JAMES. *Die Ethik Pascals*, by Karl Bornhausen..... 135
LINDSAY, JAMES. *The Brahmans, Theists and Muslims of India*, by J. C. Oman 138
LINDSAY, JAMES. *Man and His Future*, by William Sedgwick..... 258
MOORE, G. E. *Ethische Grundfragen*, von Gustav Störring..... 108
MOORE, G. E. *Philosophie der Werte*, von Hugo Münsterberg..... 495
MUZZEY, DAVID SAVILLE. *The Philosophy of Loyalty*, by Josiah Royce 509
NEWLAND, H. OSMAN. *Population and Progress*, by Montague Crackanthorpe 137
NEWLAND, H. OSMAN. *Mother Earth: A Proposal for Permanent Reconstruction of Our Country Life*, by Montague Fordham..... 260
PHILLIPS, DAVID. *The Philosophical Basis of Religion*, by John Watson 248
PHILLIPS, DAVID. *The Problem of Theism, and Other Essays*, by A. C. Pigou 510
PRICE, L. L. *The Problem of the Unemployed*, by John A. Hobson.. 132
RANKIN, G. C. *International Arbitration as a Substitute for War Between Nations*, by Russell Lowell Jones..... 516

Digitized by Google

PAGE.
SPRAGUE, LESLIE WILLIS. *Sin and Society*, by E. A. Ross..... 136
STAWELL, F. MELIAN. *Types of Tragic Drama*, by C. E. Vaughan.. 389
THILLY, FRANK. *Die Kultur der Gegenwart*, von W. Dilthey, A. Riehl, W. Wundt, W. Ostwald, H. Ebbinghaus, R. Eucken, Fr. Paulsen, W. Muench, Th. Lipps..... 118
WATERLOW, S. *The Philosophy of Common Sense*, by Frederic Harrison 130
WATERLOW, S. *Die Kunst der Rechtsanwendung*, von Lorenz Brütt.. 252
WATERLOW, S. *Memorials of Thomas Davidson*, by William Knight.. 390
WATERLOW, S. *Decadence: Henry Sidgwick Memorial Lecture*, by A. J. Balfour 393
WHITTAKER, T. *Entwicklungswerttheorie, Entwicklungsökonomie, Menschenökonomie*, von Rudolf Goldscheid..... 380
WHITTAKER, T. *New Worlds for Old*, by H. G. Wells..... 245
WODEHOUSE, HELEN. *Attention*, by W. B. Pillsbury..... 251
WODEHOUSE, HELEN. *Social Psychology: An Outline and Source Book*, by E. A. Ross..... 378

LIST OF AUTHORS REVIEWED.

BRÜTT, LORENZ..... 252
CRACKANTHORPE, MONTAGUE..... 137
BALFOUR, A. J..... 393
BORNHAUSEN, KARL..... 135
BRAY, REGINALD, A..... 256
DEVAS, C. S..... 126
DILTHEY, W..... 118
DONALDSON, JAMES..... 241
DRIESCH, HANS..... 383
DUGAS, L..... 371
EBBINGHAUS, H..... 118
EUCKEN, R..... 118
FORDHAM, MONTAGUE..... 269
FREEMAN, KENNETH J..... 243
GOLDSCHEID, RUDOLPH..... 380
HOBSON, JOHN A..... 132
HARRISON, FREDERIC..... 130, 504
JONES, RUSSELL LOWELL..... 516
KEATINGE, M. W..... 518
KNIGHT, WILLIAM..... 390
LIPPS, TH..... 118
LLOYD, ALFRED H..... 259
MCDOUGALL, WILLIAM..... 512
MUENCH, W..... 118
MÜNSTERBERG, HUGO..... 495
OMAN, J. C..... 138
ORMOND, ALEXANDER THOMAS..... 385
OSTWALD, W..... 118

Digitized by Google

PAGE.
PAULSEN, FR. 118
PIGOU, A. C. 510
PILLSBURY, W. B. 251
RIEHL, A. 118
ROSS, E. A. 136, 378
ROYCE, JOSIAH 509
SADLER, M. E. 239
SCHINZ, ALBERT 394
SEDGWICK, WILLIAM 258
SHAW, CHARLES GRAY 250
STÖRRING, DR. GUSTAV 108
VAUGHAN, C. E. 389
WATSON, JOHN 248
WELLS, H. G. 245
WILLIAMS, ALFRED TUTTLE 254
WUNDT, W. 118

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THE INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL OF ETHICS

OCTOBER, 1908.

THE MORALS OF AN IMMORALIST—FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE.[1]

ALFRED W. BENN.

I.

GERMANY, so rich in every other kind of philosophical literature, has not contributed much to ethical thought. Innumerable *Sittenlehren* have doubtless flowed from the laborious pens of her professors; and her great writers have given utterance to many casual thoughts on the problems of good and evil, virtue and vice. But with the single exception of Kant's categorical imperative she has produced nothing that the world in general has accepted as comparable to the achievements in the same field of Greece, Rome and Britain. Fichte and Schopenhauer come next to Kant for interest and value. They cannot, however, be said to have produced much impression outside Germany; and their morality is, or at least claims to be, so closely bound up with their metaphysics as inevitably to suffer by detach-

[1] The following was written before I had the advantage of reading the articles by Mr. Pigou and Miss Atkinson in the April (1908) number of this JOURNAL, of which one deals entirely and the other partially with Nietzsche's ethics. Both writers approach the subject from a point of view somewhat different from mine, and their interpretation of Nietzsche seems to me rather too favorable. But that there should be so much general agreement between three critics working on independent lines seems to me on the whole a rather satisfactory result.

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ment from their illusive interpretations of existence. And even Kant really did no more than emphasize and precisionize the idea of moral obligation, utterly failing in his subsequent attempt to fill up the blank form with a specific sum of moral prescriptions.

This speculative weakness, assuming it to exist, is not easy to explain. It certainly is not connected with any admitted deficiency on the practical side. The Germans yield to no other great nation in moral seriousness and dutifulness; such triumphs as they have achieved in war and peace would have been impossible to a selfish, a frivolous or a self-indulgent race. Nor has the disposition to theorize on what they do ever been lacking among them; if anything it is present to excess. And in fact what one misses is not ethical theorizing but originality and life in the theories.

It may be that the extreme liberty of theological speculation in Germany, combined with the want of political liberty, accounts for this anomaly, as the reverse conditions account for the extraordinary development of ethical thought in the schools of Athens and in Great Britain. For at Athens always, as among ourselves until quite recently, the popular religion perverted metaphysics into an abstract mythology, while the popular respect for personal liberty gave free play to real or ideal reconstructions of life. Plato is nearly as cautious as Mill when he touches on the ultimate realities of nature; Mill is nearly as bold as Plato when he sets up ultimate standards of conduct. Whatever freedom of thinking for ourselves in cosmic science we possess is due to Germany. Whatever freedom of social action the Germans possess they owe to us. Their *Frauenbewegung* is there to prove it.

Within our own memory Germany has for the first time produced a truly ethical genius, a thinker with whom problems of conduct constituted from beginning to end the supreme if not the sole interest of life. It may seem strange that I should say so much of the dæmonic and

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tragic figure whose name stands at the head of this study. For Friedrich Nietzsche habitually posed as an immoralist, an emancipator from moral restrictions, speaking of what he called "moralin" as a deadly poison. Nietzsche's friends, however, a most respectable set of people, were not in the least appalled by such language, nor need we take it in very deadly earnest. They saw in it no more than a strong way of saying that much of what passes for absolutely right and good is only true within certain very narrow limitations, and that there are impulses, supposed to be very virtuous, which tend on the whole to do mankind more harm than good.

In giving this paradoxical form to his morality Nietzsche was merely following the constant tradition of German philosophy. We are accustomed, and for that matter his own countrymen are accustomed, to look on Hegel as a quite exceptional instance of what may be done in the way of setting common sense at defiance. But Hegel, with his immanent dialectic of self-contradictory positions, only brought to a point what had been more or less the method of all his predecessors, and was destined to be the method of his chief successors also. Kant naïvely supposed that he was dissipating Hume's skepticism by an audacity of negation before which Hume would have shrunk back appalled; and, not content with that performance, he proceeded to integrate Free Will with a system which literally, to all appearances, left Determinism master of the field. Fichte, after reducing the non-ego—that is, the whole objective world—to an assumption of the ego, sets the ego the task of negating its own negation, which is at the same time the condition of its existence, with the comfortable assurance that a consummation which would be fatal to both parties needs all eternity for its achievement. More impatient than his master, Schelling boldly identifies the two under the names of object and subject, and the world goes on as before—indeed, according to him, always has gone on precisely because it always knew that there was no dif-

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ference between them. Schopenhauer, after disdainfully rejecting the systems of his fellow-metaphysicists as so many absurdities, sets up a new absolute which, after willing itself out of nonentity into existence, learns from sad experience the desirability of willing itself back from existence into nonentity. And to this contradiction, which lies at the very basis of his system, he adds another not less serious contradiction in working out its details. While asserting the substantial identity of all our individual wills with one another and with the universal will of which they are so many partial manifestations, he yet limits the self-negating power of each will to itself. On entering into Nirvâna I redeem myself alone; the infinite anguish of the world goes on as before. Yet at the same time the short cut of suicide is barred to me by the solemn warning that self-inflicted death amounts to a rebellious reaffirmation of the will which it seems to deny.

This immanent self-contradiction of German thought, although it first became open and scandalous in Kant's criticism, is older than Kant. To go no further back, it already afflicts the monadology of Leibniz. Those minute individual existences of which the world consists have no windows opening on the world, nor do they receive influences of any kind from one another, but all go on developing at the same pace, each by virtue of an evolutionary principle peculiar to itself. Thus, although every monad reflects the universe at an angle of its own, it has no reason to believe that this phantasmagoria represents an objective reality, for its whole experience would be the same supposing no such reality to be present; and although, by the hypothesis, solipsism is not true, there seems to be no evidence of its untruth.

It appears then that a German moral philosophy, to be thoroughly native and smacking of the soil, must at once affirm and deny morality. We shall therefore not be surprised to find that Nietzsche, while offering a brilliant exception to the rule that his country does not breed pure moralists, confirms the rule that her philosophies willingly

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assume the form of a square circle—that bold construction which Professor Meinong, no doubt on the strength of long experience, has recently declared to be quite conceivable.

Furthermore it is necessary, or at least traditional, that a German philosopher, to be original, should not only end by contradicting himself, but that he should begin by contradicting another German, preferentially his own master. And we shall find that the author of *Zarathustra* was quite up to the mark in this respect also. The teacher to whose school he first belonged, and who afterwards became the chief object of his attacks, was Schopenhauer. Nietzsche was twenty years of age and a university student when, in 1865, he first came across the great pessimist's writings, at that time only in the first dawn of their popularity. What chiefly attracted him seems to have been their high literary merit and the sincerity of their author, a sincerity displayed above all in his attitude toward theology. Schopenhauer really stood no farther from the central beliefs of Christianity than Hegel, if as far; but he never bowed down in the temple of Rimmon to the extent of passing himself off as an orthodox Lutheran or other churchman of any kind. He venerated the figure of Christ; but there could be no doubt that his metaphysics excluded the notion of a God and of a future life just as much as they excluded the possibility of a happy life. And that was why the bankruptcy of Hegelianism, after 1848, left the system of Kant's rival continuator in a position no better than before. For to the pietistic and obscurantist reaction that succeeded the abortive revolution, free thought was as hateful under the form of pessimism as under the form of optimistic pantheism. We are apt to look on Germany as the great emancipator from superstition; but in this instance, as in the early eighteenth century, she seems to have been led out of darkness by light from the West, by the influence of Buckle and Darwin, and by Renan's *Vie de Jésus,* followed up as this was by Strauss's second

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Leben Jesu. At any rate a far more liberal tone prevailed in the sixties than in the previous decade; and Schopenhauer's philosophy profited by the new spirit, which it also stimulated in the highest degree, to achieve a rapid and dazzling success.

Nietzsche was the son of a Protestant pastor, and belonged also on his mother's side to a clerical family. Brought up on strict religious principles, he had learned to set a particular value on veracity, regarding it rather oddly as a specially Christian virtue, whereas, in theory at least, it is more Greek than Christian. He also was, or believed himself to be, descended from a noble Polish family exiled on account of their religion early in the eighteenth century; so that in his case the obligation of fidelity to truth was heightened by the consciousness of representing an aristocratic and martyr tradition. Finally, Nietzsche had chosen classical philology for his profession, and obtained a chair at Basel when still under twenty-four, so that for some years afterwards his life was chiefly devoted to the study of Greek literature and philosophy. Now while giving, as I have said, more credit to Christianity than it deserves as a discipline in truthfulness, he still acknowledges that "the Greeks had the faithfulness and the veracity of children" (*WW.*, IX, p. 104; written in 1871).[2]

At a much later period our immoralist loved to maintain that the sincerity which, as a religious habit, revolts against the profession of a false religion is, as a moral habit, destructive of the morality which is no more than a convention. And he also maintained, in contemptuous reference to George Eliot, that to believe in Christian morality apart from Christianity is a weak inconsistency (*WW.*, VIII, p. 120). It was both ungracious and unjust to taunt our great ethical moralist with being characteristically English or womanish in this respect; for

[2] In the references *WW.*=Nietzsche's *Werke,* Leipzig, 1895, 1904, large 8vo ed.; *W. z. M.*=*Wille zur Macht,* Leipzig, 1901, small 8vo ed.; *Leben* =*Das Leben Fr. Nietzsches,* von Elizabeth Förster-Nietzsche.

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Schopenhauer, who was continental and virile, had made the same mistake, if mistake it is, and Nietzsche had at first followed his master's example. Accepting pessimism to this extent that the search for happiness must be abandoned as a chimera, in his work on the *Origin of Tragedy* (published 1872), he tells us that a chief note of tragic culture is "an attempt to make the sufferings of the world our own by an effort of sympathetic love" (*WW.*, I, p. 128). Greek tragedy preaches a gospel of universal harmony whereby everyone feels himself not merely united, fused and reconciled, but absolutely one with his neighbor (*Ib.*, p. 24). And in a subsequent work on the *Study of History,* among the redeeming representatives of humanity, he names not only those who have passed through existence in pride and strength, or in profound meditation, but also those who have come "to pity and help" (*Ib.*, p. 297). Later again he tells us that "there is not enough goodness and love in the world to let them be wasted on imaginary objects" (*Menschliches, Allzumenschliches,* p. 129; *WW.*, II, p. 133). And he had previously made the perfectly sane and sufficiently obvious remark that goodness and pity fortunately do not depend on the decay and growth of religion; although "*practical* morality will suffer by its collapse." At the same time this dependence of action on religious sanctions deprives it, in his opinion, of all ethical value (*WW.*, X, p. 214).

Returning to Schopenhauer, it is noticeable that Nietzsche accepted his teaching not only on the ethical but also on the metaphysical side. His work on the *Origin of Tragedy* is a bold attempt to read the philosophy of pessimism into the Greek tragic drama. It arose, according to him, from a combination of the worship of Dionysus with the worship of Apollo. The one god represents the element of Will and the other the element of Representation in his master's great work. Dionysus stands for "that original and eternal pain which is the sole substance of the world," "the true reality and

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primordial one with its eternal suffering and self-contradiction, seeking for deliverance by the creation of beautiful appearance—the Apolline element of Greek tragedy" (*WW.*, I, pp. 34 and 35).

Schopenhauer had conceived music as a direct interpretation of that suffering Will which is the true substance of the world, whereas the other arts have for their material the series of Platonic Ideas, the forms and forces of nature which are one degree farther removed from its absolute reality. And Nietzsche conceives Greek tragedy as having originated from music precisely because it furnishes such an artistic revelation of the awful secret at the heart of things. Now Richard Wagner had long before him enthusiastically adopted a theory so flattering to his own art; and, partly, no doubt, on the strength of their philosophical agreement, he and the young professor of philology at Basel had become fast friends, the two frequently spending their week-ends together at the house of the great composer near Lucerne. Indeed, Wagner is so glorified as a modern Æschylus in the *Origin of Tragedy,* that, rather to its author's annoyance, the general public regarded that work chiefly as a rapturous panegyric on the Music of the Future.

As an interpretation of Greek art the *Origin of Tragedy* has no value, and was very properly denounced by one destined to become in after years the foremost Hellenist of his age, Wilamowitz-Möllendorff. With regard to Wagner no more need be said than that Nietzsche soon came to form a very different opinion of his performances, giving music a much lower place among the means of culture, and a much lower place among musicians to that particular composer. But in a general way Wagner's influence proved of decisive importance for his philosophical development. Combined with the study of Schopenhauer and of the Greeks, it led him to conceive the promotion of genius as the highest form of moral effort. This, as we shall see, was by no means identical with the theory of the superman, although it led the way

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to that theory; nor was it at first inconsistent either with pessimism or with the common morality. Assuming that the contemplation of beautiful and sublime objects is the chief if not the sole refreshment available in a world of universal and incurable misery, the power of creating beauty is a valuable asset for humanity, and ought by every means to be encouraged.

Unfortunately what we may call the moral end of genius has, so far, been very imperfectly fulfilled. "Artists undoubtedly create their works for the benefit of other men; and yet none will ever understand and love their works as they did." It would have been a better arrangement had the relation been reversed, so that the effect should far exceed the cause (*WW.*, I, p. 467 *seq.*). Such blunders are, however, to be expected. "Nature always wills the common good, but is incapable of choosing the best means for that purpose. She shoots philosophers like arrows at the human race in the hope that they will strike and stick somewhere"—whereas they are mostly wasted *(Ib.)*.

Nature then must be taught better, she must receive a more intelligent direction; and here morality comes in with effect, but not quite according to the highest ideals now prevalent. "The goal of human endeavor has hitherto been sought in the happiness of all men or of the majority, or in the development of great communities; and under this false persuasion people will be found ready enough to give their lives for the state; whereas they would hesitate to make the sacrifice were it demanded not by the state but by an individual. As if value and significance were to be determined by counting heads!" A much mistaken view, thinks our author, with the old bias of a university teacher. "Humanity must be ever working at the production of great individuals: that and nothing else is its task, . . . a consideration suggested by every species of animal and plant" (*Ib.*, p. 442). In our case education must supplement nature. "Young men should be taught to compensate for their own im-

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perfection and failure by contributing to the development of something higher and more human than themselves'' (*Ib.*). But the hope thus awakened soon droops. ''It is hard to produce such a state of mind, for love alone can inspire the consciousness of one's own imperfection; and love cannot be taught'' (444). Indeed, things are tending in a directly opposite direction. Writing in 1874, Nietzsche tells us that ''the world was never more worldly, never poorer in love and goodness'' (*WW.*, p. 388). A common view is to value culture as a means for procuring its possessor the greatest possible amount of earthly happiness (447). Or again, the selfishness of the state demands that all culture shall be made instrumental to its service and aggrandizement. Christianity, in particular, which began as one of the purest expressions of the impulse toward culture, has ''been diverted from the production of saints into a means for the manufacture of useful citizens'' (448). Science offers no help; it is ''cold, dry, loveless; it ignores the deep sense of dissatisfaction and longing'' (453). And ''such is the hatred for originality now prevailing that Socrates could not have lived among us, or at least not lived to seventy'' (462).

It will be seen from the above extracts that, up to the age of thirty at least, Nietzsche still accepted those altruistic ideals which in later life he was never weary of denouncing. In this respect he followed Schopenhauer, who contrived to combine the most absolute disinterestedness in theory with the most absolute selfishness in practice. A really consistent pessimism would remain neutral as between egoism and altruism, since the furtherance of life is of equally little value to myself and to others. But Nietzsche had never been a pessimist in the complete or Hindoo sense of cultivating the will not to live, regarding such an aspiration as self-contradictory, or at least unthinkable. And apart from logic his personal experiences were such as to disgust him with the master's ideal of pleasure as what alone makes life worth living.

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While still a student at Leipzig the Prussian military law obliged him to serve for a time in the artillery. His career as a gunner did not last long, for a rupture of the thoracic muscles, caused by the attempt to mount a restive horse, resulted in an illness that incapacitated him from continued service in the ranks; and a short attendance with the ambulance corps before Metz in 1870 had a still more ruinous effect on his constitution. But even so much of a soldier's life, chiming in well with the aristocratic and fighting instincts of his Polish blood, gave the young professor a new idea of the possible value of life. If existence yielded no happiness it still afforded the joy of victoriously resisting the assaults of pain; and from that heroic conflict, continued in after years through intense agonies of suffering, he came forth an optimist, continuing in his faith to the end.

Hellenic studies no doubt contributed to his conversion. In his first work, when still under the influence of Wagner and Schopenhauer, Nietzsche had falsely interpreted Greek tragedy as a pessimistic manifesto, and by a strangely perverted reading of literary history, he had ascribed its dissolution to the opposite teaching of Socrates and Euripides. We have already come across a passage indicating a much more favorable view of Socrates; and in another passage written about 1877 a good time is looked forward to when Xenophon's *Memorabilia* will be substituted for the Bible as a manual of rational morality (*WW.*, III, p. 248). Earlier still the age had been referred for its models to the old Greek world, "so great, so natural and so human" (*WW.*, I, p. 352). "It was through the higher power of their moral nature that the Greeks were victorious over all other civilization" (*Ib.* 384).

Familiarity with Hellenic ideals inevitably drew our philosopher away from Richard Wagner's romanticist views of art and life. The breach between them began at the Bayreuth festival of 1876, when some traits of petty vanity and selfishness in the master's character

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first became painfully apparent to his young admirer. What made it irremediable was a question of morality and religion. Up to 1874 Wagner had been a declared and uncompromising atheist. During the last years of his life he developed a sort of mystical Christianity in which the ideas of a human fall and recovery through atonement played the most conspicuous part. His opera *Parsifal* was intended to illustrate the new departure, and the plans for its composition formed the subject of frequent conversations between himself and a group of friends at Sorrento in the autumn of 1876. Nietzsche, who was one of these, listened with dismay and disgust to what he considered an insincere betrayal of the convictions they had once held in common (*Leben,* II, p. 857), all the more offensive because it was symptomatic of a general pietistic reaction set up by the higher classes in Germany, with a view both to consolidating the new empire and resisting the spread of socialism.

Wagner's apostasy seems to have had the effect of driving Nietzsche into an attitude of more open hostility toward Christianity, and, indeed, toward all theism. Since religion could exercise such a fatal effect on the intellectual integrity of genius it was not only false but dangerous, and ought to be destroyed. His next work, *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches* ("So Very Human"), appeared in 1878, the centenary of Voltaire's death, and is dedicated to his memory. It consists of loose critical notes couched in the aphoristic form which the writer afterwards came to handle with such supreme mastery, and which alone suited his disconnected and irresponsible mode of thinking. The general trend of reflection offers a series of striking contrasts to the writer's earlier points of view; although an attentive consideration shows that the transition was already being silently prepared toward the close of the first period. In dealing with so very personal a writer we shall best understand the evolution of his ideas by constant reference to the events of his life.

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It will be remembered that in embracing pessimism our moralist had also embraced the ethical ideal of universal benevolence associated with it by Schopenhauer and the Hindoos; and how, under the concurrent influence of Wagner and the Greeks, he had sought to concentrate the passion for disinterested self-devotion on the systematic culture of genius. Unfortunately the only two great men that he recognized as such in recent history had both proved false guides, and this seems in the first instance to have made him distrust genius as a social danger. Its worship, he remarks, is a survival of the adoration formerly given to gods, and to kings as their representatives. "The elevation of individuals into superhuman beings encourages the idea that large sections of the people are baser and more barbarous than they really are" (*WW.*, II, p. 340). Genius even "acts as an enemy of truth by keeping up an intense ardor of conviction and discouraging the cautious and modest tone of science" (*Ib.*, p. 411); while "never to have changed one's opinions is the sign of having remained in a belated stage of culture" (*Ib.*, p. 407).

As a consequence of the new departure science, so lately denounced for its coldness and dryness, now takes the place of art as the leading means of culture. Before the breach with Wagner signs of a growing preference for pure knowledge had not been wanting. We had been told in a truly positivist spirit that "the proper question for philosophy is to determine how far things are unalterable; that the task of improving them, in so far as they can be improved, may then be fearlessly undertaken" (*WW.*, I, p. 514). The note of moral enthusiasm will not be overlooked. It had already been associated with a higher standard of intellectualism in the reminder that "the most fearful sufferings have been brought on mankind by the impulse to be just without judgment; so that nothing is more requisite for the general welfare than the widest possible dissemination of judgment" (*Ib.*, p. 329).

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Wagner was intensely German, intensely anti-French; and Nietzsche when he wrote about the origin of tragedy shared his patriotic views. He then looked forward to "the regeneration of the German soul by the elimination of every Latin element under the external stimulus of the last war, and inwardly by the example of Luther together with all our great poets and artists" (*Ib.*, pp. 164, 165). His expectations were not fulfilled; at any rate Germany was not regenerated, but the contrary; and it is remarkable that on looking back in 1878 to the period after the war, what most offended him was the moral corruption of his countrymen. Their notions of right and wrong were unsettled; their rage for luxury and enjoyment knew no bounds; their sensuality was disgusting; nearly every German became a degree more dishonest, sycophantic, avaricious and frivolous (*WW.*, XI, pp. 94, 95). A general lowering of intellectual standards is also complained of, but this is only another sympton of moral decay. With Wagner the last hope failed, and he turned to foreign countries, especially to England and France, for what Germany could not supply.

In the writings of the second period the references to England are particularly complimentary. She is "now [1877-1878] unmistakably ahead of all other nations in philosophy, natural science, history, discoveries and the spread of culture." This is due to the strength of individual character, resulting from a long national inheritance, enjoyed by her great men of science, and from their independence of learned associations (*WW.*, XI, p. 68). Furthermore "we must allow English writers the credit of having made admirable contributions toward an ideal scientific literature for the people. *Their* handbooks are the work of their most distinguished scholars —men of whole-minded, rich and generous natures" (*WW.*, III, p. 102). Nor is it only among men of learning that this strength of character is exhibited. "English artisans work hard at their trade not merely for profit but for power, and not merely for power but for

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the utmost freedom and individual distinction" (*WW.*, II, p. 359). Schopenhauer is now praised for the appreciation of hard facts and the determination to be clear and reasonable that often make him seem so English and so little of a German (*WW.*, V, p. 130).

Everything written at this time bears what on the Continent is called a positivist impress. Nietzsche does not seem to have read Comte, but he refers admiringly to him as "that great, honest Frenchman with whom no German or English thinker can compare for comprehension and mastery of the exact sciences," while totally rejecting the religious and constructive element of his teaching (*WW.*, IV, pp. 348, 349). For himself our philosopher professes to know little about the results of science; "but that little has been inexhaustibly serviceable in clearing up obscurities and abolishing former modes of thought and action" (*WW.*, XI, p. 402). As the quintessence of our positive knowledge three propositions are stated: (1) There is no God; (2) there is no moral world, *i. e.*, no retribution for good or evil conduct; (3) good and evil are determined by the ideals and directions of life, the best part of these being inherited, but with a possibility that the resulting judgments may be falsified by the demands of our actual ideal (*Ib.*, p. 334). With the disappearance of theism pessimism ceases to have any meaning. The world is neither good nor bad; such notions apply only to human beings, and in their ordinary acceptation cannot rightly be applied even to these (*WW.*, II, p. 46). For "free will is an illusion" (*Ib.*, p. 36), "that intelligible freedom" under cover of which Schopenhauer sought to rehabilitate moral responsibility is a fable (63), and "the thing in itself" an illegitimate inference from phenomena (31 *seq.*). In fact, Schopenhauer's metaphysics was simply a revival of medieval Christianity due to want of scientific knowledge (44).

At first the new ardor for destructive criticism extends to morality, which we are told in so many words

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is annihilated together with religion by our way of looking at things (*WW.*, II, p. 52). But the reason given is merely that science can admit no motives except pleasure and pain, usefulness and injury (*Ib.*). Such an arbitrary restriction seems itself to be a survival of theology; and in fact it is traceable to the French freethinking literature of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which Nietzsche was now studying with delight. He observes, truly enough, that "in the metaphysical sense there are no sins, but also no virtues" (*Ib.*, p. 77), without remembering that metaphysical values have been abolished. His aphoristic method had the advantage of making composition easy for himself and fruitful of easy reading for others, but combined with the passion of the higher German intellect for self-contradiction it involves him in hopeless confusions of thought.

In accordance with this mental habit the destructive criticism of morality is interspersed with appeals to moral motives and standards, or is even carried on with their aid. As a conclusive argument against unselfishness we are told that "to be always acting for others is almost as mischievous as to act against them: it is a forcible intrusion on their sphere of action. . . . Not to think of others, but always to be acting most strictly for one's self, is a high sort of morality. The world is imperfect because so much is done for others" (*WW.*, XI, pp. 310, 311). An ex-artilleryman might have remembered that the way to hit a distant mark is not to aim straight at it. A false and fussy altruism is not the alternative to taking exclusive care of number one. "Love mankind! But I say, rejoice in mankind, and therefore help to produce the sort of people in whom we can rejoice! The right morality is to seek out and encourage those who delight us, and to fly from the others. Let the wretched, the misshapen and the degenerate die out. They should not be kept alive at any price" (*Ib.*, pp. 313, 314). Our fastidious friend must have come across many unlovely sights when serving in the ambulance

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corps before Metz; we may assume that they did not impress him as a reason for shirking his duty. It may be said that wounded soldiers are frequently strong, healthy men, capable of returning to their work after proper treatment. But the same is true of many patients in our civil hospitals whose services would be lost to the community but for modern philanthropy. No hard and fast line can be drawn between such cases and the case of those whose continued existence is altogether undesirable. What we know is that the passion of pity on the whole subserves race-interests, and that it cannot be kept up at full strength unless, as with other passions, there is enough to overflow and go to waste. It is a question whether Nietzsche himself was not a degenerate; it is certain that he had to give up his work as a professor owing to ill health in a few years; and that his literary work could hardly have been continued without the help of a small retiring pension from the university. Let me add that he had been a singularly devoted teacher, among other things gratuitously preparing students "from the interior of Switzerland" for their examinations in philosophy. In private life his character was gentle, kind and sympathetic—to a greater extent, indeed, than he personally would have liked it to be—and his attacks on altruism were perhaps inspired by a consciousness of the injury it had done his health. We may also attribute to his unfortunate personal experiences the prophecy that hygienics will be a prime interest in the society of the future (*WW.*, XI, p. 69).

Throughout the second, or scientific period, morality continues a paramount preoccupation. There is no antithesis between increase of knowledge and increase of human welfare; on the contrary they are mutually subservient. Faith in the supreme utility of science and of its possessors should take the place of faith in mere numbers (*WW.*, III, p. 155). But the observations out of which science is built are themselves conditioned by sincerity and rectitude. "Even in the region of sense-per-

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ception there are none but moral experiences" (*WW.*, V, p. 155). "The history of science exhibits the victory of noble impulses; there is much morality mixed up with its pursuit" (*WW.*, XI, p. 204). "It is a mistake to estimate philosophers as artists, leaving out of sight their justice and self-control" (*Ib.*, p. 408). "Unfortunately we shall never know the best thing about genius, the self-control and self-discipline exercised in bringing its powers into play" (*WW.*, IV, p. 357). "Hurrah for physical science, for the discovery of the laws and necessities of nature; and a double hurrah for the honesty that forces us to study it!" (*WW.*, V, p. 258.)

As may be gathered from some of the passages just quoted, general utility is the end of moral action. But morality need not therefore be impersonal. On the contrary we best serve our true advantage by moral action (*WW.*, II, p. 96). Benevolence and beneficence make up the good man—but they should begin with himself (*WW.*, IV, p. 336). The greatest wonders of antique morality, Epictetus for instance, knew nothing about that altruism which is so fashionable nowadays (*Ib.*, p. 133). Nietzsche as a professional Hellenist was fascinated by Greek ethics, and the influence of its masters is shown in more than one reference. Epicurus counts among the greatest of men (*WW.*, III, p. 355); we have not advanced beyond him, but his dominion has been infinitely extended (*WW.*, XI, p. 168). Aristotle is not named; but we find his doctrine of moral habit passionately reasserted as against Luther's doctrine of justification by faith (*WW.*, IV, p. 30). And it is made a charge against our system of classical education that we are exercised in no single antique virtue as the ancients were exercised in it (*WW.*, IV, p. 187). As the consolations of Christianity evaporate the consolations of ancient philosophy are revived in new splendor (*WW.*, XI, p. 168).

Ours is, indeed, an age of comparison and selection, an age which, discarding all provincialism in conduct as in

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art, bids us look round among the historic civilizations with a view to constructing a higher morality from the forms and habits offered to our choice (*WW.*, II, p. 41). Now it is precisely the adherence to an unreasoned tradition that mankind have generally regarded as the distinctive note of morality; so that when Nietzsche first called himself an immoralist, what he meant to emphasize was his defiance of tradition as such, his demand for a reasonable basis of action. Such a basis is not supplied by an appeal to our moral feelings, for these are nothing better than inherited judgments. To trust them is to trust your grandmother and her grandmother rather than the gods within you, your reason and your experience (*WW.*, IV, p. 41).

All this sounds commonplace enough to a reader of Bentham and Mill; just as Descartes and Montesquieu may have sounded commonplace to the readers of Bacon and Locke. And when Nietzsche proclaimed the supremacy of England in philosophy it was probably to English ethics that he referred. Universalistic hedonism is not, I think, anywhere stated in terms, but its elements are freely scattered through his notes. There is, he tells us, no instinct of self-preservation; every action interpreted as evidence of such can be explained by the search for agreeable and the avoidance of disagreeable sensations. Speaking generally we only wish for objects because they are associated with agreeable states of feeling in ourselves (*WW.*, XI, pp. 253 and 292). Men might be estimated by the degree of happiness they are capable of experiencing or communicating (*Ib.*, p. 367). One of the charges brought against "morality" is that it has represented self-delight as offensive, self-torment as acceptable to the deity (*Ib.*, p. 263). On the other hand culture is an expression of happiness (*Ib.*, p. 316). The joy felt in absorbing new ideas should be carried so far as to outweigh all other kinds of pleasure (*Ib.*, p. 403). Noble and magnanimous natures experience some feelings of pleasure and pain so strongly that the intellect

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is either silenced or made instrumental to them (*WW.*, V, pp. 39, 40). Nor is happiness by any means so rare as pessimists would have us believe. The world abounds in good will; and the constant little everyday manifestations of this impulse, taking the form of good humor, friendliness and unaffected courtesy, contribute enormously to the happiness of life (*WW.*, II, p. 71). "It needs a life full of pain and renunciation to teach us that existence is saturated with honey" (*WW.*, XI, p. 154). In short, "there is no life without pleasure; the fight for pleasure is the fight for life" (*WW.*, II, p. 107). This view does not exclude morality, for each one is called good or evil according to the way in which he carries on the fight; and that depends on the degree and quality of his intellect (*Ib.*), a saying elucidated by the remark made elsewhere that no honey is sweeter than the honey of knowledge; so that he who has spent his life in its acquisition first discovers in old age how well he has obeyed the voice of Nature, the Nature that governs all things by pleasure (*Ib.*, p. 267).

We saw how Nietzsche at first looked on the discovery that action depended absolutely on pleasure and pain as destructive of morality. But he did not long hold to that crude interpretation of ethical science; for we find a passage belonging to the same period and much more consistent with its general tone in which he tells us that joy must exercise a healthy and reparative influence on man's moral nature, or why should the moments when we bathe in its sunshine be just those when the soul involuntarily pledges herself to be good and to become perfect (*WW.*, III, p. 166)? And as a substitute for religious exercises he proposes immediately on wakening in the morning to think how we may give pleasure to at least one human being in the course of the day (*WW.*, II, p. 385).

Assuming happiness, understood as pleasure and the absence of pain, to be desired by all and to be the only thing desirable, it would seem to follow that utilitarian-

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ism is the only rational method of ethics; and it might have been expected that Nietzsche, speculating as he did under the combined influence of Greek and English thought, would have frankly accepted its principles, preserving, of course, complete liberty with regard to the adjustment of details. What prevented him from taking that step was the pervading skeptical and negative cast of his intellect, aggravated, as in the case of Coleridge, of whom otherwise he often reminds one, by the use of deleterious drugs and by solitary habits. According to him there can be no moral law binding on all mankind unless we can prove that there is some universal end of action; and such an end does not exist. Pleasure will not supply it, for the pleasures of sensitive beings vary with the degree of their development (*WW.*, IV, pp. 102 *seq.*), and happiness is pursued by opposite paths (XI, p. 233). Oddly enough, the second of these considerations is directed by name against Spencer, than whom none would have more cordially accepted it. Soon afterwards the most complete development of individuality is proposed as an end, characteristically enough without reference to the priority of Spencer and Mill in this direction. It is true that Mill had certainly, and Spencer probably, taken his cue from Wilhelm von Humboldt; but Nietzsche never betrays any acquaintance with that thinker; and the way in which he associates his own individualism with the theory of evolution seems to place Spencer's leading beyond a doubt (*Ib.*, pp. 238 and 330).

After all, the effort to get rid of a moral law speedily results in its rehabilitation. For as a means for increasing the number of those happy accidents on which future developments depend, it is recommended that we should maintain the utmost variety of conditions under which human beings can exist (*WW.*, XI, p. 239); and this would surely necessitate a code of social justice to begin with, as Spencer pointed out long ago in *Social Statics,* and as Professor Juvalta, of Pavia, is never weary of insisting on at the present day, although his

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theory, unlike Spencer's, is penetrated with socialistic ideas.

Nietzsche himself, when he has to combat socialist demands, is not slow to quote justice as a recognized social obligation. Admitting that the present distribution of property results from innumerable acts of injustice and violence in the past, he deprecates the repetition of similar acts in modern times, setting his hopes rather on a general increase in the sense of justice and a diminution of the violent impulses all round (*WW.*, II, pp. 334 *seq.*).

As a last homage to the received morality, a note dating from the year 1880 may be mentioned, in which Napoleon is called the greatest of men, if his aim had been the good of humanity (*WW.*, XI, p. 387).

Not long after abandoning the cultivation of genius as a universal end, Nietzsche seems to have taken up and substituted for it the idea, so prominent in his last period, of breeding a superior race. Here again the Hellenic influence is prominent. In a fragment dating from 1876 the Greeks are quoted as an example of what may be done in the way of intellectual stimulation by the self-consciousness of such a race in the midst of a barbarous population (*WW.*, XI, p. 33). English science and philosophy, for which so much enthusiasm is expressed, would no doubt act powerfully in the same direction through the doctrine of evolution, which is known to have interested Nietzsche intensely at this time. In this connection much has been made of his debt to Darwin; but as he never understood the theory of natural selection, it seems more likely that the decisive influence came from Spencer, whose psychology he certainly accepted to the extent of describing knowledge as a nervous modification produced by the action of external objects on our organs of sense, without any coöperation from the mind (*Ib.*, p. 275). Now Spencer from the beginning was interested in evolution much less as an explanation of the past than as a promise of the future, as a pledge that human life might rise to a far more perfect harmony between organ-

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ism and environment than any yet attained; and on this side his philosophy would appeal strongly to Nietzsche, as also on its individualistic side, with which we have seen him to be in complete agreement. Indeed, he brings the two into direct association by asking: "Is not every individual an attempt to reach a higher species than man?" (*Ib.*, p. 238.) It is here, rather than in the youthful worship of genius, which his disgust with Wagner led him to repudiate, that we can lay our finger on the genesis of the superman.

Here we reach a second and still more decisive turning-point in the evolution of Nietzsche's ethics, the subsequent phases of which must be reserved for discussion in another and concluding paper.

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FLORENCE, ITALY.

SAVONAROLA.*

THOMAS DAVIDSON.

MORALITY is the preparation for goodness. The former is human, the latter divine. Man's moral life is conditioned by two factors: (1) his own will, and (2) the universal will, as realized in the world, subhuman and human. The aim of that life is to bring these factors into complete harmony. When this is accomplished, life is good, divine. God is good, not moral.

That such is the moral problem, and such its solution, has long been recognized. It is recognized in the Veda, in the Gâthâs, in the Tripitaka, in the Bible, in the Koran, in Æschylus, in Heraclitus, in Dante, in Tenny-

* This lecture is one of a series delivered at Philadelphia and other places by the late Thomas Davidson, on "The Leaders of Spiritual Thought in the Middle Ages," and has been given to the JOURNAL by Mr. Davidson's literary executor, Prof. Charles M. Bakewell of Yale University.

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son, and in many other leading seers. All these tell us that moral life consists in an endeavor after harmony between the individual and universal wills. But nearly every one of them conceives this harmony in a peculiar way, namely, as a complete subordination of the individual to the universal, a merging and losing of the human in the divine. "In la sua voluntade è nostra pace," says Dante. "Our wills are ours to make them thine," is the echo of Tennyson. And this is the way in which the relation has been conceived by all the religions of the past, without exception. Nay, more, this view lies at the foundation of all the metaphysical theories of all the great philosophical systems, Hindoo, Greek, medieval, German. It is expressly set forth in many legal treatises, in this form: "Man has no rights against God." It is this view that lies behind asceticism and priestcraft in religion, pantheism and panlogism in philosophy, tyranny by the grace of God in politics. The church, schools and state of the Middle Ages all represented the universal will, and called upon the individual will for complete conformity and submission.

But although this view of the relation of the two wills has been almost universally maintained in theory and institutionally embodied in practice, it has not always satisfied the aspirations of men or shaped their individual practice. On the one hand, there have always been a few minds that, holding the individual soul to be an essential moment of the universal, have vindicated its rights as over against any exclusive assertion of the latter; on the other, there have always been many who have made their own wills the law of their lives. The former we term mystics, the latter rebels against society. Widely apart as these two classes of men stand, they have this in common: they both equally rebel against the notion that the individual will must annihilate itself before the universal. It requires nothing but a union of these two tendencies—of mysticism in thought and feeling with rebellion in practice—to bring into existence

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a new and active form of piety, the piety of divine autonomy, divine individuality. And this union, which seems to be the appointed task of the Germanic nations, took place in northern Europe in the centuries from the thirteenth to the sixteenth. In the previous centuries there had been plenty of mysticism of that hysteric sort which accompanies inactive asceticism, and plenty of rebellion; but the two had never met in the same minds. Toward the year 1300, however, they did so meet, and the result was that movement which finally gave birth to the Reformation—the triumph of Germanism over Romanism. Indeed, if we look very closely at the Reformation, especially as reflected in the mind of its greatest representative and champion, we shall see that it is composed of just these two forms of individual assertion, mysticism and rebellion, or, if it be preferred, rebellion of the individual by right of his mystical essential union with the universal. That the Reformation was a rebellion against the absolute institutionalism of the Middle Ages has always been obvious and unquestionable; it is not so well known that it was due to a consciousness of the essential oneness of the universal and human wills, and to a rejection of the attitude of submissive thraldom by the latter. And yet we have only to study the history of the centuries immediately preceding to see what an important part mysticism, and particularly German mysticism, played in preparing the way for the Reformation. Eckhart and Tauler, Ruysbroek and Suso lacked only the spirit of rebellion to turn them into reformers of the first rank. Luther's mysticism and his respect for the mystics of the previous centuries are too well known to require more than a passing mention. It may be admitted, and is indeed true, that the early reformers, even the greatest of them, had no clear knowledge of what underlay their undertaking; but we need not wonder at this, since we find that in every movement whereby man rises to a higher stage in the consciousness of freedom, individuals are far more

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truly instruments than intentional agents or initiators. It is only when their principles have wrought themselves out to their logical results that the true meaning and spirit of them are apparent. Thus, it is only now, after the lapse of over three hundred years, that the underlying force of the Reformation is plainly revealing itself, as an assertion of the complete moral autonomy of the individual spirit, on the ground of its essential oneness with the divine spirit. *We too are Gods* is the motto inscribed upon the banners of the reformers, however little they were aware of the fact, and however bitterly they would have repudiated any such interpretation of their spirit. It is this motto, moreover, now for the first time becoming clearly legible, that is the key to all the movements of modern history. For this history, viewed on its inner side, has nothing else to record but the gradual and painful transition of the mind of man from a human to a divine consciousness—from an attitude of slavish submission to the universal will to one of joyful and self-respecting coöperation with it. And in estimating the importance of any character in modern history, this is the test we must apply: How far did he contribute to carry forward this transition? How far did he himself escape from the thraldom of the old and embrace the new; and how far did he enable the men of his time to do the same.

This is the test we must apply to Savonarola, the subject of this lecture, if we wish to form a true estimate of his character and work as ethical and religious influences. But before attempting this we must present to ourselves, in as clear a manner as possible, the mental and moral condition of the people among whom Savonarola was called to labor, that is, the condition of the Italians in the fifteenth century. And this involves a brief retrospect into the past. When the effete Roman Empire became the prey of the northern barbarians, the political and social relations which it had sustained were

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almost completely annihilated, and a condition of barbarism was the result. In the midst of this, the only civilizing power that remained standing was the Church. She, chiefly through the monastic orders, which had risen in answer to the needs of the time, did much to soften the temper of the barbarians, to restore strength to the exhausted Romans, and to heal the gulf between the two peoples. In this way she, naturally enough, acquired great power, and imparted a religious tone to the whole of society. Indeed, had no external enemy threatened Europe, it is not improbable that she would have fallen entirely into the hands of the Church, and the Pope have become in fact what he claimed to be, the successor of the emperor. But in the seventh century there arose beyond the limits of the Church a rival religious power, which from the first had been compelled to maintain itself by force of arms, and which had no objection to the use of these. The Church, finding her very existence threatened by this power, was compelled, after a time, to do two things: (1) in the year 800 to reëstablish the old empire as a military power; (2) from about the year 1050 onwards to give a systematic formulation to her creed as opposed to that of Islâm. Hence arose the Holy Roman Empire and scholastic theology, the former of which soon proved a counterbalancing check to the power of the Church, while the latter imparted to her creed a rigidity which almost necessarily forced her into the position of a persecutor. When, in the year 1073, Hildebrand ascended the papal throne as Gregory VII, he fully comprehended the position thus resulting for the Church, and set out with an iron will to conduct her triumphantly out of it. The nature of his purpose is easily stated. He desired (1) to impart to the Church a sense of mystic unity within itself and with God, a sense based upon clearly formulated dogma; (2) to render her, as this conscious unity, the supreme power in the world, overbearing all other institutions, and responsible only to God. In a word, he desired a

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complete theocracy, a kingdom of God, governed by a priestly hierarchy standing in such close relation to God as to have no will but His; or, to revert to the distinction made above, he desired to see the individual will harmonized with the universal through complete subordination. It was the attempt to realize this ideal that determined the main current of European history in the centuries from the eleventh to the fourteenth, and that still, to a large extent, determines the policy of the Roman Church. Anselm, Bernard, Francis, Dominic, Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventura are prominent among the heroes who gave themselves up, body and soul, to this great task, the accomplishment of which would have abolished the kingdoms of this world, and replaced them by a *Civitas Dei,* a kingdom of God. But while all this was going on, there was another and opposing influence blindly working its way to strength and consciousness. This was the sense of personal freedom, of moral autonomy, the sense that the only possible enduring relation between conscious spirits, however different in their grades of perfection, is one of coördination and not one of subordination. In truth, under the influence of the Germanic spirit, men everywhere were beginning to feel that there can be nothing higher than a self-conscious, moral personality. But as yet this feeling was embodied in no institution, no concerted movement. Rather it assumed the form of a rebellion against all institutions, an anarchic individualism, manifesting itself in strong men as tyranny, in weak men as simple lawlessness. The civil institutions, indeed, State and Empire, were often at war with the Church; but they were, equally with the latter, unfavorable to personal autonomy — that new ideal which was, and is, destined to put an end to both Church and State as the Middle Ages conceived them. How true this is was shown in a very striking way by Dante, who, though he tried to divide his allegiance equally between Church and State, and maintained the autonomy of the latter, nevertheless did his best to prove

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that it, no less than the former, represented the universal will, or, in his language, was instituted by God.

At the close of the fourteenth century there were in Europe three things claiming men's allegiance: (1) Church, (2) the Empire (or State) and (3) the new movement toward personal liberty. The first two preferred their claims on the ground of age, vested rights and divine ordination; the last, on the might of the deepest and divinest impulse in human nature. Under such circumstances it was no wonder that men frequently tried to combine these claims, and to look for the conditions of personal liberty in the Church, or in the State, or in both combined. Among the men who undertook to make this combination in practice, none is so prominent, none so clearly proved its impracticability, as Savonarola; and it is just this fact that constitutes his importance in history. What, indeed, was the aim of all his efforts? Simply this: to place the new impulse toward personal liberty, as distinct from political liberty, under the tutelage and guidance of the Church, the uncompromising champion of personal subordination. And had Savonarola been an insincere or ignorant or impractical man, his failure might have been attributed to these qualities, and the problem still regarded as soluble; but he was none of these things. He was, on the contrary, a man of the most perfect sincerity, a man of wide and deep knowledge, and a man of extraordinary practical ability. In spite of this he failed—failed because he attempted an impossibility. Let us see how he came to make the attempt and how the impossibility of the task revealed itself.

Girolamo Savonarola was born in 1452, shortly before the fall of Constantinople, of a worthy family connected with the court of Ferrara. Being of a nervous constitution, he received his education at home, a circumstance which tended to foster the naturally meditative and religious bent of his mind. At the age of twenty-two, disgusted with the moral degradation of the world about

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him, and unsuccessful in a romantic love affair, he left Ferrara and his family and entered a Dominican convent at Bologna. In a letter which he shortly afterwards wrote to his grieved parents he said: "If some temporal lord had girt me with a sword, and welcomed me among his followers, ye would have regarded it as an honor to your house, and rejoiced; yet, now that the Lord Jesus Christ has girt me with His sword, and dubbed me His knight, ye shed tears of mourning." This last clause contains one of the two keys to Savonarola's life. He is a knight of Christ, commissioned to represent Him and to fight for His cause, which is that of religion—mystic religion as embodied in the Church.

As such he has no will of his own. He is a mere passive instrument in the hands of what he conceives to be the universal will. And had the Church been what she professed to be, or what Savonarola was fain to believe her to be, his position would have been an easy, or at least a tolerable one. There would have been no conflict between his ideal and the reality in which he was compelled to live. But with whatever high hopes he may have entered the cloister, it must soon have become painfully apparent to him that even that "church within the Church" was by no means the embodiment of that divine will by which he was seeking to live, and the same thing was more obviously true with regard to the Church as a whole. It was only natural, then, that he, with his ardent spirit, should endeavor to find some other channel through which the universal will might pour itself into his and make him its instrument. Being, unlike most men of those times, a fervent reader of the Bible, and particularly of the Old Testament, and observing how the Hebrew nation, which he regarded as the foreshadow of the Church, had been restored to its divine allegiance by the voices of its prophets when it had fallen away and become iniquitous, he could not help wishing that he might be as one of these prophets, might come with the words of the Lord to recall the erring Church

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to obedience. And the wish was soon father to the thought, and the thought to the act. He soon came to believe that he had been chosen by God as a recipient of supernatural revelations to be proclaimed with threats of approaching judgment to the Church. In this he was aided by his sensitive and somewhat neurotic temperament, which imparted a delusive reality to the objects of his desires. It was just when this notion was becoming a settled conviction with him that he was forced to leave Bologna and take up his abode at the convent of St. Mark, in the powerful city of Florence, at that time governed despotically by Lorenzo de' Medici. His experiences here, both inside the cloister and without, were such as could only impel him with increased force in the direction in which he was already moving. The convent of St. Mark, instead of being, as once, the home of austere piety, meditation and charity, had, under the influence of the Medici, become a seat of pagan learning, and, to a large extent, also of pagan morals. The life of the citizens of all classes was pagan, worldly, carnal, selfish. The rich were given up to elegant luxury and lewdness; the poor to coarse amusements and debauchery. And the ringleader in all this life was Lorenzo de' Medici, who, like all tyrants, sought to make impossible that moral elevation which makes tyranny impossible.

Seeing all this, and believing in his own divine mission, Savonarola now only waited for an opportunity to come forward as an Amos or a Jeremiah, calling the people to repentance and announcing the imminent manifestation of God's wrath if this were neglected or delayed. Florence was for him Jerusalem, Lorenzo de' Medici an impious king leading the people away from God, the clergy the priests of Baal, himself the prophet of Jehovah. His earliest attempts in Florence to prove himself so seem to have been, in the main, unsuccessful. No more attention was paid to him than to any other friar, and friars at that time were not highly respected. The truth was, paganism had become the fashion in

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Florence and had found its way even into the pulpit, so that no man who preached simple Christianity in simple, unadorned language could expect to find a hearing. Thus the very channel by which the heart of the people might have been reached seemed closed against the prophet, who thereby, much disheartened, seemed inclined to retire from the field and devote himself to the interpretation of Hebrew prophecy. But now an unexpected opportunity presented itself. Being sent to attend a chapter of his order held in 1486 at Reggio, and learning on the way thither that the Pope was trying to subjugate his native Ferrara, he reached his destination in such a mood of mind that when questions of discipline came to be discussed in the meeting he poured forth his prophetic heart, like a second Jeremiah, against the desolation of his people and of the Church. His audience was paralyzed with amazement, and he was a famous man. Among his hearers on this occasion was the noble, beautiful and gifted Pico della Mirandola, who then became and ever after remained his stanch friend. On returning to Florence, Savonarola again tried to preach, but with no better success than before; and he now saw the reason why. Florence, under the influence of the Medici, had become pagan in thought, in taste and in morals, and it demanded paganism from the pulpit—demanded rhetoric, philosophic aphorism and classical eloquence. Others might supply this, Savonarola could not, and so he found but little appreciation in Florence. He was more successful in the outlying towns, where he roused considerable enthusiasm by his fierce denunciations of existing wrongs. In 1486 he was sent to preach in the cities of Lombardy, in which the pagan spirit had not taken such firm hold, and here his simple, natural Christian "prophesying" exerted a deep influence and caused his name to be known throughout Italy, so that in 1489 he was recalled to Florence by the express desire of Lorenzo de' Medici, whose attention had been called to him by Pico della Mirandola. On his way

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thither he had certain strange experiences which he took to be revelations, and which confirmed him in the belief that he was a prophet of the Lord.

Thus coming now to Florence with a certain prestige, with a natural eloquence perfected by three years' preaching and with a firm belief in his own divine mission, he felt himself prepared to attempt his great enterprise, the reformation of the Church and of society. And this he proceeded to do in two ways: (1) by writing pamphlets, in which he set forth his moving ideas; (2) by preaching against the corruptions and wrongs of his time. In both he spoke as a prophet, who, having a mission from God, needed not to regard men. And he did not regard them, whatever their power or position might be. He did not even spare the tyrant of Florence, much less his tools and minions. These, however, did not for a time feel themselves in any danger from the pulpit denunciations of a poor friar, so that when, in 1491, he was elected prior of St. Mark's, they did not offer any opposition. It was what followed upon this election that brought matters to a crisis, arraying Christianity as represented by Savonarola on one side and paganism as represented by Lorenzo on the other. And it must be admitted that this crisis was brought about by Savonarola. Lorenzo did everything he could to keep matters smooth. But Savonarola was working for the Lord, Lorenzo for himself; and however much self may try to make peace with the Lord, the Lord will never make peace with self. But although Savonarola, as representing the Lord, could make no pact with Lorenzo, as representing self, it is still doubtful whether he need have behaved so defiantly and made the breach so suddenly as he did; whether by meeting Lorenzo in a human, conciliatory spirit he might not have won him over to his side and made him see so much, if nothing more, that it was his interest to aid in a restoration of religion and morals. But here it was that Savonarola's Judaic and medieval notions stood in his way. In accordance

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with these he believed not only in a God external to the soul, as the ruler of the world, but also a devil external to it, as the conscious and persistent opponent of this God. Further, he believed that this external God, instead of being reached by the soul in its own supreme normal action, introduced his action into the soul in a sporadic, capricious and abnormal way, in the form of visions, monitions and ghostly presentiments, in such a way as to cross and nullify the best conclusions of the reason. Savonarola accordingly, instead of weighing in a calm, judicial way the circumstances in which he found himself and doing his best to deal with them in accordance with the canons of practical reason, fasted, prayed and waited for divine monitions to guide him, and when these came, as he thought they did, he followed them, often in a blind and reckless fashion. Looking upon the movement headed by Lorenzo as of the devil, and therefore as deserving of no consideration or even comprehension, he fulminated against it from his prophetic height in language suitable only for an angel addressing the inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrah. He rejected all the attentions, advances and presents of Lorenzo, and in every way showed his utter contempt of him. When Lorenzo warned and threatened him, he replied by prophesying his approaching death and bidding him put on sackcloth and ashes for his sins. And in despite of all his paganism Lorenzo was not free enough from the superstitious view of the world on which Savonarola depended for his power to defy him and carry his own threat into execution. This was shown in a very striking way when Lorenzo, fulfilling Savonarola's prophecy, died. As that crisis approached the tyrant sent for the friar and entreated him, as a messenger of God, to make peace between him and his Lord. Savonarola accepted the position and stated the Lord's terms of peace, as one might against whose dicta there was no appeal. Lorenzo refused the terms, and Savonarola left him to the eternal wrath of God, feeling, no doubt, that he

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had only done his duty. And, believing as he did, he could not well feel otherwise. For Lorenzo and all that he stood for, Savonarola could conceive nothing but damnation.

Now no one who knows the facts about Lorenzo will attempt to offer an apology for him, especially as he did not feel able to offer one for himself; nevertheless, we must keep in mind two things: (1) that the movement embodied in him, despite all its coarseness and lawlessness, did contain an important element which Savonarola was not able to appreciate, namely, the impulse toward personal autonomy; and (2) that Lorenzo showed a conciliatory spirit, which, if carefully dealt with, might have resulted in his conversion and the throwing of the weight of the Medici party in favor of Savonarola. But in order to do this it would have been necessary for the friar to alter his whole view of the relations between God and man, to abandon his prophetic pretensions, to stand as a man among men, regarding none as emissaries of the devil, and to use his entire influence, intellectual and personal, to bring all to a knowledge of the truth. But he was not equal to any of all these things.

The death of Lorenzo was soon followed by that of Pope Innocent VIII, which fulfilled another of the friar's prophecies. Both were succeeded by men worse than themselves, the former by his weak, debauched son Piero, the latter by Roderic Borgia, Alexander VI. These now represented the two influences against which Savonarola had to fight, and his position between them was a most difficult one. Deep in his nature lay an uncontrollable impulse toward that moral autonomy which the Medici so coarsely represented, and which, as so represented, he could not but abhor and combat; on the other hand, he was identified with and bound by obedience to the head of the very institution which was most bitterly opposed to such autonomy. He was, indeed, trying to serve two masters, and, of course, soon found that he could serve neither. In the interests of liberty he fought

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against the champions of liberty, trying to bring them into moral servitude, while at the same time he was at war with those who sought to impose such servitude. Indeed, the whole conflict lay in his own bosom, and as he could not settle it there he waited for forces from without to settle it. He was, indeed, in miniature, what Italy was for more than a thousand years. Had he been able, like Luther, to throw off the authority of the Pope altogether and to cast in his lot with the freedomward movement, doing his best to impart to it his own lofty moral and religious consecration, the results of his labors would have been very different from what they were. But had he done this he would have no longer been Savonarola.

The events connected with the death of Lorenzo went far to increase the popularity of the friar, and even Piero de' Medici for a time stood in awe of him, so much so that he helped him to obtain from the Pope a brief whereby his convent was rendered free from the Lombard congregation to which it had belonged, and he himself placed in a position of great independence. Thus situated he determined to carry forward his projects for religious and moral reform with more zeal and energy than ever. And though he directed his first efforts to his own convent, the members of which he subjected to the strictest discipline, he did not stop here. He used the pulpit to lay bare the iniquity of the time, to call the people to repentance and to threaten the wrath of God. In all this the weapon he used was fear—fear of an external, vengeful God, such as the semibarbarous Hebrews imagined—not reverence for the inner self, the only ground of moral life. Hence his best and most sympathetic biographer can say, speaking of the Florentines:

> When we turn our eyes to the religious life of these same people, things wear a very different aspect. We always find something forced or ephemeral in it, something that defies definition, but is patent to all acquainted with the chronicles of the time and the religious works of

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Savonarola's disciples. The latter, indeed, can only faintly reproduce their master's ideas, and give feeble echoes of his words. No original thought ever issues from their minds, no vigorous line from their pens. In spite of its boasted new birth in religion, this people has left posterity no record of its faith. Savonarola's is the sole figure that is truly and supremely religious; he seems to be the only real human being in the midst of a dream-world, where all is changing and evanescent.

This is admirable criticism; what does it mean? Simply this: that Savonarola, with all his purity of intent and lofty aims, never really touched the core of the Florentines. They admired him as a prophet and dreaded his prophecies and threats, but they did not through him become moral agents. Indeed, their relation to him was not moral at all, but merely superstitious. Though, as we shall see, he became the champion of freedom; it was only of external freedom. Of moral freedom he had not even a conception. And this goes far to explain why he and his followers were objects of such bitter hatred; why he was regarded as a charlatan, they as his dupes.

How far Savonarola was from comprehending the true nature of freedom and the real source of all moral reform is shown by the fact that he welcomed the French king, Charles VIII, when he came with an invading force, as the saviour of Italy. In his capacity as a denunciatory prophet he had been telling the people that unless they repented the Lord would deal with them as he did with the race at the time of the flood; and when the French entered the land, sixty thousand strong, he saw in them the fulfillment of his prophecy and welcomed their king as an avenger and a deliverer. Although the king was far from answering his expectations, he did bring about a condition of things which enabled Savonarola to put his ideas to the fire-test of actual practice. At the approach of Charles, Piero de' Medici, anxious only to maintain his own tyranny, hastened to meet him, and betrayed to him the strongholds of the land, whereupon the people were roused to such a pitch of indignation that the Medici were compelled to leave the city. As the French

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king stood in superstitious awe of Savonarola, the latter was able to influence him deeply. Addressing him as the instrument of divine wrath and as the way-paver of the Lord, the friar, as the ambassador of that same Lord, assumed the right to warn and direct him. Nor were his warnings in vain. Though Charles entered Florence as conquerer, he was compelled to come to an agreement with the people on equal terms and leave it with only the title of protector. And this result was largely due to Savonarola. When he left, the friar, now master of the situation, being the idol of the people and the accepted prophet of God, proceeded to carry out his long-desired reforms. These related to two things: (1) the political constitution of the city, and (2) its moral and religious condition. The former had been thrown out of gear, and the people to a large extent rendered unfit for self-government by the long tyranny of the Medici, while the latter had been degraded and brutalized by the coarse paganism of which they had been among the chief promoters. In his efforts with respect to these two evils, the two conflicting tendencies in the character of Savonarola came out in all their nakedness. In dealing with the political conditions, which he recognized as lying outside his special province as a monk and a prophet, he showed the new spirit—the ardent love of freedom for all men of social justice and equality. Here the real, the true Savonarola, unsophisticated by Jewish theology or hysteric prophetism, spake out and did noble work. When, on the other hand, he turned his attention to religious and moral problems he proved a true son of the medieval church, creed-bound, superstitious, the foe of reason and of moral autonomy, calling upon men to bow themselves in servile fear before a God whose weapons were the sword and the plague. These two attitudes, the old and the new, he vainly tried to reconcile, unaware, apparently, that they were irreconcilable. He did not know that it is only the morally free man that ever can be politically free, that an outward state

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can be organized only out of men in whom the state is organized inwardly.

But in spite of this the effect of Savonarola's ethical and religious efforts, as well as of his political ones, was for a brief time almost miraculous. In the course of a few brief months, Florence, from being one of the most pagan and dissolute cities in the world, given up to all the forms of coarse, Bacchanalian festivity, became to all appearance a home of Christian piety and good works. The old revels and Saturnalian processions, with their lewd songs, written, most of them, by Lorenzo, now gave place to religious meetings and processions, with "Lauds," due many of them to the pen of Savonarola. Public and private violence almost ceased, and peace reigned in the city. Charitable institutions were founded, Dante's descendants recalled and bonfires made of "vanities" in the public squares. At the same time, under the influence of Savonarola, a new, liberal, democratic constitution was being drafted for the city—a constitution which has received the encomiums of some of the ablest statesmen and political writers. To all outward appearance, Florence was on the way to a new career of freedom and power; and this was due mainly to one man. But it was just herein that the weakness of the achievement lay. In following Savonarola and abandoning the Medici, the Florentines had only exchanged one tyrant for another. "Tyrant" is a hard word to apply to Savonarola, and certainly no one ever less desired to be a tyrant than he. But a tyrant he was all the same. The difference between Lorenzo (or Piero) and him was that while the former claimed despotic power in his own right, the latter claimed it in the name of God. "I will be master," said Lorenzo; "I will have God master," said Savonarola, meaning by that his conception of God. To be sure Savonarola desired the highest, the eternal good of the people, while Lorenzo desired his own good; and though this establishes an infinite moral difference between the

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two men, it does not make one less a tyrant than the other; for he who tries to force men to be good is just as much of a tyrant as he who seeks to induce them to be evil. A tyrant by the grace of God is still a tyrant, no matter whether he call himself Savonarola, Calvin or Mather. The truth is, the new reformation in Florence was founded upon no μετάνοια or change of mind among the people, but solely on a belief in Savonarola's divine mission, and could not but vanish if that belief came to an end. And from this point on the history of Savonarola is a struggle on his part to keep alive that belief, and a struggle on the part of his enemies to destroy it. Circumstances too conspired with these enemies. By inducing the Florentines to remain true to their league with the unworthy French king and to keep aloof from the Holy Alliance headed by the Pope, he drew upon himself the hatred not only of the latter but also of all the princes allied with him, to say nothing of the Medici, whom his influence kept out of Florence and whom the Pope wished to restore as way-pavers for the tyranny of his monstrous sons. When the French king behaved perfidiously to the Florentines; when the combined power of the Holy Alliance placed Florence almost in a state of siege and Charles did nothing to help it; when the plague, with all its horrors, broke over the people crowded within the narrow city walls and cruelly decimated them; when famine stared them in the face; when Piero de' Medici and his party, instigated by the Pope, attacked the city and were with difficulty repulsed; when Piero's accomplices, some of them men of high rank, were seized and executed; when the Pope excommunicated Savonarola as a heretic, then the strength of the new moral reformation and of the principle that underlay it were put to the test. Since it was Savonarola, by his claim to a prophetic mission, that had brought about the condition of things in which Florence thus found herself, it was only natural that his enemies and others not his friends should hold him responsible for

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it; it was equally natural that he, convinced of his divine mission, should desire to maintain what he believed to be a great reformation. As his course had manifestly brought evil upon the city, and as the Church, speaking through its acknowledged head, had formally disowned him and denied his prophetic claim, nothing remained for him but to place that claim beyond doubt or question if his position and reformation were to continue. He was far too great and pure a man to care for mere position, except in so far as it enabled him to do the good as he conceived it; for his own life even, as such, he cared not a whit. But he loved his work and was willing to make any sacrifice that it might prosper. Moreover, convinced that it was the Lord's work, he was fain to believe that the Lord would defend his own. The fate of Florence, therefore, at a most critical moment in her history, depended upon whether Savonarola could establish his claim to a divine mission. If he could do so, then the violence of his enemies could be proved to be rebellion against God, and the excommunication hurled at him by the Pope the work of the devil. If he could not do so, he must himself be branded as a rebel and a heretic—an emissary of the same devil. This was the issue, and both parties understood it perfectly. It was, in fact, among other things, an issue between individual prophecy and institutional ecclesiasticism. This Savonarola saw clearly and refused to face. In order to avoid it he was forced to distinguish between the Church and its head, and while professing complete submission to the former—and this profession was very sincere—to refuse obedience to the latter. While, therefore, he pointed to his printed collection of fulfilled prophecies —and some of them are certainly not a little startling— in proof of his prophetic mission, he set to work in a most systematic manner to break the force of the Pope's excommunication, by declaring him an usurper in the chair of Peter and calling upon the rulers of Catholic Europe to combine for his ejection. But for an un-

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toward accident Savonarola might have carried his point in this matter, for the crimes of the Pope and his sons had made him an object of detestation to all the better portion of the Catholic world; indeed his next successor but one, Julius II, with the aid of a Lateran council, declared the Borgia's election null and void, and himself an usurper. A copy of a circular letter of Savonarola's to the princes of Europe, proposing a council for the deposition of the Pope, having fallen into unfriendly hands, was forwarded to the latter, whose wrath in consequence knew no bounds. He not only excommunicated him, but demanded his apprehension, trial and condemnation. The Florentine authorities long hesitated to do this, and even risked the then dreaded calamity of an interdict, and so long as the friar's party was strongest in the city his person was safe. But his party was growing daily weaker, so much so that Piero de' Medici had been able to return to the city and had ostensibly sided with the popular party, having even changed his name to Piero de' Popoleschi. Now at last Savonarola stood face to face with the logical outcome of his prophetic claims. He had sown the wind and he must now be prepared to reap the whirlwind. He had rested his authority upon the miraculous, and he must now either perish, and his work with him, or else show that he possessed miraculous power. His enemies called upon him to substantiate his claim by performing a miracle, being sure that he could not; his friends did the same, being sure that he could. Between the two there was no loophole of escape for him. The miracle he was asked to perform was to walk through a great fire lighted in the public square, his enemies engaging to send one of their men after him if he did. With good reason he shrank from the ordeal and put it off as long as he could; but he was in the grip of necessity. The fire was lighted, a man found ready to follow him, condition after condition proposed to Savonarola and accepted; but when at last the condition was made that he should enter the

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fire without the sacred elements he said no. This was interpreted to mean that Savonarola refused to submit to the ordeal. His prestige was gone. The sword of the Lord on which he had leaned had broken in his hand, and he was now left naked to his enemies. The rest was a matter of course. Savonarola's convent was attacked with fire and sword, and himself and his two faithful companions seized and dragged to prison. A mock trial with a foregone verdict—a trial in which he was several times tortured in order that he might be forced to confess to the crime of heresy or of communication with the Evil One—was gone through. Though he was forbidden to write his own confession, and what he said in answer to questions under torture was garbled by his accusers, nothing fixing either crime upon him could be drawn from his lips. But the Pope, who cared nothing about heresy, and only desired to destroy a formidable foe to his political schemes, was inexorable, peremptorily demanding that he should be executed even if he were John the Baptist. And executed he was, in defiance of all law and justice. He was hanged and his body burnt on May 23, 1498, two of his faithful companions dying with him.

Such was the end of a truly great, pure and heroic life. It was a tragic end, in the deepest and worthiest sense of that term. For here was an heroic soul, ready with all the might and worth that were in him to do God's work as he conceived it, and to sacrifice everything, even life itself, for that end. I doubt whether history knows a soul more truly single and sincere. And yet he perished in the prime of life, at the age of forty-five; and what is sadder yet, his work perished with him for the most part. Surely of all tragic things this is the most tragic. But though the work that Savonarola did perished and the end he sought was never reached, yet his life and his heroism have not been in vain. He has left us with two great truths clearly demonstrated as they never were before: (1) that no matter how noble

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a man's intents may be, or how ready he may be for self-sacrifice, all his efforts may be unavailing and worse if he does not understand the spirit and needs of the time in which he lives, if he blindly tries to realize a past ideal; (2) that the principles which are to guide society and man to salvation are to be found in the divine, eternally oracular spirit of man himself, not in any external spirit imparting its suggestions sporadically and capriciously, and so setting at naught the hardest-won results of human wisdom. If man himself be not in potence the embodiment of the divine; if he do not belong in his own nature and right to the eternal order; if he be not an active sharer in all that is done in the world, then life is futile, the dream of a dream. And unless man takes his stand on this consciousness, acting and living out of it; if for a moment he doubt his own divine autonomy and take himself for a created being or a cluster of transient phenomena, then his work is doomed to perish, no matter how good his intent may be or by what name he may call himself. If the life and death of Savonarola avail to teach us this lesson, then he did not live or die in vain. He died that we may live.

THOMAS DAVIDSON.

THE MODERN CONCEPTION OF JUSTICE.

MISS F. MELIAN STAWELL, LONDON.

THERE has never been a great word of which the content has altered more than the word "justice." The ideas in that content group themselves roughly round two conceptions: the justice of retribution, and the justice of distribution; that is, the justice of rewards and punishments for the individual regarded as the individual alone, and the justice that distributes good things among many. It is with the second that this essay is ultimately concerned, but the second may best be at-

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tacked after an attempt to handle the first. On both points the human conscience seems to have changed its deliverances in a very remarkable way. Æschylus and the earlier Hebrews seem to hold it as an absolutely fundamental desideratum that "the doer must suffer" just because he is the doer, and the righteous man must be rewarded just because he is righteous. It would almost seem at times as though poet and prophet would be satisfied in a world where misery and sin remained at the full, so long as the misery was exactly apportioned to the sin.

Now there is doubtless something in this view of permanent value, and the view itself is certainly deeply seated in the human mind. It was this, coupled with the passionate desire that the universe should conform to our ideals, that made men tolerate so long the horrible doctrine of everlasting hell. It was this that made the Hebrew psalmist give the lie to experience and assert that he had never seen the righteous forsaken, nor his seed begging their bread. It was this that could make a scientific observer like Huxley actually speak of Nature as "inflexibly just," though no one could state more clearly than he that the survival of the fittest did not mean the survival of the ethically best.

None the less, speaking broadly, we may say that as the human spirit comes to understand itself, it seems to discover that this apparently simple demand for punishment to the worthless and reward to the worthy is really based on a complex of very diverse elements, some of which must be given up. The most fundamental, perhaps, and the most valuable, is the desire that wrong should not triumph forever: that something should be discovered in the universe stronger than it, something that could master it, and show its mastery by putting the evil instruments, if need be, to destruction.

This comes out very clearly in Carlyle's demand for justice in history: "As at bottom, the question is whether this world is God's or the Devil's." "I should not

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have known what to make of this world, if it had not been for the French Revolution." There is nothing in this longing, so far as it goes, that necessarily insists on the suffering of the wrongdoer. All it wants, at bottom, is that the wrong should be mastered and ended.

But this longing is not all. The human mind wants to have it recognized where the bad and good came from. And the first step, it believes, is to recognize the fact that in deliberate action and intention good and bad come from the man who deliberates, intends and acts. An action or an intention is never conceived as going about by itself, with a directing power of its own. If it is bad it cannot be dissociated from badness in the man who intended it. In short, it is conceived in no sense as an isolated quiddity, but as essentially a manifestation of a power that endures before it and after it, a power from which other such manifestations could and will issue. This is the first part of what makes the difference between saying, "the thing is bad," and, "the man is to blame." But there is a second part, and one still more difficult to grasp. Difficult as it is, it cannot be overlooked in any treatment of justice, and even if we cannot grasp it, it may be possible to mark out the nature of the problem more narrowly than before. It is, of course, the old problem of free-will. This, it is clear, has to do with the belief that man is an originator of his own actions, an ἀρχὴ κινήσεως, in a sense in which a stone is not. That is to say, he has it in his power to alter them, and he is not, ultimately, in the grip of his past character. Thus there is a mystery in "will" which cannot be explained, it would appear, if we think of man as entirely the product of the past. In some such mystery, at any rate, the conscience of man seems to believe, when it distinguishes the *qualities* of a human being from the *properties* of a stone; when it laughs at the idea of chastising fire because it burns and water because it drowns, while it considers it may be the

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highest duty to punish a man for doing the same. In either case it conceives the event to issue from a permanent (at least relatively permanent) "something" that is more than the event, but in one case it believes the "something" cannot alter its inborn tendency to react in a certain way on the stimulus of certain circumstances, and in the other case, the case of the human being, it *can*.

The deepest reason for punishment, then, would seem to be that by bringing home to a man through the pressure of pain the fact that he is the cause of the wrong, he may bestir himself to alter that in him which has caused it. It is not to be supposed, we must be careful to add, that the punishment, of itself, makes the man better; it only gives him the chance to do that for himself. This is important to note, because there is a superficial way of stating the matter which would imply that a man can be made morally better simply and solely by discovering that the consequences of his act are uncomfortable to him. That is certainly to treat a man as if he were a dog, who would obey if he were shown a stick, and for no other cause. But it is quite a different thing to say that punishment, by bringing a man up, as it were, with a round turn, may awaken the reflective consciousness in him, and then that consciousness may, if it chooses, proceed to do its proper work.

In any case, there comes a time, after the thinking world has reached this conception of punishment as remedial, when it begins to ask whether this fundamental appeal from Philip drunk to Philip sober could not be made, and made sometimes with greater effect, by other means than the stimulus of personal pain. It begins to resent the assumption that evil must necessarily be met by counter-evil in the shape of pain to the wrongdoer. It begins to suspect that this may mean a hideous waste, or even worse than waste. For there is always the risk that the man may cease to do the wrong thing only in order that he may avoid external punishment or win

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external reward. And this is not to strengthen the ideal elements in his nature, but to weaken and hamper them. All interference that relies in any way on the sanction of force, and hence all State interference (as we know the State) must run this risk. It can never hope to succeed unless it can enlist at least the tacit admission of the culprit that he is in the wrong, and often it fails disastrously. And what holds of punishments holds, *mutatis mutandis*, of rewards: they may turn out to be no better than bribes, just as punishments may be only threats. Hence the grave danger of using either in cases where, as in marriage and religion, the inner motive alone gives any worth to the act.

This growing distrust of punishment and reward provides the first point where the modern conception of justice parts company from the ancient. Plato is at one with the moderns in conceiving punishment as essentially remedial, but he seems to think it the only remedy. The noble passage in the *Gorgias* is based on the conviction that punishment is the one way to cure the disease. The sinner, if he is wise, must long for it as the sick man longs for the surgeon. This broad statement ought perhaps to be modified by admitting the influence on Plato of the Socratic doctrine that reasoning and instruction may turn the eye of the soul from the darkness to the light; but in the main it is true, because Plato would not have accepted ignorance as a plea for the willful wrongdong that deliberately chose the lower pleasures: that fell disease, he would have said, can find no cure but in the paths of suffering.

There can be no doubt, of course, that suffering often proves a potent cure, and, no doubt, perception of that fact aided the other forces to fix in men's minds the conviction of its desirability, and in religious minds the conviction that it was inevitable. And the further conviction (doubtless in itself correct) that actions were bound to have consequences of some kind or another naturally seemed bound up with the belief that the con-

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sequences must always recoil on the head of the doer. Hence there were many factors at work to strengthen that persistent faith in retributive justice of which we have spoken, and fortify it for its defiance of experience. But no faith can persist forever in defying experience, and, as a matter of history, it seems to have been through the clash with hard fact that the great idea of vicarious suffering first arose. It was in exile that the second Isaiah learnt his gospel of the Suffering Servant of God. Through all the extraordinary and horrible perversions of this doctrine it is quite plain that it summarizes not only accurate and shrewd observation but also conceptions far profounder and more inspiring than the legalistic notion of debtor and creditor accounts. Compare for a moment the spirit of Browning's lines—and they are noble lines:

> Each as on his own head, failer or succeeder,
> Lay the blame or lit the praise, no care for cowards—Fight!

with the spirit of the Hebrew seer:

> The sacrifice of our peace was upon him, and with his stripes we are healed.

Nothing ever has gone deeper into the soul of man than those words, and they will go as deep into the modern world as into the ancient, once they are freed from their fettering association with a single superhuman redeemer.

They speak of fact and of ideal, and what they say of both is true. The innocent do suffer for the guilty, and nothing does awaken the saving compunction in the heart of the guilty more than the bare recognition of that. But beyond all actual fact is the realization that what the human heart desires is simply that evil should be got rid of in the speediest way, and if it is necessary for this that the good man should suffer, he will rejoice in the suffering and no one would even wish to rob him of its glory.


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Thus there emerge two new ideas, the first, that suffering by the innocent is not "unjust" when it is willingly borne, and necessary—when it is the only path, and the freely accepted path, by which a great good can be attained, even though this situation has been brought about by the wrong action of others; and the second, that the reward the good man works for is not anything for himself alone: what will satisfy the travail of his soul is nothing short of the justification of many. It is plain that we are now in the region of love, atonement, redemption; and however hard it may be to state the intellectual formula in a simple and luminous fashion, it is equally plain that the "justice" of purely personal reward and punishment can never satisfy the human heart in the way that the triumphant unmerited suffering of the redeemers can. None of those who owe anything to the love and suffering of others (and who does not?) can bear for a moment the idea of paying off the debt. They would as soon annihilate the heroism of a soldier by way of recompense. They know well enough that the only recompense such soldiers want is that they should be allowed to bring home the captives they have freed. Like other good things of life—like love, which is valueless if given or claimed as a right—redemption is lifted entirely out of the category of desert. Instead of desert appear the ideas of comradeship, brotherly love, pity and succor—the whole cycle of what Herbert Spencer might call "the justice of the family," as opposed to "the justice of the State." Punishment and reward in the old sense remain only as possibly serviceable tools.

The conception held by Aristotle that the good ought to rule, just because they are good, that it is their right, passes away. The good do not want to perpetuate the principle, "To him that hath shall be given, and to him that hath not," etc.; they want exactly to reverse it: "My brother, the brave man must *give* his life away." They will not be satisfied even with the subtler doctrine

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of reward being apportioned not to achievement but to effort. To use the old, beautiful language of parable, they will have more joy over one sinner that repenteth than over ninety-and-nine just persons that need no repentance; they will kill the fatted calf for the prodigal and not for the elder brother; give exactly the same penny to the laborers at the eleventh hour and to the men who have borne the burden and heat of the day. They may admit that the view concentrating attention on effort rather than on achievement is an advance on the view that holds because a man is more richly endowed at the start, therefore, though he make no greater sacrifice than anyone else, yet it is just that he should attain to greater good. And they would admit also that it is an advantage to concentrate attention on this mysterious power of effort and will, because it is the most important thing in man and the one hope for the renovation of the world, the one spring on which the work of the statesman must depend for its success. But all this does not ultimately affect the spirit of the ideal philanthropist in the least. He is every whit as anxious to save the sinner as to aid the incompetent; and the idea of gaining any more ideal good for himself in the end than he would gain for every one of his fellows, the lowest and the basest included, is utterly and forever repugnant to him.

Thus there begins to emerge, as the only thing that would really satisfy the hunger for "justice," the vision of Kant's Kingdom of Ends, the kingdom in which every single person would attain the fruition of perfect good, and none would be before or after another. Every one would then really be an end in himself, and no one would be treated as a mere means, no one only "subserve another's good."

But when we come to work out this ideal in practice—and no ideal is worth much if it cannot stand that test—we shall find that it makes a great difference whether we follow it up by another conviction or not. That con-

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viction is the conviction of immortality, and of an ultimate all-inclusive heaven to be attained through the effort of man. This seems a bold statement, almost paradoxical, in view of the fact that the conception of justice we have reached is essentially modern and democratic, and that most moderns and many democrats repudiate any belief at all in personal immortality. But none the less they appear to nurse hopes, to make plans, to demand efforts, in a way that can only be justified in the name of that love which is also justice, that universal benevolence on which democracy prides itself, if the full "amplitude of time" is available for every man.

But before setting this out at length it may be well to explain in greater fullness what is meant by the democratic ideal of the Kingdom of Ends. And perhaps that may best be done by contrasting it with the utilitarian ideal in its simple, crude, Benthamite form, where the greatest happiness of the greatest number is the standard, whatever the quality of the happiness, and every one counts for one, and no one for more than one. The Kantian ideal differs from this not only in allowing differences of worth in pleasures apart from their quantity, but also in making a profound and ultimate difference between the pleasure in one individual and the pleasure in another. From the point of view of justice this last difference is all-important. Taking the Benthamite formula as it stands, there is no reason whatever why $2x$ amount of pleasure in the individual A and none in the individual B should not be just as satisfactory an ideal as $1x$ amount in A and $1x$ in B, and yet, from the standpoint of justice, the second distribution alone is right and the first is horribly wrong.

Now it is obvious that if the Kingdom of Ends was attained in a perfectly harmonious world nothing would be called for but to enjoy the result. But in this imperfect world it is equally obvious that some, or rather countless, individuals must fail of the full fruition of good—must, as we say, "be sacrificed," if we are to

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advance nearer to the goal for others. Yet if each man is an end in himself, can it be said that it is right to sacrifice any? (This question, it may be noticed, coincides in some important respects with the dilemma put by Sidgwick at the end of his *Methods of Ethics*.)

The first answer would appear to be that though sacrifice can be claimed, and claimed justly, under this ideal, it is only on one of two conditions. Either we have to assume immortality, in which case no sacrifice of the individual need be an ultimate sacrifice, but only a renunciation for a time, and that for the sake of the speedier attainment of everlasting good: or we can allow that a man who made a willing sacrifice of himself—who, let us say, died deliberately, without hope of immortality, in order to atttain the good life for his fellows (Aristotle's instance)—did in that one glorious moment realize the greatest good for himself that his life was capable of.

This would depend on the conviction (which is not definitely expressed in the Kantian formula, but which seems in no way incompatible with it) that the happiness of two Ends-in-themselves (given the same quality of happiness) was a more reasonable thing to aim at than the happiness of one. The one man, then, in aiming at the more reasonable end, would be actualizing the life of reason in himself, and therefore, even in annihilating himself, would not be treating himself as a means but also as an end. Set out in this formal fashion heroism may sound a mere matter of arithmetic, but there is no reason to boggle at that. One of the ultimate significances of arithmetic might very well be to provide the framework of generosity, and perhaps all things are capable of being numbered and individualized just for the sake of love.

But what of the man from whom an unwilling sacrifice is demanded and exacted? However much the act may be in the service of reason, if he is not acting willingly, it cannot be said that the life of reason is actual-

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ized in him at all. How then can we avoid treating him as a means and not as an end in himself if we insist on sacrificing him against his will, or any part of him, to win, say, the good of generations yet unborn? And, if we give up as a chimera this ideal of "every man an end in himself," it would seem that in certain crucial cases we have nothing left to decide by but the amount and quality of happiness at large, whether that happiness exists in different individuals or not. This would hold, even if we were to take account of the intermediate view that up to a certain point one man's happiness might be sacrificed to another or to others, but that there was a limit at which we must pause; for there were certain primitive goods, "the lack of which in the life of an ordinary man could not be compensated by the exceptional satisfaction, however intense, of the privileged few, however gifted."[1] And even this position would be hard to maintain in face of any able defense, say, of the brilliant Greek civilization, based on slavery, or the glorious rush of life in the Renaissance, with its background of cruelty and lust. And, it may be added, such a defense is only the more telling the further we pass from an estimate of gross material pleasures to an appreciation of the finer joys of intellect and art. It is in large part the sense of these latter, of their value, of their rarity, and of their necessary cost, that gives force to the neo-aristocracy of Nietzsche's followers. Are not these fine and high pleasures in themselves so valuable that they outweigh countless lesser pleasures of lesser men?

Thus, odd as it sounds, the principle of Benthamism (without this all-important qualification of individuals as ends in themselves) might lead straight to what Professor MacCunn has neatly opposed to it as Brahminism, the principle expressed by the Brahmin to Sir Henry Maine, "that the happiness of one Brahmin was worth

[1] J. MacCunn, *Six Radical Thinkers*, p. 29.

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at least the happiness of twenty ordinary men" (*op. cit.*, p. 24). This sense of the worth of the abler men, if we add to it the idea of desert, seems to be the basis of Aristotle's justification of slavery; the modern aristocrats would differ from him only in disregarding that idea: we do not know, they would say, and we do not care whether the ablest men *deserve* the good things or not; in any case so much intensity and splendor of life is thus attained that it is better they should possess them; the right to them is the right of the greatest enjoyment; and that right is enough.

But this is to give up entirely the conception of justice we have outlined, and to do this is abhorrent to the modern spirit. Yet it would shrink from making a final choice between the brilliant individuals, the splendid "great men," and the humdrum life of prosaic, widespread satisfaction in multitudinous red-brick villas. It usually takes refuge in the hope that no such choice need be made; that somehow it will all be right "in the end," and that the welfare of each does really mean the welfare of all. It is one of the contentions of this essay that this hope, which the human mind seems driven to cherish, is only justified on a basis of immortality. Yet so great is the present distrust of the topic that it is possible, and even highly probable, that to most readers the idea of considering immortality as affecting the problem of political and social justice will seem fantastic, and the whole discussion academic and futile. And yet on the face of it it does not seem fantastic to say that it must make a difference to the plans of a father of his people if he thinks all are going to reach their journey's end, or if he knows that some are bound to drop on the way and never get any return for all that he makes them suffer; unless, indeed, he is not to be a father, but a Napoleon, and to look on men as mere tools, and that is what we have decided he cannot do.

The impatience with the subject seems to spring in the main from three reasons: the first, and the most

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potent, being that we are unable to decide for certain whether immortality is a reality or not, and still we have got to act and be as just as we can. But this does not really affect the position; for the fact that we are unable to give a decisive answer cannot logically make a question any the less important. We may wish it did, but it is worth repeating the platitude that wishes will not alter the logic of a case, though they often lead to thrusting it out of sight. The second cause, less potent but still influential, is that the conception of immortality has been thought to render all attempt at social betterment in this little life quite unimportant and trivial. If it will all be "put right" in another stage of existence, why trouble so much about it now? But this question has force only if we take a peculiar and what is now felt to be a childish view of immortal existence: the view, namely, that all is to be "put right" by a purely external Being, and without any further effort in any sense on the part of individuals. Once this conception is given up, immortality comes to be conceived not so much as a reversal of this life as a chance of working out its factors in a larger sweep and with a larger scope. It then becomes, if possible, more important than ever to begin the working-out as speedily as can be. But then it is surely undeniable that on consideration it must appear also of great moment, from the point of view of individuals, whether we believe that we have this infinite scope, so far as they are concerned, for the working-out or not. And justice must take the point of view of individuals. The third reason is that up to a certain point, no doubt, it makes no difference whether we believe in immortality or not. But up to a certain point it makes no difference whether we are hedonists, utilitarians or idealists, because the standards up to a certain point do coincide. And yet there are important dividing lines. So here, a vast amount of suffering and sacrifice is entirely unnecessary, from each and every point of view. No one is the better for the sweating

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dens, and the sweated are only the worse. There is a vast amount of luxury that is almost entirely bad; there is also a vast amount that, however delightful and harmless in itself to the possessor, neither increases the total sum of enjoyment nor the quality of it, nor could reasonably be held to hasten the coming of that city of God which is also the City of Friends. But there is also a vast number of sacrifices and deprivations that we exact from individuals, against their will, which are not unnecessary if, as we say, "civilization is to advance." Have we any right to do this in the name of Justice, if the advance is meaningless to them?

We may possibly save ourselves for a time from having to answer this by averting our eyes from the real world, and conceiving an ideal Republic such as Plato's. There we suppose ourselves capable of so arranging a community that everyone in it, although they do not by any manner of means all attain an equal share of "the good life," yet all attain as much as they are capable of. But to believe this possible we have to believe our rulers possessed of a wisdom yet unknown (as Plato saw), and our world of space and time rich and commodious in a way never yet experienced. The stupendous nature of the wisdom and wealth required will become clearer if we consider for a moment the modern ideal of "the good life." It is not simply the ideal of brotherly love alone, as it might have been for a Buddhist or an early Christian (though it includes such love as an indispensable and indeed dominating element). Nor, plainly, is it the mere provision of physical health and comfort under the rule of such love; that too might be a comparatively easy matter. It is the attainment as well of the highest possible standard in countless forms of art, knowledge and emotion. A moment's consideration brings before the mind how many of these—music, say, or mathematics—require wealth, leisure, opportunity and incentive for effort, a whole χορηγία, which, with our slender resources, is

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only available for the few. Whatever the principle on which we select the few, how in the name of that justice which is love (the only satisfactory kind) are we to answer the numbers whom we have stinted, without their consenting to it, of the comforts they might have enjoyed? With the belief in immortality, we can say: "Wait, and the prize we are fighting for will be yours as much as ours. We take this sacrifice from you because it is the only way to reach the goal we all desire." But if they can never reach the goal, it is little short of a mockery to tell them to wait. We cannot feel, as Plato and Aristotle seem to have felt, that an enforced self-denial was, for those who could not reach voluntary self-sacrifice, the highest possible good. Our modern sense of liberty is too sharp for that—our sense, that is, of the worthlessness, except as a means to an end, of what a man does not freely choose. On one condition alone is it conceivable to say that, beneath the discipline of education and deprivation, a man, even though he rebels against it, may be a higher being in so far as he is moving to a higher end, and that condition is that he himself should at last realize something of the end. But if not, he is not a higher being—he is only, at most, a better tool. A concrete instance may drive this home. Who can doubt that numbers of people are not only less happy, but actually less morally good, through being taught to read, to labor in factories and to live in cities? If there were no immortality, the Chinese refusal to purchase the gains of our civilization at its price might well stand as the more humane decision.

Nor can we avoid the problem by saying, even if we knew for certain that there was no such thing as immortality we could still act as though we believed in it and hold those things as just which tended to produce a state of things as near the ideal condition as possible, even though that ideal condition was nothing but a phantom goal. What does it matter, it might be said,

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whether the ideal pattern which we take as our norm is ever to be in actual existence or not? This pattern is the ultimately desirable thing, and the nearer we get to it the better we are, whether we ever reach it or not. When we have to choose between the many and the few, let us choose that course of action which would increase the desire for heaven in the minds of men, even though there is no such place.

But in any case this argument could not justify the exaction of unwilling sacrifice, or punishment, except wherever it could be shown that the individual in question was no worse off for the time than he would otherwise have been. And it slurs over the question already insisted upon as vital, the very question of fair distribution. Perhaps this may best be brought out by supposing that in either case—immortality or annihilation—the will to brotherly love was incarnate in all men. What, in either case, would be its commands? Surely, if death ended all, that the advance must be very slow, slow enough to allow all to share it equally now. The gains of science and of art, that are no gain to the present, must be postponed, in mercy to the individuals who will never reap the benefit. Even suppose the sum total of happiness less in the end, better that than a distribution which left some starving who might have been filled.

The only alternative to this lies in a belief at least as daring as, and much less satisfactory than, the belief in immortality—the belief in what may be called the Positivist heaven; the belief that those in the future who are to inherit a better earth will be so many in number that the sacrifice of those who preceded them would be approved by the good will. And this, it should be remembered, must be a willing sacrifice. Otherwise the "good life," whatever else it contains, cannot contain as its guiding principle the spirit of human love. For that is bound up with individuality; it believes instinctively that the mysterious barriers

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which make individuality, though sometimes they seem to divide, really unite us; and therefore above all else it reverences and respects these. And justice, if it is to be satisfactory, must do the same.

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THE DRAMATIC AND ETHICAL ELEMENTS OF EXPERIENCE.

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THE subject of this paper is one which experience is constantly suggesting to the reflective mind. The problem it raises is one of the most perplexing in practical life, and touches some of the profoundest issues of philosophy. At this time I wish to consider a few aspects of the subject, more by way of an introduction to the problem it involves than anything more comprehensive. I shall not try so much to offer a solution of the various questions it raises. That would carry us further into metaphysics than would be desirable in this paper. I shall rather undertake the simpler task, but by no means the least important task, of stating the question as clearly as I can, and of seeing what the issues involved are, and what a solution has to attempt to accomplish. In philosophy as in practical life, much, indeed a very great deal, is gained if we can only see clearly what we want to do, and what we have to aim at.

The problem is not a matter merely for academic discussion. It faces us every day, as we shall see at once if we consider certain situations, involving quite different judgments about human action. A man, *e. g.*, aims at fulfilling a comprehensive moral purpose, the reform of a social evil, the cure of a disease that is sapping the life of thousands, the accumulation of a store of wealth, the

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realization of a literary or public ambition, the rescue of a fellow-creature in an hour of danger, the ruin of another's plans or hopes. He proceeds a certain length, he is at the point of achieving the end of his desire, when, as we say, suddenly and without warning his activity is intercepted sharply and finally, and his career of moral effort ends in disaster to himself and his cause. This clearly is not an imaginary or unreal experience; it is one with which we are all too familiar, and becomes more familiar as life means more for us. We could illustrate it from the side of comedy as well as from the side of tragedy. For in both there is presented an aspect of man's experience where the efforts of his will are thwarted by agencies which lie outside the seriousness of his own moral purposes, where his moral actions become part, and are seen to be part, of a plan wider than that covered by his own foresight. Here the nature of his act has to be transmuted into other than moral terms if we are to get at its larger meaning, simply because, if not so considered, it is fragmentary, unreasonable and unintelligible.

Take again the judgments which we pass on men and actions in such cases. From the point of view of the man's own purposes and the effort he exerts to attain them, we say that the man is a good man or a bad man, a man of noble intentions or of evil ends. But when his plans are cut short, when his life is held up in mid-career of useful and valuable citizenship, we say "how sad"; "it is pitiful," "pathetic"; he is a "creature of destiny"; "fate is against him"; he is the creature of "accident" or "fortune"; his moral efforts seem "fruitless"; his moral struggles seem "wasted energy." In the case of the former, the moral aspect of his life, we praise or blame him, honor or condemn him, and express our judgments of his life accordingly; and do so in the manifold ways in which approval and disapproval can be expressed by mankind. When we take up the other point of view we neither praise nor blame, we

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neither approve nor disapprove; we pity and regret, we sympathize, or we even turn away in horror from the truth, or again marvel at the spectacle presented before us.

All this is familiar to anyone with the most ordinary experience of life. As so much fact, it is indubitable that we do take up these different attitudes toward human action and judge them from these different points of view. In ordinary life we are content to accept the fact that there is this twofold way of looking at man's deeds, and to make these judgments without considering the matter further. Human life is too full of the claims of the moment to be arrested permanently with problems about the meaning of it all. If one type of judgment does not exhaust all we have to say, we make another equally isolated judgment and pass on, satisfied with a rough and ready summing up of the case.

But most of us at some hours, and some of us at all hours, find ourselves thrown back on a further question regarding this situation. We feel there is something in the case calling for consideration; and this for primarily two reasons, which affect people differently according to their interest in the question. Some are pulled up by the contrast between the seriousness of the agent's moral purpose to himself or to others and the apparent futility of his efforts. They see, *e. g.*, that the high devotion to a supreme moral end which absorbed the agent's whole energy, and gave to his life a meaning and a value, is thrust aside by forces apparently alien to and certainly distinct from his moral end. They ask themselves, Is this moral purpose so supremely important after all? Was it worth while? Was it the complete meaning of his life as he (the agent) seemed to think it was? In short, when such things happen, has morality the last word to say in man's life? Are moral ends so permanent as to justify this whole-hearted devotion, which has been thus suddenly annihilated?

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That is how one of the problems which we are to consider arises in the reflective mind.

Another line of reflection meets the same question. The two kinds of judgment we have mentioned are entirely different, and yet they are made about the same object, namely the agent's life and conduct. One kind of judgment praises, the other does not and refuses to praise—it acquiesces. In virtue of the first, we say the agent ought or ought not to have done this or that; in other words, the action might or might not have taken place but for the man's "will." In the other form of judgment we take the whole train of events to be inevitable: "it is so;" "it could not be otherwise;" *i. e.*, the action could not have taken place except as it did. How are these diverse judgments upon the same fact to be true at the same time? How are they to be reconciled, if reconciled they can be? Is one a subservient element in the complete meaning of the other, or is there some other idea or expression which contains both? That some reconciliation is required we must admit, for it is one and the same object, namely the action and life of the individual, about which these diverse statements are made.

These different forms in which the questions about the situation appear doubtless involve one another. They are the aspects the situation presents to us when we are induced to raise the simplest questions about it.

It is obvious that if we are to get nearer to the truth than the most superficial and off-hand solution we must have a clear notion of the sphere of fact to which each specific feature refers; we must make up our minds at the start regarding the range and limits of judgments of praise and blame on the one hand, and the sphere within which expressions of pity and fear apply on the other.

What then is the area of human experience to which, and to which only, moral judgments apply? Stated briefly, we may say that this is determined by the life of

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man consciously and purposely directed toward union with his fellows in a society composed of his fellows. We shall find that all judgments of approval or the reverse imply this as the ultimate substance to which they refer. So true is this that we can safely say life in a society and moral approval go together: where we approve an action or a character, there we have a social whole of some sort; where we have a social whole, there we have judgment of approval or disapproval. For judgments of approval are not merely passed on others; they apply to ourselves *in the same sense.* Sometimes we lay stress on one of these elements, *e. g.,* we approve or disapprove the lives of others; sometimes we apply the judgment to ourselves in our own conduct. But that is a matter of emphasis, for the purposes of the occasion in hand. In all cases the judgment involves a reference to ourselves as well as to others. Thus if we explicitly approve the action of others, we at the same time implicitly mean that we should do the same in similar circumstances, for the end it realizes satisfies a standard, acknowledged as controlling the action of men in relation to their fellows. And similarly with the proper changes when we pass moral judgments on ourselves.

Moreover, in passing a judgment of approval or disapproval we always imply that the action might or might not have taken place, no matter what actually happened. There is no meaning in approving an act which would have happened whether the agent put forward effort or not. We should not praise or blame the agent, any more than we should praise or blame a sunset or a waterfall for being or not being what they are. The possibility of the agent putting forward or withholding effort in the performance of the act is precisely the reason for our judgment when the effort has been exerted.

There are, of course, other elements in the moral life besides those mentioned; but these are fundamental and are sufficient for our purpose here. The area of the moral life is defined by the relation of man to his fellows

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in a whole or a society; the maintenance of that whole or society by the conscious pursuit of ends shared in by ourselves and others constitutes the sphere of what we call moral effort. These ends may or may not be realized by our acts and our desires: our judgment of approval or disapproval expresses whether or not, and the extent to which, the acts or emotions of the individual agent conform to those ends.

So much for the general character of one side of the problem. If we reflect on what it involves we shall see, *first,* that it does not cover the whole of man's life, and *second,* that so far as it goes it is an essential and supreme form of his activity, without which he would not be man at all. It does not cover the whole of his life, because he has relations to other facts and things besides his fellows. He stands in a certain relation to "nature" which is common to man and to the brute creation, which works by its own laws independently of man, and over which at the very best he has only partial control. Thus, *e. g.,* man has no power to control an earthquake; he cannot, or at least he did not, make the seas and the mountains and the streams which drain its valleys. He uses but does not create facts of nature. Nature, in virtue of its own laws, asserts itself in spite of man's efforts, and may annihilate him and his purposes altogether. Yet nature is indissolubly bound up with man, and man with nature. To separate himself from it is impossible; nay, it provides in large measure the means and conditions of his own preservation, of his own existence along with his fellows in society. Hence arises the question of nature as such being independent of man's moral life; it may aid or hinder, support or interrupt the process of his moral life. That is the first point: man's moral life has limits, and his moral life may be invaded by forces and agencies beyond his control.

But, again, the second point has to be noted carefully: man's moral purposes are supreme in importance and value in his own life. He is only man by living in and

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sharing the life of a society of his fellows. To be a man is to be a social unit, and *to maintain the social whole by continuous effort is to be moral.* It is impossible therefore to give up moral ends; to give them up is to cease to exist. From this arises what we call the earnestness or seriousness of the moral life. It has this character because it is our only way of being ourselves, being men. No matter what other forces there be outside man's moral life, the purposes which constitute that life are absolutely important to him and inseparable from him.

If we bear these two points in mind, the problem we raised at the outset will gradually gain in clearness and significance. For what we have already said has indicated how that very problem must arise.

So far we have dealt with one side of the question—the range and limits of the moral life. Now we come to the other side—the character of that which bounds and interrupts the aims of morality in the way revealed by those facts of experience mentioned at the beginning.

Primarily the facts are to be described by contrast to man's moral life. They consist in whatever does *not* lie within the power of moral beings, either separately as individual moral agents, or jointly as a social whole. One source from which such facts come has already been indicated—nature and natural forces. There are two other sources. There are the restrictions imposed upon individuals by their own finiteness, their specific kind of capacity and endowment which constitute them what they are, which they did not make, which are there, so to speak, to start with, which cannot be altered, and which vary from individual to individual and society to society. There can be no doubt that this exists; one man cannot achieve as much or the same thing as another. No man has it in his power to originate the powers which he is to exercise; he works within a certain range of possibility, the bounds of which are set to him and set for him, and are limited in extent and in content. There is again an-

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other source of the facts we are describing, and that is the source to which we trace both our own existence and the existence of nature, and which, in the language of religion, we describe as God, or, in more general language, the Absolute Whole which contains all objects and all forces, human and infrahuman and suprahuman. The operation of this Reality is not looked on as exactly the same as that either of ourselves or of nature. It appears as what we call an all-controlling fate, Destiny, Providence. We should, for example, ascribe the processes of an earthquake to nature; but we should ascribe the maintenance of an orderly plan in all the workings of the physical universe to this Absolute Reality. And again we should not confine the term Destiny solely to the operation of those finite restrictions within which we each severally realize our moral life. No doubt we might and ultimately must trace both nature as such or our own restricted powers to this one source. But in ordinary life we do not at once do so; and our general view of the situation will not be immediately affected if we keep them distinct for the time being.

Now there are many different ways in which all of the factors just mentioned operate upon the sphere of moral purpose. But in general they do so in two forms—*i. e.*, in the form which we call accident, and in the form which we call necessity. These, indeed, are in a sense only two ways of describing the same thing. The root idea in both is independence of our moral ends, of those purposes directly or indirectly within our power to carry out. An accident is an event which lies beyond the sphere of our purpose and cuts across the process of realizing it. Thus, *e. g.*, a man is fulfilling the round of his day's work, when the roof of the building in which he works gives way and permanently interrupts his activity; a slate falls off the roof just at the moment a passer-by is walking below and injures him; the machinery of a ship cracks while a traveler is taking a voyage. In such cases we have what we call an accident, something that

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has happened directly affecting but beyond the range of our own conscious purpose. Moreover, an accident is always a detail, an event or a mere discrete series; and we take it in isolation and keep it in isolation as long as we speak of it as an accident. When we trace the course of such events, see them connected as a continuous sequence, then we find that what happened was not isolated but was part of a system. In that case we speak of it not as an accident but as a certainty; it was bound to happen, was necessitated. But here again we have the same characteristic. What was bound to happen, and could not have been prevented by and yet interfered with the process of the realization of our purpose, is just something that is independent of our ends. Hence the view so often expressed that accidents are just what we cannot explain, *i. e.,* are isolated; and again that there is no accident when we explain how it came about, that is, when it is shown to form part of a continuity.[1]

In the form, then, of accidents or necessities, these factors provide elements that enter into our moral experience and yet are neither derived from it nor modifiable by it nor dependent upon it. Accidents or necessities come from a source beyond our power, and so beyond the moral life. What we say of them, therefore, is not that we approve or disapprove of them, but simply that they *are,* and are controlled by laws and principles other than those that govern the moral life. They may assist the moral life, and our pursuit of moral ends; as, for example, when a favorable breeze brings the merchant home at the precise time which will further his commercial interests, or when a shower of rain falls precisely when the despairing farmer needs it for his crops,

[1] What these positions involve we need not stop to consider. They bear out what we have said, that accident and necessity can be looked on as aspects of the same fact, the one expressing the discrete details as such, the other the continuous system as such. For our argument, therefore, they have the same significance, and do not raise separate problems.

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or when a man's great powers of intellect and reliability of will gain him a position over a crowd of his fellows. As every man knows to his own cost, accidents may be just as cruelly against him. But whether they favor or check the realization of his aims, in both cases, as we say, they are beyond his control; they just happen and lie outside the scope of his responsible moral purpose.

Here, then, we can see the range of facts belonging to this other side of the problem we raised at the start. Their character is that they appear as necessity, fate, destiny, or as accident, as fortune, as capricious incalculable events. They may enter to any extent into the moral life; they even condition the very existence of the moral life. Our statements about them do not consist of approvals or disapprovals, but of statements of what simply *is,* and of what has, over and above their bare existence, the quality of being favorable or unfavorable to our specific moral aims. They can be either helpful or the reverse, just because they lie apart from, operate independently of, and are derived from sources distinct from, our own moral effort and purpose.

We are now in a position to discover how there may be a clash of operations between the two sides of our experience to which we have called attention. Be it noted at once that they are inseparable, the moral side and the non-moral side, from whatever source it comes. Man's moral life is inseparable from nature and natural forces, as we have already stated; the very food which supplies the basis of physical life, the securing of which constitutes so large an area of his moral life, is derived from that source. It is evident again that man's moral life is inseparable from his own mental equipment, his intellectual powers, his hereditary endowment, his resources and possibilities. It is equally evident that man as a finite being, sharing only a fragment of the activity of the life of the universe but sharing it in a certain way and to a certain degree, is

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inseparable from the one Whole of which all finite individualities are but parts and elements.

It is precisely this very distinctness of the moral life from these other factors to which we have referred, combined with their inseparable relation, that is the source of the problem we raised, and of the different judgments we pass on human situations. Whenever there is such an invasion of the moral life and purposes of the individual on the part of those other factors mentioned, as either subordinates moral ends to the latter or produces a serious interruption to the successful realization of moral ends, then we have the elements of a dramatic situation. There is nothing dramatic in a moral condition as such; it is one which ought or ought not to be; that is all. There is nothing dramatic in, *e. g.,* the processes of nature as such; they simply *are* such and such, and their course is governed by what we call necessary laws. But when a being who ought or ought not to be in such and such a condition *has* to be in a given situation in spite of or along with his moral end, there we have the possibilities of a drama. There is no drama without personality, without the deliberate and stormy struggle for supreme moral ends. But there is no drama unless this personality is laboring toward fulfilment in the midst of conditions alien to and invading his moral effort. An essential aspect of the drama lies thus in the fact of conflict of alien elements in human experience. Moreover, the interest of the drama is centered, so to say, in the success or failure of one of the parties to the conflict, namely the personality of the agent. We are not concerned directly with the significance of these non-moral agencies *per se,* but only in so far as they exercise an effect on and within the life of the spiritual agent whom they invade, only so far as they bear on the triumph or failure of the agent. Again, in every dramatic situation the whole meaning and interest center round one essential factor in the moral life as such, the limitation of moral ends by non-moral factors. The dramatic situation of the

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individual is the expression in, it may be, an acute form of the essential life of morality *as such*. It is not merely an individual episode we are called on to witness. It is the fate of morality itself as a form of human activity. It is the fate, therefore, of our own ends and purposes in the plan of things which is presented before us in the drama.

For this reason we find that, *e. g.*, in tragedy we are moved by "pity and fear." Pity and fear imply sympathy; and sympathy is a relation of like to like, of our self with another self. But it is sympathy of a peculiar kind. The sympathy is not mere fellow-feeling with the other individual; for that involves merely an imaginative placing of ourselves in his position. In tragedy we do not so much imaginatively place ourselves in his position; rather the very nature of his position compels us to identify ourselves with his lot. He is representing the universal condition in which man's personality exists. His position, therefore, *is* our position, for his position is that of human personality itself, and that *is our* life.[2]

That, then is the general character of the dramatic situation as distinct from the merely moral situation. It is a conflict within the life of a moral personality. It takes place between the moral purposes constituting his very being, and agencies of an alien character which invade these purposes and their successful operation through his effort. And it takes place necessarily because his experience, as a whole, involves the presence of these agencies.

It is easy to see, by the aid of this interpretation, the different ways in which the dramatic situation may and does arise. The form in a given connection depends entirely on the character of the invading agency. It may come from the forces of nature, disaster, "accident" or fortune. The relation of the moral purpose to this gives

[2] Hence our "pity" and "fear" are always as much for *ourselves* as for the individual overwhelmed by a tragic situation. Similarly in the merriment of comedy our pleasure as spectators—so high because the end is to be joyous and not disastrous—has an *universal* basis.

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us one kind of drama. It may come from the play of one moral character on another, each following the "bent" of his own constitution, his limited range of possibilities and ends; a bent from which the individual cannot escape, and which leads him or her in a direction producing conflict and clash between finite moral end and finite moral end, finite personality and finite personality. Much of the best tragedy is of this kind, and much of the best comedy. It may, again, arise through the operation in an individual life of the agencies and conditions imposed by the destiny controlling all things, and from which the individual cannot escape by his own effort.

A particular case of this last type is where a conflict of necessary ends within the individual life takes place in such a way that no actual unification of the ends is possible; and where therefore the conflict can only be stilled by ruin and disaster to the personality. An example of this is found in Antigone, or again in the fate of Ottilie in Goethe's *Wahlverwandtschaften*.[3]

[3] In such cases the conflict is due to the fact that the conditions under which the individual's moral life is lived produce a situation where two supreme moral ends demand satisfaction, two supreme moral laws demand obedience from the individual, while at the same time submission to one involves rejection of the other. In the case of Antigone it was the opposing claims of the law of the family and the law of the state as administered by the ruler. They meet in Antigone's life only to present conflicting demands. Had a higher law satisfying both claims been found, the dramatic situation would have been avoided; for then Antigone could only as a moral agent adopt the higher law. If this had been rejected she would have been herself culpable, and the result would not call forth pity and fear, but moral disapproval. But in the absence of such a higher law the conflict was morally insoluble; and since it was unavoidable the situation became dramatic. In many cases a higher law may exist, or be discoverable, and yet not be found by the individual, either through lack of opportunity, or lack of capacity. In these cases the situation is again dramatic; the drama is created by the limitations of circumstance or of mental endowment. The position is pathetic; moral categories do not apply. But in some of these cases it is often possible to find that the individual has not used his powers to meet the situation, and that the conflict could have been avoided had he done so. Hence the practical difficulty in cases of this kind of distinguishing between a culpable blunder and a hopeless tragedy.

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Again the dramatic situation may take two specifically different forms. On the one hand the conflict may be temporary, and be mainly sustained by the play of accident not ultimately harmful to the individual. The accident thwarts his purposes and perplexes him for a time to any extent without, however, absolutely overthrowing him or his ends. Ultimately, and in the long run, it is found to support or further his own personality and assist his own fulfilment. The process of conflict is annoying and perplexing, even painful to some extent; but the issue is happy and joyous. This dramatic situation is the feature of Comedy. The alternation of success and failure in the process of arriving at the result, combined with the knowledge that the issue is favorable to the personality involved constitutes the source of the merriment and humor the situation affords, first to the spectators and afterwards to the individual concerned in the drama.[4]

On the other hand, a conflict may take place which leads to the ruin and disaster of the moral personality, and the overthrow of his finite life and its plans. Here the issue, whatever it be, is arrived at through the waste of moral life in some form or other, and does not lead to the fulfilment of finite personality at all. This constitutes the dramatic situation of Tragedy. It may have, as we say, a "fitting" termination as regards certain individuals in the situation. "Eternal justice" may be triumphant over the wrongdoer; but even so, the result is arrived at through the waste and ruin of the good man, too; and therein lies the sting of the tragedy. The punishment of the wrongdoer is only to be brought about by disaster to the good man. The punishment is a moral result, not tragic; the ruin of the good, tragic, not moral.

[4] The various kinds of comedy arise in the way in which the elements above indicated are arranged, from the degree of seriousness of the purposes at stake, the dignity of the persons concerned, the triviality or otherwise of the circumstances which form the setting of the situation and the transparency of the ultimate issue. Hence comedy ranges from pure farce up to a situation just short of tragedy.

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It is important to note that the conflict spoken of arises out of a conflict of elements within a personal life, which in some sense is, and must be considered to be, a whole. Some kind of ultimate reconciliation is therefore at once presupposed by the conflict and demanded by the situation to justify its existence. There could be no conflict of the elements unless there were some unity to be found in a single plan or principle. And there can be no rationale in the conflict unless that unity appears at the end as the reconciliation of the elements involved in the conflict. In comedy the reconciliation is brought about by the course of events; in tragedy it is not, it remains a demand. Hence it is that tragedy seems so often to indicate the presence of an irrational element, a surd, in human experience. The solution of the conflict in tragedy does not lie in the circumstances or the development of the plot. It is only to be found, if found at all, by going beyond or behind the actual drama, by appealing to a deeper or more comprehensive principle. The appeal is made away from the dramatic outlook either to the comprehensive consolations of the religious attitude toward experience, or to the conceptual interpretation of experience by speculative reflection. In the former case the tragedies of human existence are looked upon, so to say, as part of the larger Divina Commedia of spiritual life;[5] in the latter case the apparent irrationality of the tragic situation is distilled in the pure ether of νοήσις νοήσεως.

One more point in conclusion. It will be seen from what has been said, that the dramatic situation is an inseparable phase of all human life. Doubtless it is best

[5] An optimistic type of religion is bound to show all tragedies to be incidents in a larger plan whose issue is joyous. "Our light afflictions which are but for a moment work for us a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory." It is most interesting thus to find that the essential principle of Comedy is considered a truer resolution of the conflicts of life than Tragedy. Dante's great poem is an illustration of this view that Comedy is higher than Tragedy. Hence, doubtless, the title of the poem.

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exhibited, especially perhaps in tragedy, in the case of great and outstanding personalities. The skill of the dramatic artist in large measure consists in his careful selection of his characters and situations for the purpose of conveying dramatic effect. But the dramatic situation is inseparable from human life, not only in all its forms but in all its stages. This is acknowledged when we speak of the tragedies and comedies of child-life. And it appears historically in the incessant reappearance in literary form of dramatic presentations of life at the lowliest levels of human existence.

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ETHICS AND LAW.

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"SINCE law is subordinate to ethic, or, in other words, since both those who command and those who obey are bound morally to regard, in the last resort, the commands of the moral law, it follows that the ultimate ends of law are suspended upon that of ethic, deducible from it, and justifiable by it. The logic of law is a reproduction of that of ethic, but applied to overt acts only." The scholarly author of "The Theory of Practice" has no doubts on the relation of law to ethic, a position which he believes to have established in other parts of his work. He declares further that there is continually in progress an alteration or conflict "and at every step of it, the appeal always lies from the law to the principles and logic of ethic." Surely, this "is a hard saying: who can hear it?" It is perhaps true that a good deal of modern legislation has an ethical end in view; but the history of legislation is very far from bearing out the assertion of Mr. Hodgson. In organized society there is in progress now, as there has always

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been, a continuous struggle between those who have and those who have not but desire to have. Almost everyone has an opportunity to study at first hand legislation on a small scale, in the various ordinances that are passed by municipal councils. It is seldom that ethical grounds are urged in favor of any proposed measure or are the decisive factor in its enactment. The reasons put forth are justice and expediency, usually the latter. In larger legislative bodies the same arguments that we find current in the smaller ones are alleged over and over again. We may say that the chief characteristic of an ethical act or of ethical conduct is that it aims at a remoter rather than an immediate good, and that in any event the elected course can injure no one. The man who postpones taking vengeance upon an enemy for the reason that it will be more terrible for the delay puts off what to him is a remoter good when placed alongside a nearer one; but he would in this way inflict an injury of the larger number if his example were followed by others. "Do unto others as if you were the others." "What you would not have done to yourself, do not unto anyone else." "Deal with your fellow-man as you would have him deal with you." "So regulate your actions that they may be taken as a rule for the guidance of all men." These and similar dicta may be accepted as maxims of ethical conduct and criteria of the same. How few men can rise to the largeness of vision which they demand! Still fewer are they who can put such magnanimous maxims into actual practice. We may approve and admire what we have not the strength of will to carry into effect. It is probable that in the domain of ethics no confession has been more frequently made than that of weakness of will in the presence of clear moral discernment. By far the larger part of legislation has in the very nature of the case no moral quality, and cannot have. In this respect it is a counterpart of life. A great portion of our lives is occupied in eating and sleeping. They are essential to our physical exist-

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ence. In themselves they are neither right nor wrong: it is only when indulged to excess that they become immoral. Similarly, by far the greater portion of every body of laws deals with affairs that are neither right nor wrong, and have nothing to do with justice or injustice: they are simply expedient or inexpedient. When law represents the convictions or aspirations of a democracy, its animus is usually more nearly ethical than where it is the decree of an autocrat or a clique. Apparent exceptions are, however, not always real; for the autocrat who is at the top of the political ladder may represent and give force and effect, through law, to the aspirations of those who are at the bottom. In all cases, however, law is behind public opinion; usually it is far in the rear. Customs and ideas are often as carefully heeded as if they were statutes, although everybody is perfectly free to ignore them. The moral convictions of prescient individuals are frequently millenniums in advance of the mass of mankind. These are often diametrically opposed to current theory and practice. We have a conspicuous instance in the doctrines and fate of Socrates. He maintained that one ought never to do wrong, or, conversely, that one ought always to do right, and that the relation of parties to each other did not alter the intrinsic worth of an act. He based his belief on the existence of an intrinsic value in ethical conduct. It is doubtful whether any man before him held and defended this doctrine with the insight and pertinacity shown by him. He was condemned, not by a court of law but by a legislature. We may say that a special act was passed for the purpose of making him a law-breaker. He realized the loneliness of his position and clearly expounded it to those who had his life in their power, notwithstanding the apparent egotism of his assertion. Similar cases have occurred here and there in the past, although none of equal prominence. A later instance of remarkable foresight is the edict of tolerance issued by Henry IV of France. Its wisdom is becoming more and more

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evident as time goes on, notwithstanding that it is still far from being observed in many parts of the world. In fact it is nowhere fully in vogue, even as to non-essentials. To everyone who is able to form a conception of man's relation to Deity and of the impenetrable veil that intervenes between us and the invisible world there is no attitude of mind so intrinsically unreasonable as the intolerant. Its intensity is generally in proportion to ignorance. What is the explanation? It seems to be this: In every primitive state of society there prevails a dead level of uniformity. Everything is done according to use and wont. There are no nonconformists and no dissenters. This continues longest with respect to those relations that are supposed to exist between man and the higher powers. He who dares to think and act differently from the mass disturbs these relations and invites disaster upon the tribe. Owing to man's ever-present consciousness of his weakness before the forces of nature, he is nervously suspicious of everyone who acts in such a way as to disturb the established order of events. At this early stage of society, men are too ignorant to take any account of what man thinks as long as it is not translated into actions. Hence he who refuses to conform outwardly to established and inherited customs is a dangerous person.

We find, for example, that the medieval church was concerned only about conformity to an established ritual; it took little account of beliefs. The Italian Humanists were almost all rationalists of an extreme type besides being men of loose lives. But as they outwardly practiced the ceremonies prescribed by the church, the hierarchy did not molest them. There was a rational excuse for the persecutions against the Christians sanctioned by the Roman emperors. When the head of the state was regarded as the divine embodiment of its underlying and sustaining principle, the citizen who refused to do him homage was at least constructively a traitor. On the other hand the French Protestants never wearied in

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assuring the king of their loyalty and devotion; but because they refused to conform to the usages of the established church they were branded as undesirable citizens and maltreated in every imaginable way. In such cases the influence of the hierarchy which feels that its craft is in danger counts for a good deal.[1]

The history of slavery exhibits in a striking way the length of time that may elapse between the first enunciation of an opinion or a doctrine and its final acceptance by the majority of mankind. It has been an established institution from the earliest times, and still exists. Yet the founder of the Stoic school seems to have been the first man to recognize its injustice. That many of his disciples came to hold the same view is evinced not only by their professions but also by the frequency of manumission among them, especially in Rome. Albeit no propaganda was undertaken against it; even the New Testament is virtually silent on the subject. After existing in one form and another throughout the Middle Ages, it assumed a new guise with the beginning of the African trade in human beings. In England some of the smaller sects, notably the Quakers, opposed it on ethical grounds, but not until the appearance of Wilberforce, Clarkson, Macaulay and others in the arena did a general movement for its abolition begin. This result

[1] How natural it is even for persons of some intelligence to resent a departure from use and wont was strikingly illustrated in an instance that came under my observation some years ago. It exhibited the germ which has so often developed into the most vindictive persecution. A young lady from the middle West changed her residence to New England. Intentionally or inadvertently she acquired some peculiarities of pronunciation, which she brought with her on a visit among her former associates. One of these remarked to me that he was disgusted with Miss M. for discarding the English of her earlier years. I have noticed the same thing among German peasants, when one of their number, through residence in another district, acquires a mode of speech different from that which he learned in childhood. An oft-quoted proverb among them is: "Talk as your bill grew." When an innovation in a wholly unimportant matter is resented, how much more vigorously will this be done in essentials!

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was chiefly due to the growth of humanitarian sentiments, of which the Wesleyan revival was the most marked evidence. As is well known, its chief promoter declared that "slavery is the sum of all villainies." It is generally admitted that it virtually died out in the northern states before it was legally abolished, experience having proved that it was unprofitable. Here, at least, ethical motives had little influence in the movement. The same thing may be affirmed of the liquor traffic. The most frequently heard arguments both for and against it are economic. Only a very small number of persons hold that it is a sin to drink alcoholic liquors in any quantity, however small. Ethical considerations play a very insignificant part in the controversy.

That ethical progress is social rather than statutory is convincingly shown by the terminology we find in some languages. The evidence is unconscious and unintentional, therefore all the more convincing. *Sitten* in German means custom, use and wont, pure and simple. Manners and customs are *Sitten;* but neither the English nor the German predicates any moral quality. On the other hand, when we say that certain practices are *Unsitten* or *unsittlich,* we put into them a signification which they have in modern speech but which they did not originally contain. Although the moral concepts are not engendered by social life, they are developed under social conditions. We further see this in our word "moral," which is merely a repetition of what we saw in the German terms above cited. It is derived from *mos, mores.* Cicero says distinctly that *moralis* pertains to *mores.* It has, therefore, only the remotest connection with our English term "morals," while *moralitas,* the ancestor of "morality," does not occur in classical Latin.

The wide divergence between public opinion and statute law is strikingly shown by the popular attitude, in Anglo-Saxon countries, toward certain forms of sexual immorality. The law makes no distinction between a common

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murderer and him who slays the dishonorer of wife or daughter. Yet it rarely happens that a jury will convict a criminal of the latter class. Even when a husband kills the accepted paramour of his wife, few juries will find him guilty of murder. There is reason to believe that both the South Europeans and the Slavs are more lenient in this regard than the Germanic peoples. Testimony in matters of this kind, when intentional, is usually open to suspicion; but persons who have had opportunities for obtaining evidence on this point at first hand are for the most part unanimous. Moreover, passages here and there in literature bear in the same direction. In this matter the ancient Romans under the Empire were more lax than the Greeks, and far more so than under the Republic. The irregular *liaisons* of the Roman matrons are matters of frequent remark both by the historians and the satirists. Plutarch, however, regards the adultery of a wife as an annoyance that is to be borne by the philosopher with as little perturbation of mind as possible. So far as we have evidence, herein lies almost the only difference between the ethical system of Socrates and that of the most advanced nations of modern times. If we may trust Xenophon, he did not even regard courtesans as a necessary evil, but rather as an indispensable class in the body politic. While in some European countries the law goes so far as to recognize the harm that may arise from this class of persons, it proceeds no farther than regulation. On the other hand, in Germanic lands regulation is not attempted, all efforts of legislation being directed toward suppression. The ancient point of view is that sexual irregularities partake of the nature of contract or bargain and sale, to which both parties consent, and that there can therefore be no wrong or injustice. Although harlotry was forbidden to the daughters of Israel, prostitution was in general vogue all over the East. Both Charlemagne and Frederick Barbarossa issued severe edicts against it, but they do not appear to have had much effect. The Cru-

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sades had a very deleterious influence upon the sexual morality of western Europe. It is said that the Council of Constance, in 1414, brought together fifteen hundred courtesans. For centuries before and after the commencement of the modern era, most of the German municipalities were constantly engaged in legislation designed to restrict the evil. There is no evidence that much was accomplished. The sale of indulgences had a particularly harmful effect in this respect. A general and gradual improvement took place, not as the result of legislation but in common with the general progress of enlightenment. We frequently come across the assertion that you cannot make men moral by legislation. It is usually made by persons who appear to think they are uttering a weighty thought. In reality it is mere nonsense. The object of law is not to make men moral, but to keep them from injuring one another. Wherever the object of law is to make men moral it fails of its object; therefore, in order that men may become moral there should be no legislation. This is about the sort of anarchy preached by Tolstoy. With men as they are, a society without some law, written or unwritten, could not exist. The object of law is to protect me in life and property, not to keep my enemy from desiring to kill or maim me or from coveting my possessions. Selfishness is such a powerful motive in the human breast that almost all legislation is directed against its outward expression in action. It is a curb designed to retain every man within a circumscribed sphere of activity. It does not inquire about motives; to do so would be rank folly. Hallam says somewhere that we literally live among the snares and pitfalls of law. Yet the fact is patent to every reader of history who reflects, that its whole course is strewn right and left with repealed or ignored or evaded laws. The statute books of a nation are no trustworthy guide to its morals or even its justice. Probably the best test of the moral quality of an act is the degree of its unselfishness or the measure of the in-

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tensity by which the actor elects an immaterial to a material interest. All that a man hath, that is, all his possessions, will he give for his life; if then he gives life itself, either in service to his fellow-men or as a direct sacrifice or for a cause that will better them, what more can he do? It is conceivable that a deed may be ethical from the view point of the doer; that is, it may be prompted by a purely unselfish motive which would be unethical if adopted as a rule of universal conduct. This seems to have been the interpretation given by the ancient Jews in the case of Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his son in obedience to what he believed to be his duty. As a historical fact the incident has no value, but the manner in which the New Testament writers deal with it is instructive. They call it faith. Faith, however, is not necessarily ethical. A man may invest in an uncertain enterprise because he has faith that it will prove remunerative. It is nevertheless a factor in all ethical conduct, since it invariably has regard to the future more than the present.

Justice is essentially a virtue of organized society. It is the abstract expression for something which we claim as belonging to us but which is often denied us by others. We sometimes hear men speak of being unjust to themselves. This is rather a figure of speech than an expression of actual feelings. Conversely, ethics is the abstract term for a personal virtue: it is individual excellence. Ethics takes little account of other people's opinion, because it is based on personal conviction. Hence the law cannot compel men to act from ethical motives. It can take cognizance only of conduct, not of what may be called "secret sins." When Jesus said, "Whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her already in his heart," he was speaking of an unethical motive. The state of mind to which he had reference cannot be prevented by law. In like manner it may be said that the man who is honest only so far as the law constrains him is essentially dishonest.

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Under circumstances where the fear of the consequences of a dishonest act does not deter such a person, he yields to temptation and becomes a moral criminal. It is the strong sense of a personal obligation to a power "not ourselves that makes for righteousness" which characterizes the ethical man. That the "not ourselves" may be impersonally conceived does not necessarily impair the force of the felt obligation, for it is well known that atheists have occasionally acted from the highest possible motives. They could probably give no other reason for them than that given by Herbert Spencer for abhorring cruelty: they could not help it. A man of this stamp, when brought face to face with temptation, does not say, with Joseph, "How then can I do this great wickedness, and sin against God?" but, "How can I sin against my highest conceptions of duty?" The law may be a terror to evildoers: it cannot deter men from thinking evil. The end for which the state exists (and legislation is the state acting in its corporate capacity) is justice, not ethics. Aristotle has observed that man alone has a sense of justice and injustice. He has a conception or innate idea of the reciprocal obligation existing between every man and his fellow-man. Man learned by experience that the attainment of justice is easier for him in his collective capacity than when acting individually or even in small groups; hence he unconsciously formed the state and instituted government. This idea is well illustrated by the story found in Herodotus. It may have a very slight foundation in fact, but it sets forth the Greek view, and is probably true to experience. A certain Deioces, who was a man of mark in his own village, "applied himself with greater zeal and earnestness than ever before to the practice of justice among his fellows. It was his conviction that justice and injustice are engaged in perpetual war with one another." Owing to his singular uprightness, all the surrounding villages had recourse to him in their quarrels and suits. After a while, however, he refused to sit in judgment on the

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affairs of others to the neglect of his own. Thereupon lawlessness broke out afresh. Then the Medes assembled from all quarters and declared that they could not live thus any longer. They desired a king to save them and their country from anarchy. The friends of Deioces presented his claims with such force that he was chosen to fill the office. Herodotus then informs us what the newly elected king required of his subjects, and adds that he continued to administer justice as before, although his mode of procedure was different. This story is parallel, in many respects, with the account given of the manner by which Saul was chosen king of Israel; the standpoint of the narrator is, however, different. The elders of Israel said, "Give us a king to judge us." When Samuel tried to dissuade them they cried the more, "We will have a king over us; that we also may be like all the nations; and that our king may judge us."

An ethical motive may enter into the sense of justice, but it is not necessarily a part of it. Men have a sense of justice and injustice who are strangers to ethical promptings. Gaius on Justinian says, "Justice is the continual desire of always rendering to each one that which is his due." And again, "The maxims of the law are: to live honestly, to hurt no one, to render to each one his due." We see the various labor organizations and the woman suffragists, especially in England, to mention no others, insisting and persisting that they are demanding justice and nothing but justice, and that laws should be enacted as a means of securing the end they are striving for. Herbert Spencer seems to find the germ of the idea of justice in the desire for revenge. Albeit, the conception of justice is not coterminous with the desire for revenge. The latter is always the more powerful motive. We can study its operation among schoolboys. Sam and Harry are good friends. But one day, when Sam is passing along the street, Harry, seized by a sudden spirit of mischief, hits him with a snowball. Sam's dignity is insulted and he determines to get even,

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and when an opportunity occurs hits him with a much harder ball. Sam now thinks Harry a fool for getting mad about a little matter, and plans a still worse trick. Among boys such an affair can never go very far; on the other hand, vendettas and blood-feuds are a serious matter. How they often end is dramatically told in "Stringtown on the Pike." We may study the operation of the same feelings in the history of the ancient Greeks. There, however, retaliation took a twofold form. It was expressed in the formula: Outdo an enemy in injuries and a friend in benefits. In the second case gratitude becomes an important factor, and ethical in form if not in content. Ethical aspirations bear the same relation to individual acts that the aroma does to flowers. Just as most flowers are without fragrance or with little but are nevertheless beautiful, in like manner many deeds that are without an ethical factor nevertheless win our admiration. The father who metes out justice to his son exactly as he would to a stranger, that is, acts without personal bias where the temptation is particularly strong, wins our approval because we see that he has acted justly; nevertheless he does not arouse our enthusiastic admiration to the same degree as does the person who sacrifices his life for a friend or a cause where the sacrifice can have no possible advantage for him.

It is by no means certain that legislation has any influence on the growth of ethical principles. These were the same under Hammurabi that they are under President Roosevelt. Laws, on the other hand, are continually changing. There has been a gradual approach to securing justice for every man in the body politic, although it is probable that there have been frequent retrogressions. It was a capital offense under Henry VIII, under Queen Anne, and under George IV, to steal an article of the value of five shillings; yet convictions became rarer and rarer until they ceased altogether, because juries had gradually come to feel that the theft of a piece of property of small value was a trivial offense compared with

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the murder of a human being. It may be that after several generations have been constrained by law to act ethically, their successors will come to feel ethically; but progress, if there be any in this respect, is very slow. The most ancient laws that have come down to us reveal a striking desire on the part of the lawgiver to do justice, sanguinary as many of them are. The difference, compared with our own time, is much more in the application than in the spirit. Man has always had a clear recognition of a distinction between right and wrong, between justice and injustice. Time and experience have done little more than to readjust the relation of the parties in interest. A remarkable example of the tardiness of jurisprudence compared with the growth of the feeling of justice is related by Tacitus. A rich citizen had been assassinated by one of his slaves. According to law, all his fellow-slaves had incurred the penalty of death. The number in this instance amounted to several hundred. A minority of the senators strenuously objected to the execution. Even the rabble rose in mutiny against an atrocious law, and it could be carried into effect only with the aid of the imperial guard. Says M. Denis ("Histoire des théories et des idées morales") in commenting on this incident: "Ainsi cette canaille la plus vile de l'univers au point de vue politique . . . se montrait dans sa simple conscience plus juste and plus humaine que la loi, que les princes, que les sénateurs et les juristes. Elle sentait ce qu'il y a d'horrible et de monstreux dans ces exécutions en masse. Mais ce qu'elle ne comprenait pas, ce qu'elle ne pouvait comprendre, c'est que de telles horreurs fussent nécessaires a l'inviolabilité de l'injustice érigée en droit, et que cette necessité fût la condemnation la plus terrible et la plus solennelle d'une institution, à laquelle n'osaient même pas toucher ceux qui se font gloire de gouverner les hommes."

Alexander Hamilton says: "Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It has ever been

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and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit." Justice, being a corporate virtue, must always remain to a greater or less extent an unrealized ideal. On the other hand, a purely ethical ideal may be realized because it is individual. A man or a few men may retire into solitude because they are unable to resist the passions and allurements engendered by society, or for the purpose of fortifying themselves for such resistance by contemplation. Justice can take little account of motive in meting out rewards and punishments. Two murders may differ a good deal in the degree of heinousness, but the judge can only inflict one penalty. It must be admitted, however, that according to the medieval conception of justice, death could be made more terrible by the tortures which preceded it. Even the ruthless slaughter of the Roman slaves above referred to does not awaken in the mind of the modern reader such painful feelings as the account of the manner in which the death sentence was executed upon the murderer of Henry IV. It needs to be said, however, that according to the recent German code the judge shall endeavor to discover what is right, just and equitable in any particular suit brought before him, and decide accordingly. In other words, mere technicalities are not to stand in the way of a decision on the merits of a case. Two persons may steal a piece of property of exactly the same value under what seem to be precisely the same external conditions. They will therefore be guilty of the same offense and merit the same punishment, yet intrinsically there may be a wide difference in their guilt. The same may be affirmed of falsehood. We are treading on dangerous ground when we say that a lie is sometimes justifiable, yet we need not go far afield to find instances in which the end sought through deception was intrinsically good. Abstractly considered, justice aims at putting all men on an equality before the law and according to them equal treatment. But by all men we do not mean everybody, without exception; this would

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often work injustice. What is justice for a native South African is not necessarily the same thing for a European. On this theme a great deal of sentimental twaddle has been spoken and written. In like manner, treatment accorded to a child may be perfectly just while an adult dealt with in the same way would be wronged. Conditions, the degree of enlightenment and intelligence, must be the criterion so far as may be, and the deciding factor. The law may often deal unethically with a culprit; but if it deals justly, so far as human foresight goes, it has reached the limit of its possibilities. Kant says that "Ethics, as distinguished from Jurisprudence, imposes on me the obligation to make the fulfilment of a Right a maxim of my conduct." Among the most intelligent persons in every community there are those with whom *legal* and *illegal* are synonymous with right and wrong, and whose ethical promptings are so feeble as to be scarcely discernible.

The course of human events exhibits some remarkable ethical revivals, characterized by widely diverse initial impulses. The earliest seems to have taken place in Palestine. Another, in the sixth and fifth centuries B. C., swept from China to Italy. It is associated with the names of Confucius, Gautama, some of the Hebrew prophets, with Solon, Zaleukos and Pythagoras. In India and China it was non-religious. In Palestine it was monotheistic; in Greece and Italy it was polytheistic. In Asia it was non-political; in Greece and Italy it was both social and political. Another revival, of more limited extent but of greater intensity, originated with Jesus and Paul in Palestine; but during the whole second century it was very pronounced in the entire Roman empire. For more than a thousand years thenceforward conditions apparently kept growing almost steadily worse. Morals were probably never lower in Europe than during the later Crusades. There was little progress outside of England until the beginning of the nineteenth century, when Protestant missions began to attract a

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good deal of attention. They were, however, for a long time religious rather than ethical. More recently the missionary movement in its widest sense has been primarily social and economic, with a considerable admixture of ethical instruction.

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A NEW TYPE OF NATURALISM.—MONTGOMERY.

WILLIAM MACKINTIRE SALTER.

DOCTOR MONTGOMERY'S book[1] is hardly receiving the attention it deserves. This may be in part because of the peculiar style in which it is written, and in part because of the novelty of its philosophical positions. The style cannot indeed be called simple, and easily repels the average unphilosophical or even philosophical reader; yet the language itself is singularly precise and, oddly enough, is rich in images and often highly picturesque, revealing a sensitive and essentially poetic nature. The intellectual standpoint differs both from classical idealism and from ordinary realism; the author, too, is not in harmony with prevailing views in physical science. The reviews the present writer has happened to see in American philosophical journals are lamentably superficial, or even inaccurate, one comparing the author's dualism to Locke's, another practically identifying his views with materialism. The only critiques showing any insight have been in the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale,* where points of contact with Bergson's "l'Evolution créatrice" are noted and the exact contemporaneousness of the two works is remarked

[1] "Philosophical Problems in the Light of Vital Organization," by Edmund Montgomery. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York and London, 1907 (8vo, pp. 446).

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upon, and in *Mind,* where Prof. Carveth Read calls it not only a remarkable but a brilliant book, though he dissents from some of its characteristic doctrines.

"Godlike is the doctor who is also a philosopher" is an old Hippocratic maxim, and applies to perhaps the most interesting thinkers of recent times—men like Lotze and Wundt in Germany and Professor James in our own country. To their number must be added Montgomery, whose "Dr." stands for an M. D. from Würzburg back in the fifties, and who followed his profession in St. Thomas's Hospital, London, where he became Lecturer on Physiology, and afterwards, his health being impaired, in southern Europe; retiring from practice with a moderate competence in 1869, he came shortly to America, where he has since lived as a country gentleman on a large estate in Texas. Men of this type start with a considerable fund of direct experimental knowledge instead of with an analysis of ready-made conceptions; and yet they have the instinct for analysis and reflection, and they do not rest till they have reached ultimate clearness (so far as that is possible) as to the facts they deal with, and a world-embracing view.

Some of the most characteristic positions of Dr. Montgomery are the outcome of his physiological experiments and observations — first, in his laboratory at St. Thomas's Hospital, later in one which he conducted in the London Zoölogical Gardens (where he had frequent converse with Darwin), and still later, particularly between 1871 and 1878, on his Texas plantation, where often for day after day, and sometimes during eighteen consecutive hours, he watched with his microscope the movements of primitive forms of life. As a result of these close observations, he was led to question the current view that an organism or bit of protoplasm was an aggregate of more or less autonomous cells, and maintained on the contrary that the whole mass was a continuous, unbroken, though more or less specialized, unit. He read a paper "On the Formation of So-called Cells

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in Animal Bodies" before the Royal Society in 1866, which Richard Owen pronounced "an important contribution to the philosophy of physiology." Later, in investigating the activity of muscular fibers, he became convinced that this was not to be interpreted as the result of power generated by the combustion of food, but was rather an expression of the energies of the muscular substance itself (see the *Centralblatt für die medicinische Wissenschaft,* 1870, No. xi; also the article, "The Elementary Functions and the Primitive Organization of Protoplasm," in *St. Thomas's Hospital Reports,* 1879). The conviction forced upon him by this investigation made him skeptical of the mechanical theory of natural events generally; and in articles on "Monera and the Problem of Life," published in *The Popular Science Monthly* (September and October, 1878), he acutely questioned and criticised the current view of the transformation and convertibility of physical forces. In brief, living substance became a unity to his mind, not an aggregate; and its characteristic phenomena were not mechanically explicable. Gradually a full set of physiological or biological views were developed, the maturest formulation of which is to be found in "The Vitality and Organization of Protoplasm," Austin, Texas, 1904 (pp. 82, large octavo), though contributions were made in the eighties to *Pflüger's Archiv für die gesammte Physiologie,* the *Jenaische Zeitschrift für Naturwissenschaft* and *Mind.* Life is essentially, according to Montgomery, the functional play of the organism with the surrounding medium at their surface of contact. Undoubtedly the organism is a specific chemical molecule or compound, but if it did not suffer disintegration from the influences of its environment, and on the other hand and above all have the power to make itself whole again by taking to itself complemental material from the environment, it would not be a living thing. The complemental material or nutriment (including the entodermic apparatus when it is specialized) is for this end, reintegration. Sleep, too,

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when the ectodermic activity and disintegration are practically suspended, is instrumental to this end. And the sexual organization and instinct (when specialized) serve no other essential end; they keep the type or genus whole when the individual passes. Interesting in this connection is Montgomery's view of the germ as a fragment rather than miniature copy of the parent organism, and of growth as a process in which the fragment rounds itself out and, by dint of its specific chemical constitution and affinities, becomes a whole again, like the organism from which it was detached—a phenomenon essentially of the same class with those of "regeneration" generally.

Readers of the JOURNAL are presumably interested in the philosophical and especially the ethical views of a writer, but Dr. Montgomery's philosophical and, above all, ethical views receive their shape and coloring to no slight extent from physiological data like those above mentioned. He early attained the insight, indeed, that all we call material is idealistic in nature, *i. e.*, is conscious experience, actual or imagined, though he was too circumspect and too clear-sighted in his analysis to suppose that conscious experience was self-contained or self-explicable, and was led to assert an extra-conscious reality, both without and within man.[2] His view differs radically from phenomenalism or empiricism, which he thinks is logically solipsistic—one cannot get even to another's consciousness without transcending the phenome-

[2] This preliminary insight appears, along with the beginnings of his distinctive philosophy, which he sometimes calls the "Philosophy of Organization," in his first book, "Die Kant'sche Erkenntnisslehre widerlegt vom Standpunk der Empirie. Ein vorbereitender Beitrag zur Begründung einer physiologischen Naturauffassung" (Munich: Theod. Ackerman, 1871; pp. 201). Mr. J. Hutchinson Stirling reviewed it in a lengthy article entitled "Kant Refuted by Dint of Muscle," in the *Fortnightly Review*, October, 1872. The exposition of Kant is given high praise, the refutation questioned, Stirling with grim humor remarking, "His German is good, but it is riotously good, and he flings in it only what is heaviest."

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nalist or empiricist position; he makes vigorous and repeated warfare on this leading tendency of our time, into which, as he puts it, "our most advanced physics and psychics have at present helplessly drifted" ("Philosophical Problems, etc.," p. 52). One might almost say that a cry for the permanent amid the flux of things was an instinct of his nature.[3]

But though, as a matter of reflective analysis simply, Montgomery parts company equally with materialism and with current idealism, the peculiarity and originality of his way of thinking lies in his use and interpretation of biological facts. In the first place, there is in general an inner view of things. Instead of a world of inert atoms with motion imparted to them from without, the movement of the world comes, to his mind, mainly and in every case finally from inner springs. The so-called moving causes are incitements for the most part; and the so-called effects are really in great measure reactions, coming from intrinsic energies in the body moved. *Causa non æquat effectum.* Causes are, more correctly speaking, coöperating conditions. It is a conception borrowed from physiology, or at least, to Dr. Montgomery's mind, manifestly true there, and then extended analogically (though not without objective reason) to nature in general;[4] and this without at all forgetting the specific difference between living and non-living forces. The difference is real, but the forces are alike connatural,

[3] "Can there be anything more unsubstantial and fugitive than a touch, a sound, a sight, a taste, a smell, a feeling, an emotion, an idea; in fact, an 'impression,' a 'sensation,' a conscious state of any sort?" (P. 63; *cf.* 228.)

[4] "No kind of activity is purely mechanical. What Newton called *vis insita*, in contradistinction to *vis impressa*, plays a part of its own, indeed by far the most important part in nature. The peculiar modes of reaction, of active resistance or intrinsic response, opposed by different kinds of matter to external impulsions, evinces the existence of specific indwelling powers." *The Monist*, October, 1893, p. 57. *Cf.* the chapter, "Substantiality and Causation in Physical Science," in "Philosophical Problems, etc." Sometimes, it must be confessed, Montgomery uses language inconsistent with this view (see pp. 309 and 402).

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not communicated; chemical attraction and gravitation are alike inexhaustible—neither has to be replenished or restored. The popular scientific doctrine of the conservation of energy is largely confusion of thought.

Secondly, the unity of life, *i. e.*, of the living organism, has important consequences or suggestions. No set of so-called cells or other autonomous units composes the organism; its activities are not a composite or resultant of lesser independent activities of its constituent parts, but the one protoplasmic substance differentiates itself into its various parts, whether they be cells or organs, and its activities are also similarly specialized and individually located. And when feeling or consciousness arises, it is the feeling or consciousness of the organism, and not an outside existent added to it: it is the one living individual that feels as well as moves. The change is simply that the individual now becomes more than can *be observed*—he becomes something to himself and has at least the beginnings of a personality; but it is none the less the one organic individual that is conscious and personal, and along with the development of feeling and thought, and as a kind of permanent substratum or matrix for them (a guarantee and principle of their possibility when at any moment they are not actual) goes a development of organic structure, *i. e.*, of what, when it affects the sensibility of a foreign observer, gives rise to phenomena of organic structure, or, more definitely, to those specific percepts we call a nervous system or brain. This conception of the unity of the individual becomes also the basis for, or at least makes it not so difficult to believe in, the moral autonomy of the conscious person; for the action of the organism is conceived as an action of a whole, not a resultant of independent and possibly conflicting forces, and it is, so far as outside agents go, self-originated, only incitements or occasions coming from without. Such spontaneity extends, indeed, down to the lowest forms of life and, in a sense, even to unorganized matter, though it comes to

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full flower and perfection in highly organized man and is at once cause and product of this organization. A fundamental ethical conception thus receives illumination and support from biology. Indeed, the necessitarian and mechanical view of human nature, so widespread in recent years, was in part the stimulus to Dr. Montgomery's scientific researches; and some time ago he concluded an article directed against the cell-theory, which Professor Huxley had been calling a "permanent acquisition to physiological science," with these words: "Then [after learning from nature its true lessons] we shall be delivered from the ludicrous position of having, *secundum artem,* to consider ourselves a congregation of ever so many primitive lives, and shall feel scientifically restored to the full dignity of indivisible, autonomous personalities."[5]

Of interest, too, and novel is the rehabilitation in this connection of the somewhat discredited doctrine of substance. The longest chapter in "Philosophical Problems, etc," is devoted to this subject, and, after an extended *résumé* of opinions, Montgomery ventures to say that the entire history of philosophy "records essentially a vain search after genuine substantiality." The problem is of identity in the midst of change. Is there any such thing? Dr. Montgomery will not concede it to either matter or mind: Kant's *substantia phenomenon* and *substantia noumenon* (or intelligible ego) are alike fictitious; nor does the motion or force or energy of recent naturalistic speculations come any nearer to the mark. But the living organism has an extraordinary peculiarity. It is ever being shattered, and yet it is ever restoring itself. Against change and incipient destruction it keeps itself whole. It maintains itself identical. This is its very nature. If it did not react victoriously against loss and change, it would not be a living thing. Yet what is this essentially but substantiality?

[5] *Mind,* January, 1882. *Cf.* "Philosophical Problems, etc.," pp. 6 *ff.*

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Only the conception is not static, but dynamic. It is identity by means of a process—an ever freshly created identity.

The terms that have been used have a materialistic sound, perhaps; and undoubtedly have originally a material connotation. And yet the question is, what is the content and range of life, and what is the veritable and entire nature of an organism? As matter of fact, life turns out to include feeling, thought, volition, all organically connected with the living individual and having their at least primary function in serving it, and perhaps in the humblest ways. The organism, the living individual, turns out to be a conscious subject. There is more in man, more indeed in animals, than appears to any outside observer. The ever-renewed, victorious, vital activity itself comes from the same inner depths whence consciousness emerges. The mysterious side of the living individual, deeper than consciousness itself, is plainly evidenced in the fact of memory. Sensations are fleeting things; they come and they go, absolutely disappearing. What is a pain that is no longer felt? It is a nonentity. Yet if it does not at all exist, how can there be even a remembered consciousness of it? How can we know that we had it? Must it not have left its impress somewhere? Yet where is the somewhere? Not in the brain as a material thing, for this is itself sensation or perception, and, as such, as transitory as the pain is. Not either in consciousness, for the pain may for a long time be out of consciousness. It can only be in hidden depths of our being, that are more constant and continuous than either our material or our spiritual side.

Indeed, the materialistic seeming of Montgomery's view quite vanishes when we remember that, according to him, matter itself is purely phenomenal, *i. e.*, of entirely ideal consistency. He has much to say of chemical activity, of vital organization, of nervous structure; but motion of every kind, molar or molecular, size and shape,

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however infinitesimal or delicate, all extension and all resistance, the so-called primary qualities of Locke as well as the secondary, are, to his mind, subjective appearances, unintelligible apart from consciousness, and in one sense *creations* of the subject, since they are reactions, not impressions,[6] though they are reactions to stimuli, and so signify or signalize something externally existing, even if they do not copy, much less constitute it. In other words, a man's body and brain are another's (or the individual's own) percepts; they are appearance, not reality, mere signs or symbols. Let us hear Montgomery himself. "Under such eminently vicarious conditions of visual perceptibility it is evident how superficial and remotely emblematic of the real, extra-conscious entity, despite all its vivid and definite configuration, must be the casual and transient visual percept called a brain" ("Philosophical Problems, etc," p. 137). In a private letter he says we must bear in mind that what is "perceptible as brain-function can be but a wretchedly meager visual or objective indication of what in reality constitutes such functions; that the concomi-

[6] Montgomery's language is strong. A perceptual appearance "is out and out a product of the percipient's own organic being" ("Philosophical Problems, etc.," p. 136). "Within us, by dint of the secret powers of our nature, there arises a series of phenomena, a complex phantasmagoria of things and events, in every respect the creation of those intrinsic powers" (*Mind*, No. XXIII, p. 325). "A feeling is an exclusively subjective incident, qualitatively incommensurable with anything inferred in the outside powers, which we assume as its excitants, or as its substratum. . . . The world figured in feeling is therefore an organic creation" (*Mind*, No. XXVII, p. 396. *Cf.* the passage beginning, "We may rest assured that there is here no passage open through which outside powers can in any manner and shape make their entry into the living substance," on p. 384). Hence, as to the past and future, "These things are so, were so, will be so; but only when realized by beings like ourselves. The same holds of the nebular hypothesis, the atomic theory, the ultimate chemical element, the truth being, "Thus these legitimately surmised realities would appear to spectators of our kind" (*Mind*, No. XXIII, p. 321). Again, and comprehensively, "The world we actually perceive is in us, part of us, most veritably our own intimate world" (*The Index*, Boston, May 27, 1885, p. 573).

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tant subjective experience is a much more immediate revelation of the import of this functional activity." Particularly does this apply to our higher mental and spiritual life: "The enormous incongruity obtaining, especially in this latter case, between the mere stir of material particles and the exalted feeling accompanying it, has led most thinkers to discard the idea of these two so disparate occurrences being connected by any necessary and indissoluble bond. Yet we have ample reason to conjecture that to the meager perceptual signs of the observer there correspond as their awakening causes in the observed subject a marvelously high-pitched activity of a marvelously high-wrought existent, of which wondrous activity the subject's own exalted mental experience is, moreover, another far more direct and adequate sign" (*Mind,* LVI, p. 509).

Hence comes a peculiar interpretation, or at least statement, of the psycho-physical riddle. The trouble with much discussion on this subject is that there is forgetfulness (even when there is theoretical recognition) of the purely phenomenal nature of the body and brain. Sometimes philosophers themselves appear to think they can talk wisely, when they forget their philosophy. Treating the brain naively as an objective thing, they proceed to exercise their wits as to how it can be related to sensation as another objective thing. The most circumspect of them give the precedence to neither matter nor mind, but become parallelists, or, if pressed still further to explain why the two so disparate things *should* be parallel, they reply in all modesty, "*Ignorabimus.*" Montgomery is about the only philosopher with whom the present writer is acquainted who in discussing the problem takes consistently and thoroughly his primary philosophical insight with him. Sensation and brain are not on a par as realities, and strictly speaking the brain is not an objective reality at all, but a percept in another's mind (or in the subject's own mind), and the real question is what gives rise to the percept; and it is altogether possible


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that what gives rise to it gives rise to the sensation in the subject himself. Dr. Montgomery is not dogmatic on this point, though he sometimes speaks positively enough; he is aware that his monism is supported by circumstantial evidence only (*cf.* a summary on p. 138 of "Philosophical Problems, etc."); and one of the chief attractions of his purely monistic view,[7] aside from its simplicity, is that it rests on a philosophically exact statement of the problem and does not artificially make difficulty and darkness, as our dualists, psycho-physical parallelists *et id omne genus* do.

How do the world and man—this strange being who is something more and deeper and more perduring than either matter or mind, and even in sleep and total unconsciousness continues and maintains his essential identity—come to be? There seems to be an ascending series of manifestations. The world of gravity is not the same as the world of cohesion, and the world of cohesion is broken in upon by chemical activity. Moreover, not all chemical units are vital units; some when broken up do not reconstitute themselves. There are "new modes of aimful energy" in living beings. Nor do all living beings seem to have consciousness and volition. Does one set of manifestations beget, pass into another? Montgomery appears to think not. He uses a word not current in ordinary "scientific" circles—"creation." He does not mean creation out of nothing, but the realization of potencies before latent and unfulfilled. The world of reality (or more specifically the world of power) is larger to his mind than the world of actuality. He speaks of the "great formative deep," of "the creative stress that ceaselessly elaborates the myriad formations of evolving nature," of mental awareness as "the outcome of creative potencies transcending immeasurably the grasp of our surface understanding," of increments of progress in

[7] Dr. Montgomery's view is repeatedly stated in his book, one of the happiest statements being on pp. 235-237.

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man as fixed in his frame, incorporated into his structure, not by any consciousness or will of his own, but "by the inscrutable source of all creation;" he even ventures to say that no one can foretell what the creative stress that has accomplished all these results may yet achieve, "what further heights of progressive development it may scale, assisted as it now is by man's intelligent insight and increasing scientific knowledge," and conjectures "the probable existence of beings of a still higher organization [than man] inhabiting planets of other suns." In short, there is only a limited phenomenal continuity in the development of the world—there is no absolute continuity any more than there is a real convertibility of the forces of the world; so-called evolution is ultimately a succession of new creations; nature is a capacious storehouse out of which come treasures *new* and old.

As to the ultimate elements in the creative process, Montgomery is not altogether clear. Ordinary theism he discredits. He thinks there is no creative power in mere intelligence or consciousness, even a supreme one; conscious states in themselves are forceless—this is one of his postulates. There is something more elemental and originative than thought in the world. Nor have we reason for considering the creative agencies or agency moral, in any human sense of the word. Indeed, Montgomery's opinion is that a perfect being who should create a world at a low stage of development, in order that by tedious and painful steps its sentient creatures might eventually work up to participation in his perfection, would be immoral. He also repudiates pantheism. "The natural phenomena or perceptive objects of our conscious world are therefore by no means manifestations of one and the same Force or Unknowable, but on the contrary manifestations of an extra-mental, non-phenomenal nature at least as diversified and specialized as its mental representatives. Pantheism is consequently no legitimate outcome of Naturalism, the genuine phi-

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losophy of natural science."[8] He similarly dissents from Spencer's Unknowable, "that protean, Persistent Force which Mr. Spencer imagines capable of assuming every kind of mental or material appearance."[9] Behind phenomena are rather specific and specifically different "power-complexes" or "power-endowed existents," and he sometimes speaks as if these were themselves ultimate and creative; but a careful reading (and it is better to read him carefully or not at all) shows that he recognizes something beyond them. For (1) they are interdependent—Montgomery is against any radical pluralism: "a plurality of wholly autonomous, wholly exclusive beings cannot possibly compose any kind of universe or cosmos" ("Philosophical Problems, etc.," p. 34). And (2) the "power-complexes" are gradually elaborated, *i. e.*, they arise in time; they are "power-*endowed.*" The unity of the world must have a deeper basis than the "power-complexes" themselves; and the ultimate creative activity must be back of them, though in a derivative and subordinate way they may share in it; he speaks of the creative stress as "ceaselessly elaborating," "laboriously fashioning" and "organizing." As to what it is in its own nature, however, we cannot say. It is beyond our ken. We know only its products, and those only mediately through their action on our sensibility, save ourselves, whom we know immediately, at least in part. "The mystery of being and becoming, the supreme mystery of progressive creation, remains wholly inscrutable. We have no faculty enabling us intelligently to apprehend the creative potency through which nature is existing and undergoing its toilsome transmutations."[10] "The primal source of Being and Becoming is, indeed, a mystery beyond human ken."[11] One feels a note of passionate and profound conviction of all

[8] *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, October, 1885, p. 360.
[9] *The Monist*, April, 1892, p. 354.
[10] INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, October, 1897, p. 72.
[11] "Philosophical Problems, etc.," p. 67.

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this in words with which he opened an address on "The Scientific Basis of Religious Intuition" (*The Index*, May 27, 1886): "With a feeling of awe deep as our dependence on the Source of being, with a yearning for light wide as the marvel of creation, we, the children of fulfilling Fate, with open heart and ready will, are soliciting from our all-evolving mother some little insight into the true meaning of the life we bear." He asseverates the ultimate mystery in detail. "Nature's slightest manifestation is [finally] as inscrutable as its most formidable. Cohesion is no less enigmatical than vitality; the consistency of a grain of sand no less than that of an organic being." "Though vital organization can be proved to be the indispensable substratum of all consciousness, and with it of all actual social and ethical realization, we have no slightest clew as to how it comes to be."[12] "The properties of the molecule of water are even less intelligible to us than the properties of the living molecule. Of the former we possess only a mediate knowledge; of the latter, also some little immediate knowledge."[13] The creative aspect and mystery of gravitation, cohesion, chemical attraction, etc., are set forth in a remarkable article in *The Index,* Nov. 5, 1885 (particularly pp. 223-225). In the light of all this, one can understand an assertion once made by Dr. Montgomery that there is "a naturalistic mysticism as well as a transcendental one."

But though the intimate nature of the creative activity is unknown, Montgomery holds that the order of the cosmos, its perpetual drift toward development and evident success in the formation of organic beings, indicate a teleological bent ("Philosophical Problems, etc.," p. 388). Man is the "ultimate triumphant achievement" of this activity; Montgomery even says, "We are the *children* of whatever with toil and victory is sustaining and uplifting this natural creation." The problem for man then

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[12] International Journal of Ethics, October, 1897, p. 72.
[13] *Mind*, xx, p. 13.

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is to remember the methods by which he has come to be what he is and to coöperate with the creative activity in carrying the process still farther. Though consciousness itself is forceless, it is light by which the real power-endowed agent may be guided (or rather may guide himself). Indeed this conscious, voluntary activity is what distinguishes man, and compared with this microcosm, sentient and cognizant of supreme wealth and worth, "the infinite starry heavens, dotted with huge insentiently seething masses, are but raw material in a more or less advanced state of elaboration" ("Philosophical Problems, etc.," p. 443). This last product, or child, can do what insentient, unconscious things cannot do and what without him cannot be done. Hence ethics. It has an objective and genuinely naturalistic foundation. It does not consist in ideals, save as these are in harmony with and indeed born of the creative process—continuing its drift or bent or spirit, even when it does not copy. For instance: The feeling of hunger indicates an organic need and prompts to action to meet the need, and with this satisfaction of the need there is pleasure. But the pleasure is an incident, a mere by-play, in the vital process. In the same way, the sexual appetite is a means to an end vastly more significant than any pleasure that attends its gratification. Animals may have no consciousness of all this; man has. Montgomery remarks that the entodermic organization in man and the higher animals is much the same; it is the ectodermic organization, "brain and brawn," that is different; and in virtue of his brain (of what it stands for) man sees the reason and law of things, and hence if he disregards this, and acts for pleasure simply, reckless of what pleasure should serve, he degrades himself. Montgomery is strongly anti-hedonistic, and he carries this view through the whole gamut of pleasurable sensations and self-gratifications. "Not self-satisfaction even of the most ideal kind ought to be made the aim of human life, but higher organization through rational, ethical and æsthet-

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ical transformation of our environment, and therewith of the relations connecting us with the same."[14] All pleasures and satisfactions are momentary or fleeting sensations, and our actions, at least true moral actions, have a more significant and lasting outcome than this; they assist in building up the permanent structure of life. This structure is above all the ectodermic, which the entodermic normally subserves; it is the life, that is, of outside relations, the life of commerce with the great world beyond ourselves. Of this world, the most significant part is our fellow-men. Our higher being is organized in and through and with society. Cut off from social relations, our moral and mental life alike become atrophied. This is the way in which nature has made man, and he must continue in this way to remain a man; yes, he must perfect society and social institutions to become more a man. Montgomery is anti-individualist in his economic and political views, though these are only hinted at in "Philosophical Problems, etc."

But, though the ideals of morality are thus predetermined, and immoral and irrational conduct finds its final definition as that which is averse to the developmental course of nature ("Philosophical Problems, etc.," p. 444), we human beings, even in coöperating with nature, are dependent upon it. Dr. Montgomery even speaks of our "mission," of the "task allotted to us by whatever is underlying nature and its unaccountable growth": the bond between the mystic creative activity and ourselves is close. And yet, in accomplishing our "task," what we do is little to what the creative power does with us. It is our nature and structure (faintly and imperfectly typified or symbolized in our nervous and muscular organization) that determines what we habitually do; but how does the structure arise? Our consciousness has little to do with it. "We practice gymnastics, but it is no doing of ours that increments of strength are added in conse-

[14] *The Index*, Dec. 25, 1884, p. 304.

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quence to our muscles. We learn a language, but it is no doing of ours that in consequence these words are structurally organized in the tissue of our brain. We undergo a lengthy course of education in order to become cultured beings, but we have to receive its realization, its structural fixation, from the creative power.''[15] How then are our conscious intentions and volitions to be understood? The answer is that they afford the occasion for what is done; as Dr. Montgomery once explained, ''We volitionally afford the occasion; the creative work takes place in the realm of extra-conscious existence.'' Another way in which Montgomery puts the matter is that we give the *direction* to the developmental process, but do not produce the developmental results. So close is the coöperation of human effort with the mystic creative power—or shall we reverently say, ''So nigh is God to man!''

Religion, in the customary sense, Doctor Montgomery does not seem to share. Songs of theistic praise and glorification, he has said, strike no sympathetic chord in his breast. He perceives nothing akin to human intelligence in whatever it is that underlies the course of natural events. Nothing leads him to believe that our joys and sorrows are felt anywhere but among ourselves. Nor does the cosmos itself, *i. e.*, the visible order outside us, awe him; ''surely,'' he says, ''there is no valid reason why we should humble ourselves in the presence of the inchoate immensities of the universe'' (''Philosophical Problems, etc.,'' p. 381). In an article already quoted, he expresses rather a sense of ''the appalling indifference, the cataclysmal, life-crushing outbreaks, the cold, merciless cruelty'' of creation outside man.[16] And yet the closing pages of ''Philosophical Problems, etc.,'' read almost like a pæan or a psalm. He speaks of the ''potencies'' that sweep through the universe and through

[15] From a letter. Most of the other unassigned quotations are from similar sources.

[16] *The Index*, May 27, 1886, p. 572.

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man's being, of the "wonders of their creative travail," of "joyfully and reverentially" recognizing all this, of life "thus tuned to the creative trend" as worth living. "Tuned to the creative trend"—it is the same as "devotion of our will to the undying aims of creation," of which he elsewhere speaks. Surely, if religion is the consciousness of the relation of the individual to the superindividual and eternal, then this man is not without it. And it is ethical religion, as Montgomery conceives it. Morality, the morality that ought to be, is identical with this religion—for it is just this practical response, the human obeying what is more than human, the human will subjecting itself to what is above all will. Montgomery once used this language: "Religion, clarified of its impurities, crystallizes in the clear-cut, lucid consistency of moral laws."[17] And the reconciliation of science with religion, he has said, "lies not in any intellectual penetration of the phenomenality of our world of sense," but "in humbly, exultingly accepting our living selves as a high-wrought result of formative power, individually intrusted with a grandly effective share in the transcendent work of creation."[18]

The above outline is sketchy, and no doubt faulty; but if it leads any earnest inquirer to the study of Montgomery's works and articles themselves, it will have served its purpose. At least its only other purpose is to acknowledge the profoundly stimulating and helpful influence which these works and articles have had upon the present writer. Once more he would say, after Hippocrates, what he once wrote on the title page of an early work by Dr. William James: "Godlike is the doctor who is also a philosopher."

William M. Salter.

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[17] *The New Ideal* (Boston), October, 1889, p. 167.
[18] *The Index*, Oct. 22, 1885, p. 201.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

ETHISCHE GRUNDFRAGEN. Von Dr. Gustav Störring, Ord. Professor der Philosophie an der Universität Zürich. Leipzig : W. Engelman, 1906. Pp. vii, 324.

This book is divided into three parts. The first part, which occupies more than two thirds of the whole, contains what the author calls an "exposition and critical appreciation of the ethical systems of the present day ;" and in this part far more space is given to the "expositions" than to the "critical appreciations." In the second part the author explains his "Own Ethical Principle." And the third part consists of what he calls a *Rechtfertigung der Forderung sittlichen Lebens.*

Professor Störring considers that the "ethical systems of the present day" are of five different kinds; to which he gives the names "Ethics of Eudæmonism," "Ethics of Vital Activities" (*Energistische Ethik*), "Ethics of Personality," "Ethics of Objective Spiritual Products," and "Metaphysical Ethics." But his "exposition" of these five kinds of ethical doctrine does not consist in telling us as clearly as possible exactly what he takes their characteristic principles to be and exactly how they differ from one another. Instead of doing this, he picks out certain writers, whom he takes to be typical representatives of the doctrines in question, and gives an account of the views of these writers. As representatives of Eudæmonism he chooses J. S. Mill and Spencer ; of the Ethics of Vital Activities, Paulsen; of the Ethics of Personality, Theodor Lipps; of the Ethics of Objective Spiritual Products, Wundt ; and of Metaphysical Ethics, Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann. His account of the two last, however, is very brief, and is confined, for the most part, to those of their ethical views which contain some reference to their peculiar metaphysical doctrines. Accordingly his "exposition of the ethical systems of the present day" consists almost exclusively in accounts of the views of Mill, Spencer, Paulsen, Lipps and Wundt.

And I think that the chief fault to be found with these accounts is that he includes in them brief statements of the writers' views on all sorts of points, with regard to which he does not explain how they are related to one another or to the main

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principles which he selects for critical appreciation. This is especially noticeable in his accounts of Spencer and Wundt. He seems to have aimed at giving a complete summary of the ethical views of these two writers, so that he includes a great mass of detail which seems to have no relevance to the main purpose of his book, and which he does not "appreciate" critically at all. And the same is true, to a lesser extent, of his accounts of Mill, Paulsen and Lipps. I think the book would have been much improved if he had omitted a great part of this detail, and had, instead, explained rather more clearly and fully exactly what views these writers hold on the comparatively few points which are relevant to those which he himself discusses.

As for his "critical appreciations" and his explanation of his "Own Moral Principle," he aims at expressing his views with very great accuracy and precision; but nevertheless I think he fails to make plain exactly what his view is in several very important respects.

In the first place, the main problem which he has set himself to solve is that of deciding what kinds of volition deserve to be called "moral" (*sittlich*) or have a "moral" value. And he lays it down as an universal rule that the "morality" of a volition always depends upon its "motive:" no volitions, he holds, are ever "moral" except those whose motives are of certain kinds. But this proposition of his is plainly only true if he is using the words "moral" and "moral value" in that strict and narrow sense which is most exactly rendered by the English phrase "morally good." None of his principles, therefore, can possibly be strictly true, unless he is confining himself to this narrow question of "moral goodness," and is not professing to deal with the wider question of what is "right." And yet he himself never explains that he is confining the word "moral" to the narrow sense : he does not seem to be clearly aware that there is any wider sense in which it can be used, or that many ethical writers have been mainly concerned with this wider problem.

In the second place he declares that the "morality" of a volition depends upon its *normal* effects—upon the effects, that is, which it produces "in the great majority of cases" His principles state that (provided the motive is also suitable) every volition which does *normally* produce certain specified

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effects is "moral;" and his language is misleading unless he also means to assert that no volition is moral which does not *normally* produce them. But, taken strictly, this implies that a properly motived volition which *normally* produces the specified effects will always be "moral," even under abnormal circumstances, when it fails to produce them; and also that no volition can ever be "moral" unless it does produce them *normally*. And both these implications are, I think, plainly false. We must admit that a volition which *normally* produces good effects may, in spite of the most excellent motives, be sometimes positively immoral; and also that a volition which *normally* produces bad effects may, under exceptional circumstances, be "moral." That is to say, none of Professor Störring's principles can possibly be strictly true, unless, where he uses the word "moral," we substitute the words "normally moral." He will then only be saying that a volition will *generally* be "moral" if (with a suitable motive) it *generally* produces certain specified effects; and also that no volition can be *generally* moral unless it *generally* produces such effects. And this, I think, may be true.

I think, therefore, that none of Professor Störring's principles can possibly be strictly true, unless we understand him (1) to be using the word "moral" in the strict sense of "morally good" and (2) to be also using it loosely as equivalent to "normally" or "generally" "moral." It is only with the first proviso that we can accept his principle that the "morality" of a volition always depends upon its motive; and it is only with the second that we can accept his principle that it always depends upon the volition's *normal* effects. And it is plain that these two provisos very much limit the range of the question which he has set himself to answer. But even if we understand his question to be limited in this manner, his answer to it is still very ambiguous in some important respects.

He professes to classify the contemporary systems which he criticises, not by their views as to the motive of moral volition, but by their views as to its normal effects. And I can best point out the ambiguity in his own views on this point by considering his attitude toward these other systems. It will be convenient, in the first instance, to take one of them only as an illustration; and I will take that which he calls "Eudæmonism."

He represents the Eudæmonists as holding that a volition

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is "moral" if (with a suitable motive) it normally produces the effect of promoting, as much as possible, pleasure in mankind generally, preference being given, in case of conflict, to "higher spiritual" pleasures over lower ones ; and as holding also that no volition is "moral" which does not normally produce this effect. No more than this, he seems to hold, is essential to Eudæmonism : anyone who does hold this is an Eudæmonist, whatever else he may affirm or deny. But now, what is his own attitude toward this position? Does he accept or reject it?

Curiously enough, he never answers this question at all ; he never tells us whether he accepts or rejects the Eudæmonist position, as thus defined. All that he does tell us on the point is as follows :

He distinguishes two classes of motive, a lower and a higher. And he tells us that with regard to all volitions, where the motive is only of the lower kind, the Eudæmonists are perfectly right. Any volition inspired by one of these lower motives is, he holds, always "moral" provided it normally produces the effect specified by the Eudæmonists ; and he implies, too, that no volition inspired by one of these lower motives is "moral" unless it normally produces this effect. Volitions inspired by a lower motive which do normally produce this effect he calls "simple" moral volitions ; and accordingly, with regard to the normal effects of "simple" moral volitions, he holds that the Eudæmonists are perfectly right. But with regard to volitions inspired by one of his higher motives, he does not tell us whether they are right or not. With regard to these he only tells us something else instead. He recognizes that some volitions may have the effect of promoting "simple" moral volitions themselves ; they may, that is, cause the agent himself or others to make a greater number of "simple" moral volitions than would otherwise be made. Other volitions, again, may have the effect of promoting, in the agent himself or in others, a peculiar kind of "Self-Reverence." And others again may have the effect of promoting a "Reverence for the Moral Law" based upon "Self-Reverence." And what he tells us with regard to volitions inspired by one of his higher motives is that these are "moral" if and only if they normally produce one or other of these three effects; if, that is to say, they normally promote as much as possible either "simple" moral

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volitions or "Self-Reverence" or "Reverence for the Moral Law." In short, volitions inspired by a higher motive are, in his view, "moral" if and only if they normally promote *morality itself* in one or other of these three forms ; and volitions which are inspired by a higher motive and do normally produce the effect of promoting morality he distinguishes as "higher" moral volitions, in contrast with the above-mentioned "simple" ones.

With regard, then, to the normal effects of moral volition, Professor Störring's own position may be roughly summed up in the two principles: That, with one kind of motive, volitions are "moral" if and only if they normally produce the Eudæmonist's effect ; and that, with another kind of motive, they are "moral" if and only if they normally produce the effect of promoting morality itself as much as possible. But obviously we cannot infer from this whether he accepts or rejects the Eudæmonist position. For it might be the case (as many Eudæmonists would say it is) that any volition which normally promotes morality as much as possible, does also normally produce a maximum of pleasure of the specified kind and *vice versa:* that, in short, every volition which normally produces the one effect also normally produces the other. And, if this is the case, then obviously Professor Störring's position is perfectly consistent with Eudæmonism. If his position is to be distinguished from Eudæmonism he must hold that some volitions which normally produce a maximum of morality do *not* normally produce a maximum of the right kind of pleasure, or that some which normally produce a maximum of the right kind of pleasure do *not* normally produce a maximum of morality. Unless he holds this, he is himself, by his own definition, an Eudæmonist. But curiously enough he never tells us whether he does hold this or not: he never discusses the question at all.

Owing, therefore, to his failure to consider this question, Professor Störring's attitude to Eudæmonism is completely ambiguous. And his attitude toward the "Ethics of Vital Activities" and the "Ethics of Objective Spiritual Products" is also ambiguous for a similar reason.

The "Ethics of Vital Activities" he defines as holding that (with a suitable motive) any volition is "moral" which normally produces the effect of promoting, as much as possible, "vital activities" *(Lebensbetätigungen)* in mankind generally,

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preference being given, in case of conflict, to "higher spiritual" activities over lower ones; and as holding that no volition is "moral" which does not normally produce this effect. And with regard to this system he makes it plain that, in his opinion, every volition which normally produces this effect also normally produces that specified by the Eudæmonists, and *vice versa.* But curiously enough he seems never to have thought of asking himself the precisely similar question whether it be not true that every volition which normally produces this effect also normally produces a maximum of morality, and *vice versa;* and whether, therefore, his own system does not stand both to Eudæmonism and to the "Ethics of Vital Activities" in exactly the same relation in which, according to him, they stand to one another—the relation, that is to say, of perfect mutual consistency. As it is, his attitude toward the "Ethics of Vital Activities" is ambiguous in precisely the same manner as his attitude toward Eudæmonism. He holds that this system, too, is perfectly right with regard to the normal effects of "simple" moral volitions; but whether it is also right with regard to the normal effects of "higher" moral volitions, and therefore of *all* moral volitions, he never tells us.

And with regard to the "Ethics of Objective Spiritual Products" he is equally ambiguous. With regard to this system, indeed, he tells us even less than with regard to the other two. He defines it roughly as holding that (where the motive is also suitable) a volition is "moral" if and only if it normally promotes as much as possible such products of social life as "art, science and culture in general." And as regards its truth he only tells us vaguely that the promotion of these products is both a necessary condition and an effect of the promotion of pleasure and of "simple" moral volitions. As to whether every volition which normally promotes these products *as much as possible* also normally promotes the other two effects *as much as possible,* and *vice versa,* he does not tell us. And yet it is solely on this question that there depends the question whether his own principle is or is not perfectly consistent with the principle of this system also.

Accordingly Professor Störring has left it quite uncertain whether his "Own Ethical Principle" is or is not perfectly consistent with those of Mill and Paulsen and Wundt, as he represents them. He has left it uncertain, because he has failed to

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consider whether or not every volition which normally produces a maximum of morality also normally produces a maximum of the effects specified by them, and *vice versa*. And yet upon this very question, which he has completely failed to consider, there depends, I think, not merely the question what his attitude to these other systems is, but also the question whether his own principles are true. He holds, we have seen, that with certain kinds of motive a volition is "moral" if and only if it normally produces a maximum of morality, and he holds also that, with certain other kinds of motive, a volition is moral if and only if it produces a maximum of the right kind of pleasure. These are his two principles: and he calls the former kind of moral volitions "higher," and the latter "simple." But both principles, I think, cannot possibly be true, unless every "higher" moral volition does *also* normally produce a maximum of the right kind of pleasure, and unless every "simple" moral volition does *also* normally produce a maximum of morality. For every volition which does *not* normally produce a maximum of pleasure must normally produce *less* than a maximum—that is to say, it must normally *hinder* the promotion of such a maximum, and similarly every volition which does *not* normally produce a maximum of morality must normally *hinder* the promotion of such a maximum. And hence unless every "higher" moral volition does normally promote a maximum of pleasure, some of these volitions must normally *hinder* its promotion; and unless every "simple" moral volition does normally promote a maximum of morality, some of these volitions must positively *hinder* the promotion of morality. But, in that case, Professor Störring's two principles will imply that, with one kind of motive, a volition cannot be "moral" unless it normally promotes an end which, with another kind of motive, it is often moral positively to hinder: and this, I think, cannot possibly be true. If, therefore, his two principles are both to be true, it must, I think, be true that every one of his "higher" moral volitions does normally produce a maximum of the right kind of pleasure *as well as* a maximum of morality, and that every one of his "simple" moral volitions does normally produce a maximum of morality *as well as* a maximum of the right kind of pleasure. And it is extremely unlikely that this would be true, if any volition at all which normally produced the one effect normally failed to

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produce the other. But if this is so, then it is extremely unlikely that Professor Störring's "Own Ethical Principle" is true, unless Eudæmonism is true also.

The truth is, I think, that one reason why Professor Störring has not perceived this and why he has not discussed the question whether his own principle does or does not conflict in any way with those of Mill and Paulsen and Wundt, as he represents them, is because he has not clearly distinguished the question as to what the normal effects of moral volition *actually* are from another quite different type of question. To the question, what *actually* are the normal effects of moral volition, many different answers may all be equally correct. Many different answers will in fact be so, provided only that every kind of volition which normally produces the one kind of effect also normally produces the other; and hence, in order to decide whether two different answers are or are not compatible, it is absolutely necessary to enter into this question of fact. And, as a matter of fact, so far as I can see, both Professor Störring's own answer and also those of Mill and Paulsen and Wundt may all be equally and perfectly correct. But there is another quite different type of question, to which this question of fact is quite irrelevant: namely the question which of two different effects it *would* be moral to promote, in case they *did* conflict. This second type of question cannot be decided at all by merely considering what the normal effects of moral volitions actually are; and it is, I think, chiefly because Professor Störring has not clearly distinguished between the two questions that he has given a satisfactory answer to neither. He obviously sometimes has questions of this second type in his mind, for he expresses opinions on them; but he expresses opinions on them only quite incidentally, and, so far as I can see, only in two instances. He is, in fact, expressing such an opinion where he says, as we have seen, that "higher spiritual" pleasures and activities are, in case of conflict, to be preferred to lower ones. And he does seem also to hold that the promotion of morality should, in case of conflict, be preferred to any other effect whatever. But he entirely fails to discuss any of the questions which are relevant to the truth of these two opinions. In the former case he leaves it quite uncertain upon what grounds his opinion is based; and it should be noticed that he finally identifies "higher" pleasures and activities with those which are "more

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highly evolved''—thus giving his principle a form in which, I think, it is certainly not strictly true. And in the latter case the reason which he gives for his opinion is, I think, definitely fallacious. He holds that volitions in which both motive and normal effect are the promotion of morality, always have a *higher moral value* than those which are made for the sake of promoting any other effect; and he seems to infer from this that, in case of conflict, the maximum promotion of morality should always be preferred to any other effect. But the inference is certainly illegitimate. The mere fact (if it be a fact) that volitions which both aim at and succeed in promoting morality always *actually* have a higher moral value than others, does not prove that they always *would* have it, even if the maximum promotion of morality were to conflict with other effects, with which, as a matter of fact, it does not conflict. On the contrary the admission that they always *actually* have a higher moral value than other volitions is quite consistent with the view that, if the maximum promotion of morality *were* to conflict with certain other effects, volitions which promoted it, so far from having the highest moral value, would sometimes be positively immoral.

The above are, I think, the main points in Professor Störring's treatment of the *effects* of ''moral'' volition. As regards its ''motives'' his view is at all events clearer. As I have said, he distinguishes two classes of motives, a higher and a lower; and holds that (where the normal effects are also suitable) volitions inspired by a higher motive always have a higher moral value than those inspired by a lower one. And he holds that a higher motive is present when and (with one exception) only when a volition is made *for the sake of* promoting morality itself, in one of the three forms specified; *i. e.,* for the sake of promoting either ''simple'' moral volitions or Self-Reverence or Reverence for the Moral Law. On the other hand, the motive is lower when a volition is made *for the sake of* promoting any other effect; and he specifies a good many such motives, with regard to which he insists that (where the effect is also suitable) they do give a real, though only a ''lower,'' ''moral value'' to volitions. And it is this recognition that motives other than the promotion of morality itself do give a real (though only a lower) moral value to volitions, which constitutes his chief definite criticism upon other supporters of the ''Ethics

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of Personality." He seems to hold that his own view may be justly called a form of the "Ethics of Personality;" but other representatives of this doctrine have, he says, held, with Kant, that no volition has any "moral value" at all unless it is definitely made for the sake of promoting morality in some form or other; and in this respect he holds they are wrong.

As for the justice of his views about "motives," it is, I think, certainly true that there is a sense in which no volition has a strictly "moral" value unless its motive is of a certain kind; so that, provided he is confining the word "moral" to this strict sense, his general proposition that the "morality" of a volition always does depend upon its motive is true. Only, as I have said, he does not seem clearly to recognize that the word "moral" is ever used in any other sense. Supposing, however, that he is speaking of "moral value" only in this strict sense, he is, I think, undoubtedly also right in holding that motives other than the promotion of morality itself may give a real moral value to volitions. The chief criticism to be made upon his views is, I think, that he has certainly not given (as he professes to do) a really exhaustive account of all the different ways in which a variation of motive may affect the moral value of a volition; and that it is doubtful whether some of the things which he does say on this head are correct. Even if we admit (and even this I cannot see clearly) that volitions made for the sake of promoting morality itself always (where the effect is also suitable) have a higher moral value than any made for the sake of promoting any other effect, it still seems far from obvious that, among these, those made for the sake of promoting "Self-Reverence" always have a higher moral value than those made for the sake of promoting "simple" moral volitions, and still less obvious that those made for the sake of promoting "Reverence for the Moral Law" have the highest value of all. Moreover it should be noted that he takes no account at all of any difference which may be made in the moral value of volitions by mixture of motive, or by the quality and intensity of the feelings toward those effects, for the sake of which the volition is made.

As for Professor Störring's final section, which he calls a *Rechtfertigung der Forderung sittlichen Lebens,* it is, I think, extremely difficult to understand exactly what he intends to prove by it. His professed object is to defend "the validity

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of morality," in some sense or other, against the views of "moral skeptics," and the greater part of the section is occupied with accounts of the views of certain "moral skeptics" both ancient and modern, and criticisms upon particular points in their views. But what exactly does Professor Störring mean when he says that "morality is valid"? His "positive" argument in favor of its validity seems to consist in an attempt to show, by "psycho-genetic" considerations, that so long as certain "permanent and universal functions" of the human mind remain what they are now and always have been, men always will make the "moral valuations" which he has expressed in his principle. But this implies that they do now make, and always have made, these valuations; and in what sense is this true? Does he really mean to assert that men always have attached a moral value to those volitions, and only to those, which his principle declares to be moral? The claim would seem to be monstrous; and certainly he says nothing sufficient to prove it. And yet, unless he does mean to make this monstrous claim, his argument obviously cannot prove that "morality is valid" in the sense of proving that any particular kind of volition really is and will continue to be "moral." For, unless he makes this claim, he must admit that men may sometimes value volitions which are not really "moral," and fail to value those which are really "moral;" and hence that the question whether a particular volition is and will continue to be really "moral" can, in no case, be decided by proving that men will continue to value it.

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Die Kultur der Gegenwart. Ihre Entwicklung und ihre Ziele. Herausgegeben von Paul Hinneberg. Teil I, Abteilung VI. Systematische Philosophie. Von W. Dilthey, A. Riehl, W. Wundt, W. Ostwald, H. Ebbinghaus, R. Eucken, Fr. Paulsen, W. Muench, Th. Lipps. Berlin und Leipzig: Druck und Verlag von B. G. Teubner, 1907. Pp. viii, 432.

Under the editorship of Prof. Paul Hinneberg, of Berlin, the well-known firm of B. G. Teubner is publishing a comprehensive work on the evolution and aims of contemporary civilization. The object of the undertaking is to present a broad and sys-

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tematic view of our civilization and to trace it to its origins. The chief results of the different fields of knowledge and their applications, their significance for modern culture as well as for future progress, are to be set forth in broad outlines by the leading representatives of the various sciences and their technologies. The plan of the work embraces four large divisions, Parts I and II dealing with the mental sciences (religion and philosophy, literature, music and art, the state and society, law and economics); Part III with the natural sciences (mathematics, the inorganic and organic sciences, medicine); and Part IV with their technical applications (architectural, mechanical, industrial, agricultural, commercial technology). Thus far, six volumes of Part I and one volume of Part II have come from the press, bearing the following titles: "The General Foundations of Contemporary Civilization;" "The Oriental Religions;" "The Christian Religion, including Israelitic-Jewish Religion;" "Systematic Philosophy;" "The Oriental Literatures;" "The Greek and Latin Literatures and Languages;" "Systematic Jurisprudence." These volumes are intended for the general educated reader and have already found their way into many German homes, but they cannot fail to be of interest and value even to those who possess a wider and more technical knowledge of the different branches of learning represented. In giving a bird's-eye view of the various sciences, in placing before one the main results achieved as well as pointing out new problems and indicating the lines of future progress in each field, they render a service which cannot be performed too often.

Volume VI, the book before us, deals with systematic philosophy and contains the following contributions: "The Nature of Philosophy," by Wilhelm Dilthey (pp. 1-72); "Logic and Epistemology," by Alois Riehl (pp. 73-102); "Metaphysics," by Wilhelm Wundt (pp. 103-137); "The Philosophy of Nature," by Wilhelm Ostwald (pp. 138-172); "Psychology," by Hermann Ebbinghaus (pp. 173-246); "The Philosophy of History," by Rudolf Eucken (pp. 247-281); "Ethics," by Friedrich Paulsen (pp. 282-312); "Pedagogy," by Wilhelm Muench (pp. 313-348); "Æsthetics," by Theodor Lipps (pp. 349-388); "The Problems of the Philosophy of the Future," by Friedrich Paulsen (pp. 389-422). All these contributors are scholars of recognized ability whose names inspire con-

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fidence and whose words carry authority with them. The articles are popular in the best sense of the term; they are written by masters, presented in clear and intelligible language, as free as possible from subtleties of thought and expression, brief in compass without being overcrowded with material demanding fuller treatment, and altogether suited to the needs of the persons for whom they are meant.

As an expression of German philosophical thought to-day, this sixth volume has particular value for us. It is interesting to observe that most of the articles deal with fundamental philosophical problems, and that nearly all of them are characterized by a tendency to idealism. The former distrust of metaphysics, which accompanied the triumphal march of the natural sciences during the nineteenth century, seems to be growing somewhat weaker; the metaphysical instinct is too strong to be completely and permanently stifled; metaphysics will out. Wundt, Ostwald, Eucken and Paulsen are all metaphysicians; they all regard the attempt to reach a consistent *Weltanschauung* as a legitimate and necessary effort of thought. They all point out the inadequacy of the materialistic solutions of the world problem, and most of them incline toward a monistic idealism in some form or other. This reaction in favor of the discussion of ultimate questions is not peculiar to the professional philosophers; indeed, it is perhaps stronger with certain leaders of science than with the *Fachphilosophen*. We have only to refer to Ostwald, Haeckel and Mach, thinkers who proclaim themselves as opposed to metaphysics, but who are metaphysicians none the less, "Metaphysiker wider Willen," as Wundt aptly calls them. And in other departments of research, in mathematics, theology, sociology, jurisprudence, we find the same revival of speculation; everywhere attempts are being made "to see things together," to transcend the merely factual, to construct systems.

At the same time it is not the old rationalistic metaphysics of Spinoza, Leibniz and Wolff that is advocated in this book. The old faith in logic-proof systems, in demonstrable constructions of thought, is dead. The empirical-speculative method has taken the place of the logical-dialectical method. Indeed, says Paulsen, metaphysical speculations do not lie within the province of real scientific knowledge. "At the same time it is not possible for human thinking to halt at the boundaries of what is

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scientifically known. The human mind cannot stop with the fragments of knowledge which it has so diligently gathered in the natural sciences and in history; it has an interest, a profound theoretic interest, in the whole, in the solution of questions concerning the nature and connection of all things" (p. 409). And after all, Paulsen thinks, this is Kant's meaning also; he rejects metaphysics as *a priori* necessary scientific truth, *i. e.*, the *aprioristic* form of the old systems, but has no objection to a philosophy which modestly undertakes to construct a theory of reality on the basis of facts. Wundt exhibits a similar modesty in discussing the function of philosophy. The philosopher, he declares, ought to decide not to begin anew the task of solving the world problem in all its parts; he ought to take up the attempts at such solutions as are indicated by the different sciences, compare them with each other, weigh carefully their different claims, and, so far as possible, carry them to their legitimate conclusions (p. 133). It is his business to judge between the pretensions made by the particular sciences, and to resolve their contradictions, always having a strict regard for the general principles of epistemology. The fundamental presupposition of a philosophical metaphysics is that the different parts of human knowledge cannot contradict each other, and that where such contradictions exist the cause lies not in the nature of things, but in our one-sided or erroneous conceptions. We must never forget, however, first, that no other reality exists for us than the world of phenomena, and, secondly, that we cannot deduce from the ultimate notions, to which we ascend in metaphysics from the particular fields of research, these same particular facts, as the physicist deduces certain natural phenomena from fixed presuppositions. Ostwald's general point of view does not differ materially from that of Wundt and Paulsen. What he calls *Naturphilosophie* is as much metaphysics as the systems of Wundt and Paulsen; it is simply the *Weltanschauung* of a natural scientist. The philosophy of nature in the modern sense, he tells us, means nothing but a synthesis of our total knowledge of nature, taking this word in the broadest sense. Hence it does not differ in aim from the philosophy of nature of earlier periods, but in its method it has come to recognize the duty of applying within its entire field the tool of scientific criticism which has been fashioned and is being constantly improved (p. 171). Ostwald,

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as we see, betrays the same weak faith characteristic of modern metaphysics; he, too, despairs of reaching absolute truths in natural philosophy. Mankind, according to him, is engaged in the task of extending and intensifying its most general notions; but these do not, at any fixed period, represent a system absolutely valid for all future times. But, we are thankful to note, this relativism does not prevent Ostwald from plunging right into metaphysics and offering a system of thought that aims to explain every known fact of the universe.

Dilthey accepts the view of metaphysics which is held by the thinkers just mentioned. For him, too, its aim is to solve the problem of the world and of life, and its form is universal validity. But Dilthey regards the problem as insoluble. With one of its aspects metaphysics faces religion and poetry, with the other the particular sciences. But it is not science in the sense of the particular sciences, nor is it art or religion. Philosophy cannot penetrate the essence of the world through a system of metaphysics and give a universally valid proof of such knowledge. But just as in every serious creation of art a phase of life not seen before is revealed to us, just as poetry places before us the different sides of life in works that are eternally new, and just as we possess in no work of art the total view of life and yet approximate this total view through them all, so one and the same world confronts us in the typical world-views. Each one represents this world as it appears when a mighty personality subordinates the other possible attitudes to one of them, and brings under the categories contained in this attitude all the other categories (p. 61). We can perceive only one side of our relation to the world, never our total relation, as it would be defined by the union of the different categories of being, cause, value and purpose. This is one reason for the impossibility of metaphysics. Another reason lies in the nature of these categories or attitudes themselves. We can deduce neither change nor plurality from the unchangeable unity. An absolute value is a postulate, but not a realizable concept. And we cannot discover a highest or absolute end since this presupposes an absolute value. Dilthey finds that the influence of metaphysics is constantly waning, but that philosophical thinking is gaining in importance in science and in literature.

Philosophy for Dilthey is therefore possible only as a universal theory of knowledge. In this sense philosophy is the

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fundamental science which studies the form, laws and connections of all thought-processes having universal knowledge as their goal. As logic it examines the conditions of evidence, as epistemology it examines the validity of the presuppositions of our knowledge: the consciousness of the reality of experience and the objectivity of external perception. It clears up the methods of the particular sciences by means of general logic; it brings unity and connection into the conceptions which have been developed in the sciences; it examines the presuppositions, the aims and the limits of the particular sciences; and applies the results thus gained to the problem of the inner structure and connections in the two great groups of natural sciences and mental sciences (pp. 63, 64).

We have here the familiar Neo-Kantian interpretation of philosophy as logic and theory of knowledge. A similar standpoint is held by Riehl in his paper on "Logic and Theory of Knowledge," which is a good survey of the whole field. Logic is the doctrine of the form of science in general; it is the most universal science, which therefore cannot and need not be proved. Epistemology or the theory of knowledge has for its problems the origin of knowledge, its reality and the determination of its limits (p. 88). Apriorism and evolutionism do not exclude each other; the view that Darwin has refuted Kant can no longer be held (p. 90). Indeed, Riehl holds, Kant's critical philosophy has the same mission to perform to-day as it formerly performed: to put an end to the doubts in the certainty and reality of experiential knowledge which have found their way even into scientific circles (p. 94). The principles of our knowledge of experience are immutable; only the experiences under the control of these principles are constantly advancing (p. 99).

We see, for the epistemologist there is a limit to evolutionism; something must persist in the flux of knowledge; the guiding principles do not change. In his suggestive and instructive paper on the "Philosophy of History," Eucken makes use of this idea. A real truth, he says, can nevermore pretend to be valid for a mere space of time; it holds absolutely, without relation to time. It does not become temporal by being in time for man; rather, this is the main reason of its greatness and the chief motive of its efficiency—that it transposes life to a timeless reality. It is not otherwise with the good which is

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thereby most sharply distinguished from the useful. For the latter is bound to its place in time, and what suits one age may be harmful to another; but the good leads to an elevation beyond all temporal changes because it does not from the outset aim at action in mere time, but unfolds a new order over and above the temporal order (p. 270). Truth and goodness, however, do not realize *themselves* in history, according to Eucken. The world-process is not driven forward by the inevitable necessity of reason, as some of the idealistic interpreters of the world and of history teach. The spiritual life does not directly realize itself in history; it is placed before us as an ideal which demands our recognition and acceptance. Eucken preaches a vigorous ethical idealism. We must fight for the rational character of our life and for the spiritual line of progress. Our spiritual life and its forms are the products of our own acts and decisions (p. 278). For that reason it is especially the great personalities that count, for these personalities are never mere products of the social environment. What makes greatness great is the fact that in it the spiritual stage becomes a complete end in itself. Great personalities do not rise out of the times, but raise the times up to them. Hence there can be no philosophy in the sense of a construction of history, or the establishment of a comprehensive formula permitting the calculation of the future. But we can and must have the philosophical conviction which endeavors to find an inner relation of this field to the whole of life and seeks to illuminate it from the standpoint of the whole, and there is no reason why this should not be called the philosophy of history (p. 280).

The papers on Psychology, Ethics, Pedagogy and Æsthetics are written by authorities in these fields and will prove most helpful to general students of philosophy. Ebbinghaus's account of psychology is based upon his "Grundzüge der Psychologie," the second volume of which, unfortunately, has not yet been published, but has been utilized by the author in preparing the present outline. It offers a clear presentation of the history of psychology, sharply distinguishes the stages of progress in the development of this science, discusses the ever-interesting problem of the relation between the body and mind, and studies both the elementary and the more complex forms of mental life. It is one of the virtues of German experimental psychologists that they do not limit themselves to a study of ele-

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mentary mental processes, but pay attention to such forms as are treated by Ebbinghaus in his last section: speech, thought, belief, religion, art, morality. It must be confessed, however, that this section is the most superficial part of Ebbinghaus's presentation. Paulsen's account of ethics is founded upon his "System der Ethik," a book which is almost as well known in America as in Germany. No contemporary philosopher excels Paulsen in the ability to express his thoughts with clearness, force and precision; and none is better fitted to act in the *rôle* assigned to him by the editor of this volume. Both his contributions, the one on ethics and the one on the future problems of philosophy, from which we have already quoted, are fine specimens of the popular presentation of philosophical problems. His ethical standpoint, which he calls teleological energism, is brought into harmony with his idealistic monism. One of the best papers in the volume is that on Pedagogy by Muench. The writer possesses great clearness of vision and sanity of judgment. He discusses many important educational problems, states the solutions which have been offered to them, and shows what is good and what is bad in the different programs of education. He is gifted with an hospitable mind; he does not blindly follow German custom, but knows and appreciates the efforts which are being made in other countries to solve educational problems. The bibliography given by him is one of the best in the book.

Lipps's article on Æsthetics reproduces the views presented in his large work on "Æsthetik, Psychologie des Schönen und der Kunst," the first two volumes of which have appeared. The editor could hardly have found a more thorough student of the subject than this scholar of Munich. According to Lipps, the future problems of Æsthetics are: to work out more accurately the notion of *Einfühlung,* which has come to play such an important part in German æsthetics; to establish more definitely the general formal æsthetic principles and the possibility of their application to particular cases; and to point out more clearly the uniqueness of æsthetic evaluation and æsthetic judgment. This work presupposes a thorough knowledge of psychology, which only the psychological expert can lay claim to possessing. But, he declares, it is not enough to base æsthetics on psychology. There is needed also exact observation of countless beautiful forms, mathematically exact observation, for ex-

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ample, of even the smallest and simplest architectonic forms. Lipps also reminds us in this connection that the infinite wealth of our emotional life is not exhausted by the monotonous antithesis of pleasure and pain. A mere pleasure-pain psychology cannot reach the essence of æsthetic feeling. He also repudiates the attempts of the psychologists who seek to reduce all æsthetic feelings to bodily and organic sensations.

The publishers of the work deserve credit for the excellent way in which they have solved the technical problems of this great enterprise, for the fine typography, the good paper, printing and binding. The volume is supplied with a table of contents and an index. Bibliographical references are appended to the different papers, but they are as a rule very unsatisfactory. In a work of this kind which is intended for the general reader, well-selected lists of books would prove very helpful, and the value of the different contributions would have been enhanced by the insertion of completer bibliographies. This, however, is a defect that can be remedied in future editions, and it is to be hoped that the publishers will insist on its being done.

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THE KEY TO THE WORLD'S PROGRESS. By Charles Stanton Devas. London: Longmans Green & Co., 1906.

It is an ungracious task to criticise this book. Its author is evidently informed by a deeply religious spirit. He is also well and honorably known as a writer on economic questions. His historical knowledge, if neither very critical nor very accurate, has at least a wide sweep and is not defaced by violent or uncharitable prejudice. Yet his book from beginning to end is a distortion of history all the more gross that it is apparently quite unconscious and sincere. Far from being a key to the world's progress, it is the demonstration that the actual world has not followed the true line of progress, that it has proved itself a refractory lock into which the key will by no means fit.

"We need," says Mr. Devas, "an imperial theory of history." Nothing can be more true. But nothing can be less imperial than the theory he has provided. It is provincial in the last degree, and even in the short time which has elapsed since his

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book was written, events have happened to rob his theory of its whole significance for even that petty and ever-dwindling province to which it refers. Verbally, at least, the theory of Mr. Devas is that the history of the Church of Christ is the key to world history, that "church history is all important for the understanding of universal history and for our mental outfit." Really it is that the key to world-history is to be found in the history of the Roman Church. But even this is too liberal an interpretation of his actual thesis. For the Roman Church of which he speaks and thinks throughout is the Roman Church which is identical with the present mood and form of authority within that church. It is the church expressing its mind and will through the medium provided and sanctioned by the Vatican Decrees of 1870 that for Mr. Devas is alone divine, that is the Christian Church which has worked throughout the ages as the divine leaven in the world-lump. This conception of the Christian Church has made the development of Mr. Devas' thesis tolerable perhaps as a piece of sectarian apologetic, but utterly untrustworthy as a guide to the reading of history.

The irritation which one feels with this book is due to the fact that it has wantonly missed its mark. If Mr. Devas had only taken the religious experience of the Roman Church as representative of all other religious experience instead of making it exclusive and peculiar, he would have succeeded in his aim. The picture which he has drawn of the Roman communion has indeed a certain faithfulness to fact; but that picture would correspond, with the same kind of faithfulness, to the history of any other Christian communion, indeed we may say of any religious society whatsoever. It may be natural, while the *odium theologicum* inspires our estimates of the religious value of different religious societies, that the apologist of each communion should quite honestly claim for it a monopoly of divine guidance and divine truth. But the facts of history will repudiate his claim. He remains an apologist merely, and must renounce all right to the title of historian.

The larger and more important section of Mr. Devas' book is devoted to the study of the antinomies presented by the history of the church, as he understands the church. The church appears to oppose intellectual civilization and yet fosters it; appears to oppose material civilization and yet fosters it; teaches a morality which is austere and yet joyful; is the rival

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and yet the ally of the state; upholds the equality of men and yet the inequality of property and power; is full of scandals and yet all-holy; upholds and yet opposes religious freedom and liberty of conscience; is one and yet has to endure the fact of a divided Christendom; is ever the same yet ever changing; is ever being defeated yet ever victorious. Now of some of these antinomies it may be said that they are characteristic of all societies whatsoever, whether religious or not, while the others are specially characteristic of all religious societies. Indeed one feels that this book is neither a contribution to the understanding of general history nor even an effective apology for the Roman Church, but merely an essay in the psychology of human associations founded on the history of the church as seen from a special, and that a very narrow, point of view. The Church of Rome presents most of the antinomies which Mr. Devas enumerates simply because it is a society and not because it is a specially divine society. Every society remains the same and yet is always changing, is marked by victory and defeat throughout its life. And as to the latter antinomy, it is impossible for the historian, while the society still exists, to strike the balance or to declare the issue. The greatest victory of the society may be that which it procures by its own death, by the ultimate sacrifice of its phenomenal existence. As Mr. Tyrrell, whom Mr. Devas is fond of quoting in support of his own position, has said with regard to the destiny of the Catholic Church itself: "May not Catholicism, like Judaism, have to die in order that it may live again in a greater and grander form? Has not every organism its limit of development, after which it must decay and be content to survive in its progeny?"

And again, is not every society, by its very constitution, the enemy and yet the ally of progress, intellectual or material? A society comes into existence for the very purpose of giving effect to some new aspect of truth or utility, of working out that aspect to its logical conclusion. And by this limitation of its aim it is forced into an attitude of hostility to every new aspect of truth or utility as alien or conflicting, though again the exigencies of its continued life will force it, equally on behalf of that aim, to make terms with such aspects as they appear. Instinctively it resists progress; of necessity it accepts it.

But it may be admitted that some of these antinomies are specially characteristic of the Roman Church. The admission,

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however, contributes little to our understanding of her history as the key to the world's progress. The church, for instance, has been the rival and yet the ally of the state. The rival certainly, and often the jealous and hostile rival just where jealousy and hostility to the state were least inspired by purely religious interests. As to the alliance, it might be necessary, before pronouncing a verdict upon its value to the world's progress, to scrutinize its conditions. The truth is that there are few more discreditable pages in history than those which chronicle the relations of church and state in the West, and that the balance of discredit does not lie with the state. The ideal of the Roman Church is still the medieval theocracy, and that ideal has always been more disastrous to the interest of religion than the common sense of mankind has ever allowed it to be to the interests of the secular community. The fact of history is that the church would have suppressed the state at all times, would have made it an obedient slave to its own theocratic absolutism, and could never learn to be satisfied with trusting it to prove its own independent religious and moral inspiration. It is just in the countries of the Roman obedience that the state has become most notably atheistic, and that through the necessity of resisting these absurd and intolerable claims.

The real antinomy disclosed in Mr. Devas' pages is daily and with increasing rapidity being resolved quite otherwise than he thinks. It is the antinomy not of the church and the world, not even of the Roman Church and all other world-forces, but of the Roman Church committed to a certain view of authority and all actual world-forces whatever, including forces which are alive and vigorous at this hour in the Roman Church itself. And all these forces have, in obedience to the inexorable dictates of life and development, rejected once and for all the view of authority which Rome has inherited from Gregory VII, Innocent III, and Boniface VIII. The resolution of the conflict, therefore, is not doubtful; it is already assured. If the religious witness of Rome is to be preserved to the world, Rome must submit in this matter of authority to the terms which the progressive forces of the world are in a position to dictate, which indeed they must dictate in obedience to an inspiration which is more divine than a medieval conception of authority already outworn, henceforth obsolete.

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Yet the religious witness of Rome will not be lost, for the simple reason that no witness to truth is ever lost. And such witness Rome has preserved and still preserves in spite of the almost impossible conditions on which she insists for its preservation. One thing is certain, however, *viz.*, that the same religious witness is being preserved more effectually, if perhaps also in a more fragmentary form, by other Christian societies which have not imposed on themselves the same disastrous disabilities. Rome may boast of her integral witness to religion. But what avails its integral character if she cannot bring it near to the world's heart and will? The real antinomies of life are not resolved by a conflict between two imaginary societies "of good and evil all compact," the church and the world. They can be resolved only through the conflict of two undeniably universal forces—the real church and the real world, the divine-human and the human that would ignore its own constitutive divine inspiration—in each human heart and in every association, whatever its immediate aim, of human hearts and wills. And the Spirit which alone can achieve this resolution "bloweth where it listeth," and not only in the religious preserve of the Roman Church, where indeed it is just now sore let and hindered by impossible conditions.

A. L. LILLEY.

London.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. By Frederic Harrison. Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1907. Pp. xxxvii, 433.

In the war which raged between science and religion from about 1850 to 1880, it seemed that no quarter could be given, and that, in spite of mediators, peace could only come from the unconditional surrender of one or the other party. The fact of its having been a bold, though unsuccessful attempt to intervene in this war constitutes the chief interest and significance of Positivism; and the papers collected in this volume by Mr. Frederic Harrison, the most eminent and venerable representative of the movement, are full of the clash of heroic fights, now almost forgotten. For the arena is empty both of combatants and spectators. Terms have been made somehow, though not at all under the influence of Mr. Harrison and Comte. Whatever the faults of the settlement proposed by the Positivists, it

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was touched with enthusiasm, and was nobler than the actual settlement of indifferent acquiescence.

Why did Positivism fail? The answer can be gathered from this book. Clearly it was neither religious enough nor scientific enough; the suggested reconciliation was felt by both sides to reconcile nothing. Mr. Harrison's *Religion of Humanity* is, it is true, no bad description of the mental attitude of that increasing mass of people who, while rejecting the traditional religions, are anxious to lead useful and not quite colorless lives. As long ago as the seventies he described his religion as "positive, scientific, human, sociologic and evolutionary or historical;" and now we all recognize the importance of social investigations, we take science for granted, we admit the need for enthusiasm, we are awake to the beauty and value of the past. "We find the center of our religion and our philosophy in Man and man's Earth," says Mr. Harrison; and the voice is almost that of the poet who has most influenced the present generation. The doctrine is the same in both; but this worship of Earth and the race, sublime and consoling in George Meredith's poetry, loses all its virtue when preached from a Comtist pulpit and supported by disquisitions on the synthesis of the sciences. For, stated abstractly, it is easily seen to be no religion at all. The essence of religion seems, as Doctor McTaggart has well pointed out, to be a sense of harmony with the Universe; and Positivism, rejecting the traditional metaphysical questions as meaningless, cannot give this: it can only offer instead a catalogue of virtues, and exhortations to combine common sense with optimism. Again, Positivism was as far from being really scientific as from being religious. Though much occupied with schemes of coördination and with tracing analogies between the sciences, it failed to impress scientists. It did not practice what it preached. It is not merely that rhetoric is much more conspicuous than reasoning in Mr. Harrison's writings; an abandonment of reasoning at the critical moment forms the very hinge of his position, which appears to be identical with that of agnosticism, except for the repudiation of merely negative results. Yet it is only on the negative side that Positivism uses anything like connected arguments. Against other religions and philosophies it does urge an argument—the argument, namely, that they conflict with science, experience and common sense; but beyond this point the appeal is solely to our emo-

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tions. Mr. Harrison, feeling as he does the need of religion quite as strongly as that of common sense, is not content to refute theology and metaphysics by stating the reasons (such as they are) made familiar by the agnostics for condemning these studies as "irrational musings over ancient enigmas." Having battered the bishops and philosophers he then turns and rends Huxley on the ground that questions about the soul and the universe are "dominant questions" toward which an attitude of mere negation is both impossible and reprehensible. Respect is due to this feeling as a personal conviction, even though Mr. Harrison himself pays scant respect to those who, having the same conviction, happen to disagree with him about the answer to the questions; but respect becomes impossible when the positive scheme, which is to supersede the negations of agnosticism, is paraded as something scientifically established, while in fact it is neither stated with precision nor supported by any intelligible reasons.

S. WATERLOW.

Rye, England.

THE PROBLEM OF THE UNEMPLOYED. By John A. Hobson. London: Methuen & Co., 1906 (Third Edition). Crown 8vo, Pp. xvi, 163.

This book was published originally some ten years ago; but the keen interest shown by the English people in the question with which it deals has undergone no sensible abatement in the interval. The report of the Royal Commission on the Poor Law has been eagerly awaited in the hope that it would contain important suggestions for legislative or administrative action in the matter; and a bill was in fact passed during the last Parliament, at the instance of Mr. Long, which was intended to provide better machinery than had previously been available for dealing effectively but harmlessly with temporary crises arising in this connection. Mr. Long's Act would, no doubt, be reckoned by Mr. Hobson among the "palliatives" which he discusses in his concluding chapter, and might or might not escape his criticism; but the remarks which he offers in that chapter on such proposals as labor bureaus and labor colonies have certainly not lost their pertinence at the present moment when these topics are in the forefront of popular and informed

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debate. The very circumstance that Mr. Hobson's book has reached a third edition would seem to afford convincing testimony, if it were needed, of the intense interest widely taken in the subject, and of the powerful appeal made by his particular mode of handling the discussion.

For, whether we do or do not agree with each separate portion, or with the whole, of Mr. Hobson's argument, it cannot be disputed that he has put forward a thesis which has been carefully conceived and is lucidly and cogently presented, and that it demands our patient and unprejudiced consideration. We think indeed that the hope which he expresses in his preface, that the restatement made in this book of his conception of the injury caused by "under-consumption" may avoid some of the misunderstanding to which his earlier statements were liable, is likely to be justified. We doubt whether any instructed economist, imbued with the spirit of recent developments of theory, would wish or be able to dispute the possibility of the occurrence of the phenomena described by Mr. Hobson in this book. We believe that they would admit that dislocations between the consumption and the production of wealth may easily happen in the modern world of industry and trade, and be so extensive in range and so enduring in character as to produce the conditions associated with unemployment. For, unlike the older economists of the orthodox faith, we have now come to see that the "friction" impeding the smooth mechanism of the economic harmonies is a reality of which serious account must constantly be taken. We have learned, for instance, that there is waste in competition.

But, while we might thus allow that Mr. Hobson's explanation of unemployment had disclosed a true, though not perhaps the only, cause of the phenomena he is examining, we might still contend that the connection between the malady and the particular remedy he propounds is far less obvious and sure. He urges that the possessors of unearned increments are the chief offenders in this deficiency of consumption, and that legislation which would curtail their unmerited gains, or even deprive them of the whole, and transfer this wealth to the wage-earning classes, or to the community to use in their behalf, would reduce the dislocation, and thus prevent unemployment. But, we may ask, is it so certain in the modern world that the wage earners are necessarily spenders and consumers? They

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seem, in fact, to be already becoming capitalists on an extensive scale when we look at the accumulated funds of their trade unions and of their friendly and coöperative societies. For coöperative production, in the acceptation of the term which is generally claimed by the adherents of industrial coöperation, can now, it may be observed, boast of enterprises which seem no less likely than private ventures of individual employers or joint stock companies to lock up capital in that fixed shape which Mr. Hobson deprecates ; and the houses secured to the members of building societies may similarly, no less than the unearned increments of urban landlords, diminish the consumption of the moment. In fact, the case belongs apparently to a class which is very commonly found in economic discussion; for, as Mr. Hobson in this later form of his argument acknowledges, it is hard, if not impossible, to fix the precise point where saving becomes excessive, even when we recognize, without making a reserve which cancels our admission, the possibility of such excess.

And hence, although we may allow the force of his contention that by breaking up the general problem of unemployment into a number of separate problems which can be plausibly explained by defects of individual character or particular circumstances of time or place or trade, we may end by missing the real significance of the facts we are considering, and may fail in effect to see the wood for the trees, yet his fresh mode of treatment, stimulating and suggestive as it is, may not point with the absolute certitude which he assumes to the direction in which the permanent effective cure can be discovered. For this reason among others we may still be disposed to hold that, as the problem is not one but many, so the remedies are not single and uniform but varied and complex. But in Mr. Hobson's investigations of the statistics of the matter and in his careful attempt to define the range and measure the intensity of the phenomena he is examining, there is much that is informing and not a little that is convincing. His book commands, and deserves, in our opinion, the candid scrutiny and diligent study of all who are interested in the satisfactory solution of this perplexing but important question.

L. L. Price.

Oriel College, Oxford.

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DIE ETHIK PASCALS. By Lic. Karl Bornhausen. Giessen: Verlag von Alfred Töpelmann, 1907. Pp. 171.

This work is the second in a series of *Studien zur Geschichte des neueren Protestantisms,* the joint editorship of which is in the hands of Dr. H. Hoffmann, of Leipzig, and Doctor Zscharnack, of Berlin. The place of Pascal in such a series is proved, in Bornhausen's view, by Pascal's having shown "the impossibility of the religio-ethical emancipation of the individual soul-life within the sphere of Catholicism" (p. 2).

Bornhausen begins by setting forth the ethical development of Pascal in its three stages, then passes to consider Pascal (1) as scientific thinker, (2) as religious individualist and (3) as a Catholic, after which follows a brief section on "the universal character of Pascal's ethics." Bornhausen thinks Pascal, in his first stage, got a rather self-contained knowledge of his own moral ego, in his second stage developed a sense of need of such world view as Christianity affords, and in his third stage gained an apprehension of Augustinian Christianity as related to the modern spirit and its needs. The modernism of Pascal he finds in his thoroughgoing individualism as well as in his scientific method. Pascal remained a strict Catholic in his views of the place and function of the religious community, salvation being for him found only within the church. Our author takes Pascal's asceticism to be only a consequence of his mystic religiosity, and thinks his mystic-individualistic principle passed over into a churchly authoritative one. The unsystematic character of Pascal's ethics our author duly notes, with their fundamental insistence on the principle of practice. Natural and revealed ethics exist for Pascal in such wise that anything like a real unity is rendered impossible. Our author's view is that Pascal, in his ethics, represents the Catholic-Christian idea of morality, and that, on such lines, his thoughts are original, religiously harmonious and strongly modern. He takes Pascal's personality to be thoroughly shot through with modern individualism and the scientific spirit, Pascal's whole aim being to harmonize Catholicism with these. For the philosophy of religion in its universal aspects, Pascal's thoughts are, in our author's view, ineffective, because of their Catholic and strongly marked anti-rationalistic character. His service lies, more indirectly, in the separation of the knowledge of the

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understanding from the faith of feeling; in pointing to religion as having a territory of its own within the human soul; and in securing it in its independence by means of his own particular religious psychology.

One of the pleasing features of the present and some other recent treatments is the tendency to view Pascal more as an ethicist, and less from the pathological or the apologetic points of view. Bornhausen's analysis is excellently done from the historical point of view, although such a study needs, of course, further supplementing from the psychological side. We cordially welcome, however, the ethical contribution he has here given us, and commend the work to all ethical students interested in its theme. The book is enriched with an excellent bibliography, whose critical estimates seem just and good, at least in the main. The work is dedicated to the author's father and grandfather.

JAMES LINDSAY.

Kilmarnock, Scotland.

SIN AND SOCIETY. By Edward Alsworth Ross. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1907. Pp. 168.

"Sin and Society," by Edward Alsworth Ross, Ph. D., Professor of Sociology in the University of Wisconsin, author of "Social Control," "The Foundations of Sociology," etc., is, as its sub-title states, "an analysis of latter-day iniquity." A letter from President Roosevelt commenting on the book may give it added interest with some readers; but the brilliant analysis of the moral and immoral tendencies of the present social life which Professor Ross has here given does not need any endorsement to commend it to the thoughtful student of social affairs and moral interests.

The characteristic sins of our time Professor Ross finds to be involved in the mutualism of the present life, and to be sins of betrayal rather than aggression. He feels that the morals of the personal life are improving, partly because of the teaching and nurture of past public opinion and partly because the conditions of the present life are not propitious to their indulgence. But the new order of interdependence gives occasion to a far more serious form of sinning.

The six chapters of this book, which first appeared in *The*

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Atlantic Monthly, deal with "New Varieties of Sin," "The Grading of Sinners," "The Criminaloid," "The Grilling of Sinners," "Sinning by Syndicate," "The Rules of the Game." The style at times suggests Chesterton, and is rather dazzling in its brilliance, if not somewhat dangerous in its sweeping generalizations; but it is at all times stimulating and suggestive.

The appeal to public opinion and the analysis of the defects in the present public opinion are perhaps the most profitable parts of the work. The method proposed for the remedy of present iniquity is that of legal control, and is frankly one with the purpose of social reform rather than socialism. He says (p. 19), "While idealists are dipping their brushes into the sunset for colors bright enough to paint utopias that might be if society were quite made over, one may be pardoned for dreaming of what would be possible, even on the plane of existing institutions, if only in this highly articulated society of ours everyone were required to act in good faith, and do what he had deliberately led others to expect of him."

Those who take this view point with regard to social needs will derive from this book fresh illustration of their theories; others will likewise profit by its careful reading.

LESLIE WILLIS SPRAGUE.

Brooklyn.

POPULATION AND PROGRESS. By Montague Crackanthorpe, R. C. London: Chapman & Hall, 1907.

The author of this volume is an idealist who, in agreement with Dr. Boyd Carpenter, whom he quotes, looks to the time when armaments will be no longer necessary and man will be rational enough to find his own well-being in that of humanity. He believes, however, that this ideal can only be realized by an acceptance of the voluntary principle. He regards humanity as passing through three stages: (1) the struggle for existence, (2) the counter struggle of philanthropy to save and succor the weak and make the victorious strong contribute to their support, and (3) the proportioning of population to the means of subsistence. This last process he terms purposive selection. Recognizing, with Malthus, that man tends normally to multiply his species beyond the means of subsistence, the author seeks some other means of controlling population than that suggested

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by the nineteenth-century economist. "To tell a laboring man who has the chance of a cottage that he is not, on prudential grounds, to think of marrying, is little else than solemn mockery. To him a wife is infinitely more necessary than to those of ampler means, for, the public house apart, his material comforts must be looked for in his own home" (p. 33). He will not, however, go as far as the Neomalthusians; his aim is more simple, namely to point out that the family can be limited by obedience to a natural law which, although not infallible, holds good in a large number of cases. It is as important, in his opinion also, that "the right people should be born as that the wrong people should not be born" (p. 83). He urges, therefore, that the law of the land should supplement that of the church by requiring each contracting party at the marriage ceremony to make a solemn declaration that he or she is not afflicted with a transmissible disease, whether of mind or body (p. 93). We can recommend the book to every thoughtful eugenic student. Placed in the hands of the artisan and lower middle classes it should prove of interest and profit.

London. H. OSMAN NEWLAND.

THE BRAHAMS, THEISTS AND MUSLIMS OF INDIA. By Prof. J. C. Oman, Government College, Lahore. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1908. Pp. xv, 342.

The author's aim, in this portly volume, is to bring readers into touch with contemporary India at various points, using, for illustrative purposes, his "somewhat exceptional personal experiences." The work contains a great deal that is full of human interest, but its value had been much enhanced by greater compression and more reflection of a suggestive sort upon the phenomena presented. Its chapters include subjects like "Hinduism or Goddess-Worship in Bengal," "Caste in India," "Theism in Bengal," "Hindu Social Reformers," "Festivals in Upper India," "The Muharram in India," and so forth. Religious beliefs and practices occupy a large portion of the descriptions, and cannot be dealt with at length in a distinctively ethical journal. Occasionally, however, the author's judgments are interesting, as when, for example, he says of Keshub Chunder Sen, who had been described as "one of the greatest thinkers, one of the greatest philosophers and one of

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the greatest men of the world," that "he was none of these, but a pious mystic, endowed with a rare gift of expression, a marked individuality, a strong will, not a little worldly wisdom and a charm of manner which gave him a great ascendency over the men with whom he came in contact."

The ethical material is scattered over many chapters, and lies in very concrete forms, as, for example, nuptial laws, marriage rites, social reforms, immorality and infanticide, and the ethics of social intercourse between Europeans and natives. The materials furnished on such topics are both interesting and abundant, but one greatly misses some more comparative use and reflective treatment of the data presented. It must not be thought, however, that the author has not read widely in the literature of the subject, as well as set forth what he has himself seen, for it is but just to say that he either quotes from, or refers to, the works of most outstanding writers on Indian thought, religion, life, laws, history and architecture. The work is enriched with many fine illustrative plates and with an excellent index.

JAMES LINDSAY.

Kilmarnock, Scotland.

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MISCELLANIES. Fourth Series. By John Morley. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. [Contains the Lecture on Machiavelli and several reviews and other short papers.]

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LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE JACOB HOLYOAKE. In two volumes. With two photogravure portraits and eight other portraits and illustrations. By Joseph McCabe. Issued for the Rationalist Press Association. London: Watts & Co. [A complete and most fascinating biography of the famous pioneer of coöperation and free thought.]

THE LOGIC OF WILL: A STUDY IN ANALOGY. By Helen Wodehouse, D. Phil. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: AN OUTLINE AND SOURCE BOOK. By Professor E. A. Ross. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd.; New York: The Macmillan Co.

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INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS: A Collection of International Conventions and Declarations of a Law-Making Kind. Edited, with introduction and notes, by E. A. Whittuck, B. C. L., Oxon. London: Longmans, Green & Co.

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CONSANGUINEOUS MARRIAGES IN THE AMERICAN POPULATION. By George B. Louis Arner. (Studies in History, Economics and Public Law. Edited by the Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University, Vol. XXXI, No. 3.) New York: Columbia University, Longmans, Green & Co., Agents; London, P. S. King & Son, 1908. Pp. 97.

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THE INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL OF ETHICS

JANUARY, 1909.

FRIEDRICH PAULSEN'S ETHICAL WORK AND INFLUENCE.

FRANK THILLY.

AMONG contemporary teachers of philosophy in Germany none exercised a more wholesome ethical influence within his sphere than Professor Friedrich Paulsen, who died at his home in Steglitz, Berlin, at the beginning of the summer vacation. His interest in human conduct and affairs grew with his advancing years, and instead of withdrawing into the solitude of the closet, as the thinker is often tempted to do, he felt the call to appeal to a wider circle of his fellows through the spoken and written word. And so it happened that the philosopher did not "retire under the shelter of a wall," but gave free and full expression to his views on practical subjects and did all he could to set his people right in matters of the heart as well as of the head. Nothing can be more helpful to a nation than to receive instruction from a teacher of ripe experience and keen theoretical insight, who has devoted himself to the contemplation of life and its problems and who is ready and eager to share his rich store of wisdom with the social group of which he forms a loyal member. It is an encouraging sign that in a country like Germany, where specialistic scholarship has been so highly developed, university professors are coming into sympathetic touch with the larger public outside of the academic halls and are contributing their

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share in solving questions of vital interest to humanity. Among these Paulsen became a leading figure during the last ten years of his life. As his friend and colleague Professor Kaftan said of him in his funeral sermon: "Whenever a question became a burning issue, a word was expected from him to help clear the air. Thus he came to be a faithful Eckardt to his people, one of those who time and again contributed to the awakening of the public conscience." How well he performed the service is eloquently attested by a long list of addresses and essays which were called forth at various times and published in the popular press. As some of the best things produced by him in this field may be mentioned: "Ernst Haeckel as a Philosopher,"[1] "Politics and Morality," "Party Politics and Morality," "The Monarchy and the Parties," "The Decline of Parliamentarism," "Germany and England," "The Ethics of Jesus and Its Relation to the Present,"[2] and the series of essays published in book form shortly before his death, under the title, "Modern Education and Sexual Morality."[3]

Paulsen was not an orator in the ordinary sense of the term, but he possessed the eloquence of earnestness, sincerity and reason. He had the power of convincing the seriously minded through temperate and rational thinking, and his words were received with respectful attention by those who heard and read. In a land in which paradoxical and neurotic utterances are not entirely unknown and in which the mania for originality sometimes

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[1] Published in Paulsen's book, "Philosophia Militans," a series of essays against clericalism and naturalism.

[2] These six essays are to be found in "Gesammelte Reden und Aufsätze." The address on "Party Politics and Morality" was reviewed in this JOURNAL, October, 1901.

[3] An account of these essays will be found in the *Educational Review*, December, 1908. A collection of essays, "Richtlinien der jüngsten Bewegung im höheren Schulwesen Deutschlands," discussing the school reforms inaugurated in Germany since 1901, has just been issued from the press in book form. It was completed a few weeks before the author's death.

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issues in peculiar forms of sensationalism, a man of sanity and balance, whose heart was in the right place, and whose ideals were sound, could not help finding work to do, and it is not surprising that Friedrich Paulsen, the descendant of the weather-beaten seamen of the North, came to lead many a battle against perverse theory and perverse practice. Those who attended his classes will remember how gratefully the students of the university which he served received his help in sifting the true from the false, how he strengthened their idealism and inspired in them a rational respect for clean and upright living; and they will remember too how all this was done without any effort on his part to preach morality, but followed naturally from a calm and truthful consideration of the problem. He did not plead, he did not exhort, he did not scold; he reasoned simply and honestly, and found his way into the hearts of his hearers through their intelligence; and before they knew it he had set up for them in a new form the very ideals which in their "enlightenment" they had come to regard as unbecoming to full-grown men. He lived up to the spirit of the passage from Marcus Aurelius which he adopted as the motto of the second book of his Ethics: "If any man is able to convince me that I do not think or act right, I will gladly change; for I seek the truth, by which no man was ever injured. But he is injured who abides in his error and ignorance." And another motto, too, which he took from Lao-tse, was characteristic of him: "I possess three treasures: these I guard and prize highly. The first is the love of humanity; the second, frugality; the third, that I do not presume to be better than anyone else."

How thoroughly Paulsen was interested in ethical problems may be seen from the fact that his first work, his doctor's dissertation, which was written in Latin and published in the year 1871, offered "Historical-Critical Contributions to the Moral-Philosophical Systems," and that he was one of the very few German professors of

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philosophy who gave a special course of lectures on ethics at the university. His large manual, entitled "System of Ethics, Including an Outline of the Theory of the State and Society," first appeared in 1889 and has since passed through nine editions. Other books possessing an interest for the student of ethics are his "Introduction to Philosophy," which is in its nineteenth edition; his "Schopenhauer, Hamlet and Mephistopheles: A Study in Pessimism"; his "Immanuel Kant"; his "Collected Addresses and Essays"; his "German Universities"; his "German Education";[4] his "Modern Education"; and his paper on "Ethics" in the sixth volume of *Kultur der Gegenwart,* which was reviewed in the last (October) number of the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

The "System of Ethics" is one of the most human and readable books on the subject ever written. As the author frankly confesses in his preface, the book is not intended for philosophical experts, but for all those who are interested in the problems of practical philosophy and who are in need of a guide who may help them in solving the same, or if that should sound too presumptuous, of some one with whom to discuss them. The criticism that the treatment of fundamental principles is less searching and thorough and that the questions of the day *(Tagesfragen)* receive more attention than they deserve in a philosophical treatise, is therefore not at all pertinent. "I have not been able," says Paulsen, "to make up my mind to enter upon a more detailed discussion of principles, because I do not believe that great prolixity in these matters will do anyone much good. The philosophers, to be sure, have long ago worked out their own principles; to readers, however, who lay no claim to such a title the meaning and adequacy of the basal

[4] The "System of Ethics" (not including the "Outline of the Theory of the State," etc.), the "Introduction to Philosophy," the "Kant," the "German Universities" and "German Education" have all been translated into English.

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notions will be proved more easily by their fitness to explain particular cases and to solve concrete problems. I have been equally unwilling to ignore the questions which are moving our age; books which have nothing to say to their times, and therefore fill their pages with untimely logical quibbles or with endless historical-critical discussions, are plentiful enough as it is, and there has never been a dearth of tiresome books, so far, in Germany. There are books that are timeless because they are written for all times; but there are also timeless books which are written for no time. This book does not belong to the first class, and it does not wish to belong to the second." "Besides," he goes on to say, "I do not believe that a new system of moral philosophy is either necessary or possible; the great constructive principles have been already so thoroughly worked out by Greek philosophy as to be satisfactory, in the main, even to-day. To bring the old truth into living touch with the questions which occupy our age is, in my opinion, the most important function of modern ethics. . . . Perhaps there never has been so little disagreement concerning the problem and principles of moral philosophy since the days of Christian Wolff as exists at present."[5]

By the "old truth" Paulsen means the teleological conception of morality which governed the thinking of most philosophers from Aristotle down to the time of Kant, who brought about a reaction in favor of intuitionistic formalism, and which is again coming into its own, thanks to the influence of the modern biological theory. According to the teleological view acts are right or wrong according to their tendency to produce certain consequences. The standard of right and wrong is to be sought in the effects which acts naturally tend to produce. Kantian intuitionism which defined acts as good or bad in themselves, regardless of their effects, our author considers

[5] "System of Ethics," English translation, Preface.

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a survival of the individualistic and rationalistic mode of thought common to the eighteenth century.[6]

Paulsen would therefore agree with utilitarianism in the view that it is the effect of the act that ultimately makes it right or wrong. But he differs from the English school in his opposition to its hedonism; for him pleasure is not the end or purpose to be realized, pleasure is not the highest or absolute good; the goal is "welfare," "an objective content of life," "definite concrete activities," "the perfection of our being" or "the perfect exercise of life." For this theory he has coined the term *energism,* in order, as he says, to bring his view into sharp contrast with hedonism: the end of the will is not feeling but action. "Its resemblance to Aristotle's ἐνέργεια may also serve to remind us of the origin of the conception. The word *welfare,* finally, seems suited to designate the highest good in its twofold aspect; it shows, first, that the highest good is an objective content of life, consisting in the perfect exercise of all human psychical powers; then it also suggests that such a life is accompanied by pleasure, and hence that pleasure is not excluded from the perfect life, but included in it."[7] We must admit that this conception is purely formal, but it cannot be made more specific. "It is as impossible to define the perfect life as it is to define a plant or animal species. We can simply give a description of it; this it is the business of the doctrine of virtues and duties to do."[8]

Another point is emphasized by Paulsen in this connection, which is often overlooked by utilitarians. The end or purpose realized by morality is grounded in the human will, it is something upon which the will is essentially directed, something which is accepted as a good, indeed as the highest good. "The highest good for man,

[6] See article on "Ethics" in "Systematische Philosophie" (Part I, Vol. VI, of *Kultur der Gegenwart*), p. 288.

[7] "System of Ethics," p. 224.

[8] "System of Ethics," p. 251.

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that upon which his will is finally directed, is a complete human life; that is, a life that leads to the full development and exercise of all capacities and endowments, particularly the highest, the mental and moral capacities of the rational personality."[9] In this respect, it seems to me, the teleological theory approximates the Kantian conception: in the last analysis the good inheres in the very nature of the will; the human will is essentially a good will, and good is good because human willing makes it so.[10]

It may be said that we are here reasoning in a circle. This is true. The value of virtue is said to consist in its favorable effects upon the perfection of life (welfare), and then it is held that the value of life consists in the normal performance of all functions, or in the exercise of virtue. Virtue is first conceived as a means to welfare, and then it is conceived as an end in itself. This circle is regarded by Paulsen as inevitable. We are here confronted with a relation analogous to that which we find in organic life, where everything is also both a means and an end. "Heart and brains, hands and eyes, muscles and bones, are means of preserving bodily life; but they are at the same time parts of the body," and therefore partial ends in themselves. "So, too, in the moral sphere every excellence or virtue is an organ of the whole, and at the same time forms a part of life; it is therefore, like the whole, an end in itself."[11]

Accepting the view that all virtues are both means and ends in themselves, we have to remember that not all of them are so in the same degree. Just as some organs in the body are more important than others, some moral functions are of greater worth than others. That human life therefore will be the best which succeeds best in sub-

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[9] "Systematische Philosophie," p. 283.

[10] See my articles, "Intuitionism and Teleology" (INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, July, 1902) and "Kant and Teleological Ethics" (*Kantstudien*, Vol. VIII, No. 1).

[11] "System of Ethics," p. 276.

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ordinating the lower functions to the higher. "A perfect human life is a life in which the *mind* attains to free and full growth, in which the *spiritual forces* reach their highest perfection in *thought, imagination* and *action.*" Since, however, such a life is possible only in a historical human environment, we must include the *social virtues* in our scheme. And we may go on and say that although a perfect human life is an end in itself, it is at the same time a part and a means of a larger whole, of a national life, and finally of the life of humanity as a whole. Perfect humanity, then, or, in the Christian phrase, the kingdom of God on earth, would be the highest good and the final end to which all nations and all historical products are related as means, not as indifferent means, but as parts and organs of the end. We cannot, of course, give a concrete exposition of this ideal; all we can do is to outline it by means of the general concepts of the historical mental life which we know. It is still more difficult to give a concrete conception of the ideal when we insert the life of humanity, as we can do, into a greater and more comprehensive reality and call it a part of the universal life of the all-real. Here we are transcending the domain of knowledge; we merely indicate the direction in which we, as feeling and willing beings, are moving when we attempt to complete our conception of reality in this way. We are expressing our belief that all reality is tending to some highest end. Here we are thrown back upon the symbols of art and religion; the intellect cannot grasp the contents of this highest good.[12]

We have seen that the energistic theory finds the deepest root of morality in the human will. The objection is here urged: the good is not what we will to do, but what we *ought* to do. To do good means to do our duty, and our duty does not seem to coincide with the natural will. Can we solve this contradiction, or is the truly *moral*

[12] "System of Ethics," pp. 277-283.

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good absolutely different from the end or purpose of the natural will? The evolutionistic explanation of the sense of duty or conscience will, in Paulsen's opinion, help us to answer this question. We noticed before how the teleological theory approaches the Kantian view; we may observe now how it makes use of modern evolutionistic ethics. In conscience or the sense of duty the triple authority of parents, people and gods reveals itself; it is a feeling of obligation to a higher will which sets a limit to particular inclinations. This higher will is recognized by the individual will as having absolute right to command, as one which must under all circumstances be obeyed, even where it has not the power to compel. The sense of duty commands obedience to custom; customs are purposive modes of behavior conducive to the preservation of the social whole which creates them as well as to the normal development of the individuals of whom the whole consists. We may therefore say that duty commands nothing more than what the individual human will regards as good; indeed duty expresses the true will of the individual, his essential will, his universal will. The individual will and the social will tend on the whole to determine conduct in the same way; in the last analysis the will of the individual desires the life and welfare of the group. It is only in particular and isolated cases that he desires exceptions to be made in his favor.[13]

In a later account[14] Paulsen expresses the matter somewhat differently, in the language of Hegel, of which he was not particularly fond in his earlier days. What he formerly called the individual's basal or essential will he now speaks of as the *objective* will. The system of objective morality is regarded not as a product and function of the individual as such or of his "reason," but as the product and function of a universal reason immanent

[13] "System of Ethics," pp. 340 *ff.*

[14] "Systematische Philosophie," pp. 289 *ff.*

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in the social forms of historical life. The individual participates in the customs and morality of the social whole just as he participates in language and religion. We cannot explain morality without going to objective morality, which is expressed in the customs and laws, in the moral commands and judgments, conceptions and ideals of the race. Conscience is the knowledge on the part of the individual of objective morality and his inner relation to the same. Duty is the feeling of obligation to act in accordance with the demands of objective morality, without regard to accidental desires of the individual will. The function of objective morality is the regulation of intersubjective relations. The individual is nowhere left to his own choice and caprice in the solution of the problems of life; the path is marked out for him by custom and law. Morality has a social-teleological meaning. Social union and coöperation between willing beings are made possible only by general rules or norms which determine the conduct of all. Social action is possible only through the regulation of the voluntary action of each by uniform law.

This suggests to us the question of the freedom of the will. Psychological freedom, according to Paulsen, has never been denied; an act is called free when the will of the agent is its immediate cause. Metaphysical freedom, however, that is, the theory that the will or the particular decisions themselves have no cause, Paulsen rejects. It belongs to philosophizing theology or scholasticism; modern philosophy has not solved the problem: it has simply dropped it. No one really believes that the human will is an *ens a se,* or that, a certain nature and certain conditions being given, a certain stimulus will sometimes produce one act and sometimes another. Man is the product of the collective body from which he springs. But man is not molded mechanically by things and men; the outer as well as the inner man is formed by the reaction of an inner principle upon external influences, by which his nature is gradually developed.

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But this inner principle, this character, this ego, or whatever we may choose to call it, is not itself absolutely uncaused, it does not enter the world as an absolutely isolated element. This ego, like the organized body, is the product of evolution.

Then is there no freedom of the will? Yes, there is, in this sense. Man determines his conduct by resolutions. Resolutions are the result of deliberation; in deliberation several possible courses of action or modes of behavior are compared with the ultimate aims of individual and social life, and the choice is made accordingly. Man then is not determined by his *impulses*, but he determines himself by *ideas of ends*. This faculty of regulating and determining the particular functions of life by an idea of one's life, by ends and ideals, by duty and conscience, is precisely what we mean by free will. In a certain way then man emancipates himself from the course of nature; he rises above nature and opposes it as a self, he determines it and employs it, is not determined by it: man becomes a *personality*. It is apparent that freedom in this sense is not an original endowment of human nature, but an acquired characteristic; it has been acquired by the entire race in the course of history, and must be acquired anew by each individual. Man can learn to fashion his outer and inner man with conscious purpose, according to his ideal; he can discipline his natural impulses, nay, even suppress them, so that they will no longer move him. It is to be understood, however, that the determining principle itself must be native to man; this he cannot give himself by his will, for it is the innermost will itself. Man does not exist before himself, choosing or determining his will by his will; that would be equivalent to Münchhausen's attempt to pull himself out of the mire by means of his own queue. Only a preëxisting fundamental will can determine the development of the empirical character in the course of life. In this sense Schopenhauer is right: the character does not change. But he is wrong when he says that a change

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of the nature and the modes of action of the will is impossible. Whoever *desires* to change *can* do so; only the will must be in earnest, it must desire the means which lead to the end. Empty wishes will not avail.[15]

After this review of the fundamental principles of Paulsen's system, we are prepared to understand his conception of the nature of ethics and its relation to metaphysics. Actual morality, as it is expressed in the laws and customs of the social group, is on the whole adapted to the conditions of life, and is therefore rational. It is the business of ethics and jurisprudence to recognize this objective reason in law and custom and not first to introduce reason into life. Or we might say, it is the real problem of ethics to describe the contents of the "correct" conscience and to show the practical necessity of the same. Considered in its mere form, the subjective conviction of the agent constitutes the "good" conscience, and nothing further can be said on that point. But no system of ethics, not even that of Kant, has confined itself to a mere definition of the subjective form of right and wrong; if it had, it could have been written in a single sentence.[16]

A teleological ethics demands a teleological metaphysics for its completion. If the life of man, including his moral life, forms an inseparable part of universal life, then it must be possible to insert the theory of this life into a universal theory of reality. Aristotle declares that nature creates nothing without a purpose; this conception of his teleological philosophy of nature also forms the starting point of his ethics: the purpose of man may be inferred from his cosmic position. What distinguishes man from other creatures is reason, hence reason is the purpose of nature: in human reason absolute reason has created the organ which rethinks its cosmic thoughts.

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[15] "System of Ethics," pp. 452 *ff.*

[16] "Systematische Philosophie," pp. 282, 292, 299 *ff;* also Introduction to "System of Ethics."

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This idea is likewise expressed by Hegel. Mental and moral life, and most of all, philosophy, is the end or purpose of evolution: the self-consciousness of the idea in thinking, the thinking of the thoughts which constitute reality, this is both the meaning and purpose of reality as such, as well as the end and highest good of human life.[17]

Ethics cannot rest in a materialistic philosophy; both ethics and metaphysics revolt against it. Ethics demands harmony with metaphysics because it cannot set up a purpose for man without assuming a purpose for reality as such; and conversely metaphysics demands harmony with ethics, because it cannot conceive a reality which consists of absolutely disparate beings, of unfeeling, unintelligent atoms, on the one hand, and of feeling, willing, valuating beings on the other, said to arise from the former. But these postulates are more than mere surmises or demands of faith without any theoretic basis, as Kant would have it. They are, rather, thoughts of which the facts lead us from both sides.

The objective idealism of Greek philosophy, which celebrated its resurrection in the speculative philosophy of the nineteenth century, is the necessary form of philosophy. The moral laws are natural laws of human life, natural laws in the sense that their observance leads to the preservation and perfection, their violation to the destruction, first of spiritual life, and finally also of physical life. In the moral will we have the profoundest and most essential expression of the nature of reality as such; reality conceived as a unity has the form of a holy will, in which the highest goods of life, even of our own life, have a reality that can never be lost. To be sure, we cannot adequately know this final unity of reality and goodness which we call God: we can only conceive it schematically. We cannot describe or exhaust the infinite content of this life; we can determine its nature in

[17] "Systematische Philosophie," p. 309.

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relation to ourselves only by means of symbolic expressions; hence a symbolic anthropomorphism is the necessary form of the human belief in God. Hence the belief that the real exists for the sake of the good is a belief grounded in the will, or, as Kant puts it, a postulate of practical reason rather than a theoretic knowledge.[18]

The principles outlined above formed the background of Paulsen's interpretation of human conduct and human institutions. Everywhere he sought the reason for things and endeavored to see them in their relations to larger wholes. The third and fourth books of his "System of Ethics," in which he discusses such subjects as self-control, bodily, economic and spiritual life, honor, justice, benevolence and veracity;[19] the family, sociability and friendship, property and property rights, society and the social order, socialism and social reform, the nature and origin of the state, forms of government, the function of the state and its limits, as well as his essays on ethics and politics, are full of practical wisdom. In the many contributions to educational literature made by him, he never lost sight of his ethical ideal, the highest good, and the high esteem and loving remembrance in which he is held by the teachers of Germany[20] show that his words have not fallen upon unwilling ears. Paulsen's profound knowledge of human nature and his sympathetic interest in all things human, his fine sense of discrimination and his penetrating insights, his genius for seeing things as they are and grasping their essential bearings, his intellectual honesty and healthy moral judgment, his good temper and rational self-control, these were the qualities which quickened his work with the spark of life and made his service valuable to his people. He was the child of a hardy, frugal, clear-headed and warm-hearted sea-

[18] "Systematische Philosophie," pp. 308 *ff.*

[19] See also "Systematische Philosophie," pp. 305 *ff.*

[20] The new Realgymnasium at Steglitz has been named after him, and a movement has been set on foot by the gymnasial teachers of Germany to erect a suitable memorial to him.

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faring race, and he gave philosophical expression to the ideals of a stock from which so many intellectual leaders of the old fatherland have sprung, and upon the integrity of which the future glory of Germany must depend.

FRANK THILLY.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

THE LATE DR. EDWARD CAIRD.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

THE death of Dr. Caird removes a great figure from the philosophic world; how great, this is neither the time nor the place to inquire. The majority of readers have probably not quite an adequate appreciation of the importance of his work. The fact that his writings were very largely historical and expository in their form, has tended in some degree to conceal the originality of his thought. Careful students of philosophy are, however, well aware that such exposition as his is in reality a creative act, implying a more complete mastery and a more resolute forward movement of thought than most of what presents itself in the definite form of a fresh construction. It would be vain to attempt here any account or estimate of his contributions to philosophic literature. It may suffice to say that the present writer is probably not alone in thinking that he has built up a solid treasure-house of wisdom that will outlast many more showy erections. Some of his contemporaries may have surpassed him in subtle dialectic, in incisive criticism, in grasp of detail, in directness, definiteness and force of utterance; but in breadth of knowledge, balance of judgment, maturity of insight and power of luminous exposition, he was probably without a peer. One returns again and again to his writings, from works that may sometimes seem more brilliant, with a constantly recurring sense that no one has perhaps come so near as he to the pronouncement of the last word that the present state of

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our knowledge permits on the greatest problems of speculative thought. He taught Idealism with the utmost enthusiasm and force of conviction; but he guarded himself, more carefully than almost anyone else, against the pitfalls of subjectivity.

The questions with which he dealt in his published writings were in the main metaphysical and religious, rather than directly ethical. But his elaborate investigation of Kant's ethical system, his exposition of the relation of Aristotle's ethics to his metaphysics, his examination of the views of Comte, his appreciation of the teaching of Carlyle, and perhaps most of all his summing up of the essence of Christian morality as "self-realization through self-sacrifice," are contributions to ethical thought which, we may well believe, the world will not soon let die. He was one of those who constantly remind us—what some ethical teachers are too ready to forget or ignore—that the practical life of mankind cannot really be understood without the discussion of man's place in the universe—without the consideration of the reality of his spiritual nature and the validity of his larger hopes.

It was, moreover, not merely by his writings that Dr. Caird impressed his generation. For more than a quarter of a century he was professor of moral philosophy in Glasgow; and even after he went to succeed Jowett as Master of Balliol, he continued to devote a very large part of his time and energy to the work of teaching; and in this respect it may be doubted whether any of his contemporaries has left so large and lasting a mark. His great gift of exposition was here preëminently in place. His pupils are to be found all over the world, carrying with them the indelible stamp of the influence under which they came. It is much to be hoped that some of them may be able to reproduce from their notes, for the benefit of others, some permanent record of those inspiring discourses.

And there was more even than this. With his Socratic

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wisdom and depth of thought, and his Socratic earnestness in teaching, there was combined a Socratic strength of friendship, and especially, perhaps, a Socratic warmth of interest in the young which led many of his pupils to feel toward him, not merely as toward a master, but almost as toward a father. His inexhaustible patience and depth of sympathy are at least as memorable as his wisdom. Nor was it individuals alone who were affected by them. He was the ready supporter of every good cause, chiefly perhaps of everything that affected the welfare of women and of workingmen. It will be remembered, among other things, that he was the first president of the London Ethical Society. He took a keen interest in current politics, and was a strenuous Radical. It was one of his sayings, that the prophet in our time must be a man of the world as well.

Altogether it may be questioned whether any finer personality has been known in recent times. He had a noble simplicity in his manner, and never aimed at popular effect; and a certain reserve and slowness of utterance may have tended to conceal his merits from a certain number. But those who knew him well admired and loved him with a devotion that was almost unique. He now rests with his friend and comrade T. H. Green. Many of those who attended the recent obsequies at Oxford must have recalled the words of a great poet on a similar occasion, and felt their appropriateness.

"Mourn for the man of amplest influence
* * * * * * * * *
Our greatest yet with least pretence
* * * * * * * * *
Rich in saving common sense,
And, as the greatest only are,
In his simplicity sublime.
O good gray head which all men knew!
* * * * * * * * *
O fall'n at length that tower of strength
Which stood four-square to all the winds that blew!"

J. S. MACKENZIE.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, CARDIFF.

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THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS ON MORAL EDUCATION.

M. E. SADLER.

I.

THREE separate streams of effort led to the holding of the first International Congress on Moral Education in London last September. The idea of such a congress, and the determination to hold one, came in the first place to prominent workers in the International Union of Ethical Societies. Had it not been for the faith and zeal of Professor Foerster of the University of Berlin, and of Mr. Gustav Spiller, the secretary of the Union, the recent congress would not have been convened. It was they who framed the first outline of the plan and effectively urged its acceptance. And, from first to last, Mr. Spiller gave his strength and knowledge without stint to the work of organization. But secondly, the previous labors of the Moral Instruction League, in pressing upon the thoughts of the public in Great Britain the supreme importance of effective moral and civic education in all schools, had prepared English opinion to welcome such a gathering, and had disposed the newspapers to attach due importance to its deliberations. It would have proved difficult, if not impossible, to organize the congress successfully this autumn in London, without the nucleus of energetic workers furnished by the committee of the Moral Instruction League, and without the ready coöperation of the League's secretary, Mr. Harrold Johnson, whose courage, idealism and practical promptitude have for some years been directed to a propaganda of the idea of systematic moral instruction. Thirdly, the dangers of division and of hurtful controversy, which in other circumstances would have been found serious, were averted by the fact that, since the

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autumn of 1906, a large and influential committee, fully representative of all shades of conviction and of educational experience, had been engaged in a systematic inquiry into methods of moral instruction and training in schools in Great Britain and elsewhere. In the work of this committee (which sprang from the initiative of Dr. Paton, of Nottingham, Mr. Clifford W. Barnes, of Chicago, Mr. Harrold Johnson, Mr. W. T. Stead and one or two others) men and women of very different schools of thought had been brought into intimate relationship. By careful study and frank discussion of the complex and many-sided problem of moral training, they had discerned the possibility of a synthesis between some seemingly contrariant ideals—a synthesis which might compose parts of the present controversy without any surrender of principle. When invited to support this plan of holding the congress, those who had borne the chief part in this long investigation threw themselves (on being assured that the basis of the discussions would be one of fairness to all parties concerned) unreservedly into the further work of helping to organize the gathering. The result of this joint action on the part of three influential bodies of opinion (not wholly distinct from one another, but very far from identical in personnel or in purpose) was that the congress commanded a wide range of international affiliations, the zeal and influence of the Moral Instruction League and the good will and respectful attention of the great religious bodies and of the associations of teachers in Great Britain.

The success of the congress exceeded general expectation. The numbers attending were large, as many as fourteen hundred tickets being sold. At least eighteen nations, more than thirty universities and over a hundred educational organizations were officially represented at it. The general public took considerable interest in its proceedings. The debates were for the most part weighty from the educational or administrative experience of those who engaged in them. Speeches in any one

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of the three languages officially recognized at the congress—English, French and German—were evidently followed with close attention by a considerable number of those present. There was no serious disproportion between the two sexes in the large audiences which, to a striking degree, maintained their size and interest to the last. In spite of the fact that during the earlier months of the year, London had already been the meeting-place of ten international congresses, this (the last) made a deeper impression upon public attention than any of its predecessors. Many of the papers submitted to the congress were of high merit, and an unusually large number of the speakers in the debates excelled in terse and lucid statement, some rising to a memorable level of moving eloquence. The plan of having a different chairman at each session gave variety to the proceedings, while the unremitting attendance and attention of the vice chairman secured continuity of experience in conducting the discussions and gradually established a tradition of wise procedure. In this and other connections especially valuable service was rendered to the congress by Mrs. Bryant, Professor Muirhead and Professor Adamson.

At every congress or similar gathering, those present are influenced (often more than they realize) by a prevailing spirit which forms itself in the assembly and gradually imparts a tone to its proceedings. On this occasion such a spirit quickly made itself felt, and has left behind it many precious memories. The spirit of the congress was one of intense sincerity, combined with forbearance and mutual respect. The truth was bravely told, but told with delicate regard for opposing convictions. Some of the questions under consideration touched the very core of spiritual experience. But there was no wrangling, no intolerance, no anger. Among those who took part in, or listened to the debates, there was no general agreement. On the contrary, on many fundamental points there was profound divergence of settled prin-

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ciple. But a spirit of reverence and of respectful regard for the convictions of others prevailed in the congress, and united most of those present in a common search for truth and in a desire to reach a right judgment upon the momentous questions under review. The result was that many who entered the congress with distrust of the intentions of some of those holding opinions conflicting with their own, left it with widened sympathies and with the knowledge that they had learnt much from those who differed from them. To have thus assuaged the temper of controversy, to have softened much deep-seated prejudice and to have disposed some of the champions of contending principles to search for an honest synthesis of apparently opposite truths, is a happy issue upon which the originators of the congress may look back with thankfulness.

Such a result is never reached without careful and long-continued preparation. An achievement of this kind is rarely, if ever, improvised. The preparative work of the congress was well and patiently done. Mr. Spiller, Mr. Harrold Johnson, Miss Alice Ravenhill, Miss Wells, Mr. Bompas Smith, Miss Jourdain, Mr. Harvey and other investigators, appointed by the committee of the inquiry into moral instruction and training, had in the course of hundreds of interviews in Germany, Switzerland, France and Great Britain helped in focusing the thoughts of teachers in all types of schools upon the questions which were subsequently included in the program of the congress. The publications of the Moral Instruction League had familiarized great numbers of British teachers and education authorities with many of the issues which came up for consideration in the course of the debates. And two books, opportunely published before the meeting of the congress, had provided material for study and reflection on the practical and theoretical bearings of the problem of moral education. One of these, published by Messrs. Longmans early in September, was the report of the international inquiry into moral instruction and train-

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ing;[1] the other, issued a fortnight later, was the volume containing the chief papers prepared by various writers for consideration at the congress itself.[2]

But the most careful preparation cannot insure success for a congress unless public opinion is ripe for such a gathering and instinctively interested in its discussions. The event has shown that the congress was held at the right time, in the right place and on right lines. All over the world there is a great stir of thought on the subject of education and a deepening conviction that the question of moral education is the heart of the educational problem of our time. Side by side with the strengthening of national self-consciousness there has been a growing eagerness on the part of each nation to learn from the educational experience of other peoples. In England, along with much inertia on the subject of national education, there has always been a strong belief (far from always translated into practice) that the main purpose of educational effort is to help in the formation of upright character. The demand for the supply, at public expense, of those kinds of education which enhance industrial and commercial efficiency, though never without its active champions among us, has always left the masses of English people somewhat cold. The advocacy of schemes of educational reform intended to recast at the public cost our system of schools upon lines congenial to political democracy has not yet succeeded in arousing any remarkable demonstrations of popular sympathy. The English are an odd mixture of democracy and feudalism; of new ideas and old traditions; of dislike of undutiful privilege and of limpet-like attachment to a system of vaguely outlined social groups. They do not

[1] "Moral Instruction and Training in Schools: Report of an International Inquiry." In two volumes. Vol. I, The United Kingdom; Vol. II, Foreign and Colonial. Sold separately. London and New York: Longmans, Green & Co.

[2] "Papers on Moral Education Communicated to the First International Moral Education Congress, 1908." One volume. London, David Nutt.

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take kindly to plans of educational reform which ignore their social presuppositions. But to one appeal they have always been willing to respond. They believe in character. And they value any kind of education which imparts strength of moral principle and makes for integrity and "straightness" in practical life. Accordingly, English opinion welcomed with almost unexpected warmth a congress which put the question of moral training into the forefront of educational aims. And it heartily approved a plan of debate which gave a fair field and no favor to different convictions and secured opportunity for the expression of different forms of tested educational experience.

In three points the congress, perhaps unavoidably, fell short of complete success. There were too many subjects in the program. At only two or three of the sessions did the speakers come to close grips upon matters of crucial importance. And American experience was inadequately represented in the debates. These defects could not well be avoided. One chief purpose of the first congress was to present a wide survey of the whole problem under review. Hence the too congested program. Secondly, it was impracticable for the chairman to ignore the claims of previously appointed speakers and to allow each session to take such a course as the spirit of the moment would have dictated, had the field been free. And thirdly, the time of year at which the congress was held was fixed by other engagements which could not be ignored, but had the unfortunate result of making it impossible for many of the American teachers and administrators, whose cooperation would have been most valued, to attend the gathering.

II.

Three episodes at the congress stand out, in retrospect, as having been of especial significance. The first was a short debate as to the degree in which the great English public schools foster a sense of civic obligation. The

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second was a conflict of view as to the value of systematic courses of direct moral instruction as helps in the formation of right principles of conduct. The third was a discussion, on Monday morning, September 28, as to the relation of religious education to moral education. A brief account of these three episodes may be acceptable to those who were not able to attend the congress.

1. The educative value of the corporate life of the school was fully recognized by many speakers in the course of the discussions. In an educational gathering held in England, it was appropriate that stress should thus be laid upon the powerful influence which may be exerted in the formation of character by the responsibilities and collective duties imposed upon its individual members by a school community which is wisely organized, morally healthy, largely self-governing and not too closely watched. Eighty years ago, at a time when the rapid growth of the factory system and of competitive industry threatened to make untrammeled individualism too self-assertive in English life, Thomas Arnold of Rugby and several of his contemporaries developed the restraining and moralizing power of such a school community. Most potent in its influence was the corporate life of such a wisely disciplined but largely autonomous school community when the latter was set (as at Winchester and Eton) among surroundings which appealed to the sense of beauty and to the historic imagination. England, the radically minded pioneer of the factory system, has at the same time been one of the most conservative of all countries in her higher educational tradition. The idea of the school community is a medieval idea adjusted to modern needs. It was no accident that, as an antiseptic to the dangerous germs of selfish individualism among those classes in England which were rapidly rising to wealth and social influence, Arnold of Rugby and his contemporaries thought it well to use, in English secondary education, the power of corporate life. They believed that such corporate life was an important

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factor in moral training and in the formation of character. At Winchester (oldest of the English public schools) and at Oxford (most ancient of the English universities) Arnold had learned the power of collegiate life, the educative influence upon one another of young people living together in a community which appealed to their loyalty and to their sense of corporate responsibility. In English educational history during the first half of the nineteenth century, the determinative facts were the self-reform of ancient collegiate bodies and the consequent survival of the semi-autonomous medieval institutions which French revolutionary influence swept away in most other parts of Europe. The renaissance of the great English public schools, due in large measure to Arnold's personality and courage, marked an effort to withstand the disintegrating influences of an excessive individualism, and a desire to bring the future leaders of competitive industry and commerce under the spell of an educational ideal which inculcated the duty of self-abnegation to the claims of the community.

Since Arnold's time the great English public schools have laid the nation under a heavy debt of gratitude. But the best proof of their living power is the readiness with which many men who have spent a lifetime in their service admit the comparative failure of the English public schools to rise to the full measure of their new and changing opportunities. On Saturday morning, September 26, Sir Arthur Hort, a Harrow master, and son of a great English theologian, submitted in grave and temperate language a point of great importance for the consideration of the congress. Admitting to the full the value of the English public-school system in training the power of administration and government, acknowledging that by the system of self-government the English public schools habitually remind "unthinking boyhood that the tone of the community is only a general impression of the character of the individuals who compose the community," Sir Arthur proceeded to state that it is "un-

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deniably disappointing'' that the sense of corporate life once gained in such a miniature society does not more often develop into civic patriotism in after life. He thought that, in the majority of cases, the English public-school boy did not afterwards turn out a good citizen, so far as the responsibilities of municipal and local government were concerned. He asked for suggestions toward a solution of this difficulty: Why does not the training for social responsibility within the microcosm of school-community life bear larger fruit afterwards in a spirit of enlightened service toward the local community as distinct from the larger service of Parliament, government administration or the empire? Sir Arthur Hort was inclined to think that the fault did not lie in anything which the public schools did, but rather in something which they left undone. But he did not believe that any abstract or theoretical teaching of the duties of citizenship could replace the present performance, on a small scale, in adolescence, of duties identical in kind with those which fall to the adult man.

Up jumped Dr. Hayward in reply. The public schools which Sir Arthur Hort represented were in bondage to a false philosophy of education. They thought that if you trained the ''faculty'' of loyalty to school duties you would find that faculty exercising itself in the necessarily different circumstances of adult citizenship. What was wanted in the public schools was the more definite teaching of a social ideal applicable to modern political conditions.

An old Rugby boy, Mr. G. L. Bruce, who has done excellent service in London education, continued the debate. He traced the weakness to which Sir Arthur Hort had called attention to a different source, namely, to the exclusiveness of the English public-school system. The boys were segregated from the community. During the critical years of education their sympathies were not rooted in local life. They were trained apart in communities which had no intimate relationship to local duties

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and local government. The result was that they produced a patriotism which was a class patriotism.

Professor Muirhead pointed out that the criticisms made by Dr. Hayward and Mr. Bruce were in fact complementary to one another. The great public school was a boarding school. We should all welcome, therefore, the strong efforts which were being made in many quarters to infuse the day secondary school (whether for boys or girls) with the same spirit of corporate unity which had been the strength of the great public boarding school. To carry forward into the day-school work of the present the best tradition of Arnoldism was one great task of English educators to-day. But in order that the boys and girls might have insight into the meaning of the social duties which awaited them, and might learn how to apply their education to the tasks of modern government, local and central, it was desirable that there should be more definite instruction in economic and social questions, provided that such instruction were well adapted to the age of the pupils and to their intellectual and moral development.

On this point I venture to quote a passage in the introduction to the recently issued "Report of the International Inquiry into Moral Instruction and Training in Schools (Vol. I, pp. xxxviii-xxxix):

> Systematic and practical instruction in social and economic questions seems to be still surprisingly infrequent in our great public schools, although the older boys are admittedly well able to make good use of it. In view of the responsible duties which lie before them in later life, such instruction, if given in a suitable form, would be especially appropriate to their needs. Head masters and governing bodies might with advantage encourage some of those whom they propose to appoint to their staff of teachers to undertake a special course of preparation (practical as well as theoretical) for the work of giving accurate and stimulating instruction on the methods of local and central administration, and upon the real working of our social and industrial organization. What the pupils want is a course vivid with practical experience, and full of sound history and competent economics. The important thing is to kindle their interest in scientific methods of social investigation, and to make them see that the problem of social reform is very urgent and very complicated; that ill-formed or partisan talk merely darkens counsel; and that it will be both dis-

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creditable and unfortunate if, through lack of intelligent study and investigation, the more leisured classes in England find themselves obliged to leave the intellectual lead on social questions in the hands of men and women whose educational opportunities have been far narrower than their own.

2. In England, during the last three years, there has been sharp conflict of expert opinion as to the usefulness of systematic courses of direct moral instruction in the formation of character and in the imparting of a choice-worthy ideal of life. The one view is that moral thoughtlessness may be corrected by definite moral instruction; that "evil is done from want of thought as well as from want of heart;" that good conduct is in great measure the outcome of a clearly apprehended moral ideal; and that, for the building up of such a moral ideal, the imparting of clear moral ideas is both desirable and necessary. The other view is that to prescribe systematic courses of moral instruction for children is to impart prematurely adult moral conceptions into the minds of children whose own moral life ranges in another sphere; that it is only too easy to get children "to repeat and memorize adult language with fidelity," but that such parrot-like or adult-approbation-seeking repetition is no proof of real moral growth, and may be prejudicial to it; that abstract thinking in morals should follow concrete experience, and may be precociously stimulated; that by putting morals into a separate compartment we may detach morality from the real business of school life; and that it is perilously easy to set up in words a moral standard which the teachers' deeds belie or which the unreformed social evils in the children's home life may reduce to bitter irony.

I submit that some of these sharp differences in opinion spring from an almost unconscious divergence in educational ideals. In educational thought at the present time there are two divergent ideals of the work of a school. The first pictures to us a highly trained, Herbartian-minded instructor directing from his desk the

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intelligence and aspirations of a diligent and well-disciplined class sitting in rows before him in the classroom. The other ideal conceives of the school as a community which (to quote Kinglake's words in "Eothen") "buzzes with life"; which is educating itself through bearing responsibilities; which is busy with practically educative tasks; which is full of freedom and initiative; which is getting experience of the labors and relationships which lie at the foundation of all human society; which is dynamic, self-expressive and busy with efforts to accomplish (under the unobtrusive guidance of tactful teachers) certain things which its individual members wish to accomplish and in which, therefore, they find a strong motive for effort. The first of these views finds its most distinctive examples in the ordinary school practice of France and Germany, and in such methods of the English elementary school as have been borrowed from continental precedents. The other view has been presented with persuasive skill by Professor John Dewey, and has been most elaborately realized in the University Elementary School at Chicago, in the Normal School at Hyannis, in Dr. Reddie's school at Abbotsholme, and in the Landerziehungsheimen, founded in Germany by Dr. Lietz. Teachers and students who incline to the first of these two educational ideals instinctively turn to methods of moral instruction which repel and irritate those who incline to the second. Both agree in thinking that one main purpose of the school is to kindle high ideals. Both are convinced that schools should try to influence conduct and to impart a higher ideal of life. But methods of moral teaching which seem appropriate and even axiomatic to the one may seem pedantic and (in the literal sense of the word) preposterous to the other. Those who conceive of the school as a directly didactic institution naturally turn to systematic courses of direct moral instruction as an appropriate addition to the present curriculum. Those, on the other hand, who distrust any excessive development of the didactic work of a school;

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who think that all true education is a fostering of growth from within, and that (in the words of Lafcadio Hearn) "education only develops the preëxisting," shrink with horror from the premature introduction of abstract moral teaching as likely to produce unreality of feeling and double-mindedness in conduct. But may we not say that each of the two conflicting ideals of education outlined above holds part of the truth, and that neither, in its extreme form, is really applicable to all the needs of children and adolescents? Do we not discern a possible synthesis between what is sound in each of the two views? Should it not be our aim to combine the two educational doctrines and to blend a considerable measure of constructive work and of self-directing activity with the more abstract and didactic part of school instruction? Toward such a synthesis the deliberations of the congress seem to point.

3. From the memory of those who were present, there will not easily fade the recollection of the candor and intense reality of the discussion which took place at the congress on the relations between religious and moral education. In the gaunt shed which, for the present, serves as the great hall of the university, there were assembled on the morning of September 28, representatives of the great religious bodies and of those organizations which, detached from older dogmas, are striving for the furtherance of the good life. Anglicans, Roman Catholics, Independents, Wesleyans, Quakers, Positivists, Unitarians, Ethical Culturists, Rationalists of all shades had come together for a momentous debate. Six speakers, Father Maher, S. J.; Mr. Edward Lyttelton, head master of Eton; M. Ferdinand Buisson, of Paris; Mr. John Russell, of Hampstead; the Anglican Bishop of Southwark, Dr. Talbot; and the Anglican Bishop of Hereford, Dr. Percival, made the most important contributions to the discussion. Their sincerity, their charity, their modesty of utterance, their respectful regard for opposing convictions produced throughout the session a

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feeling of reverence, of noble toleration and of spiritual awe which left upon those present the impression that they had listened to the unfolding of sacred experiences rather than to any clash of contending faiths. This is not the place in which to attempt to summarize all that was said or implied in the speeches. A verbatim report of the discussion will shortly be published by the committee of the congress (office, 13 Buckingham Street, Strand, London, W. C.). But perhaps a few words which fell from the Bishop of Hereford at the close of the debate best describe the impression which it produced: "Every one amongst us feels that he or she is set in the midst of what we call the Infinite. It is impossible, therefore, fully and adequately to train any individual without what we term the religious element. We are naturally religious; we are inevitably religious. But that is no reason why we should not concentrate our attention in our school relationships with the young upon what we term fundamental morality. A considerable section of this meeting is inclined to deprecate the introduction of religious instruction into our schools. On that I say nothing but this: That the religious teacher and the moral teacher have the same need, the same end, which is to build up conduct and character and good purpose in the child. They have the same need of an atmosphere and of a tone in the school; and the atmosphere and the tone of the school depend upon the personality of the teacher. The teacher will give forth from his or her personality what lies at the root of it. So long as we have religious teachers we may be content. We might even be content, in that case, with only moral teaching in our schools because there would also be religious teaching, passing out unconsciously but inevitably from the personality and example of the teacher. I would venture as an old man to suggest to the young teachers who are enthusiastic for moral teaching and afraid of religious teaching, that the difference between moral teaching and religious teaching might be expressed by the difference

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between the circle and the parabola. In the circle you confine yourself to what is within a certain limited boundary. In the parabola you have on one side this same limited boundary, but on the other it reaches out to the infinite. Inasmuch as you have to deal with individual minds and imaginations—souls, if you will—which are reaching to the infinite in all directions, you cannot separate these two. But the one thing you have to remember is that out of your own personality will come the influence with which you mold the child. And so, whether we are teaching religion or teaching morality, let us remember that in the teaching of these things the best of our teachers will rise till they touch the spheres."

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SELF-ESTEEM AND THE LOVE OF RECOGNITION AS SOURCES OF CONDUCT.

H. H. SCHROEDER.

ONE of the most important sources of conduct is to be found in the feelings aroused by what we think of ourselves, and by what we care for what others think of us. The social environment in which we live approves of certain types of conduct, while it disapproves of others; it places a valuation on certain capacities and qualities, while there are other characteristics that it just as positively condemns. The thought that we are possessed of qualities that have value in the eyes of our fellows, or that our conduct has been meritorious, is a source of pleasure to ourselves rather than of indifference or of displeasure, we have a "feeling of pride"; contrariwise, the thought that our conduct in any matter has been unworthy arouses a painful feeling, we are ashamed. The habitude that is fostered by these particular pleasurable

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feelings at the thought of our worth constitutes the feeling-disposition which we call self-esteem, showing itself in a variety of forms such as vanity, pride, haughtiness.

Unfortunately there has ever been great laxity in the use of these various terms, so that a certain opprobrium has become attached to all of them.[1] This is to be regretted because it is liable to lead teachers into the error of attempting to eradicate an inherent proclivity of the child's nature, instead of utilizing this potent propensity to the end of securing desired results in conduct. A more nearly perfect analysis of the nature of self-esteem in its various forms certainly shows how the same may be made a most efficient means of securing proper development along moral lines. Adam Smith goes so far as to say that the "secret of education is to direct vanity to proper objects."[2]

It is evident that the opinion that an individual may form as to his ability or capacity, as to his worth or merit, need not necessarily be correct; in fact, it is more likely to be faulty. Furthermore, it is more apt to be too favorable than too unfavorable. The mistake in judgment may be due to the individual's imagining that he possesses meritorious qualities that he does not possess, or that he does not possess in the degree in which he thinks he does. This form of self-esteem we call *conceit*. Where the mistake in judgment is due to the actual possession of qualities of supposed merit or of only trifling merit, such as good looks, pretty clothes and the like, we have the form of self-esteem called *vanity*. Again, there may be an overestimation of the true worth of qualities or possessions that have greater social value, such as energy, will power, intellectual ability, learning, money, family connections. This is the habitude that is properly

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[1] Ruskin, for instance, says: "I have been more and more convinced, the more I think of it, that in general pride is at the bottom of all great mistakes." He really means haughtiness, for elsewhere he defines pride as a "looking down on others because of their true inferiority to us."

[2] "Moral Sentiments," VI, p. 3.

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called *false pride,* which is liable to be accompanied by a looking-down on others as inferiors, when it is called *haughtiness.* Where there is a just estimation of the true worth of the individual, we have *true pride.*

From the fact that the pleasures of self-esteem are valued so highly by us, there is in our nature an inherent tendency to preserve intact our good opinion of self. Where our regard for self—really our concern to preserve intact the pleasures of self-esteem—keeps us from performing certain actions deemed unworthy of ourselves, we call the attitude *self-respect.* But what we consider to be unworthy is, for most of us, determined by what our social environment considers to be unworthy. What is ordinarily called self-respect really is dependent, in the great majority of cases, on what people generally think regarding such matters.

On the other hand, an individual may care more for what some particular class, clique or social set thinks regarding these things, and under this head might be grouped such habitudes as the sense of honor and the sense of propriety. Similarly an individual may ignore what people generally, as well as what particular classes or groups, think concerning what is worthy and unworthy, and base his conduct on his own views concerning such matters; then we are liable to call the attitude *pride,*[3] and this may be either true or false. If the standard that determines his opinion is a true one, society will be the gainer ultimately, even if in his individualistic attitude he has been nonconforming to her present standard.

The very young child necessarily places his valuation upon what to the mature person might amount to nothing or to trifles. There are but few of his physical organs and mental capabilities that he has learned to use well as viewed by the adult. But it is just such exercise that calls forth words and signs of recognition, praise from

[3] We call it pride because the individualistic, nonconformist attitude taken must strike us as presumptuous and overweening.

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his parents and other grown-up acquaintances. It is such recognition that arouses in the little tot the flush of pleasure. So when he has mastered a new feat in the way of physical gymnastic or can pronounce a new "big" word or has learned a new fact, he must show it off to his elders, to receive the new pleasure due to the recognition of his new achievement. He is not content with the new achievement, nor even with the thought that this new achievement is the *potential* means of securing the pleasure due to recognition by others. He must *actually* receive that added pleasure. The mere consciousness of his own ability (to his mind, his own worth) does not furnish him with sufficient pleasure; it must be reinforced by actual recognition from others.

By the time he comes to school, matters have not changed much, nor is there likely to be much of a change during school age unless he is here subjected to wise guidance. With advancing age he will gradually pride himself less upon these lesser things and more on the things that have greater social value, as physical strength, agility, endurance, keenness of perception, retentiveness of memory, accuracy of judgment, power of critical analysis; ability to excel in debate, oratory, music or other accomplishments; scholarship, wealth, family connections, ancestry. Such pride, false as it is, is not necessarily productive of great harm, provided that it mark only this transition period, and that the process be not arrested at this stage of the child's development. Should it, however, be brought to a stop at this point, it will result in some form of that grievous distemper, haughtiness, such as the overweening and patronizing arrogance of the familiar "man of family," the pompous snobbishness of the wealthy upstart, the vulgar affectation of "cultuah" of the society-butterfly product of certain female seminaries, the supercilious self-sufficiency of the half-baked scholar who likes to dwell in thought, at least, on the fact of his belonging to the "aristocracy of learning"—all maladies symptomatic of a deeper-seated

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ailment: the lack of real intellectual or cultural development.

Under proper guidance he will learn to see that even though these things have value, or may have it, they do not reflect merit on the possessor, being in the main gifts of nature. When he sees that rugged physical constitution and perspicacity of intellect, desirable as they may be, redound no more to his credit than he is blameworthy for being a cripple or being afflicted with an impediment of speech, there will be a new shifting of the basis of his self-esteem; for now he will begin to realize that the true worth of a man depends on the proper use of the powers with which he has been endowed. In other words, his pride will now gradually become a moral pride, *i. e.,* a pride based on moral factors. His question will not longer be: "What exceptional qualities do I possess?" qualities which he realizes are accidents of birth, but instead: "What proper, *i. e.,* what moral, use do I make of the capabilities bestowed upon me?" As a result it will be his endeavor to bring about a corresponding development in his own character. As he grows in the direction of truthfulness, fidelity to duty, faithfulness to friends, scrupulosity of conscience, adherence to principle, he is approximating toward the ideal development of self-esteem. But it is just at this stage that there is danger of developing the false moral pride of the "unco guid," the self-righteous attitude of the Pharisee who prides himself in his self-complacency on not being "as other men." It still is false pride for the simple reason that it is *exclusive.*

True pride is always accompanied by true modesty and true humility. It is not puffed up or overweening like the false moral pride of the Pharisee. Lao-tse with pithy brevity says: "Inferior virtue never loses sight of virtue. Therefore it has no virtue." The true modesty and humility here mentioned are not to be confounded with that false modesty and false humility that are the characteristic guise of the self-seeking, canting hypocrite, that false

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modesty which shows itself in insincere and ostentatious self-disparagement, and that false humility observed in the fawning servility of that abomination of abominations, the cringing, self-debasing, tuft-hunting toady.[4] Neither are they found in the undue self-depreciation of those unfortunates who have been buffeted about by the calamitous vicissitudes of life until they have lost all confidence in self, if not faith in human nature. The modesty here spoken of is rather a dignified, tactful, unostentatious reserve due to the possessor's just appreciation of his real ability and true worth. He fully realizes that the recognition that ordinarily comes to men is not based on true *worth*, but instead on social *value* due to exceptional gift; that, therefore, in so far as recognition coming to him is due to his possession of unusual capabilities—the result of accident of birth or contingency of training—it is not due him; that, therefore, he is receiving a disproportionate share of that recognition which should be distributed on a more nearly just basis.[5] Similarly, the humility here spoken of is the natural habiliment of the person who sufficiently recognizes the frailties, the foibles and the failings of human nature, and is fully imbued with the sense of his own incompetency in view of the exalted demands of the moral law that he is trying to take as his guide.[6]

[4] Where Goethe says, "Only knaves are modest," he is thinking of this feigned modesty.

[5] The etymology of the German word for modest, *bescheiden*, is significant; it meant at one time, *to be well informed.*

[6] The contention of theologians in times past as well as of such and others of the present day, to the point that pride is always an undesirable attitude, cannot be well taken. If it be entirely proper to feel *shame* at the thought of having been guilty of unworthy conduct, why should it not be equally proper to feel its opposite, *i. e., pride*, at the thought of having done something worthy? Calling the resultant feeling by another name will not change its nature either; for the gratification, satisfaction or pleasure one experiences under such circumstances is just the very feeling that we term pride. A great many writers call the desirable development of self-esteem self-respect, as, for instance, Fowler, "Principles of Morals," Part II, p. 64. To the present writer it seems more accurate to use the term self-respect in designation of that habitude *before* an

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When self-esteem has reached this point in the course of development, we have its desirable climax. In place of mere *contemplation* of one's powers, it has now secured their proper *application.* It is no longer exclusive. It now demands for self no more respect or recognition than it would see accorded to others. Its concern now is to preserve intact true human dignity not only in self, but equally so in others. Probably it is now less a respect for self than it is a respect for the human nature element in self, *i. e.,* less a personal regard for self than it is an impersonal regard for human nature. It is only then that it can secure the adherence to such a maxim of conduct as Kant's: "So act that you always consider mankind, not only in your own person but in the person of every other, not simply as a means, but at the same time as an end." It is only then that it can see that there is possible such a thing as unworthy treatment of even the basest of men. The question could well be debated whether regard for self has not been transformed into a regard for the moral law. In order to realize the *end,* the securing of true personal worthiness, attention and endeavor had to become focused on moral conduct as the *means* to this end; thus moral conduct became the *aim* of effort, until at last, by the strange workings of that interesting psychological phenomenon, the substitution of motives, it became the end or goal to which the individual was objectively driven, perhaps even without his realizing it.[7]

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action to be performed, in which we think of the worthiness or unworthiness of the action to be performed; on the other hand, the pleasurable feeling and corresponding feeling-disposition coming as the *result* of an action considered worthy, is pride. Self-respect would be the *prospective* phase of self-esteem, pride its *retrospective* phase.

[7] Jodl, "Lehrbuch der Psychologie," II, 334, second edition, calls attention to the significance of self-esteem to the individual in these words: "Without the counterpoise which is to be found in our self-appraisement, we should be as thoroughly prostrated by the pressure of the indifference and condemnation encamped about us . . . as we should be crushed by the atmosphere surrounding us were it not for the resistance offered by the air contained within our own body."

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THE LOVE OF RECOGNITION.

The pleasures of self-esteem, largely due to what we think of ourselves, are enhanced or reinforced by recognition on the part of others. We can very properly speak of an inherent love of the recognition of our own merit or supposed merit. It includes the pleasures due to any form of expressed appreciation by others. Where it is directed toward commendation or praise by individuals we have become accustomed to call it the *love of approbation.* Where it is directed toward public recognition, as, for instance, in the form of honors or popular demonstration of esteem, we speak of it as the *love of honors.* From the fact that approbation and honors are pleasurable it would but follow that a love for these things would naturally be accompanied by a striving to secure them. And so the love of approbation frequently manifests itself as a striving to secure approbation, as, for instance, in vanity. Similarly, the love of honors is apt to show itself in a striving to secure honors—*ambition.*

In this regard for the good opinion of others we have one of the most potent means of securing moral conduct; in the eyes of some of our great thinkers, as, for instance, Locke, regard for the opinion of others is in fact the whole source of conduct. The most depraved approximate toward an entire disregard for the opinion of others; even there we find left a concern for the good opinion of certain of their fellow-men, even if not for that of society at large, *e. g.,* "honor among thieves." At the other extreme, in the great leaders of thought, we also find a seeming disregard for public opinion; but even here the thought that public opinion at some later day will approve of the stand now disapproved of no doubt is a partial source of the sustaining power and fortitude that enables the reformer to remain true to his ideals. And certainly in the case of the non-exceptional it is most clear that regard for the good opinion of others is a most potent means of securing conduct in conformity with the

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standards of the day. A proper regard for the esteem of others is therefore not only permissible, but desirable.

But just as a proper regard for any other good may, by being too constantly entertained, become transformed into an *inordinate* desire in that direction, so here. Proper self-regard or self-love may be nursed until it becomes an undue self-regard or self-love, namely, selfishness or egoism. Now outside of our desire for the creature comforts, this very habitude, the love of recognition of our ability or merit, when inordinate, includes all the selfishness there is; for the greed for wealth and the love of power, when carefully analyzed, will be found to consist largely of this love of recognition, or, as Aristotle says: "Wealth and power are eligible because of the honor they confer."

The very young child, seeing the great disparity that exists between his own ability and that of his elders, would be crushed with the consciousness of this difference were it not for the recognition that he constantly receives for what ability he does possess, and what worth he is made to think he possesses. It is due to this principle that he is so much more in need of external reinforcement of his self-esteem than are older people; and it is due to the same cause that he naturally tends to "show off," manifesting the working of a power that Mother Nature has bestowed upon him to enable him to secure that recognition that he needs as much as he does his daily nourishment. When he needs bread, it will not do to give him a stone. Similarly, it will not do to pamper and overfeed him with seductive sweets in place of giving him a sane diet of *wholesome* recognition.

As he grows in ability and his consciousness of the same, he becomes more self-sustaining in his self-esteem; there is less need of reinforcement from without. Furthermore, with the increase of experience and intelligent judgment, he becomes more discriminative as to the value of the recognition coming from various sources and in different forms. He learns to care more for the

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commendation that comes from those who to his mind possess superior judgment, or again for the approval that comes from those who to his mind have his interest at heart. It is apparent, of course, that he can be mistaken as to who has this superior judgment and as to who is his true friend. Similarly, he soon learns to see that there is a difference between recognition and recognition, and then it is that he will prefer the more precious praise sparingly given to the cheaper article spread broadcast, and still more to its base counterfeit, flattery. Again, when he has met with praise that was unlooked-for, he learns to value unsolicited approval more highly than that which is brought home only by overt efforts to secure it; his vanity changes to pride—he is "too proud to be vain." Furthermore, other things equal, the expression of esteem on the part of many will give him greater pleasure than that of a few; in short, the love of approbation expands into a love of honors; parallel to it, the striving to secure approbation, vanity, changes into striving to secure honors, ambition. Unfortunately, there are dangers ahead. Will he be able to avoid them?

Recognition in any form, at least where it is genuine, is an expression of esteem or respect based on the real or supposed *worth* of the recipient. If this recognition could be bestowed, or if it would be bestowed, *only* on true worth, then the love of recognition could not lead the individual astray. Unfortunately, however, those who have it to give may, in the first place, be ignorant as to what constitutes true worth, and may thus put it on a wrong basis just as the vain person or person of false pride is mistaken as to what constitutes true worth. Again, others are not always able to recognize true merit when they meet with it, and may be deceived into taking a counterfeit for the genuine. What is more, perhaps, people sometimes bestow honors—supposed to be the token of esteem, honor or respect—on the basis of their individual likings, affections. As a result the individual

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is misled in his endeavor to secure the esteem of his fellows by conforming to their opinions with regard to what constitutes the basis on which the token of esteem is rendered. But the greatest peril is found in the fact that we can have a good name or reputation without really possessing a good character, can be respected without being really respectworthy, can secure honors without being truly honorable. In place of making ourselves truly worthy, we can deceive others into believing that we are worthy where we are not. True worth can be secured only as the result of patient, persevering, painstaking endeavor in the direction of self-mastery in the duties to ourselves and others. It is a laborious and tedious and long-drawn-out process, full of misgiving, disillusionment and disappointment. How seductive the temptation to secure the sweets of recognition by a less toilsome process! It does not take us long to see that we can secure the tokens of recognition for worth, not only by offering true worth, but that we can *purchase* them by giving a counterfeit—mistaken for the genuine—or again, can get possession of them by *bribery*. We can, in short, gain preferment, rank, eminence through the actual *possession* of true worth, but as well, if not better, through *deception* as to our worth, and through *popularity* rather than fitness or worthiness. Of course, the latter two are really one, being simply the obverse and the reverse sides of the same counterfeit.

INSINCERITY GROWING OUT OF INORDINATE LOVE OF RECOGNITION.

In what might be called the adolescence of inordinate love of recognition, the stage of conceit and vanity, the element of insincerity is hardly present. At best we could there speak of an innocent, unconscious disingenuousness, showing itself in an instinctive tendency to draw attention to self, or rather toward those qualities or characteristics that are held to be meritorious, while at

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the same time trying to conceal weaknesses. Of course, in cases of arrested development we still find the same thing in youth and even in maturity. But there, except in rare cases, the attention-soliciting efforts are no longer spontaneous or impulsive, but more largely the result of intentional design and purpose. We are all familiar with the parading pretensions and grandiloquent swagger of the shallow-pated coxcomb, and the loud guffaw and unseemly vociferousness of blatant, self-advertising mediocrity.

Gradually the individual comes to see that his overt fishing for compliments and manifest solicitation of publicity and resulting honors are offensive and defeat their own purpose. If because of a native disinclination to strenuous, especially long-continued effort he still dislikes the "straight and narrow path," there is but one other course left: he must become more skillful in the art of interesting others in self, and so his mastery in the manipulation of covert and insidious devices of self-aggrandizement grows apace. These devices can be conveniently classed under two heads: those of dissimulation and hypocrisy, and those of ingratiation. But they are twin and inseparable.

In the first place, then, he must *feign* those virtues highly valued by society. And, above all things else, he must convince others of his unselfishness. And so, just because he is so very *self-seeking,* he will, when arrived at perfection in his art, be, in his action at least, anything but *self-centered,* and that to the innocent and guileless observer is proof of his unselfishness. Because he is so very consistently selfish or *egoistic* at heart, his outer demeanor will be anything but *egotistic,* and if he be a man of exceptional gifts, he may for years be considered the very embodiment of the spirit of self-abnegation. However, the average mortal cannot ordinarily attain the acme of perfection in the wiles and arts of hypocrisy, although he can long baffle ordinary observers in their attempts to see through his villainy, and what is worse,

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may keep those others under suspicion who really are what they appear to be. For, unfortunately, it is easier to deceive than it is to detect deception. The keen eye and ear of the practiced observer, however, are apt even so to detect an occasional gesture that betrays its source or note a word that does not ring true. For in his very endeavor to aim high in his efforts to attain perfection, the deceiver is liable to overshoot his mark. The very persistence with which he keeps his modesty, his virtue, his piety to the front betrays the presence of set purpose. This is especially manifest in the well-known, long-winded, introductory apology and painfully studious avoidance of reference to self noticed in the insincere speaker, standing in marked contrast to the unwitting use of the pronoun "I" by the perfectly genuine speaker who loses himself in his message. As a result the deceiver produces a copy not quite true to the original, even though it be difficult to detect the difference. And so in place of the easy, spontaneous reserve of true modesty we see the self-conscious, modesty-emphasizing obtrusiveness of its baser substitute; in place of the upright, self-respecting lowliness of true humility, the groveling, self-debasing servility of its fictitious counterpart; in place of the seemly and natural retirement of true and genuine piety, the vulgar, sanctimonious importunity of its canting, lip-serving, eye-rolling copy; and in a general way, in place of the simple, unassuming, straightforwardness of virtue, the artful, studied sinuosity of hypocrisy.

But deceiving others into the idea of our possessing real worth is not the only means to which inordinate love of recognition resorts. Preferment is secured not only on the basis of being *esteemed,* but as well on that of being *liked*; for where people like they unwittingly assume the presence of worth, whether justly so or not. And so, in seeking preferment, ambition needs but seek popularity by currying favor. Now what is the basis on which we favor or like others? Briefly, we like those who cause us pleasure rather than pain. So the self-seeking, am-

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bitious man has an easy task of winning our good will: negatively, it means for him the need of being considerate to others, and positively, of rendering them agreeable service. Thus it is that he soon possesses himself of that tactful urbanity that never opposes, but always accedes to, the opinions of others and that leads him to become "all things to all men." But here again inordinate self-regard debases the currency that circulates as the token of regard for others, and so, in place of the bland and genial affability of genuine cordiality and good will we have the smooth and oily unctuosity of its inferior counterfeit. And as far as regards the agreeable services rendered to others by self-seeking ambition, they consist in the main of agreeable attentions, for it must be remembered that inordinate, impatient, unworthy ambition is disinclined, on general principles, to overstrenuosity in the direction of real service anywhere. It is easier to secure the desired good will and resulting favor by the bribes of wheedling[8] flattery, obsequious adulation and subservient truckling, especially to those in high places. The *complimenting* of the "mixer" becomes in the hands of the "jollier" *complete mentiri, i. e.,* complete or thoroughgoing lying.[9] The extreme ends to which misguided ambition can lead by this medium of ingratiation can be seen in the abject spectacle of the self-stultification of the lick-platter parasite, and in the still more loathsome sight of the self-prostitution of his bigger brother, the lick-spittle place hunter.

This same inordinate desire for personal preferment is the source of envy, jealousy and maliciousness toward rivals. Wherever many men are active side by side, with chances for promotion, as in the army, in factories, work-

[8] Wheedle, probably from the German *wedeln,* to wag with the tail. In the case of the dog we recognize the "wheedling" as the expression of joy in anticipation of the possession of the bone that *he* is to receive; but unfortunately for us, the wheedling of the fawning flatterer is interpreted by our vanity as a genuine interest in *ourselves.*

[9] As transcribed by Karl Julius Weber in his "Demokritos."

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ing-crews, counting houses, the professions, this particular aspect of the workings of ambition can be readily observed. It is largely due to the fact that we have rivals that we are so anxious to let others know about our ability, as in the boastfulness of conceit, or to let them see it, as in self-advertising vanity. When we have advanced beyond this stage, we become more skillful in letting others see what we are doing without letting our efforts to do so become apparent. Where superior worth, lost in the work at hand, does not let "the left hand know what the right doeth," lesser worth, wrapt up in self, is ever thinking of the reward that is to come for what he is doing. So, also, where a man is not content with his present station, but aspires to one that calls for a greater range of ability in a broader field of activity, he is likely to be tempted to be forever trying to show his superiors his ability in those other directions, in place of concentrating his energies on his present tasks. A foreman, for instance, in order to convince his employers of his qualifications for a position calling for greater organizing and executive ability, might spend considerable time and energy in keeping himself posted on what others are doing, in place of confining himself to the particular work assigned to him, and showing his fitness for greater things by being faithful in those which are least.

Where unworthy ambition is intense enough it is, of course, not content with this negative attitude toward rivals, but assumes the more positive attitude seen in the direction of backbiting, slander, traducement, defamation, detraction. Here again it is only the bungling apprentice in the arts and crafts of inordinate ambition who resorts to open underrating, denunciation or calumny. Advancing in the hierarchy we find the covert disparaging, accusation, defamation of the more skillful fellow-craft; the infamous wiles of innuendo of the still more proficient master; the diabolical genius at insinuation of the adept past master. It would be impossible to enumerate all the detestable artifices of these experts in their

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impious practices, but who is not familiar with the atrocious "damning with faint praise"? Who has not been witness to that excessive lauding where praise is bound to injure, and its accompanying professing of ignorance where the telling of the well-known truth would help? And who has not met with that maintaining of an eloquent silence that far more effectively undoes the object of its rancor than could any effort of more manly disparagement or arraignment, at the same time that it serves that other purpose of impressing the hearer with a consciousness of the exaltation of that virtue which will say nothing where it cannot speak approvingly?

Occasionally, however, even the adroit expert in the insidious arts of unworthy self-aggrandizement must find freer vent for the malice and envy he feels toward his rivals. But even then his pent-up feelings secure expression under the hypocritical guise of apparently innocent bantering or seemingly good-natured jest, thus securing the relief of easement on the one hand, and at the same time fortifying self against the possibility of deserved chastisement should the butt of the jest unexpectedly see through the real intent of the jester. It must have been this that Pascal had in mind when he said that the "jester is a bad character." If there is anything the ambitious man of this type dreads it is an open fray, for well he realizes that there he might be worsted; he can fight successfully only by skulking in ambush and sending his poisoned shafts from the cover of his cowardly retreat. He stands in no need of the counsel of Lady Macbeth: "Bear welcome in your eye, your hand, your tongue: look like the innocent flower, but be the serpent under't." Full well has he heeded the admonition, "Be wise as the serpent," but in the innocent purity of his devout preoccupancy he has inadvertently overlooked its companion injunction to "be harmless as the dove." And if, in spite of herculean efforts to prevent it, he should be unwillingly forced into combat by an ungrateful and worldly rival, it is with a heavy heart that he

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finally takes the aggressive, and then of course under that banner which alone is worthy of such extreme measures: disinterested, lofty morality. Heine[10] well says: "And it is always religion and always morality, and always patriotism, with which base villains palliate their attacks. They attack, not from sordid private interest, not from envy of their literary rivals, not from inborn servility, but only to rescue the good Lord, good morals and the fatherland."

Unfortunately, the attitude of untoward ambition to friends presents just as unprepossessing a spectacle. In reality, self-seeking ambition knows no friendship, for friendship calls for an unselfish interest in another, and inordinate ambition sacrifices everything else to its own selfish ends. It helps others as long as that will help self. The author can give no better statement of the relation existing between selfish ambition and disinterested friendship than by quoting from Kuno Fischer's "Life of Bacon":[11] "To-day Bacon still made every effort to save the man that had been his benefactor; but when he saw that the graciousness of the queen was at stake, he dropped the friend whose favor he had sought only because he was the favorite of the queen. . . . The collision was not between duty and inclination, but between selfishness and friendship. Essex had loved him with a passionate interest and had overwhelmed him with benefits, to which Bacon had responded with as much devotion as his dispassionate nature admitted of. What he loved in Essex was less the friend than the influential favorite, who was of use to him. The favorite fell, and Bacon's friendship was put to the test that it could not stand. . . . Bacon had to choose between him (Essex) and the queen. . . . At the request of the queen he himself had to support the accusation, and publicly to vindicate the execution of Essex, after it had taken place. He supported the ac-

[10] In the introduction to Part III of his "Salon."
[11] First Edition, Leipzig, 1856, pp. 11-19.

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cusation, he wrote the vindication, he did both without sympathy, both in such a way as showed plainly that Bacon now had left but one consideration, only the one concern, to please the queen. When the latter made the request of him to vindicate the consummated execution by means of a pamphlet, Bacon answered that he was glad to know that the queen took a fancy to his pen."

Just as disinterested faithfulness to a friend lies beyond the practical comprehension of selfish ambition, so also with unselfish fidelity to duty or adherence to principle, for everywhere selfish interest is paramount. When accompanying a low stage of intellectual development, it readily betrays itself by its sordid narrowness, but in the more highly educated and cultured individual, it becomes more intelligently and coldly calculating, with a keen eye for the benefits and advantages that accrue to him that readily adapts himself to the ever-changing flux of contingencies in his immediate environment. Courage and conviction, to such a one, are impossible conceptions, for they call for stability instead of fickleness, devotion to duty and principle instead of devotion to self, manly resistance in place of knavish yielding. We are all familiar with the human weathercocks that veer with every shifting zephyr of public opinion, the two-faced people that blow hot and cold with the same breath. Much as *honors* are coveted by this amphibian breed, *honor* is to them nothing but a sound, as is so nicely expressed by Falstaff: "Can honor set to a leg? no: or an arm? no: or take away the grief of a wound? no. Honor hath no skill in surgery, then? No. What is honor? A word." And so it is that the very recognition we strive for may bring about in the place of manly adherence to exacting principle and unyielding rigorism, the convenient expediency and flabby opportunism of the time-serving trimmer.

In coming now to a final appraisement of this powerful disposition toward conduct, it is most patent that the

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question of its worth in any individual person depends on what that person aims at in his endeavor to secure the esteem of his fellows. The end with which all set out at this point is the same: to secure the satisfaction of self-esteem that lies in the recognition by others. But at the very outset two different aims present themselves: either one can aim at the securing of *true worth* by the means of moral conduct, or one can aim directly at the securing of *recognition* by means of deception. In the former case every act about to be performed is first referred to the crucial touchstone of our own moral judgment; in the latter it is instead referred to the uncertain criterion of the incalculable changes in our unstable environment; in the first, the consideration is as to the rightness or wrongness of the act to be performed; in the second, the concern is as to its popularity or unpopularity. We cannot as readily deceive ourselves as we can others, for we can see the selfish motive concealed from the outside observer. Where in exceptional cases a person succeeds in deceiving himself, it is always one who pursues the second course; as a result of his trying so long to convince others of his genuineness, he finally becomes deluded into that belief himself.[12] In a general way, the more the individual inclines toward the former course, the more salutary the results, and the more he tends in the other direction, the more mischievous the ultimate consequences.

Even in the case of intense ambition striving to realize itself by honest and honorable means, there are dangers: on the one hand, that of overwork, which cuts down so many of our ablest and worthiest men in their prime, and on the other, that of refraining from all the pleasing graces and the little kindnesses of social intercourse because of a just detestation of the infamous use to which

[12] Perhaps the best example of this kind in literature that the author is familiar with, is Fritz Nettenmaier in Ludwig's novel, "Between Heaven and Earth," a novel which has probably never been excelled, if equaled, in the matter of keen psychological analysis.

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they are so often degraded and because of the fear of being drawn into the same abominable practices, thus developing a serious gravity often mistaken for forbidding severity, if not cold indifference or even self-important haughtiness. But even in the case of the unprepossessing angularity and unapproachable austerity that unfortunately result in cases, what noble dignity there is to simple-minded sincerity compared to the abject beggarliness of adroit and subtle duplicity, and that in spite of the engaging blandness, the taking suavity and the captivating good-fellowship in which the latter is so apt to array itself!

In view of the potent influence toward both socially desirable and undesirable conduct that lies in self-esteem and the love of recognition, it is of the utmost importance that teachers pay heed to these dispositions and bring proper influences to bear on them to the end of securing their coöperation in the work of education. The first concern must be to place respect or esteem on the right basis, and that not only by theoretical appeal to the intellect, but more especially by the practical appeal to the imitative nature of the child by the example of the teacher. Could every child be sufficiently impressed with the thought that he will be esteemed because of the worthy use he makes of his abilities, even though they be mediocre or inferior, there would be no such strong desire on his part to attain by illegitimate means those heights that he cannot attain by an honorable use of the powers with which he has been endowed. Were our educational agencies to be controlled with this aim in view, it would not be so difficult to secure the thoroughness of the real worker in place of the superficiality of the ambitious eye-servant. Then we could consistently urge our pupils to take as their motto the words of Schiller:

> Who something perfect would perform,
> To something great give birth,
> Must gather, quiet and unwearied e'er,
> The greatest power in smallest sphere.

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Just because the undesirable features of the love of recognition are brought out where it is inordinate and conscious of its own relative inability as compared to that of rivals, it is clear that in order to secure desirable results, ability must be improved, ambition curbed and judgment developed as to what is really worthy and therefore worth while. In the language of Lao-tse, we must "weaken ambition" and "strengthen backbone." If we do that we can have some assurance that our efforts will be instrumental in bringing about a life absorbed in service to those higher interests worthy of the dignity of man's estate, instead of a life devoted to a fruitless chase after the elusive rainbow of evanescent fame.

> For what are men, who grasp at praise sublime,
> But bubbles on the rapid stream of time,
> That rise and fall, that swell, and are no more,
> Born and forgot, ten thousand in an hour.—*Young.*

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THE MORALS OF AN IMMORALIST—FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE.

ALFRED W. BENN.

II.

IT has been disputed whether Nietzsche's superman was intended by his prophet to stand for a new animal species, or for a new and improved variety of human being, or, finally, for a sporadic type of individual excellence, cropping up occasionally in the existing state of civilization. So far as the name and notion have become popular it seems to be generally understood in the last sense. The superman is commonly identified with a coxcomb whose opinion of his own superiority to the rest of the species

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is only equaled by his contempt for the ordinary obligations of morality. Such pretensions are not new; and it would be strange if Nietzsche had no higher ambition than to reëdit them under a more pompous appellation. In fact it very much disgusted him to find that the watchword of his philosophy should be used to procure admittance for degenerate types with whom he sympathized even less than with the unregenerate Philistine. Nothing like the superman had ever turned up in his own experience; whether history had offered any examples of his ideal remains doubtful. On this point the language of Zarathustra is perfectly explicit, and if taken alone would settle the question. When the greatest and the smallest are stripped and compared they show themselves too fatally alike, and both of them all too human. In a later work Napoleon seems to be mentioned as an exception, but an exception that proves the rule, being a combination of the superman with the brute (*WW.*, VI, p. 134, and VII, p. 337).

Napoleon, in fact, embodied the formidable alternative confronting us at the present day. The human race represents a transitional stage of unstable equilibrium. We must either go back to the brute or on to the superman (*WW.*, XII, p. 210). And the choice is not doubtful. Our very first article of faith is the duty of not relapsing into a savage and anti-social state (*WW.*, VII, p. 52). Therefore the new beings can only be conceived as a multitude; goodness can only be developed among equals (p. 210).

It remains to be decided whether we are to conceive the superman as a new animal species, differing not less from the actual human species than that differs from the anthropoid ape, or merely as a new race, related to the modern European somewhat as the Greeks were related to the barbarians among whom they settled. This seems to be a point on which, as on various others, our prophet had no scruple about changing his mind without caring to acknowledge the change either to others or to himself.

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To my mind at least, there cannot be the faintest doubt that when he wrote *Zarathustra* his wish was to represent the superman as a new animal species to be evolved by artificial selection from man. I know that his sister and biographer, Madame Förster-Nietzsche, refuses to accept this interpretation; but it is significant that she can only get rid of the relevant texts by explaining them away as poetical metaphors. But when Nietzsche talks in parables he makes them unmistakably parabolical. We find ourselves among a motley assemblage of rope-dancers, lions, adders, tarantulas, kings, beggars and other mystical properties needless to enumerate. But every now and then this rather wearisome entertainment is relieved by the expression of plain ideas in plain language, quite familiar to us from their recurrence in the author's other works where, as Cassandra says, the oracle looks out not like a bride behind her veil, but like wind-driven waves against a rising sun. And foremost among these is the idea of a new species, a superman to be evolved from man, or in the still more telling phrase once let fall, a super-race from the race (*WW.*, VI, p. 111).

We have not now to discuss the feasibility of the idea. What has to be pointed out as the most interesting and attractive element in the work where it first appeared is the fire of moral enthusiasm burning through it from beginning to end. "Zarathustra has found no greater power on earth than good and evil" (p. 84). But as yet this power has been wasted because it was not directed toward the attainment of a single end. "There have been a thousand aims because there have been a thousand peoples. Humanity is still without an aim. And to be without that is to be without itself" (p. 87).

That men should combine for one end is not hopeless, for they already combine in smaller groups. "Regard for the interest of the herd or the community is older than self-interest. The individual is a most recent creation. So long as a good conscience represents the herd only the bad conscience says, 'I.' Truly the sly and

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loveless self that seeks its profit in the profit of others is not the beginning but the end of the herd" (p. 86).

At no time of life did his Hellenism make Nietzsche an admirer of the modern state; and at this period he positively foams at the mouth with hatred for it. The people and the herd may be fit objects of faith and love; never the state, although it impudently claims to be the people, which is not deceived but hates it as "a sin against morals and rights." There are many languages of good and evil, but it lies in them all. "All that it says is a lie, and all that it possesses has been stolen." Even those who vanquished the old god fall a prey to the snares of the new idol that promises to give them all if they will worship it; "so it buys the splendor of your virtue and the gaze of your proud eyes." The state must cease to exist before real manhood can begin; much more, before the way to the superman can be prepared (pp. 69-72).

What is the justification of this violent language? We may assume that the state discourages the growth of individuality; and as, according to Zarathustra, it was invented for the benefit of the "superfluous classes," it is apparently made responsible for their continued existence, while they in turn naturally support it.

Evidently, however, what Nietzsche most dreads and detests is not the mischief done by the modern state in suppressing individualism and favoring the survival of degenerates, but the fact that as a real, living, visible, attractive unity it enters into formidable competition with the glorified individuality of his imaginary superman. Michelet has pointed out that the giant Gargantua was nothing less than the new monarchy of the Renaissance; and one has only to think of him as coming into conflict with Cæsar Borgia, whom Nietzsche regards as the highest individual product of that age, to see which party would win. And after all the Duke of Valentinois, like another and greater Cæsar, was, from his German admirers' point of view, a traitor to the individualistic

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cause, the ambition of his life having been to establish the new monarchy in the pontifical states, if not, as Machiavelli hoped, over the whole of a reunited Italy. Neither he nor Alcibiades nor any other of the same class has ever been content to "exist beautifully," nor do they seem inclined to tolerate the existence of any other such paragons by their side.

Here then, at first starting, we find the idea of the superman afflicted with an immanent self-contradiction in the best Hegelian style. Conceived as individual, he at once establishes a leveling despotism, thus sublating the very type that he represents. Conceived as a class, he perishes by internecine strife.[1]

Close behind it comes a second self-contradiction afflicting the means proposed, or rather suggested, for bringing the ideal into existence. As already mentioned, they consist in an appeal to moral motives, in the proposal to create a new enthusiasm of humanity, uniting all the tremendous forces that now work for a multitude of conflicting ends toward a single end. Now this demand assumes the existence in the human race, as a whole, of such passionate self-devotion, combined with such cool, unerring judgment, as no example of has been found in the past. For it must be a devotion capable of sacrificing every other end to the achievement of this one end—an end, too, of which as yet there has been no experience, and an end involving, as no other thing sought after has ever involved, the total disappearance of the race that has brought it about. And the judgment called into play for that purpose must find the means for evolving a new animal species, a task to which human ingenuity, operating on the most passive and plastic materials, has never yet found itself equal. Surely a race so splendidly endowed with the noblest capacities of heart and will as to answer Zarathustra's call would de-

[1] The condottieri whom Cæsar Borgia treacherously massacred at Sinigaglia were "higher men" of a sort, though not so high as he was.

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serve a better fate than such self-annulment, would itself have anticipated the superman, and would require all the running it could make to keep in the same place.

It so happens that we can lay our finger on the initial error whence these monstrous consequences arose. Much as Nietzsche hated Germany, he hated England more; and with the rather discreditable object, I fear, of depreciating England and her great naturalist, he tries to show that without Hegel there would have been no Darwin. For, according to him, the German philosopher, by teaching that specific notions were evolved out of one another, prepared the scientific intellect of Europe to entertain the idea of organic development (*WW.*, V, p. 300). Historically there is, of course, no foundation for such a claim. Evolutionism was hereditary in the Darwin family, and goes back to a time before Hegel; while Hegel himself took the idea of development from Schelling, who in turn owed it to the naturalists of his time. What I wish to point out, however, is not the historical error, but the profound misconception of organic evolution that it betrays. Hegel's theory of logical development is determined by the idea that the lower notion suffers from an inherent self-contradiction, in consequence of which it falls to pieces, and spontaneously gives birth to the higher notion. With Darwin, on the contrary, the decay and death of the old species are not the antecedent, but the consequence of its having given birth to the new species, with which it is unable to compete. And this very internecine strife is another point of distinction between the two processes. Hegel's notions only perish in an ideal sense. In the actual life of logic they survive and continue to play a useful part in the economy of thought.

Applying the result to Nietzsche's philosophy we now see how, under an illusive show of Darwinian biology, he really evolves superman from man on the lines of Hegelian dialectic. That is to say, the old human species

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in awakening to the consciousness of its degeneracy overcomes and supersedes itself, thus calling the new superhuman species into being. Thus the pessimism of his youth becomes unexpectedly justified as an ideal expression of race suicide preparatory to a better state of things.

I have said that Nietzsche hated England; and it may be thought that this is inconsistent with the praises he lavished on her in his second or scientific period. But the revulsion merely repeats in a much less excusable form his earlier revolt from Wagner and Schopenhauer. It belongs to an unpleasant habit he had of kicking down the ladder by which he had climbed up. He could not forgive the English thinkers for what he owed them; and the "profound mediocrity of the English intellect"—represented presumably by Shakespeare, Newton, Chatham and Byron—is charged with having caused a deep depression of the European intellect as a whole, and more particularly of the French intellect. This very mediocrity, however, enables the English to perform important services for which men of genius are incapacitated by their splendid disregard of facts. Darwin, Mill and Herbert Spencer, being the men to whom he personally owed most, are particularly mentioned in this connection as examples of useful dullness (*WW.*, VII, p. 223). Of the three Spencer seems to have had the largest share in ultimately determining his philosophy, and so he is never mentioned without some expression of contemptuous disagreement. English utilitarianism is the foundation of his ethics; and therefore it is savagely denounced as a canting, hypocritical attempt to secure the greatest happiness of England under pretense of pursuing the greatest happiness of all. In England itself the standard of happiness among moral philosophers is comfort, fashion and a seat in Parliament (*Ib.*, p. 184). Gyzicky once congratulated a German critic for having performed the rare feat of attacking utilitarianism without forgetting the manners of a gentleman. This ad-

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mirable exception could not have been our aristocratic immoralist.

Throughout his second period Nietzsche, besides being a utilitarian in the wide sense of judging actions by their consequences, had also been a hedonist, that is, he had considered happiness (or pleasure) as a universally desired and absolutely desirable thing, although at the same time as a thing too indefinite to be made a standard for the unification of human life. The desire of domination, on the other hand, is mentioned in a note bearing the date of 1880 as a symptom of weakness (*WW.*, XI, p. 405). Within a year we find the first intimation of his final doctrine, that power is the *summum bonum* and love of power the universal motive, in an aphorism setting forth (for the rest without an attempt to demonstrate it) that whether we give pleasure or pain to others, it is solely for the purpose of satisfying our love of power (*WW.*, V, p. 50 *seq.*). A little later still, Zarathustra proclaims power as a new virtue, a new standard of good and evil (*WW.*, VI, p. 112). It is not so very new, being borrowed, as usual without acknowledgment, from an English philosopher, Hobbes; and besides that, Nietzsche, in his later writings, especially in the uncompleted *Wille zur Macht,* assumes that power is what everyone really wants and has always wanted. Everyone, with a single striking exception. "Men do not strive for happiness—only Englishmen" (*WW.*, VIII, p. 62); though elsewhere our people are associated in this contemptible pursuit with "shopkeepers, Christians, cows, women and other democrats" (*Ib.*, p. 149). Nevertheless "every healthy morality is controlled by an instinct of life" (*Ib.*, p. 88); "the proof of an action imposed by the vital instinct is the pleasure it gives" (*Ib.*, p. 226); "everything good is instinctive, and therefore easy, necessary, free" (*Ib.*, p. 93); "pleasure is a feeling of power; to exclude the emotions is to exclude those conditions which give the feeling of power, and therefore of pleasure at its highest" (*W. z. M.*, p. 240). Herbert

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Spencer would not have dissented in principle from this statement; but then he would not, like his critic, have distinguished between happiness and pleasure, which two other Englishmen, Wordsworth and Ruskin, would have identified with "vital feelings of delight." Can Nietzsche have been ignorant that the gospel of health, with its accompanying condemnation of the sickly and helpless, had been preached before him in *The Data of Ethics?*

On the other hand, Spencer would have emphatically dissented from such a statement as that "egoism belongs to the essence of the distinguished soul; I mean the immovable belief that other beings must be naturally subject to a being like us, and have to sacrifice themselves to it, regarding this relationship as founded on the primary law of things" (*WW.*, VII, pp. 251-52). Nor would he have allowed that the conquest and spoliation of the weaker by the stronger was the very principle of society and of life itself (*Ib.*, p. 238). But he might have fairly challenged the Prussian philosopher to reconcile these crudities with the admonition given elsewhere: "Learn betimes to discard the supposed individual; to discover the errors of the ego; to feel cosmically about the me and thee" (*WW.*, XII, p. 74). Or again, why should Zarathustra compare unfavorably the vulgar who want to live *gratis* with men like himself, who are always thinking what they can give best in exchange for the life they have received, and who condemn the wish to enjoy without giving enjoyment in return? (*WW.*, VI, pp. 291 *seq.*)

Among his other adventures, Zarathustra falls in with an imbecile hedonistic moralist, who is accosting a herd of kine with the object of inducing them to disclose the secret of their happiness (*Ib.*, pp. 389 *seq.*). It does not seem to have struck the prophet that these cows had a logic as well as an ethic, or that, if the pasturing animals were too gentle to toss him on the horns of a dilemma, a savage bull might have been invited in for the purpose. If self-interest is the law of life, with what right can the

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present generation be called on to sacrifice themselves for the evolution of a superior race? If there is a moral law prescribing self-devotion, how can it be our duty to create what the highest of our contemporaries would call a devil (*WW.*, VI, p. 213)?

If Nietzsche ever contemplated the idea of evolving a higher animal species than man, he soon gave it up. His last work, *The Anti-Christian,* puts the problem quite clearly, as, not "what is to succeed man?" but—"what kind of man ought to be desired and bred as the more valuable, the more worthy of life, the more certain of a future?" And he proceeds to state, in direct contradiction to Zarathustra, that the desirable type has often presented itself in history, but never as the result of a conscious effort, while the effect of prevalent opinions has long been to repress or extinguish it. Two agencies in particular have hitherto worked with fatal effect in this direction, morality and Christianity. He therefore applied himself with a holy zeal to the destruction of both, his intellect being indeed much better fitted for the work of pulling down than for the work of building up.

The attack on morality, by which is meant the doctrine of universal benevolence, proceeds on the lines of the historical method, and rests on the false assumption that a belief is refuted by showing how it came to exist. Such a method, were it generally applied, would ruin every belief without exception, as all beliefs have a history, and even the skepticism that displaced them would share their fate. As it happens, however, the historical explanation offered of the current distinction between good and evil in conduct is entirely false. It is the work of a mere classical philologist, and a very imperfectly informed one at that. His thesis is that the valuations of character and action were originally fixed by the ruling caste in society, those qualities of health, strength, beauty, courage, liberality and truthfulness which were most conspicuous in its members being approved of, while the distinguishing qualities of their serfs were proportion-

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ately despised. In those right-minded ages to be strong and successful was the great merit, to be weak and a failure the great vice. As the subject classes had become enslaved through their weakness, they set up a rival scale of values in which pity, the correlative and consolation of weakness, occupied the highest place, while the virtues of their betters were disparaged, their rightful claims on the laborers treated as wicked spoliation, and their favored position viewed with vindictive envy.

The aristocratic and chivalrous virtues maintain their ascendency in a chronic state of war by which they are at once originated and preserved. Prolonged peace, on the other hand, creates a fatal split in the ruling body, and undermines its ideals by favoring the development of a priesthood, and enabling it to share the supremacy with the warrior caste. For a priestly life, being conducive to physical degeneracy, breeds all the mental characteristics of a weak race, and therefore throws the priests out of sympathy with the warriors, and makes them the natural allies of the servile herd whose scale of values they adopt and systematize into a code.

It would seem that, according to Nietzsche's reading of history, which is nowhere given as a connected whole, the first essay toward organizing a servile or gregarious ethic was made in Greece by Socrates, himself a man of the people, and afflicted with the characteristic vices of his class, one of these being a morbid disposition to substitute self-conscious reasoning for instinct. Under his corrupting influence Plato, an aristocrat of genius, but born with the soul of a Semitic priest, proceeded to work out a theory of values based on supernatural sanctions in which the right of the stronger, vigorously but vainly defended by those genuine champions of old Hellenic ideals, the sophists, is subordinated to the interest of the masses; a pestilent doctrine which in company with an equally morbid asceticism became more or less current in all the later schools of Greek philosophy.

More, however, was needed than a false philosophy to

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secure the final victory of servile over seigneural values. The Jews, a race of slaves and priests combined, managed to impose their degrading morality on the civilized world by appealing to the instincts of the lowest classes in the Roman Empire under the name of Christianity. This must not be confounded with the genuine teaching of Jesus, a religion in which supernaturalism had no place, and which died with him on Calvary. What carried all before it was Paul's theology, in which the idyllic domestic morality of the Jewish Diaspora is artfully combined with a scheme for giving envious plebeians their revenge on the rich in another world.

In modern times Christianity has transmitted its *moralin* virus to utilitarianism—an essentially gregarious ethical system, first founded by the sickly Jewish artisan Spinoza, and further developed by the plebeian English race, of which Buckle, with his cheap and noisy eloquence, is a characteristic type. For, let there be no mistake about it, what we call "modern ideas" do not come from the essentially aristocratic French people, but from the plebeian English (*WW.*, VII, pp. 224 and 307).

As we learn from his letters, Nietzsche was in early youth a careful student of Theognis (*Briefe,* I, p. 2); and his theory of the two moralities, servile and seigneural, or gregarious and egregious (taking the second word in its Latin or Italian sense), seems to have been suggested, in the first instance, by that aristocratic elegist's bitter complaint of the change in language brought about by the democratic revolution in Megara. An improvement in their condition has turned the ignorant rustics from bad to good; while reverses of fortune have given an evil name to the quondam nobles. In reference to these passages Welcker, quoted by Grote, observes that the political, as distinguished from the ethical, sense of good and bad fell into desuetude through the influence of the Socratic philosophy, which, according to the same authority, first popularized those terms as ethical qualifications (Grote's *History of Greece,* II, pp. 419 *seq.*).

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However this may be, there is no evidence that the personal revaluation brought a change of moral values in its train, nor that either then or afterwards a change in the relative estimate of the different virtues took place. Least of all does it appear that either pity or vindictiveness was a peculiar characteristic of the lower orders. Theognis is thirsting to drink the blood of his enemies; and he particularly reproaches his young favorite Cyrnos for not grieving long over the sufferings of his friends. Indeed, Homer alone would prove that tenderness and sympathy were qualities highly valued among the best-born Greeks; while the oath taken by every member of an oligarchic club during the revolutionary period, "to do the Demos all the harm he could," is evidence that resentment flourished to the full as much among the hawks as among the lambs.

It would be more true to say that different classes have different and contrasted vices, than that they have different and contrasted virtues—or values, if the latter term be preferred. And we may admit that insolence and cruelty are more characteristic of a ruling, meanness and mendacity of a servile class, while contending that the permanent public opinion of both classes makes for the consecration of courage and gentleness all round. Indeed, the very word "gentleness" is a historical lesson in itself, proving that English aristocratic society, at least, discerned a peculiar connection between sweet manners and good birth.

As a young professor at Basel, Nietzsche fully accepted Grote's vindication of the Sophists, although he failed to see that a far better case than Grote's might be made out for them as ethical reformers. In his latest phase he peremptorily, and without reason given, goes back on the old view, glorifying them as apostles of brute force (*cf. WW.*, X, p. 129, with *W. z. M.*, p. 235). In this connection also he accepts the Melian Dialogue—that masterpiece of tragic irony—as an expression of what Thucydides himself thought about public morality.

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There is no direct reference to Plato's Gorgias—a wise abstinence; for perhaps it would have involved him in the necessity of finding an answer to the unanswerable Socratic argument against Callicles, the real author of Nietzsche's distinction between gregarious and egregious morality. For, after appealing to natural law in justification of the claim put forward by the superior man to subjugate and despoil the inferior, this cynical aristocrat has to admit that the many, by banding together, may and do gain the upper hand so decisively as to impose their standards on him. Callicles tries to get out of the difficulty by falling back on qualitative distinctions as constituting the right to rule; but this admission readmits moral values into the discussion, with the result that their supremacy over the whole of life has to be conceded.

Such is also the outcome of Nietzsche's efforts to get beyond good and evil. His objections to the received morality can only be accredited by an appeal to moral considerations of a still higher order. His polemic against pity for degenerates derives its whole strength from the argument that their survival and propagation impairs the life-enhancing qualities of the race. But if anyone chooses to say, "What do I care for the race?" his principles leave him without any answer, but a torrent of unconciliatory abuse.

In so far as popular religion is identified with popular morality, the attack on Christianity lays itself open to the same objection. Nor is that all. What gives such luster to the whole argument and raises it as literature to the first rank among the author's writings, is the moral passion displayed throughout; the constant invoking of truth as a precious thing violated by the Jewish and Christian priesthoods at every step in the propagation of their creed.

Whether his charges have or have not been made out is a question irrelevant to the present discussion. What interests us to observe is that at any rate it did not lie

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in the mouth of a professed immoralist to make them. For they involve the assumption, to which he is not entitled, that there is such a thing as moral obligation, and that part of it is to speak the truth. Nietzsche had some glimmering of the difficulty; but he never worked out a consistent theory of the subject, and his language when he touches on it is still more illogical than elsewhere. Even before the days of Zarathustra, some of his reasonings would have discredited a conservative speaker opposing Bradlaugh's claim to be sworn. "Our whole European morality falls to pieces with the death of God. Now, in disclaiming the will to deceive, we stand on moral principle. But supposing, as seems very probable, that all life rests on a basis of deception—what then? Would it not be Quixotic, and even worse, to insist on veracity? Let there be no mistake about it; what fires us still, unbelievers and all, is the old Christian belief, which was also Plato's belief, that God is the truth, that truth is divine. How then if this should seem every day more incredible, if God himself should prove to be our oldest lie?" (*WW.*, V, pp. 271-276.)

At this rate, philosophers, whose business it is to investigate truth, might be expected to receive the news of their only guarantor's death with some dismay. On the contrary, they show an exultation which, in the circumstances, strikes one as rather indecent. "Our whole heart overflows with gratitude, wonder and hopeful expectation" (*Ib.*, p. 272). Zarathustra is one of this jubilant band; but then he sees no connection between theism and intellectual honesty *(Redlichkeit);* on the contrary, he describes the latter as the latest born among the virtues, and hated, as knowledge also is hated, by those who have God on the brain. "Good," or what we call "goody," people "never tell the truth" (*WW.*, VI, pp. 44 and 293). A note dating from the same period suggests the rather awkward compromise that we should have no conscience in respect to truth and error, in order that we may be able again to spend life in the service

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of truth and of the intellectual conscience (*WW.*, XII, p. 63).

In the mass of notes collected for what was to have been his *magnum opus,* the *Wille zur Macht,* an untranslatable title which we may approximately render by *The Will to be Strong,* Nietzsche nearly anticipates pragmatism. Indeed, it might seem to be completely anticipated in such sayings as that "truth is what exalts the human type" (p. 153); "perhaps the categories of reason express nothing more than a definite advantage for the race or the species: their utility is their truth" (p. 274 *seq.*); "our confidence in reason and its categories only proves that their utility for life has been shown by experience, not that they are 'true'" (*Leben,* II, p. 775), were they not balanced by other passages of a distinctly intellectualist type, such as the assertion that "it is absolute want of intellectual honesty to estimate a belief by how it works, not by its truth" (*W. z. M.,* p. 120); "intellectual honesty is the result of delicacy, valor, foresight, temperance, practiced and accumulated through a long series of generations" (*Ib.,* p. 245); [with Christianity] "the question is not whether a thing is true, but how it works—which is an absolute want of intellectual honesty" (*Leben,* II, p. 719).

On the whole, it would seem as if this extreme regard for veracity were only used as a means for discrediting religion, morality and the Socratic philosophy. And their defenders might plausibly allege that they only used deception—when they used it—for a good end; that is to say, for an augmentation of vital power. "Everything for the army," as Colonel Henry said. It would have been more consistent, not to say honest, on the part of Nietzsche had he attacked the popular creed simply on the ground that it lowered the vitality of the species. Even on so narrow a basis the attack could not have been worked without an appeal to disinterested motives; in other words, without an appeal to morality. For a selfish religionist might well prefer the gratification of his

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mystical cravings, and a priest his ambition, to the health of the race. But here also our critic has thrown away his whole case by two most serious admissions. We have first a frank acknowledgment that "there is nothing diseased about the gregarious human being as such; on the contrary, he is of inestimable value, but incapable of self-guidance, and therefore in need of a shepherd, a need perfectly understood by priests" (*W. z. M.*). "Petty virtues are good for petty people" (*WW.*, VI, p. 246); and when the lower strata of the population are decadent "a religion of self-suppression, patience and mutual help may be of the highest value" (*Leben,* II, p. 734). Therefore "we require that gregarious morality should be held absolutely sacred" (*Ib.,* p. 809). And, secondly, we find a parallel acknowledgment that Christianity deserves great praise as "the genuine religion of the herd" (*WW.*, XIV, p. 336). "The continued existence of the Christian ideal is most desirable. My object in making war on that chlorotic ideal was not to destroy it, but to put an end to its tyranny, and to make room for new and robuster ideals" (*Leben,* II, p. 744). "Common people are only endurable when they are pious" (*WW.*, XII, p. 206). They are not likely to remain pious long where books like *The Anti-Christian* circulate freely.

In England we have had a good supply of those "robuster ideals," for which the German moralist wishes to find room; nor, by all accounts, are they wanting in America; yet he does not seem to have looked to either country for his models. His enormous self-esteem would have suffered by such a reference. It also affected his conception of the superman, who in Nietzsche's last writings no longer figures as a new species, destined to succeed and displace the human species, but rather as a superior race, like the Greeks. At first supermen are thought of not as ruling over the inferior race, but as living apart from them, "like the gods of Epicurus" (*WW.*, XII, p. 211). But this view was soon seen to be

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impracticable, and abandoned. Throughout the *Wille zur Macht* nothing is contemplated but a new aristocracy, a ruling race, whose sole business will be to rule, offering splendid examples of beauty, strength and intelligence for the delectation of themselves and of the lower orders. Owing, presumably, to their wise administration, the laborers are to live as the middle class live now; but the higher caste above them will be distinguished for its abstinence (*Ib.*, p. 214). This *élite* naturally falls into two divisions; a small body of supremely intellectual men, performing the highest functions and leading the most perfect life, and, below them, an executive of soldiers and judges to relieve them of the rough work of government; while men of science and the majority of artists will find their appropriate place among the laboring classes (*WW.*, VIII, pp. 302 *seq.*).

It has been mentioned how dependent Nietzsche was on the English moralists in his positivist period, and under what studied rudeness his sense of obligation was concealed. In his last period the debt to Plato is even more obvious, and his resentment is conveyed in the same way, only, as befits the occasion, with extraordinarily virulent abuse. Plato is "a great Cagliostro," an example of "the higher swindling," "a moral fanatic," a "poisoner of heathen innocence," and, worst of all, "tedious" (*W. z. M.*, pp. 234 and 244; *WW.*, VIII, p. 168).

It might be asked how a race of born rulers can be called into existence by suspending all the laws of morality; whether the duties of government are likely to be better performed by an aristocracy permanently emancipated from every social obligation; and finally, whether these "dragon warriors from Cadmean teeth" are likely to keep the peace with each other longer than their fabled prototypes. But the *Wille zur Macht* opens a question of more practical importance for Nietzsche's philosophy than these. The theory adumbrated in that unfinished work seems to be that nature consists of nothing but energy; that the natural process consists in the appro-

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priation of energy by one body at the expense of another; that the ascending line of organic development is determined by a continual gain, and the descending line by a continual loss, of energy; that, in so far as we can use such expressions as right and wrong, the right morality consists in preferring the qualities that make for vital energy, and wrong morality in preferring those that make for its decay.

So far there is nothing in this philosophy incompatible with the assumption that great individualities are the highest products of nature, and their production the worthiest objects of human endeavor. Of course, it always remains open for Socrates, Plato, the present reviewer, or any other wretched decadent, to ask why we should scorn delights and live laborious days in order to promote the evolution of some future Cæsar Borgia. Supposing, however, that we accept the transvaluation of all values to that extent, a remorseless logic will impel us to go further, and make a united Italy, which was Borgia's own ambition, or a united Europe, which, according to Nietzsche, was Napoleon's ambition, or finally, a united world, the object of our activity. I can quite imagine and sympathize with a valuation that counts human personality as the supreme thing, that says with Heraclitus, "one man is worth ten thousand if he be the best." Only Nietzsche bars himself out from that valuation by his repeated assurances that personality is an illusion (see, among other passages, *W. z. M.*, p. 369). And it was by no freak of paradox that he took up this position. It was an essential part of his antitheistic polemic. According to him the ascription of phenomena to a personal cause arises from the fallacious grammatical abstraction of subject and predicate, noun and verb. There is really no such break in the continuous stream of becoming. Furthermore, gregarious and Christian moralists, in their vindictive hostility to the rich and powerful, have coined the false notion of personal responsibility, on the strength of which their op-

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pressors were to be visited with everlasting punishment (*WW.*, pp. 337 *seq.*).

If I may borrow an illustration from Schopenhauer, Nietzsche is like the magician who sent his familiar spirit to draw water, but knew no spell that could stop him, with the result that he and the whole country were drowned. Our modern Callicles has reformed himself, discarding the brutal licentiousness of his prototype, and even adopting the passwords of Plato's *Republic*. But it is all in vain. The terrible Socratic dialectic works on and on to his utter and overwhelming confusion. He appeals to Power, and to Power let him go. He invokes a superman, and will find him in the modern state; that state so decried by Zarathustra as the stronghold of the weak and defenseless. "By value is to be understood the conditions under which complex vital structures are maintained and exalted" (*Leben*, p. 790). So says morality also; but above the individual, however gifted, she places the state, and above the state a universal society whose object is the greatest good of all its members; a good which for purposes of convenience may be variously expressed in terms of pleasure, of life, of health or of power, but in which the good of the parts ultimately coincides and identifies itself with the good of the whole.

I think something of this had begun to dawn on the noble spirit, to whom I have tried to be more just than he was to my teachers, before it went down under the waves of insanity. For among his later utterances this passage occurs: "In the whole process I find living morality, impelling force. It was an illusion to suppose I had transcended good and evil. Freethinking itself was a moral action, as honesty, as valor, as justice and as love" (*WW.*, XIV, p. 312).

ALFRED W. BENN.

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THE WILL TO MAKE-BELIEVE.

WILBUR M. URBAN.

I.

WE all know what believing is, and I think we may assume, after the eloquence of Bishop Blougram and Professor James, that "it's best believing if we may." It tastes good, like health, repose. We know equally well what unbelief is; it tastes bad, like restlessness and disease. But full, rich belief and lean, empty unbelief are after all rarely attained, and are so much a matter of constitution and taste that with them common sense has really no ground for quarrel. A too gross appetite for beliefs and a morbid taste for skepticism are both abnormalities leading to excesses which in turn bring about their own cure. It is rather the *half beliefs,* the impossible attitudes of suspended judgment where belief and unbelief "shake us by fits," that common sense finds intolerable, and from which it bids us save ourselves by any means whatsoever, even by the merest unabashed and radical act of will. Now that this already *de facto* claimant for the throne of Reason has received pragmatic sanction, there remains still the question of how to put and keep it there. This is possible only by developing the instinct and will to make-believe. Such a conclusion is indeed so completely implied in the "will to believe," and the implication is doubtless so completely realized by the initiated, that what I shall have to say will, I am afraid, seem to them but a painful elaboration of the obvious. In excuse for any defense of the *will to make-believe,* for that is the burden of this study, I can only plead the original and, alas, often practical meaning of the word obvious, for

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it is precisely this obvious inference which, until understood and accepted, stands in the way of the new doctrine.

I have myself long defended this thesis of the lawfulness of making one's self believe, and have not shrunk from the consequence that it is lawful to make others believe also. But most of my hearers are so under the spell of the traditional worship of what they call sincerity and logic (or else have been so dazed by Chesterton and Bernard Shaw) that they refuse to take it seriously, as other than a paradox, although in point of fact they are constantly making believe to themselves and to others to the limit of their powers. I am myself profoundly convinced that we have here the key to life, and that its frank acceptance means relief from some of the most distressing inherited conventions and restrictions which hamper our modern life and thought.

II.

First of all we must realize that anything like completely suspended judgment is impossible. Ideas are never *pure* ideas without energy, either potential or dynamic, for belief. Mentality is too vital a thing. Ideas have different degrees—we might almost say, of warmth or cold, of moisture or dryness, of roughness or smoothness—but they are never completely indifferent. Such indifference, although often an ideal, is none the less an idol of the cave. Ideas always have some relation to our passional nature, some at least remote possibility of assimilation by those digestive processes of belief which mean life and health.

Let us call any such possibility, any such idea with potential belief, an *assumption*. Assuming it to be true, it would be fine! Now there are many such assumptions, make-believes, which flit across our souls merely as fancies. They are beautiful—alas, often too beautiful—but they have such remoteness, such distance, however brought about, that, while glowing, they are cool and

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dry. Such make-believe is but playful and temporary, and we are never tempted to go farther. Between them and our will there is a peculiar esthetic dissociation. Such are our ideas of Apollo and the nymphs, of the Golden Age and of the Blessed Isles. There are other assumptions which make a closer connection with our nature. They are warm and moist, and acquire a smoothness which makes it difficult to keep them from slipping over into belief. Such are our dreams for ourselves or our children, of social utopias and heavenly homes. Still it is always possible to doubt them if we will, so we may call them *half-hearted* make-believe. Finally there is another group of make-believes, differing with different individuals, which are no longer conscious or half-conscious self-illusion, but which have received whole-hearted acceptance. These we may call *whole-souled.*

Now between belief and whole-souled make-believe there is, for practical purposes, no difference. Two mental states which have the same practical consequences are in reality the same. It is the half-hearted make-believe that has not yet become whole-souled, but is merely in the process of becoming so, that makes all the trouble. The actual making of belief, in ourselves or others, takes on too easily the appearance of wanton self-deception and pretense. Into this difficulty we must inquire, but first let us consider the range of the possibility of make-believe.

When we look at certain facts it appears as though the will to make-believe, to ourselves and to others, and indeed to have others make-believe, not only lies at the root of most of our actions, but in most cases actually works. When we look at other facts it seems that make-believe is absurd, is powerless before the sound instincts of the brutally unsophisticated man. Let us consider the latter facts first.

III.

It does, indeed, seem preposterous to imagine that make-believe can ever pass over into belief, can ever be-

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come whole-souled, where the brute facts of life are concerned. To be sure, there are interesting cases of the temporary wiping out of the lines between illusion and reality, as when the cowboy jumps upon the stage in pursuit of the villain of the melodrama, or the superb actress, wishing to spite her manager, feigns illness to such good purpose that the make-believe becomes whole-souled, and she almost dies of fright. Or still more complete dissociations, as when men come to believe that they are Napoleons, prophets and Christs. At first they pretended, made believe, and finally ended in belief. But all these we describe as alienations, loss of control, either temporary or permanent, abnormal phenomena for which we have invented such big names that we feel fairly comfortable in the thought that they are forever clearly marked off from the experience of the healthy, normal-minded man, who still has power to arrest his impulses to make-believe, and to control illusion. In fact, wherever the hardest facts of life are concerned, we cannot make-believe if we wish. Is it not rather the fashion to bewail our lost illusions and our powerlessness to make them live again? We are all familiar with the process by which the beliefs and whole-souled make-believes of childhood and youth pass over into the half-hearted make-believes and the receding dreams of maturity and middle age. But that the process should be reversed, that there should be descending as well as ascending and *disappearing* of the angels on the ladder between earth and heaven—that is impossible!

Nevertheless, in that remarkable applied logic of belief-making, Newman's "Essay on Ecclesiastical Miracles," we find the most minute directions for the gradual creation of a pious and satisfying belief. Here he tries to make us (and indirectly himself) believe not only in the logically improbable and impossible, but in that which is at first morally rough and distasteful; and in doing so he argues as though belief were a matter of the most marvelous alchemy, in which the logical and passional

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elements must be mingled with an artist's hand. Assuming that God exists, so he argues, it is "antecedently probable" that wherever He is manifesting His will He will work miracles, which will be as proper for ecclesiastical history and the lives of saints as deeds of daring and skill are for profane history and the lives of soldiers and adventurers. Secondly, if God makes monkeys and snakes, it is antecedently probable that there will be certain unexpected and grotesque phenomena in the church as well as in nature. We are now ready for almost anything in the way of a wonder-working God, and the most marvelous beliefs will soon come with a rush. But wait! The way from assumption to belief is only smoothed—lubricated. There is such a thing as unduly hastening the process. There must be a moment of doubt, of suspended judgment, so that when the passional element gives the push, the belief will be wholesouled. So he hesitates. To be sure, we must admit that there have been imposture and deception, but all these impostures, embellishments and deceptions, far from militating against the truth, on the contrary rather confirm the truth of ecclesiastical miracles "on the whole." For what does hypocrisy prove but the existence of virtues? And in the same way, imposture and pretense of miracles, what do they prove but the existence of real miracles, which the former strive to imitate? For "such counterfeits become not a disproof but a proof of the existence of their prototypes." Now is the favorable moment for the emotional element which is to work the transmutation! "And suppose some of the miracles which we believe *are* pious frauds. Has not Queen Victoria many romances told about her? Do you think she is displeased at them? No more is God displeased if we believe to our edification." "Some miracles," so he concludes, "are for our conviction, and these we are to confess with the mouth as well as believe with the heart; others are for our comfort and encouragement, and these we are to 'keep and ponder them in our hearts' without urging

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them upon unwilling ears." If we brood over them lovingly and habituate ourselves to believe these *possibly* false stories, whether fables, legends or impostures, we may not only poise them lovingly in our own minds, but also, when we get a willing ear, endeavor to habituate others to them.

Could the transformation of half-hearted into whole-souled make-believe be more completely shown or the technique of the process more completely disclosed? And yet you probably feel that when religious faith expresses itself thus (in a sort of pious self-hypnosis) it is in a desperate strait. And you are not encouraged to try the same discipline when you learn that, as the result of the process, Newman cannot withstand the evidence which is brought for the liquefaction of the blood of St. Januarius at Naples, and for the motion of the eyes of the pictures of the Madonna in the Roman States, and does not see why the Holy Coat of Trèves may not have been what it professes to be; that he can record with apparent acceptance the appearance and vanishing of a large plate of silver before St. Anthony in the wilderness, and relate in the same spirit of acquiesence the miracles of St. Martin, who, in answer to a heathen's challenge, caused a fallen pine tree to reel round and fall on the other side by making the sign of the cross.

IV.

This talk of making ourselves and others believe! When we look at the mechanism does it not seem hollow and simply silly? Nay, more, from another point of view it seems worse than silly; it is vile. Can we wonder that those who devote themselves to "Truth" should work themselves into righteous indignation over such a mixture of child-play and rhetorical cunning? When we turn to the monuments of human heroism and sincerity; the months spent in hunting down a single scientific fact (which, when found, is useless except perhaps to disprove

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an opponent's theory); the lives lost in seeking the exact truth about the North Pole; the moral devotion and grandeur with which men have set themselves the task of righteous disillusionment of individuals and whole races; the telling of unpleasant truths to one's neighbor; above all, such painful though noble sacrifices as those involved in the effort to drive even so harmless a myth as that of poor Santa Claus from the virgin minds of our children and from the unsullied purity of the public schools—when we realize the meaning of this submission to, even welcoming of the hard, cold, dry facts of nature and humanity, then how low and contemptible seems this playing with our own and others' credulity! "Ought we not," in the words of Oersted, "take shame to ourselves when we catch ourselves *even wishing* for a truth other than the actual one? . . . No; let us give all honor to truth, for with truth goodness is inseparably united. Perfect truth always brings consolation with it."

All this strikes one as moral and healthy, although perhaps a little old-fashioned and self-conscious in its pathos. Yet if anyone should assume that even these noble attitudes are without the subtle instinct to make-believe, are free from all elements of sentimental illusion, he would be simply flying in the face of facts. He would be reckoning without his host, the unfathomable will upon which our shallow intellects subsist as the veriest parasites of a day. This very faculty of working ourselves into a passion over abstract truth, free from all infection of passion and feeling, is one of our latest attainments, an asceticism so difficult to live up to that in all except our highest moments we have to resort to a pitiful make-believe which at times comes dangerously near to being pretense.

But aside from this, of which more presently, the mere fact that we are able to work ourselves into such a passion of disgust over Newman's make-believes means nothing more than that we no longer have the necessary presumptions, the antecedent probabilities, from which the

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logic or mechanism, as you please, of such make-believe can get under way. It is only those make-believes whose underlying beliefs are already dead, cold, dry and rough, that we cannot revive and make workable again. All these were living, smooth and workable enough at one time, because they were what people wanted to believe. In a time when God was very real, what he wanted one to believe or make-believe for edification was a very important matter, and one would do his best to meet the demand, even if he had to strain a point. Now that *vox populi* is the *vox Dei,* we have a new set of presumptions, and with them a new set of make-believes, which have driven out the old.

Most of us, for instance, believe in democracy, necessary progress, the omniscience of the business mind, popular education, with a necessity of belief which is usually inversely proportional to the degree with which we have examined the grounds, and consequently we have no difficulty in building up the necessary system of make-believe required to keep them going. Granted these dogmas, there are certain consequences so *antecedently probable* that make-believe in their actual existence is not only lubricated but becomes whole-souled almost of itself. Our anxious democracy is only too glad to see the real thing in the most patent imitations. The "good fellow" and the "mixer" are so affected by our love of the morally and socially miraculous that they are more than willing to fool the "dear public" for its edification, and incidentally for their own gain. We believe in progress with such greediness that we finally come to support each other in the make-believe that all change is progress, even when it improves upon the multiplication table and the Ten Commandments themselves. We find it difficult to believe in the miracle of the changing of the blood, but we have no difficulty in believing in the greater miracle of the moral leopard changing his spots. And what if this lust for moral and social miracles has given rise to many pious pretenses and impostures—that the money

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grabber is bearing the burden of the world upon his shoulders, and that when he is working most for himself he is really working for humanity? What if we stick temporarily at the placing of the account book beside the Bible, and at the wail that it is a sin to die rich? Can we not argue that these pious pretenses, if they be such, merely prove the existence of the "real thing" which they seek to imitate, and that if we only habituate ourselves to them and lovingly keep and ponder them in our hearts, they will turn into realities for us? For are not all these make-believes but passionate affirmations of what we desire, in which our social system backs us up?

Evidently, then, make-believe can and does pass into belief, and wherever we have a vital belief to start with we are on the verge of whole-souled make-believe. Not only are there passional tendencies which *run before* our belief, but there are those which *come after* and create make-believes which develop and sustain the belief. Newman's "Grammar of Assent," instead of being powerless, is in reality but a picture of what we are all doing in our own particular way. If we believed in God as much as in the *vox populi,* we should really be communing with the saints and accustoming ourselves to the marvels in which they delighted instead of lovingly hugging to our hearts our own particular twentieth-century miracles. Evidently the situation is not quite as simple as it appeared at first. The distinction between belief and make-believe and pretense is not absolute.

Having recognized this mixed-up state of affairs, our next duty is to ask whether it is simply pathological and reprehensible or whether, on the other hand, we must treat it as a normal element in our mental make-up. The thesis which I defend is briefly this: *Our passional nature, with its instinct to make-believe, not only lawfully may but really must do so when the make-believe is genuine or whole-souled, that is, when it is, in turn, the necessary condition or resultant of some other belief, the*

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only alternative of which is disbelief and skepticism. For in the first place, between belief and whole-souled make-believe there is, as we have seen, for practical purposes no difference; and in the second place, to say in such circumstances, *do not make-believe,* let truth prevail though the heavens fall, is itself a passional assertion—a form of make-believe in which it is very difficult to be whole-souled, and which is attended by the same danger. of half-heartedness and pretense which attends any other assumption. This thesis, somewhat abstractly and, it must be confessed, somewhat paradoxically expressed, will I trust become quite clear and wholly acceptable when it is properly lubricated. But we must indulge in a bit more preliminary work.

V.

In the first place, we must clear the ground by parting absolutely with the moral skeptic and cynic and all his works. In our demand that make-believe shall be whole-souled we have deliberately postulated that we have genuine souls or selves, and that we may be those selves; that there is such a thing as the "real thing" in word and deed; that the maxim "to thine own self be true" still has meaning, and is an assumption which we share with the veriest puritan and dogmatist in morals. But the determination to be true to one's self may be held in two senses: after the fashion of the absolutist and purist, and in the more genial way of the practical man. The purist or puritan holds that we may not only be the real thing, our real selves, but that we may infallibly *know* when we *are* it, while the practical empiricist holds, on the other hand, that while we may be true to ourselves *on the whole,* we can *know* what those selves are only by experimenting.

If we look closely at the grounds of this difference in practical attitude, we find that it springs from different views of the nature of the self and of what goes with it,

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conscience. The absolutist holds that the self to which he is to be true is something "sole and entire," something pure and *essential,* which acts as a sort of touchstone, infallibly distinguishing the true from the false. Or, to use the more common figure, it makes itself known in a disembodied voice or tone, for which he has the single preadjusted resonator, one supplied to go with each self, and one which assures the pure, whole tone of conscience without any admixture of the partial overtones of passion or impulse, of compromise or expediency. Assuming this, his whole salvation consists in keeping the resonator to his ear and shutting out the mixed voices of the world. Whole knowledge, whole faith, whole honesty or nothing! The very *life* of the self consists in abstraction, contrast and isolation!

But there is also another type of man, with another set of impulses—one who feels most himself when he goes out into life, makes himself one with others, assumes what they assume, opens his ears and heart to the *nuances* of life, accepts their half-faiths, their partial integrities, their little make-believes, even if they are on the verge of pretense, and makes them his. All this, be it observed, on the assumption that we mean right on the whole, and that the self is still to be made. He feels more at home with this larger self, even if it is a little indeterminate and its tonality a little confused. In fact he rejoices in many selves—family, business, church warden and civic. For him, too, there are pure tones, but he has a whole set of little resonators, each answering to its appropriate stimulus. Still he dislikes to mix the tones too much. If the church warden note rings when his ear is without the appropriate resonator, he overhears hypocrisy and pretense. In his own *several selves* he is still the veriest purist and dogmatist.

But now, since we are such confirmed purists by instinct, such confirmed believers in absolute honesty and singleness of heart, what shall we as practical men do about the fact? Shall we espouse it and indorse it, or

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shall we treat it as a weakness of our nature from which we must ruthlessly free ourselves if we can?

I sincerely believe that the latter course is the only one that we can follow as practical, "up-to-date" men. Absolute frankness and sincerity are doubtless very fine ideals to play with, but where on this attitudinizing planet are they to be found? I am therefore a complete empiricist and opportunist so far as my theory of human action goes. I live, to be sure, by the practical faith that I am an honest man *on the whole,* that I am true to myself and my friends *on the whole;* but to which *one* of my many selves and of my friends with their various selves? To be at all times one, and only one, of these various selves, as though it were ultimate and final, is, I believe, a tremendously mistaken attitude. There is only one certainty which skepticism itself leaves standing. When I have stripped off all the make-believes and pretenses which constitute my various selves, when I have, like Peer Gynt, peeled off all the layers of the onion, there is either nothing left or else merely the monstrous make-believe, illusion, *that I can actually do just this peeling.*

After all, then, make-believe is practically the *very germ, the root* of the self. And the scientific views of men about the self—what do they have to tell us? Here we find the same alternative: either "psychology without a soul," or one with a great deal too many of them —two, three, four. When they start to peel the onion, it is layers, layers, and again layers, and if you insist upon going on, finally nothing. Either an abstract point which is simple, but useless, or a concrete self which is plural and fallible, but workable. And what is the concrete self, these layers? Upon this point we are again not left in doubt. They are successive layers of imitation, make-believe, even protective mimicry. Just as the cat, through the playful make-believe of hunting the mouse, finally learns to catch the real mouse, so the child, by playing to be a self of many kinds, finally becomes a genuine self.

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And it is only by imitation, make-believe, by "try, try again," that we all continue to become such genuine selves as we may.

It is not surprising, then, that while we all agree that the genuine self is the whole-souled self no concrete test of the genuine self can be agreed upon. The wonder is rather that not a single purist among them all seems ever to have considered that the difficulty may all the time be in the essential nature of the self, and that the self, even in its moments of intensest conviction, may not know infallibly which one of its chameleon-like changes is the fundamental one. Indeed, when one remembers that the most striking practical application of the doctrine of absolute sincerity and frankness is the conscientious insistence of one's neighbor in telling us what we don't want to hear, one feels less tempted than ever to lend the doctrine a respectful ear. But please observe that when, as practical men, we give up the hope of absolute sincerity, we do not give up the quest for sincerity *on the whole.* We still believe in its existence, and we continue to gain an ever better position toward it by continuing to simulate it. The very fact of the posture—or imposture—proves the existence of the reality.

VI.

And now, after all this introduction, let us go straight to our question. I have said, and now repeat it, that not only as a matter of fact do we find our instinct for make-believe actually creating beliefs, but that there are some situations in which this influence must be regarded as inevitable and lawful.

Here you may be disposed to draw back. You may have agreed that *unconscious* make-believe is an ingredient in all our practical activities, and that in so far as it *is* unconscious, and in that sense whole-souled, it may have utility, as biology and psychology have shown. There are even such things as fruitful illusions. But you

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feel sure that we should stop short of the conscious will to make-believe, of the final *push.* That comes too near to pretense for comfort. Well, of course, I will agree, in so far as the realities of life will allow. Whenever the make-believe is *not whole-souled,* and there are certain regions where make-believe must, with the best intentions, remain half-hearted and degenerate into conscious pretense, then, for the sake of avoiding this egregious pretense, we must refrain from make-believe. But such situations are fortunately rare.

There are undoubtedly certain limited and specialized regions of human interest and activity where make-believe is out of the question, where normally it cannot become whole-souled, and must therefore degenerate into empty pretense. These are the realms of pure science and of pure imagination. The term *pure* is here the significant thing. By the initial assumption or make-believe of pure truth or pure fiction, any personal or private make-believe, becomes irrelevant and is, so to speak, excluded automatically. In the case of the former, the purity consists in the fact that both the postulates and the processes of science are assumed to be free from any admixture of passional interests. The only feelings which are still *comme il faut* are those which are stirred by the click of the laws of identity and contradiction and which tell us that the machine is working properly. Having indulged in the tremendous initial make-believe that the results are indifferent to us one way or another, we thereby exclude automatically any other minor elements of make-believe. In the sphere of pure imagination and art, on the other hand, the purer the original make-believe, the more complete the pretense, the more irrelevant do any minor pretenses become. By this initial convention, the world is so removed from that particular kind of reality where pretense is significant that it becomes not so much reprehensible as absurd. Not only the ideas themselves, but the feelings, are wraiths without sufficient vitality to become genuine pretense. Both science

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and art are games. In the former the rule is not to pretend at all, because by hypothesis, by convention, there is no concrete self for whom the illusion or delusion would be either sweet or bitter. As well bluff in a game of solitaire. In the latter, on the contrary, the rule is to make-believe so completely that everybody is in the game, and the assumption of seriousness becomes absurd.

But when we leave the worlds of parallelograms and stars, of past creations and of perfect masterpieces, and descend into the lower world of things in the seeming and the making, things immediately become strangely mixed. Now we are in a world where reality and ideality, facts and values, jostle each other at every turn. Here values have a finite fate in which we are deeply interested and in which we have a hand. Here we learn that truth and illusion alike may be both a blessing and a bane, and that "truth, to go kindly in all kinds of harness, must be kept in the *abstract.*" We learn to keep it there and to economize it, not so much indeed because of a personal timidity as because it is the rule of the game, and if we wish to play the game we must abide by its rules. It is just because of our interest in the fate of values that we are aware how dangerous is the apparently harmless assumption that truth and value are identical!

Before you can go about in this world at all you must assume or make-believe certain things, and assume them no longer playfully and artificially, but with at least an appearance of reality. You must assume what I assume —put on, if you will, certain clothes of thought and feeling—and they must not vary too much from the mode. Nakedness is thinkable in an anatomical lecture or in a picture, but not in the House of Lords. If you do not have certain beliefs and feelings you must find them, and when once assumed they will soon become part of you. The only man who was ever cynical and indecent enough to be completely and solely himself was Diogenes, and yet he was, perhaps, the world's greatest fakir!

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VII.

But turning now from these general considerations, let us examine the more personal relations, states of mind between man and man. There is something in you, let us say, that I like. I cannot define it, but I know that it is the *real you,* the "real thing." "Nothing more simple," you say. "If you want me, come and find me. Show me your real self, and I will show you mine." But not so fast. It is not at all as simple as that. If I should show you my real self all at once, it would probably be for the last time. Whitman loved the crowd and thought to elbow his way into it—and he *was* himself, almost "sole and entire;" but the crowd would have none of him, although he was, after all, really quite a simple and harmless soul, as his more intimate friends, who gradually accommodated themselves to him, finally found. No; my first calls must be in a certain dress, of the mind as well as of the body. I must meet you half way, assume, nay, even pretend to (I do not shrink from the word) certain points of view, attitudes and feelings which I do not really have, or at least not in the degree which I allow you to assume. Above all, if you are a woman, must there be this initial pretense. Illusion you will have, even if your keen eyes partially see through it. The chivalrous, the tender, the heroic! Of course they dare not be crude. The older "business" of the strut and the falling on one's knees no longer works, and there must always be some faint adumbration of something real, not necessarily quite like the passing show, but still not wholly different, some reality which you can dimly guess. So it is, and when I answer the kindly invitation of your eyes to come and find you, I must perforce give you back *your* self before I dare to show you mine. But to argue that such procedure, such *assumption* of your points of view and attitudes, is a form of deception, is to misconceive the entire situation. Perhaps the very attitude I am assuming, the sentiments and opinions I make-

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believe to possess, are what I *really want,* since I admire them in you; and my make-believe is thus but a preliminary step to whole-souled acceptance and to their becoming real in me. And after all, if one is not quite true at the start does it so much matter? Who knows what is quite true of himself? We are going in the right direction; that is the main point. If I want to coax a child to come to me, I hold out my watch; when he takes hold of the watch I substitute a penny; when he begins to suck the penny I substitute a chocolate. What is the harm of this? And what are men, in comparison with the quite true, but babes? And what am I but a baby, too, crying for the truth? And what are words, meanings, conventions, but toys and sweetmeats for grown-up babes who call themselves men?

When, moreover, we multiply these personal relations and get that new irrational quantity, the *social will,* things become even still more mixed. A social group or organism, of whatever sort, whether large or small, is what it is because of our mutual make-believes. Whenever a group of people meet together, whether for dance or prayer, whether for philanthropy or plunder, the initial presupposition or platform is a certain assumption of common attitudes and motives which, according to all psychological laws, cannot in everyone be genuine, but must for some be make-believe. But because I do not feel at this particular moment the abandon of joy that characterizes the dance shall I be a kill-joy rather than show a pleasure I do not feel? Because my feeling of reverence at the moment scarcely justifies the kneeling attitude shall I sit bolt upright and communicate my lack of devotion to others? Rather may I not hope that if I appear to be what I am not, and persist in that appearance long enough, I shall actually make it real ultimately? The same rule holds in all the more serious and prolonged social relations, of parents to children, of teachers to pupils, of the ruler to the ruled, of one class of society to another. If in these relations there is much

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of make-believe, much of it is also *whole-souled,* in that in the very act of appearing to be better than we are we are really willing that the oncoming generation *shall* be better, and often actually believing that man and society, as a whole, is better than we are individually. In politics and business the cohesive power of mutual make-believe has long been seen to be an absolute necessity. The manufacture of public sentiment, the creation and sustaining of business credit, have come to be recognized as not only legitimate, but absolutely indispensable, specialized forms of modern industry. Some of you will recall a recent newspaper symposium upon the question: What would happen if everybody in New York told the absolute truth for one day? The answers were many and detailed. At this moment I can recall the horror with which I looked into that abyss of possibility, and I can honestly say that I hope never to look into it again. Only the imagination of a Poe could sustain such a vision for any length of time.

All these conclusions may, I think, be generalized in the following proposition: *When the realization of an end, itself useful or good, depends upon the reflex effect upon ourselves and others of the assumption, even pretense, that we already have it, then make-believe, pretense, is certainly a lawful and probably an indispensable thing.* A rule of morality which would absolutely prevent me from making these assumptions (and encouraging others to make them, if they can), upon which the very actualization of ideals depends, would be a thoroughly immoral rule. I confess I do not see how this logic can be escaped.

VIII.

But now, it will be said, these are all human and relative situations. In a world which is, alas, in some respects a stage, and all the men and women merely players, we must indeed play our part, with a smile on

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our lips, and in our hearts, perhaps, "an aching chasm 'twixt the dream and deed." But after the play, in the intervals of the tiring-room, then there can be no pretense, nay, not even make-believe. That would be too uncanny. There we might meet Reality, Self, God—all spelled with capital letters! There, too, we might get touched on the sleeve by Death. . . .

> Thus God might touch a pope
> At unawares, ask what his baubles mean,
> And whose part he presumed to play just now?
> Best be yourself, imperial, plain and true!

So said Bishop Blougram. And in the tiring-room, stripped between the acts, we *do* seem to come dangerously near to that pure simplicity which is either our true self or God.

At first sight it appears so. We seem to be beyond the human and social in the region of stars and absolutes, of pure truth—or pure poetry. Either, or! But is it really so? Are we not just on the dangerous edge of things, where as the good bishop further said, "our interest is;" on that outermost edge of a chasm between value and reality where it is now madness to stop, and where our only chance of leaping it lies in an almost superhuman exercise of the instinct to make-believe—where the watchword must be not only *pretend,* but *pretend fortiter?*

Let us see what the religious question really is. Is it not the great option of believing that the world is human or inhuman at the core? Pure science and pure art are essentially inhuman. If you give them a chance to speak out their full meaning, it will always be a hard inhumanity to man, as a Bradley or a Whistler will not hesitate to declare. They are both, in their own way, of a hard procrustean temper, both arch-abstractors, cutting down the human to fit their scale of pure illusion or pure truth. But religion says that the world is *human, on the whole.* However varied its forms, and they are mani-

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fold, in essence it is always the same, the very human assumption that *what is not nevertheless still is.* According to our temperament we cry: "He's a Good Fellow, and 'twill all be well" (in its higher form, "God's in his heaven—All's right with the world"), or, again, "He is a jealous God"—or, more ideally expressed, "He is of purer eyes than to behold evil, and cannot look upon iniquity." Whether a glorified trust or a glorified fear, in either case religion is essentially a very human attitude.

What then is the logical situation in case the religious hypothesis, in either of its forms, is true on the whole? Of course we must assume that we *believe* this or the question of the will to *make-believe* has no significance from the outset. If we accept the humanistic view of the world, there is nothing for it but to be human to the last. If I once believe that *what is not nevertheless is,* I have in this very belief an "antecedent probability" which has the power to transmute make-believes into beliefs, illusions into realities; and logic and practice unite in demanding that I shall use it. On the other hand, if I refrain from the whole-souled make-believe which develops and sustains the belief, my belief loses its vitality and I am again face to face with the old option between the inhuman and human view of the world.

Moreover, if we once reach the conclusion that the religious interpretation of the world is the humanistic, I cannot see that our relations to the religious principle can be other than personal and human, with all their pathos and humor. If I wish to make the gods' acquaintance, to stand well with them, I shall have to put my best foot forward, even if at times I make-believe to be a little better than I really am. It is all a part of my assumption. Either they are good fellows, and will understand, or else they are jealous gods, and will see that I am doing my best to please them. To take a trivial illustration: just as in our relations to each other he is

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a sorry wight who is always hugging his precious integrity to his bosom and enters into no social relations because of his fear of lending himself to social hypocrisy and pretense, so we may well believe that the cosmical mugwump who walks by himself is just as little pleasing to the gods and has just as little chance of having his make-believes come true. And if make-believe sometimes leads to pretense? Pretense for pretense: what is there to prove that pretense through fear of hypocrisy is any better than pretense through hope of ideality? I for one fail to see that the former is anything but honesty by a kind of dishonesty.

But we may look more deeply still—into the very eyes of Death himself. Why should I fear the familiar touch of His servant Death, even if I have not yet composed my face? If deep within me is that immitigable instinct which has led me, half-knowing and half-unknowing, to spin my make-believes, how shall He take too seriously my pious pretense? Especially when, as I cannot help believing, the whole history of religious symbolism shows that it is from illusion to illusion that He has been leading me on, precisely as in the case of my own innocent make-believe—first the watch, then the penny, and then the stick of chocolate! I am sure that when I awoke from that series of beautiful illusions I was not racially indignant, my tribal self was not scandalized. There is a beautiful story, of John Luther Long's, I believe, called "The Prince of Illusion," in which a little blind boy is kept by his devoted mother in the illusion that he is a prince, in a wonderful world of make-believe. Finally he awakes from the dream. But he is not angry for he understands the great love of his mother. In that love he *is* a prince, richer and nobler than before. Is God any less human, any more inhuman, than we are? Do you suppose that he is displeased when we carry our make-believe a little far? And when, in our anxiety to realize the good in ourselves or others, we are just a little forward in assuming that it is already

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there, do you think that he is angry? I trow not! There is a game going on between you and the nature of things, but it is a beautiful game, in which both mean the good and the true *on the whole.*

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CRIME AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY.

CARL HEATH.

IT is in harmony with what one may perhaps call the *modern* growth of social consciousness that society becomes more and more concerned with the problem of the treatment of those of its members who fall below the accepted normal standard. The submerged tenth, the insane, the degenerate, the criminal, the problem of these abnormal factors of the social organism becomes more and more insistent with the advance in that order which is the expression of a higher consciousness—social in its inception, humanitarian in its activity. For it is this note of humanitarianism that would seem to distinguish the social instincts of the modern world. The conception of a social being which overrides with a stern imperative the desires and satisfactions of the individual is no new human concept. Egyptian, Jew, Greek and Roman were each in turn possessed by it. What is new, since possibly the French revolutionary era, is the extension of this social concept to all humanity, and even sub-humanity, and its impregnation with the spirit of humaneness.

I need not labor the point, for whatever we may say of the degenerate tendencies of the age, there never was a period in which the question, "Am I my brother's keeper?" was met with so ready an affirmative.

We are astounded at the harshness, the cruelty, the indifference of the past; and some militant writers like the

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Earl of Meath would have us believe that our astonishment arises from our growing feebleness. We have, he tells us, lost our "grit." But perhaps this grit, whose supposed loss he deplores, was but our dullness of spirit with its attendant cruelty; and a growing intelligence, a humaner social and human consciousness is the more reasonable explanation of the general revolt against harsh and brutal conditions, for ourselves and for others.

And this is peculiarly true in the realm of criminology. We cannot treat our criminals as we did; we have moved on. We realize our relationship to them as our fathers never did. We see the social, the moral, the economic factors which produce them, and we know that for these factors we also are responsible. "The criminal problem," says a writer in the *Nation*, "is at bottom not so much a penal as a social problem. And as we sense our responsibility we seek to understand the problem. How far are we, as a society, responsible and how far is the criminal individual to be blamed for his acts? And then, since he is there, what is to be done with him? For we are not only scientifically aware of our intimate relationship one with another, but as I have said, our modern social consciousness is instinct with the humanitarian spirit. But to answer these questions is no easy matter. Problems of social life, of economics, of ethics, of heredity, of free will, all have to be considered—in short, everything that bears on the study of human character and human relations.

To this end a considerable part of the work of the Ethological Society, or society for the systematic study of human character, gives assistance. A pamphlet recently published by Dr. Bernard Hollander, its president, well known as a brain specialist, entitled, "Crime and Responsibility," claims the attention of every thoughtful student of criminology.

To get at the root of responsibility for criminal acts we must consider the make-up of men. Thus there are the primary inherited feelings which find expression

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through the brain organization. Whatever the ego, the real self, may be, for all practical purposes of social relationships the self is conditioned by the material organism through which it acts. It is somewhat appalling, indeed, to think how much character depends, as Dr. Hollander reminds us, "on physiological accidents." "Thus even a slight injury to the brain may totally change the character of a person; the habitual use of drugs and alcohol may change the disposition; long illness may cause a person to grow less sympathetic and gracious, and more selfish; moreover a small patch of inflammation in a man's brain may give him homicidal tendencies, while a little softening of a square inch of the cortex may make another a kleptomaniac."

Can the will overcome these adverse factors? Will power may be strengthened by training, but it is to be borne in mind that it "has no separate existence" of itself. "It is only a capacity of being so powerfully attracted by one motive that other motives become insignificant." "We do not," says Dr. Hollander "make deliberate choice; all that our judgment can do is to weigh the various attractions of several motives. The most powerful must certainly prove victorious."

How does this work out? It follows, says Dr. Hollander, in effect, that if we are not as some still suppose, born equally good or bad by nature, but that our characters depend on (1) our inherited primary feelings, and (2) our inherited will-capacity., *i. e.,* capacity of being predominantly attracted by this or that motive, then men have all degrees of moral capacity as they have of intellectual; and as you cannot expect or demand common sense from the mentally deficient, so you cannot ask for normal morality from the morally deficient.

The criminal is a morally deficient being. Is it, then, reasonable to punish him for his deficiency, for which deficiency he is not responsible?

The only excuse for punishment, strictly so-called, would be that the terrorism of punishment supplies a

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powerful element in the "sum total of actuating motives." Thus it has a practical value to society which seems to justify it to Dr. Hollander. Punishment in this view becomes merely an expedient deterrent. It is not here justified on any ethical basis.

Dr. Hollander is justly severe on that absurd thing the legal test of insanity, *i. e.*, "knowing the difference between right and wrong." "The lunatic," he says, "knows the difference as well as we do." It is the very thing which often "drives him to despair." And then the idea of a hard and fast line between sane and insane has long since been given up by medical men. "Persons are to be met with of all stages between the normal and the profoundly insane." Large numbers of criminals are not admitted to be insane when convicted, but their insanity is proved later on. Thus in England one in every one hundred and twenty-six prisoners is certified insane, and one in eight comes of insane or epileptic parents. This, by the way, would of itself justify the abolition of the death penalty if our penology were based on scientific and moral grounds.

But there are many stages before we come to the certified insane. Every kind of weak-mindedness supplies its quota of crime. We go on believing in prisons, police and punishment for those derelicts of society—the mentally deficient—when they commit crimes, whilst leaving them beyond the age of sixteen, "to carry on their existence until the catastrophe occurs which could have been foreseen and ought to have been prevented, and then as a climax to our proceedings, we hang them to prevent further trouble and for the purpose of warning future evil-doers." Thus in Manchester board schools of forty thousand children, five hundred were found to be feeble-minded. The Manchester authorities provide special schools for and control these unhappy children until the age of sixteen, and then they are left to go their own gait. Thus society breeds its troubles in good truth.

The other classes of criminals, the *born* criminal with-

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out moral sensibility—by-product of the slums, of the dregs of civilization; and the *accidental* criminal, product of adverse social and economic circumstances—of both of these types Dr. Hollander has much to say that is wise and fruitful, and his words are well illustrated by cases that have come into his hands as a medical man.

The born criminal, or as Dr. Hollander calls him, the professional criminal, is one "whose vocation is crime by a physical and psychical proclivity, a man in whom the selfish tendencies predominate over the moral and religious sentiments and altruistic motives, and whose intellectual powers instead of inhibiting such tendencies are employed to further them and to supply means for their gratification; moreover such men are usually not influenced by domestic affections, and much too insensible to the esteem of others to be prevented from committing crimes." No doubt true enough, and yet on Dr. Hollander's own showing it is society which is responsible for the production of such beings. Society must then find the remedy and the cure, which one can hardly believe lies in the direction of physiological operation such as some so strongly advocate in these days.

Little need be said of the accidental criminal. There is no way of getting rid of such but by ceasing to produce him. "Economic and social causes largely account for the production of this class of criminals. The rush of life, the competitive system, exciting pleasure, morbid literature, the wealth of the wealthy, the poverty of the poor, the frightful overcrowding of the masses, the continuous labor of married women, working right up to the day of their delivery, and working again within a week after their confinement; all these things help to call into life not only a race of beings who have neither moral nor physical strength, but also a large number of individuals who are subject to strange whims, delusions and uncontrollable impulses."

All these types of criminals, indeed, tell us the same story of social responsibility and of the great need for

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study and experiment in penological treatment. No doubt as time goes on Dr. Hollander will give us more of his experience and suggestive thought on this question. His conclusion that "crime calls for intelligent and scientific treatment," will be generally admitted, and also very largely his further conclusion that the public will in the future "look to the physician . . . for the differential diagnosis between the curable and the incurable criminal." Indeed there is only one fault to be found with his attitude, and that is its tendency to be too purely a scientific one. For beside physiology and experimental psychology, beside economic and strictly medical questions, lie others of psychic and spiritual import bearing on this question of crime and responsibility. Dr. Hollander does not touch on these, and yet how can they be ignored and satisfactory methods adopted? I do not know Dr. Hollander's ideas in these directions, but there is always a fear lest the medical criminologist, particularly the brain specialist, be led away by the idea that "brain secretes dog's soul," and man's too. There is just the fear that in the consumingly interesting study of the brain organization and the bearing of this study on the problem of crime, we may lose sight of the being whose organ the brain is; may tend, that is, to think too much of the materialistic view. "The public will look to the physician," true, but for the sake of a just and broadly human line of action it is to be hoped not exclusively to the physician. For after all the physician is not even an expert in the realm of ethics. And each age develops its morality. A scientific and medical priesthood is no more desirable than a theological one. We can but resolve, each of us, to live in the whole the good and the beautiful, and to apply this resolve to the settling of the lines of social action in their application to the criminal, conscious that here, indeed, we are very specially our brother's keeper.

CARL HEATH.

LONDON.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

MORAL INSTRUCTION AND TRAINING IN SCHOOLS. Report of an International Inquiry. Edited by M. E. Sadler.

These two volumes form a veritable thesaurus from which writers on this subject will draw materials for many years to come. Mr. Sadler and his fellow-inquirers have done their part admirably; yet they will certainly be the first to admit that the work has only begun. We have here the foundation stone well and truly laid: it is now possible for the building to go on. In his admirable introduction the editor is unable to do more than indicate a few of the general lines of opinion. The value of the volumes, however, lies largely in the possibilities of future work. A unique combination of personal qualities and special experience has enabled Mr. Sadler to place before us a mass of materials that have been hitherto sadly to seek. On no subject are we more prone to dogmatize than on education, and within this subject there is no branch that lends itself more to easy generalizations than that which deals with moral training. In these volumes we have now the means of testing many of those sweeping statements that vex the soul of the earnest student. Though no attempt has been made to reach anything even approximating to final conclusions on the great issues raised, much has been accomplished in the way of making clear the points that are at issue. The question of the sanctions—religious, civic and personal—is now fairly put; and almost unlimited material supplied to enable readers to deal with the problem in a more or less scientific way. There is a general preponderance of opinion among English teachers in favor of the religious sanction. As Principal Burrell synopsizes his experience of professional opinion, "There is an unwillingness to forego the religious sanction. Many teachers will admit of no other. Ethical systems as sanctions are too cold for school work." It will be for future investigators to determine how far this preference for the religious sanction is based upon a conviction that it is the *most powerful* weapon in the teacher's hand. The problem of the relation between the esoteric and the exoteric function of religion is here involved.

It is quite in keeping with the English love of compromise

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that while the profession is solidly in favor of the religious sanction, most of the English witnesses favor the view that "moral and religious teaching are in some essential points interdependent," and that therefore "in view of differences in religious conviction, a due place should be given within the framework of national education to schools which are closely associated with religious bodies, and which can give full expression to the principles of their corporate life."

From the point of view of method the teachers who have given evidence fall naturally into two great groups, those in favor of direct methods and those in favor of indirect. Taking all the world into account, the two groups are probably about equal, with perhaps a balance in favor of the direct method. But when we confine ourselves to the English teachers there is a decided majority for the indirect method. This majority becomes overwhelming in the case of the secondary teachers. They are strongly opposed to systematic instruction in morals in the sense of giving more or less formal lessons on morals. The elementary teachers are more evenly divided on the subject, the cause of this difference being probably the fact that elementary teachers have been in the habit of giving Bible lessons, which are at least allied to moral lessons. The evidence, however, would almost suggest that the secondary teachers regard their pupils as different in kind from those found in the elementary schools. One witness (Rev. Chancellor Bernard) openly states that "there is a difference in docility between boys in elementary and those in our great public schools. In the former there is nothing of the critical, superior position which a boy of the upper class assumes, except, indeed, when he comes face to face with a man like Dr. Arnold or Bowen of Harrow." This would imply a difference in the conditions of the psychological problem that presents itself to the elementary teacher as compared with the secondary. As a matter of fact we have this distinction practically applied in Mr. Keatinge's treatment of contrariant ideas, which seem to find a more congenial field in the secondary schools than in the elementary. This is a matter on which more light is urgently needed; no one can read the first of these volumes without realizing how important are the issues involved.

It may be worth noting that perhaps the term *incidental* would better represent what is meant than the term *indirect.*

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The teacher of a secondary school regards moral training as a part of his duty—as the most important part indeed. But he thinks he can attain his end better than by going directly toward it. He thinks that the longest way round is the shortest way home. Yet he teaches directly though incidentally. A serious talk that arises by chance is none the less direct that it was not provided for in the time table. Indeed, there is a curious inconsistency in opposing direct moral instruction and yet upholding the school sermon. It would almost appear that what separates the two camps has a quantitative rather than a qualitative reference.

Though less controversial—except where the French system keeps alive the problems of volume one—the second volme is full of valuable information that so widens our view that we can in future speculations take the world as our unit. It is impossible to praise too highly the fairness that marks the presentation of all the conflicting evidence that has been poured into the inquiry committee.

JOHN ADAMS.

University of London.

WOMAN: HER POSITION AND INFLUENCE IN ANCIENT GREECE AND ROME, AND AMONG THE EARLY CHRISTIANS. By James Donaldson, M. A., LL. D., Principal of the University of St. Andrews. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1907.

This work (254 pages) is divided into four books, the first three of which have been compiled from essays that appeared between 1878 and 1889 in the *Contemporary Review*, London. The fourth book, both in form and substance, reads like a series of notes bearing on the subject-matter of the first three books. The whole forms a series of brightly written studies of womanhood, which, if they possess more or less the characteristics of literary snapshots rather than the sustained interest of the development of a history or of an idea, are nevertheless formed into a unity by the all-pervading sympathy of the writer. On every page this sympathy creates an atmosphere which makes throughout for the conclusion that (p. 191) "as with individuals there is no place like home, so with a state there is no institution like home; that a community can be great only where there are happy, harmonious and virtuous homes, and that homes can-

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not be happy and harmonious and virtuous unless woman is accorded a worthy place in those homes, with freedom of action, with a consciousness of responsibility, and with the right, unfettered by circumstances or prejudice, to develop all that is best and noblest in her to the utmost perfection."

On pages 20 and 21 Dr. Donaldson gives a charming version of the story of Nausicaa, and incidentally a fascinating account of the life of Homeric women, with their "fine development of the body." "They are much in the open air." "They can do everything that is necessary." "Time never hangs heavy on their hands." "And the strength and freshness of body produce a sweetness of temper and soundness of mind which act like a charm on all the men who have to do with them."

The conditions of life in Sparta and Athens are interestingly contrasted, and we are made to feel that the exclusive conditions of the Spartan community made a relatively great freedom possible to its women, with the happiest effects on the health and beauty of its people and on the frank, wholesome relations of the sexes. In Athens, on the other hand, commercial life, the attraction of her philosophic schools and of her great art treasures, induced a mixed and diverse population in which that racial purity which was a common Greek ideal seemed only achievable at the cost of the freedom of the women. Those people who believe to-day that woman's sphere is exclusively the home, and her work exclusively domestic, would do well to study the life of the women of ancient Athens. There the home life, home work, home interest, home education of the women was complete in its separation from the public life, public education, political work and political interests of the men. Outraged human nature revenged itself in the corruption of the home life of the women and in the passing of influence, intelligence, power and wisdom out of the hands of the legitimate wives into the hands of the Hetæræ, who because of their freedom to do and be whatsoever they would and could, became by virtue of their richer experience the "companions" and beloved comrades of the men.

The strongly organized Roman family is attractively sketched. The good points—the strong sense of duty between its members and toward the state, the mutual affection and respect between its men and women; and its weak points—the legal possession of its women by the men, the consequent revolt of its

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women and their recourse to poisoning and other crimes as means to the realization of a thwarted and disregarded will; all these are dispassionately set forth. Also the breakdown of the Roman contract-marriage, the unwillingness of the men to incur the vast expenses incidental to an over-luxurious family life and to the dowering of daughters.

Most interesting, too, is the examination of the causes of the curious degradation of the idea of marriage which occurred during the early centuries of Christianity. At that time, we are shown, the doctrine of the value of the individual human soul, as such, which was destined ultimately to carry with it the full recognition of the human equality of men and women, was overlaid by the false antithesis of the flesh and the spirit. Marriage during these early Christian centuries tended to be regarded almost wholly as a relation of the flesh, and therefore it was felt that saints of God must crucify the flesh and abstain from marriage if they were to achieve saintship.

In his treatment of this impious heresy (of which Christianity has not yet seen the last), as well as in his treatment of the whole subject—many times appearing—of the relation of modesty and clean-mindedness to knowledge and to nudity, the author has an attitude which we would call intensely modern, were it not that it was so nobly held by that most modern-ancient, Plato. Through these difficult places Dr. Donaldson walks with a firm and even tread. He handles his subject-matter without bitterness or overstatement, but with the assurance and humor and easy leisure of a man too convinced of the nature and tendency of things to be in a hurry.

MARY GILLILAND HUSBAND.

London, England.

THE SCHOOLS OF HELLAS. By Kenneth J. Freeman. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1907. Pp. xviii, 231.

One need not say to oneself, *de mortuis nil nisi bonum,* before proceeding to say good things of Mr. Freeman's book. It is in itself charming and attractive. It is a work by a young Hellenist on things Hellenic; it is a book by a classical schoolmaster on classical schools. One might be listening, as one reads, to one of Plato's bright and eager figures—a Glaucon or an Adeimantos. The literary charm is, indeed, ever and again,

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almost Platonic. Now there is a little sparkle of wit, and now an apt quotation from a Greek poet; and now there is a fresh modern parallel. The book generally may be said to be written from a literary point of view. It is not concerned, to any extent, with the theory of Greek education. One section of the work (pp. 227-272) professes to deal with the theory of education; but the section consists chiefly of excerpts from the early part of the "Republic," along with a brief sketch of the "Cyropædia."[1] Aristotle's elaborate theory of the place of art, and especially of music, in a scheme of education is dismissed, somewhat slightingly, in half a page (p. 258).

The merit and charm of the book rests in its simple and lucid exposition of the curricula and methods of Greek education in the first section (pp. 11-227), which constitutes the bulk of the volume. The author distinguishes carefully the three stages of Athenian education, and he explains as carefully the subjects which were studied in each of these stages, and the method of their study. In doing so he bases himself freshly and fully on original evidence, and especially on the evidence to be drawn from Greek pottery. A number of illustrations of school life, taken from this source, help to give color and force to his descriptions of schools and of scholars. He draws, too, on the comic poets and on the mimes of Herondas for illustration; and not only so, but he uses his own imagination to good purpose. One of the most interesting passages in the book is a description of a day in an Athenian gymnasium (pp. 134-142), in the course of which various bits of evidence are pieced together to form a convincing and lifelike picture.

Writing as an old public school boy, the author has naturally compared Greek schools and their methods with those of the modern English public school. There is much that is fresh and suggestive in these comparisons; but one would have liked to see the connection and comparison between Greek education and later methods of instruction drawn out on a somewhat larger scale. One notices the four subjects, which in the Middle Ages formed the *quadrivium,* mentioned together, without any allusion to their later history. And again, it seems an omission that no mention is made of our modern primary schools, and their aims and methods, when the author indulges

[1] The editor explains that "some chapters, dealing with Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, did not appear sufficiently complete to justify publication."

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in parallels between Greek primary education and our own. For the aim and object of our primary schools, as expounded in the Code itself and by educationalists like Professor Sadler, are definitely Greek—the training of character and the formation of good citizens. It is to the primary school, therefore, rather than to the public school (where the training of character is not so directly an object and citizenship is not so definitely inculcated) that one naturally turns for a parallel to the primary education of the Greeks; the more, as our primary education, just like that of the Greeks, stops at the age of fourteen. But a wider experience and greater reading would no doubt have enabled the author to do these things, and yet more, as he advanced in the study of his subject. As it is, the book remains, in spite of these slight criticisms, *κομψόν τι καὶ ἐυρυθμον.*

In a work for which such scholars as Mr. Morshead and Mr. Cornford stand joint sponsors, it would be hard to detect any errors. One such is the statement (p. 23) that "the Dorians can claim the ethical and collectivist philosophy of Pythagoras;" for Pythagoras was an Ionian, and had not, in any real sense, a philosophy, such philosophy as one understands by the term Pythagoreanism belonging to the later Pythagoreans.

ERNEST BARKER.

Oxford.

NEW WORLDS FOR OLD. By H. G. Wells. London: Constable & Co., 1908. Pp. 355.

Readers of Mr. Wells's former works, imaginative or speculative, will find here, not perhaps more in the way of direct practical suggestion, but more of the spirit of compromise with present reality, than in anything he has previously attempted. His work is indeed intended as a popular introduction to a practical socialism. On the whole, his romances prefigure the critical part of this, while its reconstructive part is prefigured in his series of utopias. To me the former part is the more impressive. In direct criticism here, as in imaginative suggestion elsewhere, Mr. Wells shows himself undoubtedly a powerful analyst of the existing order of society. A certain intellectual affinity with the mechanical side of it, derived from scientific training, makes the destructive effect of his analysis all the stronger. Probably no one can exaggerate effectively for an

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imaginative purpose something in which he has no sympathetic interest. In Mr. Wells's representation of his Martian monsters I seem to perceive an element of underlying respect for the power of those highly efficient instrumental or mechanical intelligences placed momentarily at the summit of things and draining the life out of humanity. Whether "The War of the Worlds" was intended as an allegory I do not know, though the remark in the present volume (p. 93) that "the idea of property has run wild and bacome a choking universal weed recalls an incident in that book. But that the nightmares of "The Time Machine" and "When the Sleeper Wakes" were definitely elaborated as conceivable developments of the industrial plutocracy in which we live there can be no doubt. In the last stage of the process, nemesis has come, and the parts are reversed. We get, as M. Anatole France has epigrammatically summed it up, "an anthropophagous proletariate and a comestible aristocracy." And now, in the opening part of Mr. Wells's new volume, he gives us a perfectly sober criticism showing forth the utter irrationality of the selective process as it is allowed to go on in modern societies dominated by the concentration of wealth as an aim.

So far the socialist's case is complete. The question then arises, ought all of us who desire to emerge from the present economic order to call ourselves socialists? According to Mr. Wells, we ought if we are logical. The alternative is between socialism and definitive plutocracy. If there is no organized effort of human will, the completion of plutocracy is inevitable. Yet he admits that there are real difficulties in accepting socialism, and that socialists often neglect to answer them. Some of them he himself answers by insisting on the difference between the contemporary and the earlier types of socialism. "The modern socialist is not a communist." Money, as the medium of exchange, "is indispensable to human freedom." Posthumous property will persist in a mitigated state under socialism. "All that property which is an enlargement of personality, the modern socialist seeks to preserve." There will be no attempt to produce a dead level. On the contrary, society will be so ordered that there is free play for every kind of faculty, and reward will be proportioned, with more justice than at present, to merit.

These are important concessions. Yet we find it also laid

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down that "socialism [by which I understand the socialist state] will be the universal landlord and the universal capitalist" (p. 147). Practically this appears to work out into general dependence for employment on the state or some municipality. When we are told that the kind of personal property necessary for freedom will still be left, is not this as if the new society were to try to retain the fruit while cutting the roots? The kind of *meum* and *tuum* which, as Mr. Wells points out, children spontaneously recognize, does not seem to be enough for the freedom of adults. The circumscription of spheres within a single household is an insufficient analogy for the developed state. Undoubtedly thinkers from opposite starting-points may considerably approximate to one another's positions. Mr. Wells I take to have been primarily a thinker of socialistic tendency. At an earlier stage (on record in his utopias) he seems to have regarded liberalism and democracy as superseded. Further development of his view has led him to see the extreme importance of providing for liberty and for democratic criticism in a socialistic state. On the other side it is a conspicuous fact of the time that liberalism admits more and more of what is called "socialistic legislation" as compatible with its principles. In their immediate aims liberals who desire movement and socialists who wish to achieve something in the present for the most part agree. For all that, there is a certain difference of ultimate ideal which it is better not to try to disguise. Mr. Wells's actual sketch of an ideal socialist order will in many respects not appeal to one who is primarily liberal or republican as distinguished from socialist. That socialism (with the state ultimately as universal landlord and universal capitalist) and plutocracy are the only logical alternatives I do not admit. To take them as such appears to me to result from trying to generalize an antithesis founded essentially on considerations only of the economic order. Mr. Wells, indeed, points out the limitations of purely economic theory, and notes how earlier socialists had already done this. Yet a close analysis, I think, would show that he has not altogether emerged from the circle in which most of the thinkers distinctively called socialist have moved. The communism of Plato or of More escapes this criticism, whatever may be said against it on other grounds.

Mr. Well's work is so suggestive of points to discuss that it

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tempts the reviewer to go on indefinitely. Much might be said on the question whether a socialism which leaves so many things undecided can be "ultimately a moral and intellectual synthesis of mankind," even though it is added, "from which fresh growth may come." If we are to take certain limitations of conception as final, and not merely as part of the formulation of a compromise, then socialism is reduced entirely to a system of economic readjustments, and cannot claim to be a general synthesis at all. Is the form of the state, for example, indifferent? Is the expectation serious that popular religion will be much the same after as before the transition? If so, then I do not find the socialistic reorganization radical enough.

T. WHITTAKER.

London.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF RELIGION. A Series of Lectures by John Watson, M. A., LL. D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in Queens University, Kingston, Canada. Glasgow: James Maclehose & Sons. Pp. 485.

The lectures which constitute the body of this work are mainly essays in the reconstruction and history of religious belief. The author believes that "nothing short of a complete revision of current theological ideas can bring permanent satisfaction to our highly reflective age"; and "that the theology of the future must take the form of a philosophy of religion" (Preface.) This work is not, however, in the full sense, a philosophy of religion. There is no systematic inquiry as to what religion is, on what it depends and the place it occupies or should occupy in human life.

In the first chapter it is pointed out that religion contains three distinguishable but inseparable elements. It is at once a life, a creed and a ritual. Very little is said about ritual; the relation of life and creed is discussed at some length, and the contention is, that religion is a life nourished and sustained by beliefs which are fundamentally true. True beliefs must be capable of being formulated into a definite system of ideas; and the only reasonable basis of religion is a system of metaphysics. Professor Watson does not say, with Dr. McTaggart, that no man is justified in a religious attitude except as a result of metaphysical study. He agrees with Newman that the religious

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consciousness is not created by dogma. Faith precedes and is the condition of dogma; and the development of faith comes largely through the influence of men of religious genius. But he contends that faith is enriched by a reflective formulation of its own principle. What leads men "to look at all systematic thought about religion as doing violence to its original simplicity and power is mainly a confusion between dogma in the sense of a number of propositions based upon external authority, and a reasoned doctrine which claims no other support than its own inherent truth" (p. 7). This is true, but it is not the chief reason why a large class of thinkers rightly or wrongly distrust dogma both in the sense of a "number of propositions based upon external authority" and as a "reasoned doctrine." To many metaphysical construction appears as an attempt to put together abstractions, and attention to it means neglect of the concrete and personal which alone can inspire a living faith. On the one hand it is claimed that the right Christian method is to aim at assimilating the life to Christ's, to identify the self with Him, so that the whole relation to God, man and nature may be the same as His. On the other hand it is maintained that "we cannot state the 'doctrine' of Jesus; for it appears as a supramundane life which must be felt in the person of Jesus, and its truth is guaranteed by the fact that such a life can be lived" (Harnack, "History of Dogma," Vol. I, Ch. 2). Professor Watson discusses the views of Harnack, but he does not fairly face the problem whether there can be any valid reason for faith or any criterion of religious value which is not metaphysical. He emphasizes throughout the necessity of a true interpretation of the universe as the condition of the religious life. The "undeveloped intuitions" of Jesus must be expanded to the completeness of modern constructive idealism (p. 188). "We now recognize that while Christianity is based on a universal principle, that principle is not capable of being imprisoned in a few simple truths, but just because it is a living thing must be enriched by all the elements with which it comes in contact. To identify Christianity with its first simple form and reject its later developments merely because they are later, is as unjustifiable as to prefer the germ to the full-grown plant" (pp. 255, 256). In order to show in a concrete way the process by which religious thought has been gradually purified and enriched, Professor Watson gives us studies on Philo and



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the New Testament, the Gnostics, Augustine's Theology, Medieval Theology, and on Liebnitz and Protestant Theology. He examines also the attempts made to base religion on authority, and criticises the views of several modern philosophical writers whose views differ from his own.

The chief value of the book lies in its criticisms. It is well written, the style is clear and untechnical, and anyone who is interested in the philosophical basis of religion will find it worth reading.

DAVID PHILLIPS.

Bala, North Wales.

THE PRECINCT OF RELIGION IN THE CULTURE OF HUMANITY. By Professor Charles Gray Shaw, B. D., Ph. D. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1908. Pp. i, 279.

This book "contains the substance of the lectures delivered in the Graduate School of New York University in the course entitled Philosophy of Religion." The author claims to have set aside in these lectures both metaphysics and psychology "for the sake of a humanism which seems best adapted to defining the essence of human worship." Who will be able to read this announcement without a start? Humanism in religion without psychology! The central doctrine is that religious consciousness possesses an independent nature and a self-constituted character. Four parts of about equal length make up the book: (1) The essence of religion, (2) the character of religion, (3) the reality of religion, (4) the religious world-order.

The reviewer cannot share the satisfaction which the author no doubt feels at having succeeded in excluding psychology almost completely from his treatment of religion. And he regrets having to record another achievement of the author as unfortunate as the first: the rich stores recently added to their respective sciences by the students of anthropology and of primitive religions have remained unused.

The result of this voluntary exclusion, or ignorance, is the production of a volume as formal, remote from religious life, and therefore unprofitable, as any we have seen for a long time.

JAMES H. LEUBA.

Bryn Mawr College.

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ATTENTION. By W. B. Pillsbury. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co. Pp. x, 366.

This addition to the "Library of Philosophy" is an expansion of a volume published in 1906 in the "Bibliothèque internationale de psychologie expérimentale." It is a useful monograph, containing almost everything important that has been said on the subject of attention, and a good deal about other subjects; chapters on "Attention and Ideas," "Attention and Association," "Attention and Reason," tend almost inevitably to develop in part into separate treatises on ideas, association and reason. On the whole, however, the continuity of the main subject is creditably maintained in a material that is difficult to manage. The summaries of results at the end of each chapter are useful in maintaining it.

The strongest part of the book is that which concerns experimental psychology; Professor Pillsbury has himself contributed to the laboratory investigation of attention, and is well acquainted with the literature of other people's results. The weakest part has to do with points in the fundamental analysis of mind. The discussions on "activity," for instance, do not leave a clear impression; it is sometimes hard to see whether the author is intending to deny the fact of activity or only the "feeling" of it, or to reduce the feeling to sensations. It is difficult in the end to make out the relation of his position to such a view as Dr. Stout's. Again (p. 129) we find, "It is a generally accepted fact that all other mental states are but combinations of sensations in some form or other" (sensations including images). The point is not very important for the author's purpose, and one feels that so startlingly debatable a statement need hardly have been brought in at all, but if it is to be made it had better be anticipated before page 36, where Professor Pillsbury explains that an important precondition for attention to an object is to have in mind what he calls alternately an "image" of the object and an "idea." Those who are accustomed to distinguish between these two will have a difficulty in following the discussion without such a warning, since they will incline to agree thoroughly about the second point and to hesitate about the first. It seems unnecessarily controversial, once more, to introduce "images" into the account of recognition (p. 41).

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Two smaller complaints must be made. The book is written for the most part in good and pleasant English, which renders all the more disconcerting the odd slips in grammar which occur now and then: on page 5, "it is frequently denied that . . . but rather that"; on page 20, "when listening to a man walking . . . the hand would swing;" on page 35, "they [impressions] owe their origin . . . to having held the expected sensation in mind"; on page 315, "equally . . . as"; on page 317, "different . . . than." And the illustrations, which are most commendably numerous, are apt to be a little trite and sometimes unreal. There is a story about a builder and a geologist on page 63 which we do not believe.

HELEN WODEHOUSE.

University of Birmingham.

DIE KUNST DER RECHTSANWENDUNG: Zugleich ein Beitrag zur Methodenlehre der Geisteswissenschaften. By Lorenz Brütt, Dr. Jur, Berlin: 1907. Pp. 214.

Dr. Brütt begins with a sketch of "critical positivism." The leading idea of this philosophy, which must not be confused with the "naïf positivism" of Comte, is "back to Kant." It is defined as the view which, holding that no knowledge of things in themselves is possible, confines itself to experience. A corollary, important for the matter in hand, is that no ethical judgments are objectively valid. Dr. Brütt's reasons for this view seem to be (1) that space and time are subjective forms of perception, and (2) that all propositions (except those of mathematics, which are purely formal and yield no fresh information about reality) are analytic. Other points on which he lays stress are the fallacies of confusing cause with reason (Spinoza) and of hypostatizing universals (Hegel). But it is not until section four that the bearing of these views on the theory of jurisprudence begins to appear. That section discusses the vexed subject of the theory of the interpretation of law, and begins by considering Savigny's theory of philological interpretation, which is rejected on the ground that the fixity of law is not to be exposed to the caprices of language, but demands a system of literal interpretation. On the other hand, literal interpretation notoriously breaks down; often, as in Section 833 of the German Civil Code (on the keeping of animals), the words may

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bear many different senses. Hence we require a criterion for finding the right sense without falling into the historico-philological error. This dilemma Dr. Brütt solves by the notion of "immanent judgments of value": the judge has to disengage the judgment of value which is latent in the law, treating it not as the *cause* of the law (that would be the philological fallacy), but as the *ratio juris*. Here, then, we have a point of connection with the author's philosophical views, although it is difficult to see that the connection is more than verbal. In the next section the theory of latent values is applied to the problem of supplementing omissions in law. And first, are there any "gaps" in law? Dr. Brütt rejects the opinion of those jurists who hold that every system of positive law is complete in itself; we must in practice admit that there are situations (private international law supplies the most glaring instance) as to which positive law gives no ruling; moreover, to attribute to law an indefinite power of dialectical expansion would contradict the doctrine that all significant propositions are analytic. This is a second and more important point of contact between philosophy and jurisprudence: the doctrine of "gaps" in law is deduced from the subject-predicate theory of propositions. Another philosophical consequence is the condemnation of "Begriffsjurisprudenz." Under Hegelian influence the school of Savigny and Puchta, followed by Ihering, treated legal concepts as self-subsistent realities; hence, in spite of their historical merits, they have fallen before modern positivism in jurisprudence, just as metaphysical realism has fallen before scientific method. Equally untenable is "Gefühlsjurisprudenz," since the judge's mere feeling for justice cannot give the objective standard we require. After a section devoted to the views of Stammler, whom Dr. Brütt in the main follows, and between whom and Kant he draws a parallel, we approach, in section eight, the final development of the theory of latent values. This consists in defining the criterion which the judge must apply whenever he has occasion, by supplementing positive law or otherwise, to bring out the latent judgment of value. The criterion is that of "richtiges Recht"; and that law is called "right" which promotes as much as possible the development of a nation's civilization. The rest of the book is occupied mainly with tentative applications of this criterion to technical problems.

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In England and America a judge's position under the common law is so different from that in Germany that the subject of this ingenious work must seem rather unreal to English-speaking readers. Still a few words of general criticism may be in place. Dr. Brütt has not made good the claim of his subtitle; whatever the value of his work from the point of view of the jurist, it fails as a contribution to the doctrine of scientific method. The fault lies in failure to establish a real connection between principles and conclusions. We are given the Kantian premises, and we are given the conclusions about "richtiges Recht" and "latent values"; but nothing could be flimsier than the pretense that the latter follow from the former. It may be doubted whether the ideal, which floated before Leibnitz in his youth, of developing theory of jurisprudence from logic, is more than a dream; at any rate Dr. Brütt does nothing to dispel the doubt. If anything, he confirms it, since his system is self-contradictory in a vital point. For the judgment that any law is "right" is surely an ethical judgment, even on Dr. Brütt's definition of "right"; but if so it cannot, according to the philosophy of section one, be allowed objective validity; and hence there is no reason for preferring it to the "Gefühlsjurisprudenz," which was disqualified solely on the ground of subjectivity.

S. WATERLOW.

Rye, England.

THE CONCEPTS OF EQUALITY IN THE WRITINGS OF ROUSSEAU, BENTHAM AND KANT. By Alfred Tuttle Williams, Ph. D., Columbia. New York: Teachers College, 1907.

Mr. Williams has contributed a valuable item to the theory of ethics, and therefore to the theory of education. Of the concept of equality one has to ask, with Aristotle, *in what respects?* There is no equality of hereditary dispositions, talents or any kind of natural endowment. There is no equality of happiness. For Plato equality was of opportunity. For Aristotle, quite similarly, it was of justice. For the Hebrew nation it was of the moral nature. For Christianity it had a basis in the conception of a spiritual sonship of God. Having touched lightly but adequately on these ideas, Mr. Williams advances to modern political and ethical theory, halting for

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a time with Hobbes and Locke, and more leisurely with Rousseau, in order to estimate the value and limits of the theory that men are by nature endowed with equal and inalienable rights. The conception of equality in the "Discourses," the "Émile," the "New Heloise" and the "Social Contract" of Rousseau is discussed under three headings: (1) Equality is an ideal primitive world before the beginning of civilization; (2) equality on the basis of feeling which is at least an implied ideal in the "Émile" and the "New Heloise"; and (3) equality in the social state, the supposition of the social contract.

Bentham's "greatest happiness" principle aimed at an empirical if not a natural equality, especially on the supposition that "every one is to count as one, and no one for more than one." For Kant, on the other hand, men were equal as rational beings; that is to say, the basis of equality lay in reason, not feeling. The contributions of Rousseau, Bentham and Kant to a theory of equality were factors in the modern conception of equal personal worth. *Personality* is wider than rationality, deeper than sentience; it implies the capacity to seek an idea of the common good; it involves the notion of an organism of society in which the parts are not merely means to the whole, nor the whole to the parts, but all are ends in themselves.

Mr. Williams finds these principal forms in which equality as a social idea appears, political equality, civil or legal equality, economic equality or equality in wealth, or at least in opportunity, religious equality, which allows to everyone the privilege to believe and worship as he chooses, and finally moral equality. But there is no absolute equality. "There are never in nature two beings which are exactly alike and in which it is not possible to find a difference" (Leibnitz). Things are therefore only equal in abstraction, in idea or in respect to their common elements. Equality is therefore essentially an ethical concept. "The ethical idea that each individual is a person to whom must be accredited in some sense absolute worth, at least means to the educator that each child endowed with capacities for social life is an individual problem to be studied, and means to the state that each child is worthy of education."

PERCIVAL R. COLE.

Teachers College, Columbia University.

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THE TOWN CHILD. By Reginald A. Bray, L. C. C. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1907.

This work affords a clear and definite statement of many hitherto vague and unformulated notions, which are prevalent concerning life to-day. It does not give to us ideas of striking originality, but it does give that general survey of our position which is so essential if we are to insure progress as distinct from meaningless change. This is presented clearly and vigorously and with such a wealth of illustration that the account is easily readable and interesting throughout.

The book is divided into two parts. In the first, our author seeks to determine the mental, moral and physical influence upon the race of an environment which is coming, almost generally, to be that of the town. Part II develops the author's own system of social philosophy. Here the problem is viewed from the standpoint of the social reformer, and an endeavor is made to determine the means whereby something of the spirit and health of the country may be developed by the town child. Mr. Bray would have him assimilate its repose, silence and beauty. It should be made possible for him to realize, no less than for his farming brother, the rich and abiding fruits of his individual toil. In the town, the so-called triumphs of civilization tend to make the workers themselves smaller, shallower and more discontented, as increasingly minute specialization allots to each individual a mere fragment of a whole, and leaves his sense of personal achievement and value to atrophy. In actual treatment, however, no very definite line seems to have been drawn between the attitudes of the two sections. The subject of Part I is much amplified in Part II, whereas, in defining what ought to be the relative spheres of voluntary and state enterprises, our author is presenting in the first part something of his system of social philosophy. It is upon the subject of Part I, wherever it arises, that we have found the most conspicuous points of interest and value. In spite of Mr. Bray's practical knowledge of social difficulties, we should be inclined to doubt the efficacy of several of the remedies he offers. As usual, the state is to intervene and achieve at many points. Such intervention has often been known to aggravate existing evils. School meals encourage the mothers to

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work in factories, and thereby both lower their vitality and heighten the general discomfort of the homes. There can hardly be a more forlorn spectacle than that of a class of children with the keys of their homes suspended from their necks.

At the commencement of the chapter entitled "The Child and the School" we read: "The sole justification for the present chapter must be sought in the fact that its author can boast no professional experience as a teacher." The negative qualification is significant, for what our author has of his own to teach in this connection would be the despair of the professional educationalist. The chapter contains much that is indubitably true, but this is either a repetition of what Professor James has already taught, and the reader could not do better than refer to the still more vigorous and illuminating original, or else the truth given to us is platitudinous. We trust that the time is now past when it was necessary to urge that geography is best studied out of doors, and that our ideas of local geography are in advance of those of our author, when he recommends capes and bays as an admirable lesson for the little Londoner. The remainder of the chapter involves many misconceptions which result from its negative justification. Thus, the criticism of art teaching in schools issues from a misunderstanding of the main aim which it has in view. This is not to develop a nation of professional artists, but to foster those very powers of appreciation and expression which our author himself values so highly.

The last two chapters likewise savor very much of Professor James in his lectures on "Some of Life's Ideals," but the application is essentially our author's own. Here, he is so very much in earnest, and speaks so forcibly and strikingly, that the lessons taught and suggestions made cannot fail to be fruitful.

In spite of the many questions upon which we should differ from Mr. Bray, if space permitted, we are very glad to admit that he has written a useful, stimulating and very attractive book.

M. Lightfoot Eastwood.

Bolton, England.

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MAN AND HIS FUTURE. By Lieutenant-Colonel William Sedgwick. London: T. Werner Laurie, 1907. Pp. 256.

The author of this work writes from the standpoint of sympathy with evolutionary science, and hopes, in his preface, "that intellects of all kinds will be reached, as the facts are solid enough to stand any amount of rearrangement." The hope is rather a vain one, for not every type of intellect can be brought to find that the facts of evolutionary science subserve the interests of religious orthodoxy. Evolution, says our author (p. 129), "instead of clashing with the old ennobling ideas, as it was supposed to do, and exploding them, in reality affords them the strongest support." Again (p. 119), "we find evolutionary philosophy agreeing with religion in looking for another and a better, in fact, a perfect universe." The author's argumentations in support of these contentions cannot be said to be at all so forcible as to be capable of appeal to "intellects of all kinds." When he rises to the discussion of man's future as reaching on into immortality, he mixes up lowly considerations drawn from the case of the "sheep-dog" and "the state of the labor market" in ways that make one sigh for the higher and —let us have the courage to say so—less scientific, but not less rational and human, considerations that point to immortality as the needed goal of man's life and endeavor. This danger one continually finds besetting the use of scientific arguments, and one is very skeptical of the potency of their appeal to all higher and stronger types of intellect. We are not greatly consoled by the author's leading everything up to the conclusions of an unimpeachable orthodoxy so long as, in the same fashion, he disposes of august themes like free will by telling us (p. 66) that our free will is that of the dog, which can follow one or other of two masters. This sort of lack of depth greatly lessens the value of the book, which suffers badly also from lack of compression. It is but just, however, to say that there are parts of the book in which the author does better, and urges the need and the difficulty of getting man to look upward in ways that one can read with pleasure. The author's treatments of the historic evidence as to race expansion, and the worth and importance of man, are in no way striking or original. And the chapter on the constitution of the universe is of interest mainly as showing that the author takes a creditable interest

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in recent scientific developments. The value of the book is not great, so far as the working out is concerned of those ethical implications with which this JOURNAL has specially to do.

JAMES LINDSAY.

Kilmarnock, Scotland.

THE WILL TO DOUBT. By Prof. Alfred H. Lloyd. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1907. Pp. 416.

This book, which "might be described as an introduction to philosophy," though it is "addressed quite as much to the general reader or rather to the general thinker, as to the prospective student of technical philosophy," is an attempt to show that "the contradictions, duplicity and vacillation" of human experience, by preventing any "fatal digression" from reality, enable us through our doubts "to believe in the very things we doubt"; and that "doubt is essential to real belief." "Its very contradictions hold an otherwise phenomenal, relative, changing experience close down to a real world."

As was perhaps to be expected, Professor Lloyd believes that "known truth is imperfect or even false" (p. 21), that "nothing is absolutely anything" (p. 139), that "consciousness in general deals, and always must deal, with artificial forms, with symbols, constructions and transformations" (p. 113); and that "reality is not knowable face to face" (p. 277). These assumptions, which play no unimportant part in the argument of the book, receive no satisfactory examination, and no reasons are given for supposing them to be true. This defect, coupled with a plentiful use of such unintelligible distinctions as "true" and "relatively true," "belief" and "real belief," and the lack of definition of the meaning, and consequently in the use of such words as "objective," "relative," "real," "unreal," etc., make the book exceedingly obscure and unconvincing, and as "an introduction to philosophy" practically worthless. So many of its assertions may mean so many different things.

If reality is not knowable face to face (or otherwise), how is anyone to know whether the contradiction of human experience does prevent it from "digressing fatally" from reality? It may appear beside the point to inquire whether the moon is or is not really made of green cheese, or whether arsenic is or is not really poisonous; but the moon and cheese and greenness and

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arsenic which we do know cannot belong to the reality which is not knowable. And if they are not real to the general thinker, and to the prospective student of philosophy as well, it would appear that they are unreal. But, says Professor Lloyd, "nothing can be or ever has been unreal" (p. 254). Surely "reality" needs to be very carefully defined by Professor Lloyd, and in the absence of any such definition, the general reader is perhaps not unjustified in continuing to believe in the reality of the poisonous nature of arsenic, and in the unreality of the green-cheese composition of the moon. Professor Lloyd has failed to show that we can believe in the things which we doubt.

A. R. AINSWORTH.

London.

MOTHER EARTH: A Proposal for Permanent Reconstruction of Our Country Life. By Montague Fordham, M. A.; with Preface by J. A. Hobson, M. A. London: The Chiswick Press.

Back to the land is the cry of many an earnest reformer, but few are the attempts to solve the problem which are neither too timid or too rash. Mr. Fordham, however, with a thorough experience of country life and a varied business training, advances a large, bold and comprehensive solution. He is, perhaps, like most reformers, especially those who have never had to work very hard for their living, too optimistic; for he supposes that an unemployed man, *e. g.*, a man who could do a little carpentering "had he access to a bit of land and a little capital could, without doubt, support himself and bring up happy children" (p. 28). One would think it was the easiest thing in the world to work a small piece of English land at a profit. The author also is too much given to abstractions, *e. g.*, "Everyone has an inalienable right to a plot of land, to tools and all that is necessary to start him as a free worker on the land" (p. 29), but he is practical enough to recognize that "as the nation has allowed the land to pass into the hands of private owners and the law has for many generations confirmed their rights, all that can now be done is to resume the land as quickly as possible without injustice to interests so long recognized."

The author regards small holdings as no solution of the diffi-

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culties of the agricultural laborer (p. 93). He believes that all men have not the temperament necessary for proprietorship, and that some must remain laborers all their lives. He advocates therefore, strangely enough, a legal minimum wage, thereby encouraging the growth of this less desirable class. The best and most practicable suggestion is his scheme of a land club, which has already been carried into effect. We like also his suggestion for renewing and increasing the number of country festivals uniting man with nature. The volume is exceedingly interesting to him or her who combines nature-study with a desire to solve some of our great economic problems.

H. OSMAN NEWLAND.

London.

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BOOKS RECEIVED.

REALITIES AND IDEALS: Social, Political, Literary and Artistic. By Frederic Harrison. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. [A collection of miscellaneous essays dealing with the position and rights of women, education, the House of Lords, art, Herbert Spencer, etc.]

CULTS, CUSTOMS AND SUPERSTITIONS OF INDIA: being a revised and enlarged edition of "Indian Life, Religious and Social." By J. C. Oman. With illustrations. London: T. Fisher Unwin.

THE PROBLEM OF THEISM, and Other Essays. By Professor A. C. Pigou. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. [The subjects dealt with are "The General Nature of Reality," "The Problem of Theism," "Free Will," "The Problem of Good," "The Ethics of the Gospels," "The Ethics of Nietzsche," "The Optimism of Browning and Meredith." Three of the essays are reprinted from this JOURNAL.]

THE PROBLEM OF LOGIC. By W. R. Boyce Gibson, M. A. With the coöperation of Augusta Klein. London: A. & C. Black.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT EXPLAINED. By Professor John Watson, LL. D. Glasgow: James MacLehose & Sons. [A companion volume to the same author's "Selections from Kant."]

MORAL INSTRUCTION AND TRAINING IN SCHOOLS. Report of an International Inquiry. In two volumes. Edited, on behalf of the committee, by Professor M. E. Sadler. London: Longmans, Green & Co.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI. By Professor G. S. Brett, Lahore. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd.

AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY. By Dr. William McDougall. London: Methuen & Co.

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A STUDY OF THE INFLUENCE OF CUSTOM ON THE MORAL JUDGMENT. By Frank Chapman Sharp, Ph. D., Professor of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin. (Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin, No. 236.) Madison, Wis., June, 1908. Pp. 144.

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THE MEANING OF EVOLUTION IN ETHICS.*

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A COMPLETE discussion of the problem of evolution so far as ethics is concerned should involve answers to four questions:

I. What is evolution?
II. Has morality evolved?
III. How has it evolved?
IV. What light does the idea of its evolution throw upon its standards?

I. The first of these questions I am going to pass by as too large for adequate discussion here. I will only suggest that the idea of evolution, if it is to mean anything, must include three points: (1) change, (2) identity through change, (3) progress. Changelessness is not evolution, but neither is mere change. There must be a certain continuity or unity in the change; the successive aspects must be held together so as to constitute a process and not a mere succession. The fall of forest leaves is change, but it is not evolution, for there is no continuity in the succeeding leaves. And, finally, progress is involved, however difficult it may be to define this debated term. A mere marking time, a circular motion,

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is not evolution. Evolution is dramatic, involving beginning, middle and end. It is the becoming of that which was not, or of that which was to be. This progress may be for the better or the worse, measured by certain standards, but progress there must be if evolution is to have meaning.

II. The second question is a double one. It may mean, has morality evolved from the non-moral? or, has morality evolved within its own sphere? I shall discuss both these briefly.

1. Has morality evolved from the non-moral?

A clear idea of the nature of morality is a necessary prerequisite to a discussion of the problem of its origin. What is, then, the essential difference between moral and non-moral action? The question here concerns, not the distinction between good and bad conduct, but that between conduct upon which we do pass moral judgment and that upon which we do not. It is the difference between the action of a being with a conscience and the action of one who has none.

This distinction is one difficult to make in a way satisfactory to all thinkers; but I am myself fairly well satisfied with the definition of moral conduct as that in which the particular action is judged good or bad by the agent with reference to an objective standard. To have a moral consciousness or faculty is thus to estimate the value of conduct in terms of its relation to the good. Our action may not be in the line of our decision as to what is good, but if the estimate is made we have a conscience. The moral man is one whose conduct is thus controlled by his idea of the good; the immoral man is he who has the idea but disregards it. This means that the conscience is the application of reason to life—practical reason, as Kant called it—the interpretation of life in terms of universal law. The case is quite analogous to that of theoretical truth. We have theoretical truth only when our particular judgment has been referred to an objective order of fact and by this confirmed. We have moral

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truth only when our particular desires and impulses are similarly referred to an objective order of worth and found good. Without this possibility of reference to an objective standard we can have neither science nor morality. Unless we can say not only, "I want this," but, "This *is* good," we are not moral beings. The reflective judgment is necessary.

Our problem then is, how do we come to judge our conduct in this objective fashion? How does it come about that we not merely have certain desires, but ask in regard to them whether we *ought* to have such desires? Whence comes this objective standard which seems to claim authority to control our lives? Is it a special and unanalyzable faculty, or is it a product of evolution?

And here, again, we have a problem of meaning. What do we mean by the question as to whether conscience has evolved or not? In a large majority of cases those who ask the question have not the faintest idea of what their question does mean. I certainly am not at all sure of their meaning. But, perhaps, they *might* mean to ask, if they *did* mean anything, whether conscience is different in kind from the non-moral consciousness or only different in complexity; whether it is *other than* animal consciousness or only more of the same kind; whether man is only a bigger brute or of a different class; or, to put it in slightly different terms, whether moral action is completely explicable in terms of animal action, or contains a new element not previously found. To say that conscience has evolved may mean that its nature is to be adequately stated in terms of that which preceded it.

If the evolution of conscience means this, I am quite prepared to deny that it has evolved. There is more truth in the theory of special creation than in this. I know that this whole matter of difference of kind is a difficult subject, but I maintain that more confusion of thought is likely to arise from the identification of moral and animal action than from their distinction. The conduct of Socrates choosing to die rather than to violate

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the laws of his state is not the action of a sheep blindly following its fellows through a gap in the fence; it is rather the action of a man deliberately refusing to follow his fellows through the doors of his prison. And the explanation of his conduct is to be found, not in the imitative instinct, nor even in a prudent calculation of his future pleasures or pains, but in his recognition of the absolute value of a certain type of life.

But the evolution of conscience may mean that, although it is different in quality from its predecessors, it has yet developed away from them by a series of slight changes, the law of which we can give. Its evolution is here a certain continuity of differences, the conditions of which we can approximately determine. It would mean that while at the two ends of the scale we can recognize absolute differences in kind, these extremes are united by an infinite series of intermediate qualities between which it is practically impossible to distinguish. But because darkness passes through twilight into day by imperceptible degrees we do not deny the difference in quality between darkness and light. Nor do we deny the distinctness, even though physics may say it corresponds to a purely quantitative difference in rates of motion. No more need we deny moral differences under similar conditions.

The question now becomes one of fact: can we find a graded series of types of action reaching from conscience at the top to brute action at the bottom? Can we find the missing link in morals which completes the continuity of the chain? I think we can, thanks to modern psychology, genetic and social.

The old contrast that used to be drawn was between the purely selfish beast and the highly social man. How can there be any kinship between the purely self-seeking animal and the strictly self-denying man? How can we think of the conscienceless beast subjecting himself and his desires to an objective law? How can selfishness change into its own opposite unless it is its own opposite?

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The answer has been found in a denial of the facts. The purely self-seeking animal has been found to be a fiction like that of the economic man. The parental and gregarious instincts have been discovered and a certain unity found in the lower life. The beast is no longer thought of as exclusively going about seeking whom he may devour, and we are forced to find a new analogue of the devil. There seems to be law in this primitive family—law in the herd, a restraint upon indiscriminate action. And when we come to primitive man we find the same condition: the savage is not by nature an isolated individual. He is from his birth a member of a family and group, whose customs are his customs and whose laws are his laws. His whole life is lived under this social control. This is the idea of the tribal self, which Clifford has developed, or the social self, as emphasized by Baldwin and Royce. The individual's very self is a borrowed one; he thinks as the tribe thinks, feels as it feels, does as it does. In this social, gregarious, parental control we have the anticipation of moral control. The standard by which action is determined is not an individual but an objective social one. Conscience is the voice of the race.

In fact, so successful has been the attack upon the old idea of isolated, selfish individuals as the units of society, that our difficulty nowadays is just the opposite of what it was before. Instead of the problem of how selfish man came to be social we have the even more difficult one of how social man came to be selfish—how it was that he ever thought of setting up for himself and disregarding the customs of his tribe, how it was that there came to be individuals. For conscience implies both these elements, the social and the individual. Man must act for and with society, but he must do it, not in a blind, instinctive fashion, but as an individual, conscious of his own independent life, yet willing to devote it to the larger end. Morality is the *self*-devotion of individuals to the common good.

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Into the psychology of self-consciousness we cannot go here. Enough that necessarily in the course of rational development the individual does come to a consciousness that he is a relatively independent center of things and can determine his life for himself. He finds that he has private interests as well as social interests, and then comes the clash and conflict out of which conscience emerges. This is the fall of man; a fall up instead of a fall down, we are taught nowadays—at any rate, a transition from blind obedience to social instinct and tradition to a conscious struggle between ideal and unworthy motives, between the private self and an objective good.

How is this transition effected? How does this self-devotion take place? Here we reach the limits of explanation, for it is a matter of the mystery of any conscious choice. Without it we have brutes, with it we have moral man.

Our missing link, then, while important, does not close the gap completely. There is still the long step from social instinct to self-conscious choice; and while we may believe that the last step is made as the earlier ones were, and that we have no need to invoke miraculous agencies, it is nevertheless true that we shall probably always find a decided break in the qualitative continuity. The moral life will feel new.

As to the factors in bringing about these changes, I think there is no doubt that natural selection is the most important. Social instincts are obviously of the highest utility for the groups possessing them, and aid survival. Self-conscious reason is equally valuable both for the individual and the tribe. And, finally, the harmony of both in moral action or conscience is imperative. Conscience survives because it is biologically valuable. As to why it *appears,* that is one of the mysteries of variation.

2. Has morality evolved within its own sphere?

Granted, now, the race in possession of its conscience, and we have this second meaning of the question as to

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the evolution of morality within itself from lower to higher forms. And here I have space only to discuss the meaning of the question itself. Does this advance mean a development of greater conscientiousness in the performance of known duty, a stricter observance of the moral standard, a greater subjective morality? If it does I fear we can gather little evidence for such an increase of conscientiousness. The gap between the ideal and the actual shows no signs of gradual closing. In spite of Mr. Spencer's optimism the annoying distinction between what we want to do and what we ought to do remains grimly immovable, and the saint is he who feels the gap most keenly. Our growing reason has revealed to us possibilities of sin far beyond those known to our innocent ancestors, and we have not been backward in availing ourselves of these. To-day, as in the past, every man has to work out his own salvation. The moral life is not a fixed quality or structure to be handed down by inheritance or tradition, but is something to be *achieved* by each man for himself, and unless so achieved is not the moral life. We cannot expect, therefore, to find evolution in character through the gradual accumulations of righteousness. The virtues of the saints are not transferred to their descendents—we cannot stand morally on the shoulders of our parents. Indeed, the more we inherit of opportunity or ideas, the greater becomes our problem.

Nor do we find evolution in the nature or form of the moral consciousness itself. To be moral now is just what it has ever been—to be true to one's reflective ideals of life. If the savage is moral at all he is so in this way, and the best of us knows no better. The quality of will which renders *him* moral is exactly the same as that which makes us so. For all of us it is merely the choice of the better before the worse.

This evolution within morality must mean, then, the development of higher standards of conduct—the development of objective, rather than subjective goodness. It must mean a certain gradual growth in ideals as these

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are applied to conduct. And here we should distinguish, as does Hobhouse, between verbal and practical ideals—between those which are looked at on Sunday and those which are for week-day use. It is only in the latter that we find a real test of development. That there has been moral evolution in this sense I shall not take time to prove. It seems to me a postulate, a presupposition, of our moral judgments. There has been change, and that this change is for the better or higher is a faith involved in our efforts after deeper moral insight. Nor shall I even attempt to suggest the direction taken by moral development, interesting as that problem is. More complicated problems demand our attention.

III. How has morality evolved?

And now for the factors in moral evolution. By what means is the advance effected? Is it the work of the same factors as in the lower grades of life, or have we new forces? Natural selection is the great factor in physical evolution. In the struggle for existence only those forms of life survive which are adapted to the conditions of the environment. Nature weeds out the unfit; and their unfitness is determined solely by their inability to exist under the given conditions. No idea of value enters here. No conscious or rational selection is made; no selection at all, in the strict sense of the term. The fit are not *selected,* it is the unfit who fail to survive, and the fit are merely the survivors. The process is negative throughout. A railroad train selects its passengers in the same sense—those who come on time get aboard, those who do not, get left.

Is this the way in which the development of moral standards takes place? Partly, at least. The elementary virtues are the forms of conduct which enable the individual and the tribe to survive. They have become fixed standards because without them man would have perished in the struggle for existence. Courage and temperance and justice found a foothold in life by the same natural selective process by which the eye and hand assumed their

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present shape. They were useful. And so to-day we find a certain eliminative process going on by which the morally unfit are submerged and lost in the social and physical struggle. A man whose morals vary from type in an unfavorable direction has little chance to survive.

But while natural selection in the early stages of morality, or in the premoral stage, may have been an important factor, it has by no means the importance for ethics that it has for biology, and naturally so, when we consider the difference in the two spheres. In biology the question is as to the existence or non-existence of certain types of living beings. Shall they survive or not? The unfit cannot survive; the individuals are wiped out of existence and the fit inherit the earth. But, in ethics, we have the question of the development of ideals, and in most cases the variations in these ideals are not such as to affect the survival strength of the individual or race which holds these ideals. A lower ideal will not kill a man in civilized society—perhaps reform would progress more rapidly if it did—and hence nature has not this effective and drastic remedy to apply. Both good and bad forms of conduct flourish together, for unfitness does not mean death.

We have then to look for other factors, and instead of the *negative* process of *natural* selection we find at work the *positive* process of *rational* selection. This means (1) that instead of the selection consisting merely in the destruction of the unfit, it consists in the active choice of and caring for the fit. It means that instead of the drunkard being merely eliminated by his own inability to exist, the temperate man is chosen and encouraged and favored. It is no longer a mere struggle for existence in which the one party depends solely on its ability to meet fixed and unresponsive conditions, but a test in which the conditions favor and respond to the one who meets them. The survivor does not pull himself up unaided, he is lifted into safety.

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This means (2) that this selection is a *rational* or conscious selection. The development of the ideal of universal arbitration and its approaching victory over the martial ideal is not to be explained without reference to conscious selection, to deliberate choice. It is not due to the fact that our military heroes, as unfitted to survive, have gone under in the struggle, and that their ideals have perished with them. Captain Hobson is too good a sailor to perish in this easy fashion. It is not his body that is lacking, but his ideas and ideals. He persists as vigorously as ever, but his ideas are not acceptable to the thinking people of our time. Society thinks, analyzes, weighs these ideas, and their fate is dependent upon their choice. Those judged fit are held and propagated, and those judged unfit are rejected. In this moral evolution purpose, rationality is the important factor. It is not merely that the results are *actually* useful and reasonable, but that their reasonableness is the explicit ground of their conscious selection. The utility of the eye may be the reason why it assumed its present form, but this utility was a resultant, and not the end for which nature worked. Arbitration is also useful, but it comes not merely because it has been useful but because men believe in it and work for it. Teleology may be problematic in natural evolution, but it is self-evident in moral evolution.

Mr. Huxley was one of the first of scientific men to recognize this difference between natural and rational selection, and his statement of it in his essay on "Evolution and Ethics" created much disturbance among his scientific brethren. In that essay he points out the difference between the condition of things on an open heath, where natural selection is unchecked, and in a walled garden, where the conditions are consciously adjusted by a gardener. Inside the wall all manner of beautiful and rare plants may be made to grow by intelligent direction of the gardener, plants such as would instantly perish if left unprotected on the open heath. Both within and

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without the walls the plants survive because they are fit to survive; but without the walls this fitness is a matter of mere physical strength, within, it is a matter determined by the conscious purpose of the gardener. Without the walls beauty may not constitute fitness, within, by the will of the keeper, it does.

So within the moral sphere. Virtues which never would have constituted fitness under a process of mere natural selection, under the more discriminating process of rational selection acquire survival value. Generosity and courtesy, while in their broader forms they may have had value for purely physical survival, certainly in their more delicate and finer forms never would have been selected by a natural process of brute struggle. It is because they are elements in the *higher* life and not merely elements of life that they have been chosen.

Mr. Huxley is right, therefore, in emphasizing the contrast between the natural and the moral process. Moral evolution is a struggle for the control and overthrow of nature, for the establishment of a kingdom whose laws are other than those observed by nature. The world process has produced a conscious intelligence, and this conscious intelligence is aspiring to control the process of its own production. Nature has become self-conscious, and has thereby ceased to be merely natural. Man is getting one foot in the stirrup and it remains to be seen how and where he will ride. But he is bound to ride somewhere whether it be to salvation or destruction, for he is no longer content to be led blindly to his fate. This seems to me the meaning of the modern questioning of tradition and convention—the ceaseless inquiry into the nature of man and society, the development of science and, above all, the beginnings of the application of science to the control of life. The development of knowledge is to be applied to the development of life, and the materials of nature are to be used in the realization of ideals which, but for conscious choice, would have no meaning.

A word as to the mode of transmission in moral evolu-

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tion, for this, too, differs radically from that in organic evolution. Physical evolution is necessarily slow because the acquired characters of individuals are not readily transmissible to descendants, but in social life the achievements of one age are handed down to the next by social tradition. The new ideas of to-day may be the accepted commonplaces of to-morrow through the miracle of the printing press and the school. Our libraries are the incarnations of our ideas which through them acquire the chance to live beyond the limits of our own lives. Social supplants almost exclusively physical heredity.

IV. What is the ethical significance of the idea of evolution?

This brings us to the final phase of our problem and we have to ask of what value to ethics has the idea of evolution been? That value has been, in general, of the same kind as in the other sciences, though, as we shall see, less in degree. It has consisted in the exposition of the unity and continuity of life in all its forms. The present has, on the one hand, been shown as continuous with the past; and, on the other, organic life has been shown as in close and vital relation with its environment. Interconnection, successive and simultaneous, is involved in the idea of evolution.

With more special reference to ethics we find: (1) That the various traits of the moral life are now regarded as adaptations to the conditions of life, instead of as arbitrary elements in a fixed character. Courage and temperance and justice assume their forms in relation to certain needs, and their value is not determinable apart from these needs. Our moral judgments must include not only the agent but the situation, and a virtue out of place is not a virtue.

(2) Not only are the virtues such only in relation to the environment, but they must also be considered in relation to one another. Evolution has emphasized the conception of the moral life as an organism in which the virtues are not isolated but are only the various functions

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of a single life which is more important than any of its members. This idea of the moral life as organic is, of course, not an original contribution to ethics by the theory of evolution; it is as old as the Greeks, but it has been newly emphasized and realized in the light of recent science.

(3) The moral life has been seen in its relation to its physical conditions. This is only a special instance of the former influence. Spirituality is now called sentimentality if it ignores the fundamental instincts of the body. It is true enough that now, as ever, we may be called to throw away the physical life for the sake of a larger good; but now, as never before perhaps, we are called upon to make sure that it *is* a larger good for which the life is lost. Flesh and blood are coming to their own again as we recognize our kinship with the animal. It may well be that flesh and blood are encroaching beyond their boundaries under this new favor, but that nature has regained her place again we should be thankful. In this again, however, the theory of evolution has but recalled us to the naturalism of the Greeks. It has given a certain biological basis for that which the healthy instincts of the Greeks had uncritically believed.

(4) The absolutist conscience has been eliminated by evolution. Our moral judgments are no longer trusted as absolute revelations of truth irrespective of criticism. The influence of time, place and circumstance is too plainly traceable in them to be ignored. Under the guidance of the idea of evolution research into the history of morals has shown us plainly the inconsistency of our concrete judgments. Not that conscience has been exposed or invalidated, but that its deliverances are always for the particular situation and are not of oracular or universal import. It cannot be understood apart from its historical situation.

These four things, then, the theory of evolution has done for ethics. They constitute its contribution toward the history of morals, in consequence of which we have

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come to consider moral conduct as part of conduct in general, and conduct in general as one term in the larger relationship of life and environment.

But the science of ethics is not primarily and essentially interested in the history of morals as a mere record of what has been without reference to its value. It is not a special branch of history, nor is it identical with sociology, however closely related it may be in subject-matter. Its purpose and point of view are fundamentally distinct. Its main interest is not in the discovery of what men have done in the past nor even in the motives which have induced them so to act. Rather it is the problem of the nature and validity of the standards men have used to which ethics addresses itself. It seeks to determine the worth of ideals and not their history; to render consistent our judgments of what is good or bad, and not to explain how we come to have such judgments. And hence if the theory of evolution is limited to this matter of historic development and can throw no light upon the value of our ideals, it must be of minor importance in ethics.

That the theory of evolution should hold such a minor position in ethics, however, its official expounders by no means believe. If it is good for anything it is good for everything, is the maxim of some. If it has explained how men have come to hold certain beliefs, it can also explain whether they ought to continue to hold them. The explanation of the fact is the explanation of its value.

We have not time to discuss in detail the ways in which the idea of evolution has been applied to the solution of this central ethical problem; mention must suffice.

(1) It has been denied that there *is* any real problem of what we *ought* to do apart from what we *do* and *must* do. The last word of science is its statement of an absolutely necessary order of the world in which the individual is only a product of forces beyond his control. To speak of what he ought to do apart from what he does do is like speaking of what the stone ought to do when it

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is dropped from the hand. This denial of the problem is an easy, but correspondingly cheap, method of its disposition. It is due to the limitation of view which can see but one aspect of life, its physical, and therefore denies the possibility of others. It is as childlike as the savage's interpretation of nature in terms of his own familiar, capricious spirit.

(2) Those who admit that there really is such a problem as that of the *ought* in moral life, differ somewhat in their views as to how the idea of evolution helps solve this problem. It may be said, for instance, that the better life is the more evolved life, and that the more evolved life is the more complex life, evolution being the progress from the simpler to the more complex. The ideal, therefore, should be such increase in complexity as is equivalent to higher development. Not to mention the horror with which such an ideal must be received by the prophets of the simpler life to-day, one may very reasonably ask why the more complex forms of life are any better than the simpler forms. Even grant that the actual process of life seems to develop such complexity, we have yet to ask whether such development is worth while. Complexity as such seems a perfectly colorless idea, or even an exasperating one. Our question is still, what is the complexity good for? does it serve a useful end? Mere complexity only renders a machine more liable to dislocation and disruption. Unless our finely organized nervous system produces results other than its own complexity, it were better to remain a clam.

(3) Accordingly, then, this increased complexity may be held to be valuable as resulting in better adaptation to environment. Our delicate organization is justified in evolutional terms because it is a wonderful tool in producing adjustment. The better life is the more evolved life, and the more evolved life is the one better adapted to its environment. We *ought* to seek such adaptation as the supreme good of life.

Yet this does not seem quite satisfactory. Judging by

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results in survival, one can hardly say that civilized and moralized man is much better adjusted to his environment than is his more unevolved brother. "The days of our years are threescore years and ten; and if by reason of strength they be fourscore years, yet is their strength labor and sorrow; for it is soon cut off and we fly away;" whereas the lusty whale flounders about in his element for hundreds of years. It is true that when he comes in contact with man his strength also is cut off and he is towed away; his human environment is too much for him, he cannot adapt himself. But it is also a question whether, indeed, man will be able to adjust himself to the civilization he has himself made.

But the inadequacy of adjustment to environment as the standard of conduct becomes evident enough if we remember that such adjustment itself involves a standard if it is to mean anything distinctive. If adjustment means only the actual relations existing between organism and environment, then everything is adjusted to everything else, and poison as well as pie furthers such adjustment. To give the phrase meaning we must ask, adjustment for what end? And then we are forced to the conception of certain ideal relations in which organism and environment are thought to stand. We never ask merely, are we adjusted to our environment, but do we and our environment together constitute a desirable situation. The question is not, am I adjusted to the unsanitary or corrupt physical and social conditions in which I live? but, is the total situation what it should be? How can we better both ourselves and our surroundings so that ideal relations may exist? Adjustment to environment is good only if the environment is itself good as tested by some standard other than itself.

(4) Is that standard, then, to be found in life itself? Is conduct morally better in so far as it conduces to the development of life through the adjustment of the relations between the individual and his environment? This sounds a little more promising, for life seems to involve

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a certain value and to lend itself for use as a standard. But are we really out of our difficulties? Or have we merely turned up at our starting point again, having completed the cycle of possibilities? Our problem was as to the better life. This we found to be, not the more complex life, nor the more adjusted life, but now the more developed life. And we have not yet found a test for this development. Mere physical persistence and power in and by itself is not identical with what we mean by the best life. Physical life is itself only part of that larger system of things which man calls good. It is indeed the condition for the development of social, esthetic and moral goods, but these are other than and more than it. Men have not hesitated to count their lives not worthy of comparison with these more ideal interests. If actions are to be counted good because they tend toward the development of life, the measure, then, of this life is not to be taken in physical terms alone. And if this is so, it seems to mean that we have no quantitatively exact standard of goodness, and that the idea of evolution has not been of much service in this respect.

(5) There is, finally, just one other attempt to solve the ethical problem by evolutionary means which it is worth while to note. Mr. Spencer thought he had found a definite standard in biological evolution by which the value of life might be measured. We have found his discovery worthless. Leslie Stephen and S. Alexander recognize this failure and propose a modified theory. There is no definite end in the evolutionary process, and therefore no fixed standard by which to measure the worth of conduct. What we find is that life tends always toward a certain adjustment with its environment, or toward a relatively stable equilibrium. The maintenance of this temporary equilibrium is the end of moral conduct. The equilibrium is upset from time to time by changes in its elements, but there is a constant tendency toward it again. Conduct which eliminates friction, which works easily, which promotes the social health, is good conduct. Just

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what kind of conduct *will* work we cannot tell till we try. Life is a continual experiment with ideas and institutions in which the useful survive and become rules of action. A rule of action is thus justified by its very survival, which is only possible if it is a rule which works for the social health. The survival of the fittest in the struggle of ideas is the survival of the best, since the best is only the efficient. If political equality actually survives its struggle for existence, its ability to survive will constitute its moral value. Nothing succeeds like success. The real is the rational. Might makes right.

This sounds hopeful—almost common sense. It is encouraging to think that the cosmic process itself is going to determine what is right, that the mills of the gods, though grinding slow, will grind exceeding small and fine. The only trouble is that we cannot wait for the grist these mills will grind. Our scientific faith that only the useful and therefore the good can survive in the long run, is beautiful indeed, but meanwhile we want to know what to do about things now. Our faith that if woman suffrage is useful it will surely come, can hardly help us much when we want to know whether we should join the political equality club or not. It would rather suggest that we get out of the way and wait till the matter has decided itself. And if we all pursued this eminently sane and scientific method, what would become of woman suffrage, or of any other cause which demands present action, and in the decision of which we ourselves are factors?

The difficulty with the method is that it fails to realize the nature of moral judgment and moral evolution. It assumes that moral development takes place automatically or mechanically without reference to the judgment of the individual, who may be left out of account in considering the results. On the contrary, however, moral evolution we have found to be a process of rational selection in which the individual is a conscious factor. We ourselves are deciding what the outcome of the process is to be, and hence we cannot use the idea of that outcome to

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determine what we shall decide. One might as well tell a man he ought to walk in the way his legs carry him when he is really trying to decide which way his legs ought to carry him. It is silly to say that the survival of the fittest is to be our standard of conduct, when the real problem is as to what we mean by the fittest.

In this point lies the essential weakness of all naturalistic theories of evolution as attempted explanations of the value of conduct. They attempt to play "Hamlet" with Hamlet left out. They assume that distinctions of right and wrong can be fixed by an evolutionary process quite independently of our conscious judgments as to these things. Evolution is personified, objectified, as if it were itself a power which did things rather than a character of processes upon which it is absolutely dependent. Our moral standards are not produced for us by any such imaginary power independent of us. We cannot sit back in our armchairs and comfortably watch the evolution of moral ideals, waiting for that one to appear which bears the label stamped with the approval of the evolutionary union; upon the appearance of which we are to seize and apply it to the regulation of our lives. On the contrary, it is our faith in our own ideals that forbids this armchair attitude toward social progress, and sends us out into the midst of life to determine what the course of its evolution is to be. We and our ideals are factors, not merely products, of evolution. The term moral evolution is only a name for a certain continuous progress made through the efforts of rational men and women in working out their ideals of life, and therefore presupposes such ideals. So far, then, is evolution from being the explanation of our moral judgments, that, on the contrary, our moral judgments are the explanation of evolution.

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SOME ETHICAL ASPECTS OF INDUSTRIALISM.*

D. H. MACGREGOR.

IN the opening words of the most authoritative of modern economic works, it is said that the two greatest forces which have impelled mankind have been the religious and the economic. At first this may seem to read like a truism, implying no more than that all human interests can be divided into the material and the spiritual. But reflection brings to the front this deeper aspect of Professor Marshall's words—that religious and economic interests are especially *personal* interests, bearing on the individual directly and for his own sake. Political interests, on the other hand, bear on the individual through social institutions and for the sake of further social results. In this paper, it is this superiority of personal values which I have sought to emphasize; because if it is true that personal forces have been the strongest, it follows that it is to personal reforms that we must chiefly look for progress. Now modern industrialism is in danger of becoming, if it has not become, pervaded by the spirit of the doctrine of evolution, whose regard for the individual is far less than its regard for types, for stages of progress, for new levels of life; the doctrines of the equality of things in the long run, of the inevitable displacements of labor by inventions, of the necessary margin of unemployed for the elasticity of trade, of the industrial uselessness of men over fifty, are examples of this. And, further, the main body of the reform movement in economic affairs consists of those Socialists whose belief is in a change of system, such that the sphere of personal activity will be contracted and that of institutions enlarged.

It is extremely difficult to combine economic and re-

* A paper read at the Church Congress, Manchester, October, 1908.

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ligious standards, or even to correlate them. Industry is conducted now through companies, not through persons; and in joining to create a company "a man isolates a certain part of himself, a certain wish or purpose, and sends it off by itself, so to speak, to work independently of the rest of his aims and impulses. Other men do the same, and the result is essentially mechanical and not human. The man, as a moral whole, is not in it; it is only a fagot of parallel interests."[1] It is for this reason that all economists find a difficulty in deciding principles of fair trade or fair price on any standards within the economic sphere; for ethical or religious standards are personal, but companies are impersonal, and are there essentially to represent *partial* interests only. The nineteenth century has created a complexity which has made the moral problem in industry both more acute and more difficult to handle.

The development of large organizations of labor and capital is not the only nineteenth century result that presents difficulty; there is also the relation called employment, with which we are so familiar that it is hard to realize what an odd product of democracy it is. There is a remarkable separation of labor from industrial ownership and government, though it shares the chief risks of misgovernment when firms fail. To some sections of the socialist movement the whole grievance lies in their passionate hatred of the wage-relation simply as such. It has been said that "you cannot accuse a nation"; and in the same way we perhaps cannot accuse a century either. But we can always decline to become dulled to the moral issues involved in this very peculiar relation of a few men to masses of others. It has given us, in addition, a system of industrial combinations of men and masters such that industry presents the same broad aspect as international politics; peace lies in preparation for war, the purpose of the constant preparation

[1] Cooley, "Personal Competition," p. 110.

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being presumably to keep us from forgetting the blessings of peace.

It is easier to let this whole system judge itself by showing certain broad features of it, than to judge it by exact ethical standards. The things which are considered normal and abnormal, the qualities which are demanded as between persons, the results which are regarded as most praiseworthy; these can at least be indicated and allowed to speak for themselves.

The virtue of which we hear most from the advocates of social betterment is *sympathy*. And it is mainly a class sympathy which they wish to have developed. It is asked that this sentiment be extended from the upper social classes toward the wage-earning classes, not at special times or in special cases, but as a usual and natural feeling. It would be different if this sentiment were required of us on behalf of the distressed and the very poor, or any who had fallen on bad times. It would not then be distinctly a class sympathy, but only a human one. This constant request is significant, because it implies that conditions of work bear with some special severity on these classes, and that allowances must be made, or standards of judgment stretched, in forming opinions. As a constant attitude, this can scarcely be said to be a mark of social health. No class ought to deserve this permanent sympathy of another class. What calls it forth is sometimes the *kind* of work, such as coal mining, or the stoking of great ships, or weaving in a moistened and heated air; here there is a sort of admission that invention is backward, and that people are doing work which merely is not human in its nature. Sometimes it is the direction of work, sometimes its monotony, sometimes its social degradation, that is especially perceived; or perhaps the difficulty with which those who are engaged on it can, at the end of a day or week, enjoy whatever facilities there are for recreation or education or religious teaching. The fine flowers of civilization can only, perhaps, be produced at this cost; and if we esti-

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mate the worth of a social system by its highest results—the people of finest feeling, highest artistic and literary gifts, and so forth—then we get accustomed to the attitude of constant class sympathy. It is those who believe more in the worth of concrete individuals than in the worth of a society in the abstract, who can never allow it to be a high claim for any system of social organization that it always requires a strong class sympathy proceeding downwards. That there is not more bitterness in the lower ranks of industry is one of the indications of the wonderful social power of habit. It is probable that we shall see a considerable reduction in the working hours of some of the more arduous trades; considerations of human worth teaching us that labor should not be most protracted where it is most severe. The growing movement for workmen's education will then have more of a chance.

Let us now apply another test—the acts or conditions which are considered notable enough to have attention specially drawn to them. It will be admitted that this is a good way of estimating industrialism by its own unconscious standards. In this connection I may quote a remark of a great English economist that "factory acts are a disgrace." By this is meant that the things expressly enacted, with penalties attached to their nonobservance, are such as ought surely never to have required to be insisted on by law. Anyone may understand this point who reads the provisions regarding women's and children's labor; or even, for instance, those which enforce the posting of a copy of the act in places where the employés can see it. Of course, all penal legislation is aimed at what are called in economics "marginal" or limiting cases; that is to say, the severity of its provisions is determined by the possible action of the least scrupulous people. To the more scrupulous, the act matters less; by some it is not felt at all. Even so, a perusal of the factory acts gives one seriously to think. Take, as a further example, the various schemes which come under the general name

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of "social betterment." Such are model factories and dwellings, and opportunities for rest, recreation and education, which some firms provide, without making them a substitute for fair wages. All these things can still be regarded as notable and unusual, till it becomes actually depressing to see a large meeting listening intently to the explanation of them. The pioneers of this movement would probably welcome few things more than to lose their prominence and exceptional noteworthiness before the public. The moral rule would then have ceased to be the industrial exception. A third example of this is connected with the methods of industrial peace. Two instances may be quoted. In an important dispute in which he was called in as arbitrator, Lord Rosebery gave a luncheon to representatives of both sides, thus bringing them at least physically together. It will probably be some time yet before we hear the end of this luncheon, so notable a fact is it that men and masters should have met as guests at the same table, and that an earl's. Could anything have been more obvious than a luncheon-party in these circumstances? But this is not the most remarkable case. In the report recently published by the Home Office on Wages Boards and Arbitration in Australia and New Zealand, the writer points out that when the representatives of men and masters meet for discussion, as the law requires them to do, they sit round the same table. There rises in the mind of anyone who reads this a picture of the men at one table and the masters at another, sending notes to each other, or using some other means of communication which would not interfere with due proprieties. It is considerations such as these—the more valuable because they are unconscious indications of social spirit—which pass their own judgment on modern industrialism. Many of what would appear to be simple humanities are not able to be taken as matter of course.

Another side of this question presents itself to anyone who watches the course of public controversy on questions

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which bear on industry. There is practically no constructive economic or fiscal proposal against which the charge of corruption is not at once entered. A good deal has been heard of this corruption argument in regard to the free-trade controversy. So good a name as fair trade —for if we weigh them against each other "fair" is as fine a word as "free"—has not saved its advocates from the objection that they will introduce into England a most notable system of corruption in industrial affairs. But this corruption argument, with its implied mistrust, has far wider scope than the fiscal question. It has been urged in recent times against income taxes, since "the best liar is best off"; against *laissez faire,* with its "economic man"; against municipal trading; against indentured labor; against old-age pensions; against the cooperative system; against trusts, shipping conferences, and all forms of combination which place great power in the hands of a few; against the whole system of trading by agency and advertisement.[2] The objection is, in fact, pretty sure to turn up against any industrial proposal that is made in the legislature by either party. No one trusts the economic motive in or out of sight. The prevalence of this argument, while it lessens the importance of any particular use of it, gives us again ground for reflection on industrialism as we have it.

The development of industrial peace by the means of conciliation and arbitration is a more hopeful aspect of the present position. But yet no one would contend that conciliation was a good high-water mark. It implies antagonisms that have to be overcome. It excludes the ideas of partnership, community of interest, and any real kind of sharing. The fact that in the most highly organized trades, in the highest products of industrialism, committees of men and masters meet at stated times for

[2] Since the above was written, Sir G. Gibb has quoted the same argument against railroad nationalization. If it is true that workmen should not vote on matters affecting their own wages, schemes of industrial copartnership must also be ruled out by the corruption argument.

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purposes of conciliation, is pleasing on the contrary, according as we look backward or forward. As an industrial ideal, this cannot possibly be final. We must remember, too, that the right to strike is jealously maintained, and that compulsory arbitration is not popular in England. Proposals to do away with the industrial right to resort to a trial of strength would in any case not come well from governments which maintain that it is only great armaments which preserve political peace.

It is with regard to industrial fluctuations, however, that most has been heard of the moral aspects of our industrial system. The theory of what is called the "long run" has to be applied under conditions where the wastage that takes place in short periods is wastage of human life. In mechanics or biology no moral problem is created if we say that in the long run fluctuations balance each other, the loss of one period being made up for by the gain of another. But individual human beings have rights; and no possible idea of justice is satisfied when one man's failure to find a living now is balanced against some other man's high wages in the future. Personal values render the utilitarian calculus useless. This is realized in political affairs. If an individual suffers an injustice, no one suggests that this shall be regarded as incidental to our legal system, or that in the long run these things are evened out. On the contrary, the case of Don Pacifico settled the principle that this country was prepared to go to war to maintain the rights of an individual. The "right to work" is a statement of the same demand in the industrial sphere.

It seems to me impossible, in dealing with this claim, to suppose that we do our duty if we make provision for the next generation, and seek to make their lot better than their fathers'. There is a great deal, in popular dealings with industrial distress, of this kind of ethics of posterity. To some extent it is a part of the broad evolutionary ideals which are now being applied in the social sciences. Take care of the children; invest your

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capital where it can still be productive of results in the future; with the distressed men and women we can only make some shift. I have a profound aversion to this kind of morality. The children of the state are of value because of their coming manhood and womanhood; and I cannot see why existing men and women should have their realized value put aside. The world is happy in proportion as persons are happy, not in proportion as happiness is saved up. We cannot be always taking thought for the next generation; it is not a possible ethics. There is no discontinuity that marks off one generation from another; our special care is with all the living. This ethics of posterity would pile up a golden age for the last generations, if it were not that they might not know they were the last, and might indulge, too, in prospective well-doing. As posterity will only abuse us, and call us the dead past, and ask us to bury our own dead, we may as well let it know that we hope it will take care of its own living.

Those who believe, as I do, in the right to work, which appears to me a consequence of the duty to work, will never get on in the social sciences with Mill's ethics. But here is the difficulty of applied ethics. A duty may imply a right, but it also must imply a power. Ought implies can, and how can Kant's ideas be made useful if there is no work—real productive work, that is, during periods of distress?

This is not the place to enter into a technical argument, but it is possible to indicate broadly where it seems to me that want of very ordinary consideration creates the distress we call unemployment. If a firm's trade slackens by ten per cent., what is done at present? Ten per cent. of the men are *dismissed.* This is the very crudest way of reducing the wage bill. A set-back has happened to a body of producers; we should expect it to be borne proportionately by them all. Each man, that is, should lose one day's work in ten. Instead of this, one man in ten is paid off; ninety men in a hundred suffer

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nothing and ten lose everything. This is not bearing each others' burdens. If each man lost one day in ten, it is a simple thing to arrange that ninety per cent. of the staff which is working daily, though the actual personnel is different. With a five-per-cent. depression, which is above the average of our unemployment figures, each man would have one idle day in three weeks, instead of five per cent. of the men being idle all the time. My point is that there is no *period of time over which,* if there is any real corporate feeling, there is no need for an individual's services. We visit, under the present method of proportionate *dismissal,* the whole depression on the heads of a few. Therefore their distress is acute.[3] If the men who remain in work when their comrades are dismissed realized this fact, the trade unions are strong enough to mend matters. If we use the method of proportionate *reduction* instead of that of proportionate *dismissal* when trade falls off by a certain amount, then every workman has the right and the power to obtain that degree of work which the general industrial conditions of the time make available. There is no ethical right to more work than this. My argument implies that to *dismiss* a workman on the ground of trade depression is unjust if the firm continues to work even at lower speed. The acceptance or non-acceptance of this position on its *ethical* grounds indicates whether we do or do not regard the relation of employment as in any sense a corporate one; corporate, that is, not only as between men and masters, but as between men and men. Its rejection on *technical* grounds—and I grant that in some kinds of piecework there will be difficulties—will at least show how much practical effort the unemployed problem is thought to be worth.

There is a similar neglect of personal values in regard to the relief funds which are in the habit of being estab-

[3] I apply this consideration to all forms of wages, my point of view being determined by the fact that the labor "reserve" is held to be economically necessary. In a few British and German trades, and many Belgian ones, the work is shared, often under trade union conditions.

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lished in our great cities when unemployment is unusually severe. The chronic appearance of these funds has almost become part of the industrial system. When trade returns to a normal state, the funds are closed, because unemployment is said to be no longer exceptional, but only, like trade itself, normal. Now it is evident that if a workman has any claim at all of this kind on the community, that claim is quite independent of the number of other workmen who share his misfortune. If his claim is good, it is a personal and industrial claim, and is equally valid whether he is one of a hundred unemployed or one of five thousand. Since a certain reserve is held to be necessary at all times for the elasticity of trade, it appears to follow that unemployed funds ought to be permanent, and not chronic. But we have got into a habit of looking at this problem as a numerical one, instead of a personal one; and we speak very lightly of the necessary labor "reserve." This military metaphor is more brave than useful; since the army reserve is not without occupation in time of peace.

The economic laws which most directly bear upon ethical discussions of industrialism are two—that wealth and poverty are social creations, and that economic advantage and disadvantage are both cumulative. It is the degree to which the first of these laws can be given its due weight that will determine how far we can get past the present position of bargaining between opposed organizations of men and masters, and find a better high-water mark than conciliation. This law is also the basis of organized charity, as well as of most social legislation. In 1834 England was persuaded to accept the scientific fact that subsidies lower wages, and that alms should not be given. The strain has been too great, and we have since then organized charity. We have also introduced legislation which provides funds for the poor at the cost of the rich and well-to-do. If these schemes do not contravene the views implied in the poor law, they must mean that they are attempts to rectify a faulty distribu-

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tion, and that they simply restore what is due. It is the same with public benefactions. If it is degrading for an individual to accept gifts, it is more so for a rich nation. Almsgiving does not become public spirit simply by an increase of its scale. The acceptance of such gifts for education, hospitals, and so forth, can be justified finally only on some implied view that individuals are merely the chance channels of circulation of national creations of wealth. The national acceptance of donations from foreign sources is a less pleasant, because much remoter, application of the same idea. I do not see how a pure individualist can regard what this nation owes to private benefactions as anything but intolerable.

It is sometimes thought to be the teaching of economics that all the earnings of individuals are, by the natural operation of free competition, adjusted to their efficiencies. Each man gets just what he is worth, otherwise he would not be employed. This is the "efficiency theory" of wages. It has recently been used as a convincing argument against socialist proposals.[4] And I agree that anyone who thought this was proved could not regard a great part of modern legislation as just, except in so far as it might be just to enforce charity. What economics does teach, however, is that the reward payable to or for the service of any agent of production tends to be adjusted to the efficiency of that agent. Land and capital are among these agents, but though they earn they cannot acquire, being impersonal; their reward goes to their owners, so that *personal incomes* are not proportioned to *personal* efficiencies. It is therefore allowed by implication in our modern social legislation that part of the income from *property* is national; and, if that is driven further back, it implies a national claim to property itself. It appears to me that a final defense of social legislation would rest on considerations affecting land.

That advantage and disadvantage are cumulative is

[4] In the *Edinburgh Review*, January, 1908.

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the result of the laws of interest and increment, of bargaining, of mental confidence and depression. There is a tendency to create two idle classes at the opposite poles of society, especially when we add the factor of heredity in each case. It is a false judgment, however, that one of these classes is to any real extent the cause of the other. Rich men have not the power to withdraw their wealth from social use. The circulation—as distinct from the ownership—of national wealth is little affected by the particular names under which it is grouped in the books of banks. It follows the current of strongest demand and highest interest, the influence of the very rich being mixed with that of others in helping to form the directions of demand. They have a theoretical right to go against this current, but the cases in which this right is used are mostly those of philanthropic endeavor—of "giving the people what they do not want" in order that they may come to want it. The economic responsibility of the idle rich is their own; they do not make the poverty of the poor. The social influence of this class is more important, not only through the creation of class bitterness, but because of their control over the legislature. Improvement in economic conditions may thus be delayed.

Change of institutions will probably do much less for industrial progress than change of persons. There are many economic results—like trusts and monopolies—on which no judgment can be passed except that all depends on the hands they are in. Their powers of industrial moralization, by eliminating much that is evil in competition, are as great as their powers of extortion, by using new kinds of competing strength. The reaction of institutions on persons is, in my view, much less. For the ethics of industrialism, therefore, there would appear, in view of all that has been said, to be required a modification of the utilitarian ideal by that of Kant—the absolute value of personality. It is true that the utilitarian formula includes "the greatest number," and implies attention to distribution as well as to aggregates. Unfor-

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tunately, no calculus can work with such a double maximum. Higher ethical ideals will therefore introduce a certain vagueness, and increase the scope of intuition, personal sympathy and tact in industrial proposals. This is the strength, as it seems to me, of religious teaching. Its emphasis is on personal reform. It was promulgated at a time when conditions of life were at their simplest, so that it cannot be quoted now on behalf of definite institutions or schemes. If there is one difficulty which more than others besets us in social affairs now, it is the unequal rate of development in the last century of the economic and ethical or religious ideals. Science has given new methods to economic development and has retarded religious faith. Evolution and the idea of the "long run" are apt to make us callous to personal rights and values. Industrial activities and ideals are ahead of others, and the need is for a more equal pace with religious and ethical ideals.

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ATTEMPTED APOLOGIES FOR POLITICAL CORRUPTION.

ROBERT C. BROOKS.

NEARLY all current contributions on the subject of political corruption belong frankly to the literature of exposure and denunciation. The ends pursued by social reformers are notoriously divergent and antagonistic, but there is general agreement among them and, for that matter, among Philistines as well, that corruption is wholly perverse and dangerous. How then may one have the temerity to speak of apologies in the premises?

Certainly not, as one writer has recently done,[1] by presenting a detailed and striking picture of the force with which the temptation to corrupt action operates upon individuals exposed to its malevolent influence. No doubt such studies are of great value in laying bare to us the hidden springs of part of our political life, the great resources, material and social, of those who are selfishly assailing the honesty of government, and the difficulties in the way of those who are sincerely struggling for better things. In the last analysis, however, all this is nothing more than a species of explanation and extenuation, which if slightly exaggerated may easily degenerate into maudlin sympathy. That men's votes or influence are cheap or dear, that their political honor can be bought for $20 or $20,000—doubtless these facts are significant as to the caliber of the men concerned and the morals of the times, but they do not amount to an apology for either. If, however, it can be shown that in spite of the evil involved political corruption nevertheless has certain resultants which are advantageous, not simply

[1] "An Apology for Graft," by Lincoln Steffens, *American Magazine*, June, 1908, 66-120.

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to those who profit directly by crooked devices, but to society in general, the use of the term would be justified.

Four main lines of argument have been gathered from various sources as constituting the principal, if not the entire equipment of the *advocatus diaboli* to this end. These are, first, that political corruption makes business good; second, that it may be more than compensated for by the high efficiency otherwise of those who engage in it; third, that it saves us from mob rule; and fourth, that corruption is part of an evolutionary process the ends of which are presumed to be so beneficent as to more than outweigh existing evils.

I. Of these four arguments the first is most frequently presented. Few of our reputable business men would assent to it if stated baldly, or indeed in any form, but in certain lines of business the tacit acceptance of this doctrine would seem to be implied by the political attitude of those concerned. In slightly disguised form the same consideration appeals to the whole electorate, as shown by the potency of the "full dinner-pail" slogan, and the pause which is always given to reforms demanded in the name of justice when commercial depression occurs. But while we are often told that corruption makes business good, we are seldom informed in just what ways this desirable result is brought about. One quite astounding point occasionally brought up in this connection is the favor with which a portion of the mercantile community looks upon the illegal protection of vice and gambling. A police force must sternly repress major crimes and violence. Certain sections of the city must be kept free from offense. These things understood, a "wide-open" town is held to have the advantage over "slower" neighboring places. A great city, we are told, is not a kindergarten. Its population is composed both of the just and the unjust, and this is equally true of the many who resort to it from the surrounding country for purposes of pleasure or profit. The slow city may still continue to hold and attract the better element which seeks

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only legitimate business and recreation, but the wide-open town will hold and attract both the better and the worse elements. Of course, individuals of the latter class may be somewhat mulcted in dives and gambling rooms, but they will still have considerable sums left to spend in thoroughly respectable stores, and such patronage is not to be sniffed at.

Ordinarily this argument stops with the consideration of spending alone. It may be strengthened somewhat by bringing in the reaction of consumption upon production. A great city prides itself upon its ceaseless rush and gayety, its bright lights and crowded streets, its numerous places of amusement and all the evidences of material prosperity and pleasure. These may be held to be enhanced when both licit and illicit pursuits and diversions are open to its people; and further, the people themselves, under the attraction of such varied allurements, may strive to produce more that they may enjoy more. In the Philippines, it is said that the only laborers who can be relied upon to stick to their work any considerable length of time are those who have caught the gambling and cock-fighting mania. Under tropical conditions a little intermittent labor easily supplies the few needs of others, whereas the devotee of chance, driven by a consuming passion, works steadily. In the present state of a fallen humanity there are presumably many persons of similar character living under our own higher civilization.

Strong as is the hold which the foregoing considerations have obtained upon certain limited sections of the business community it is not difficult to criticise them upon purely economic grounds. Of two neighboring towns, one "wide-open" and the other law-abiding, the former might, indeed, prove more successful in a business way. But we have to consider not simply the material advantage in the case of two rival cities. The material welfare of the state as a whole is of greater importance, and it would be impossible to show that this

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was enhanced by corruptly tolerating gambling and vice anywhere within its territory. On the contrary, economists have abundantly shown the harmful effects of such practices, even when no taint of illegality attaches to them. What the "wide-open" community gains over its rival is much more than offset by what the state as a whole loses. Morever it may well be doubted whether the purely economic advantage of the "wide-open" city is solid and permanent. Even those of its business men who are engaged in legitimate pursuits are constant sufferers from the general neglect of administrative duty, and sometimes even from the extortionate practices, of its corrupt government. They may consider it to their advantage to have gambling and vice tolerated, but only within limits. If such abuses become too open and rampant legitimate business is certain to suffer, both because of the losses and distractions suffered by the worse element in the community and because of the fear and avoidance which the prevalence of vicious conditions inspires in the better classes. Indeed cases are by no means uncommon where the better business element has risen in protest against lax and presumably corrupt police methods which permitted vice to flaunt itself so boldly on retail thoroughfares that respectable women became afraid to venture upon them. There remain, of course, the expedients of confining illicit practices to certain districts of the city, or of nicely restraining them so that, while permitting indulgence to those who desire it, they do not unduly offend the moral element in the community. But such delicate adjustments are difficult to maintain, since vice and gambling naturally seek to extend their field and their profits and, within pretty generous limits, can readily afford to make it worth while for a corrupt city administration to permit them to do so. And even if they are kept satisfactorily within bounds, the state as a whole, if not the particular community, must suffer from their pernicious economic consequences.

It has been thought worth while to go at some length

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into the criticism on purely economic grounds of the argument that corruption makes business good; first, because the argument itself is primarily economic in character, and secondly, because its acceptance by certain hard-headed business men might lead to the belief that its refutation on material grounds was impossible. A broad view of the economic welfare of the state as a whole and business in all its forms leads, as we have seen, to the opposite conviction. And this conviction that corruption does *not* make business good in any solid and permanent way is greatly strengthened when moral and political, as well as financial, values are thrown in the scale. It is not necessary to recite in detail the ethical argument against gambling and vice in order to strengthen this point. The general duty of the state to protect the lives and health and morals of its people, even at great financial sacrifice if necessary, is beyond question. There is a possibility, as Mr. Goodnow maintains,[2] that in the United States we have gone too far in attempting to suppress by police power things that are simply vicious, as distinguished from crimes; but however this may be, some regulation or repression of vice is always necessary. The real point here is that, having once drawn the line, corrupt practices shall not be resorted to in order that vice may be permitted to flourish in certain localities. In such cases the state suffers not only from the effects of the vice but also from the disregard into which the whole fabric of law falls because of the failure to enforce it in part. With regard to the particular plea that the life and animation and pleasures of a wide-open town stimulate its citizens to greater activity in producing wealth, it should be observed that this amounts virtually to the advocacy of the purchase of a dubious economic benefit at a high and certain moral cost. In the long run most, if not all, the vicious practices which thus find a quasi-justification directly cripple

[2] "City Government in the United States," Ch. IX, p. 228.

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productive efficiency much more than they can possibly stimulate it indirectly. "A short life and a merry one" may serve well as a motto for a criminal career, but not as an economic maxim for a community of sane people. It may be admitted that the world is not to grow perfect in a day. Vice will persist, corruption will persist, although doubtless in less noxious forms, and business will persist with periods of greater or less prosperity under such conditions. It would be arrant folly, however, to expect business to reach its highest development with vice rampant under a corrupt police administration. A policy of repression, firmly enforced, will be best in the long run both for morals and for business. But even if honesty and prosperity were incompatible, it would still be true that it is the higher duty of the state to make men good than to make them rich. Ordinarily, however, both ends may be pursued at the same time and without conflict.

Up to this point the discussion of the argument that corruption makes business good has been confined to the forms of corruption under which vice is illegally tolerated. A dishonest government, however, is also frequently appealed to by businesses perfectly legitimate in their general character for concessions of one sort or another, ranging from the privilege to obstruct sidewalks by show windows up to the granting of public service franchises worth millions of dollars. With an open-handed distribution of such favors business is thought to flourish. Of course, all these concessions must be paid for, but only part of the money goes into the public purse, the rest falling into the hands of boodlers, contractors and politicians. As the latter could not establish the most perfect title to the rights and franchises they sell they are often inclined to fix prices much below real values. Hence a chance for extraordinary profits to those less scrupulous business men who know the political ropes. A still more important feature of such a situation is that almost anything can be bought. In the lingo of those

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who are willing to engage in corrupt transactions, business men know "where they are at;" the politicians are men with whom "they can do business." With reformers in power "favors" are not to be expected. Moreover reformers differ widely among themselves with regard to the proper method of dealing with public franchises and privileges of various sorts. Under "good government" these concessions may not be attainable at all, or, if so, only at such excessive prices and under such onerous conditions designed to safeguard the public interest, that the margin of profit left is extremely small. No wonder that contributions are made by certain kinds of business men to political organizations which the contributors well know to be corrupt, and refused by the same men to reform parties. The argument is, of course, that if the rascals win it is a good stroke of policy to secure their favor in advance, whereas if the reform party wins everybody will be treated alike anyway.

From a business point of view that considers immediate profits and nothing more, this reasoning is of great significance. Several deductions must be made from it, however, before the final balance is struck. It sometimes happens that corrupt organizations fix a regular tariff for privileges of all sorts. So long as the rates are low business appears to boom. But with the wide distribution of privileges the purchasers may lose any monopoly advantage which they enjoyed when the number of concessions was limited. Worse still, a corrupt gang that feels firmly entrenched in power is apt to develop a pretty fair sense of values itself, and to raise the rates for concessions to figures that prove well-nigh prohibitive. The very willingness of business interests to pay and keep quiet encourages the politicians to increase their demands and to devise new methods of levying tribute. In the end the gang may determine to assume the profits in certain lines by the formation of inside contracting rings which make all competition from the outside futile. Of course, while this process is going on the worst and

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most unscrupulous competitors in the businesses affected by it have a decided advantage over their fellows. Business men who complain of railroad rebates should certainly be able to recognize the destructive character of corrupt and unfair political conditions of the kind described above. Even those who most profit by alliance with the gang are apt to repent it in the end. They may have succeeded in securing all the favors which they need, and yet stand in constant terror of blackmail and strike legislation by their former political confederates or of exposure by reformers. Finally, although they may be so fortunate as to escape indictment for particular misdeeds, the general belief that a business has been corruptly managed is likely to bring about a demand for legislation affecting its conduct which, temporarily at least, may reduce its profits and the value of its securities very materially. The agitation for municipal ownership is a case in point. Quite apart from the logical weight of the arguments advanced in support of this policy, there can be no doubt that many people favor it largely because of the corrupt methods believed, although in most cases not legally proved, to have been practiced by public service corporations.

II. The second argument to be considered is that corruption may be more than compensated for by the high efficiency otherwise of those who engage in it. Such a plea may be offered either for an individual or for an organization, such as the machine. Many historical cases could be cited of statesmanlike ability of a high order and undoubted honesty on great issues coupled with a shrewd eye for the main chance whenever minor opportunities presented themselves. Even for men who are currently credited with having possessed a much larger share of guile than of ability, admiration is sometimes expressed. There are those who think that New York owes a statue to Tweed, and Pennsylvania already has a statue of Quay—if not a place for the statue. The same manner of thinking prevails in other fields than politics, espe-

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cially whenever graft can be made to appear as a sort of tribute levied upon a supposedly hostile social class. For example, a labor leader who extorted checks from employers by threatening and even calling strikes was defended by many of his followers on the ground that he had shown wonderful ability in organizing the union and securing higher wage scales.[3]

The question is sometimes raised as to whether or not some purely personal moral obliquity should be held against a candidate for office whose qualifications otherwise are unimpeachable. A practical answer would, of course, depend largely upon the kind of evil charged against the man and the probability that it would interfere with the performance of his public duties. Even an extremist upon such an issue would have to admit that certain statesmen who have given most distinguished service to their countries have been, for example, intemperate in the use of liquor or unfaithful in the marriage relation. If in such cases we excuse and forget, why not also excuse and forget corrupt transactions that have been more than repaid by general brilliant conduct of affairs of state? No answer to this second question, however, can avoid the distinction that while certain kinds of personal immorality may affect the value of a man's public service to an infinitesimal degree only, corruption in any part of his political career strikes directly at whatever efficiency he may possess as a public servant. In the former case his sins are in a different category from his virtues, whereas in the latter case they belong to the same category. Moreover a corrupt record even on a minor point in a man's official career is apt to prove a great stumblingblock forever after. Usually designing persons can more readily employ their knowledge of it to force him to the commission of further and worse corrupt actions than they could hope to do had his earlier offenses

[3] This argument is presented in a very striking way in Mr. Hutchins Hapgood's "The Spirit of Labor," pp. 114, 260, 345, 369.

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been of the same degree but of a purely personal character.

There is, of course, no quantitative measure whereby we can reckon exactly the efficiency and honesty of men, and, striking a joint average, definitely appraise their value for a given position in the service of the state. If there were such a measure assuredly it would seldom, if ever, register both perfect efficiency and perfect honesty. The work of government, like that of all social institutions, must be performed by relatively weak and incapable human instruments. At best we can only seek to secure the greatest attainable honesty and the greatest attainable efficiency. There may be cases where a degree of the latter amounting to positive genius may offset a serious defect in the former. Distinguished ability, however, ought to be relatively free from moral weakness. Men of more than average capacity, to say nothing of genius, should find it less necessary than others to stoop to equivocal practices in order to succeed. If no higher motives swayed such men, then at least an intelligent appreciation on their part of the risks they ran in pursuing crooked courses would serve as sufficient deterrent. It is your stupid and incapable official ordinarily who, because of moral insensibility or in order to keep pace with his abler fellows, is most easily tempted to employ shifty devices. The weakness of the second apology for corruption is thus apparent. Normally corruption and efficiency are not found together. On the contrary honesty and efficiency are common yokemates. A public sentiment which weakly excuses corruption on the ground of alleged efficiency will be deceived much more often than a public sentiment which insists upon the highest attainable standard of both.

III. The third apology for corruption is that it saves us from mob rule. In Mr. Ford's felicitous phrase the appearance of corruption "instead of being the betrayal of democracy may be the diplomatic treatment of ochlocracy, restraining its dangerous tendencies and mini-

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mizing its mischiefs."[4] According to this view the machine, dominated by the boss or gang, is the defender of society itself against the attacks of our internal barbarians. Tammany Hall had the brazen effrontery to assume this attitude during the New York mayoralty campaign of 1886, when it nominated Mr. Hewitt in opposition to Henry George. "Yet it would be difficult to name a time in recent years when frauds so glaring and so tremendous in the aggregate have been employed in behalf of any candidate as were committed in behalf of Mr. Hewitt in 1886."[5] Society would seem to be in desperate straits, indeed, if it needed such defenders and such methods of defense. In favor of their employment it is sometimes said that our propertied and educated classes have grown away from the great democratic mass. Of themselves they would be quite incapable of protecting the goods, material and ideal, which are intrusted to them. The corrupt machine, seeking its own interest, it is true, nevertheless performs the invaluable social service of keeping the restless proletariat in subjection. In order to obtain the votes of ignorant and venal citizens the unscrupulous political leader is obliged to perform innumerable petty services for them, as, for example, securing jobs both in the public service and outside, supplying or obtaining charitable relief in times of need, speaking a friendly word to the police magistrate after a neighborhood brawl, providing recreation in the form of tickets to chowder excursions during the summer and to "pleasure club" balls during the winter. Bread and circuses being thus supplied, our higher civilization is presumably secure. If the corrupt machine did not perform these services, it is assumed by some timorous persons that the mob would break forth, gut our shops, rob our tills, burn and kill in unrestrained fury.

If catastrophes so great and terrible were actually impending the situation would seem not only to justify

[4] *Political Science Quarterly*, 1904, 19, 678.

[5] "The History of Tammany Hall," by Gustavus Myers, p. 323.

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our present corrupt rulers, but might also be held sufficiently grave to induce us to establish new bosses and gangs, giving them license to graft to their heart's content, provided only that they continue their beneficent mission of saving civilization. Dictatorship would be cheap at the price. The whole argument, however, rests primarily upon a shockingly unjust view of the real character of our proletariat class. Even if this very indefinite term be interpreted to mean only the poorest and most ignorant of our people, whether of native American or of foreign stock, the view that they need to be constantly cajoled by the corrupt politician in order to prevent them from resorting to the violent seizure of the property of others is a grotesque misconception. In the great majority of cases such persons desire nothing more than the opportunity to earn an honest and frugal living in peace. We must admit, of course, that lynching and labor riots occur with appalling frequency in the United States. No one should attempt to minimize the danger and disgrace of such outbreaks. Let us not, on the other hand, fall into the gross error of regarding them as deliberate revolutionary attacks upon the existing social order.

With such circumstances confronting us, what shall be said of the alleged utility of the corrupt machine as prime defender of social peace? If we should conclude to recognize the gang frankly in this capacity any materials for the formation of revolutionary mobs that we may possess would certainly be encouraged to increase the demands made as the price of continued quiet, and even to furnish a few sample riots from time to time as a means of enforcing their demands. In reality, however, corrupt political machines care very little for social welfare. The very essence of corruption is self-interest regardless of public interest. Familiarity with the favors bestowed by politicians is hardly the best means of encouraging quiescence among poor and ignorant recipients. It may become the first step toward idleness and crime. But besides the distribution of favors the corrupt poli-

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tician has many other means of procuring power. Hired thugs, and sometimes members of the regular police force, are employed to drive honest voters from the polls, and every manner of tricky device is resorted to in order to deceive them in casting their ballots or to falsify the election returns. Do such things allay social discontent? Even the rank favoritism shown by the corrupt organization to its servile adherents must make enemies of those who feel themselves slighted. Few forms of political evil are more dangerous than the fear sometimes displayed by mayors or governors that the vigorous employment of the police to suppress rioting may cost them votes when they come up for reëlection. And there are many other consequences of corrupt rule which indirectly but none the less surely inflame the sufferers against the injustice of the existing order: insufficient and inferior school accommodations, the absence of parks and other means of rational recreation, dirty streets, impure water supply, neglect of housing reforms, poor and high-priced public utility services and so on. All things considered, the corrupt machine is the sorriest saviour of society imaginable.

Assuming, finally, for the sake of argument, that there is real danger of class war in the near future, the best defense would obviously lie in strong police, militia and army forces. The life of the state itself would require the destruction of every vestige of corruption in these branches of its service at least. If the danger of class war were real but not imminent a thoroughgoing policy directed to the establishment of social justice and the elimination of public abuses would be imperative. Among other things, better education, sanitation, poor relief and public services would have to be supplied, and to get these we would have to get rid of the corrupt machine as far as possible. Under either assumption, therefore, the state threatened with social disturbance would find safety not in corruption but in honesty and efficiency. However, in exposing the hollowness of the pretense that

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society needs to be saved by crooked means, we should not fall into the error of assuming that the corrupt politician alone is responsible for all our social ills. We who not only tolerate his works but who tolerate many other abuses with which he has no connection whatever, should remember our own responsibility for the improvement and continued stability of society. It is the custom to castigate the rich in this connection, but the indifference, snobbishness and narrowness of large sections of our middle classes are also very gravely at fault.

IV. The fourth apology offered for corruption is that it is part of an evolutionary process, the ends of which are presumed to be so beneficent as to more than atone for existing evils attributable to it. Complaint might justly be made that this is a highly general statement, but its formulation in the broad terms used above seems necessary in order to include the various details of the argument. A similar sweeping defense might be set up for any conceivable abuse or evil—for tyranny as well as for corruption, for immorality or for crime. In all such cases, however, it would be necessary to prove—although it seems quite impossible to do so—that the ultimate beneficent end would more than repay the evil involved; and further, that no better way existed of attaining the promised goal. It must be freely conceded that we know little or nothing of the remote ends of the evolutionary process as it exhibits itself in society. Repulsive as are many of its details, there seem to be sufficient grounds for believing in wonderful ultimate achievement. An apology for contemporary corruption based on such considerations may therefore be worthy of attention, provided, however, that it does not attempt to bind us to a purely *laissez faire* attitude in the presence of admitted and immediate political evils.

From the latter point of view political corruption may be regarded as a symptom, bad in itself but valuable because it indicates the need, and in some degree the method, of cure. Like pain in the physical economy it

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is one of the danger signals of the social economy. Thus, as we have seen, the neglect of proper facilities for education, sanitation, poor relief and so on, particularly in our large cities, is both a resultant in part of corruption and a cause of further corruption. By providing better facilities along these lines we may, therefore, hope ultimately to improve the whole tone of our citizenship and the life of the state. A still more concrete illustration may be drawn from Prof. Goodnow's masterly discussion of the boss in his "Politics and Administration."[6] According to his view certain defects in our governmental organization, notably the decentralization and irresponsibility of much of our administrative machinery, the futile attempt to secure by popular vote the election of a large number of efficient administrative officials and the lack of a close relationship between legislation and administration, all combine to produce a situation which only a strong party organization dominated by a boss can keep from degenerating into chaos. From this aspect it might be maintained that the evil political practices commonly associated with the boss are only incidental and in part excusable after all. Fundamentally he exists because of defects in the organization of our government, and his activities go far to correct these defects. Even accepting this argument fully, however, some choice in bosses, as Prof. Goodnow points out,[7] would still be left open to the electorate. By progressively overthrowing the worse and choosing the better aspirants for political power the boss may evolve into the leader, who will retain many of the great functions of his predecessor but will exercise them in a responsible manner and free from corruption. The practical significance of Mr. Goodnow's argument, however, lies far less in the explanation it gives of the temporary ascendency of the boss and the system which he presides over than in the conviction it enforces of the necessity of certain reforms in the organization of our

[6] Particularly Chs. VIII and IX.

[7] *Ibid*, p. 195.

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government that will bring its functions into harmony with each other, and ultimately, it is hoped, make corrupt and irresponsible bosses impossible.[8] In no proper sense of the word, however, can this line of argument be considered an apology for corruption such as is usually alleged to be associated with the bosship. It makes clear only that under present conditions the boss has his good uses as well as his bad ones. But these good uses do not justify the bad ones. On the contrary the corruption associated with the great powers of the boss is a menace so great as to make necessary the most far-reaching reforms.

Whether we are soon to get rid of the boss or not we are therefore bound to fight against any corruption that may develop as a result of his rule. Our present system is manifestly unstable in the long run. Individual bosses seldom retain power any great number of years. The bosship may remain, but "spasms" of reform usually succeed at least in introducing a new incumbent who brings with him new methods and new groups of favorites. The net result is far from guaranteeing that certainty and stability which both business and public interests demand. Even assuming that in some way security against popular upheaval could be conferred upon the boss, other difficulties would still have to be met. The large financial interests which need the favors of government or seek release from its burdens sometimes go to war among themselves, and in these contests control of the bosship gives valuable strategic advantages. Hence many ambitious aspirants among the principal heads of the gang, each awaiting a possible palace insurrection. It is conceivable, however, that a boss might secure himself both against factional and popular disturbances, and at the same time be supported by consolidated business interests powerful beyond the possibility of successful attack by other financial groups. With

[8] A discussion of these reforms in detail is given in Ch. IX of Prof. Goodnow's book.

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further growth of corporations and the adoption of the community of interest policy among them, the latter condition might indeed be pretty thoroughly established. In this case we would have a boss as impregnable as the conception allows. True he would still operate through democratic forms, but his democracy would be nothing more than a mask for oligarchy. The system might conceivably work out into a highly efficient and stable government. Both the boss and the financial interests behind him might prudently decide to content themselves with small percentages of profit, and otherwise insist on solid merit in both the men and the materials they employed. The disturbances due to popular uprisings on the part of an untrammeled voting mass would be reduced to a vanishing minimum.

In this successful combination, however, the oligarchy and not the boss would be the dominating factor. Indeed even under existing conditions the title of boss is a singularly inappropriate one in most instances. Unless the bearer is possessed of financial ability of a high order himself he must remain a lieutenant rather than a leader. Usually he does not possess this ability. Nor is the reason hard to perceive. The boss is, and probably will continue to be, a specialist in one line only, namely, political manipulation; and in his extremely exposed position this work is quite sufficient in detail and variety to absorb all the time and talents even of an extraordinarily gifted person. Under the financial oligarchy, therefore, the boss will probably be nothing more than an agent, a departmental head charged with the duty of securing the necessary majority of the popular vote at all elections and of retaining control of office holders. From this point of view the absurdity of the conception of the boss as the saviour of democracy is again apparent. At bottom his function is to secure power through his knowledge and subtle bribery of the people and to sell or lease this power to financial interests which recoup themselves out of the pockets of the people. Instead of

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being the saviour of democracy the net effect of his work, little perhaps as he realizes it, is the selling out of democracy to oligarchy.

There is, however, not the remotest possibility that the hypothetical process sketched above will be carried to completion. If it were it could not long survive. Oligarchies are notoriously unstable compounds. No matter how secure they may make themselves from internal dissension, their very power and success provoke to attack from the outside. In the case we have assumed the weak point lies in the unavoidable necessity of securing a majority of the popular vote from time to time. Ultimately the oligarchy would have to become strong enough to disregard this necessity; that is, to throw off the mask of democracy by abolishing popular elections. Long before this point could be reached, however, the ruling clique would probably find itself attacked by organizations of great voting power which would demand a share of the spoils of sovereignty for themselves. Reduce all politics to a mere calculation of profit and even those voters who now sell themselves for a few dollars or a few petty political favors would come to realize that they held their ballots at too low a figure. They would see political privileges based on their venal compliance or connivance become the foundation stones of large fortunes. They would further realize that the capital value of such privileges was based largely upon the profits extracted from their own pockets a penny at a time and many times over by the high prices charged them for public utility services. Under conditions approaching frank oligarchy, with a political philosophy justifying such conditions, and with class consciousness bred of them, it would seem inevitable that powerful organizations, particularly of laborers or other industrial classes, would be formed for the purpose of wresting valuable privileges from the government. Instead of the low individual forms of corruption now prevailing we would have other forms, higher because tinged with

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a group character, but still corrupt because narrow interests would be advanced to the detriment of the interests of the state as a whole. Confronted with such difficulties the corrupt machine would no more prevail to save oligarchy than it is now prevailing to save democracy.

Fortunately every sign of the times points against the development of oligarchy, and such a struggle between it and strong class organizations as has been suggested. The great mass of our people, fully two thirds of the entire voting population according to Prof. Commons' estimate,[9] stands outside the sphere of such a conflict. This powerful neutral influence may be depended upon to establish a rude sort of fair play and to suppress any overweening attempt to make the machinery of the state subservient to narrow interests. Moreover public sentiment as expressed by both the great political parties is setting strongly against special privilege. It was once an easy matter for politicians to approve such a sentiment outwardly, while continuing to deal with it practically merely as a glittering generality quite devoid of any real significance. That decidedly equivocal manner of meeting the situation will no longer serve, however. Regulation of railroads, trusts and insurance companies, tariff reform, reforms of our governmental organization, particularly state and municipal, primary and ballot reforms, all these have passed into the arena of practical politics and are dealt with as living issues by both political parties. Mistakes will be made in all these lines, the process of reform will be slow, but that we are on the right road, and that in the end the grosser forms of corruption that disgrace and disgust the present era will be eliminated there can be no doubt.

A very significant evolutionary argument on the subject of corruption has been advanced by Mr. Henry J.

[9] See his extremely able article entitled "Is Class Conflict in America Growing and Is It Inevitable?" in the *American Journal of Sociology*, May, 1908, 13, 756.

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Ford,[10] and may finally be taken up at this point, although it might also have been considered in connection with the third apology. In Mr. Ford's opinion:

> Just as medieval feudalism was a powerful agency in binding together the masses of the people into the organic union from which the modern state was evolved, so, too, our party feudalism performs a valuable office by the way it establishes connections of interest among the masses of the people. To view the case as a whole, we should contrast the marked European tendency toward disintegration of government through strife of classes and nationalities with the strong tendency shown in this country toward national integration of all elements of the population. Our despised politicians are probably to be credited with what we call the wonderful assimilating capacity of American institutions.

That the contrast drawn by Mr. Ford between government in Europe and the United States is true and enormously in our favor there can be no doubt. Of course, historical conditions would have retarded or prevented any similar unifying development in Europe, even if that continent had been privileged to enjoy the ministrations of all the most talented party workers of America. And in the United States frontier conditions, the public school, the church, the labor union, the press and our democratic political creed—for none of which the ordinary politician is directly to be credited—have all worked effectively toward the establishment of "connections of interest among the masses of the people." But the fact remains that the party worker has played his part, and that it was a very important part indeed in the process. Of course, his motives were largely selfish—personal or party success; and his methods not of the cleanest—direct purchase of votes, petty favors, minor offices for leading representatives of the class or nationality whose votes were desired and so on. At any rate the party worker met the immigrant with open arms, while too many of our educated and propertied people sneered at or ignored him. Let us suppose that the latter attitude had prevailed, and that the despised foreigner had been

[10] *Political Science Quarterly*, December, 1904, 19, 673.

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kept from the polls either by legal means or by other repressive measures. In defense of such procedure it could have been argued that the purity of American institutions was at stake. The slogan "America for Americans," once so potent in our politics, might have prevailed universally. At the same time our Know-nothing rulers and people might have asserted that they were protecting and cherishing with paternal unselfishness the best interests of the foreign population which, manifestly, was unfit for the exercise of political rights on its own behalf. Clearly by following this policy some of the political evils which have been attributed so frequently to the foreign vote could have been prevented. If immigrants were freely permitted to come to America while all this was going on we should, however, have had in time to reckon with a large class of unfranchised laborers who could hardly have failed to look upon native Americans as poor professors of democracy, or possibly even as oppressors against whom insurrection was fully justified. Immigrants would not have become citizens, America would not have shown the assimilative capacity which is the wonder and despair of Europe.

Things were not so ordered. Immigrants were permitted to come in staggering numbers, and once in the country were admitted to the ballot with a light-hearted ease that seemed sheer insanity to many observers. The corrupt politician improved the opportunity and marshaled them to the polls in droves, often to the loudly expressed disgust of the native born. Every method of coercion, deceit and corruption was employed to keep the foreigner in the ranks. But this policy was foredoomed to failure from the start. In his native country the immigrant was either ignored or else kicked and cuffed about by those in authority; imagine his surprise at being courted for his political influence in the land of his adoption. The few dollars or few petty favors at first offered him for his vote may have been a very despicable method of acquainting him with the value of his political

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rights, but the lesson had the merit at least of being adapted to every grade of intelligence, including the lowest. Good government tracts on the duties of citizenship would hardly have proved so effective. On the whole it would be hard to imagine a worse school for citizenship, and the only wonder is that in the end it has turned out so many good citizens. A large part of the foreign vote has learned to repudiate the leadership of designing native politicians. It has developed leaders and aims of its own. Many of these leaders are doubtless quite as purely selfish as the former American leaders, and many of the aims pursued are not so high as they should be, but the political capacity to reach higher things is there; and that, after all, is the main consideration.[11] It would be easy to find fault on much the same grounds with the political ideals and leaders of those parts of the country which have been little if at all affected by immigration.

Believers in the ultimate good resulting from a questionable evolutionary process might point in support of their faith to the foregoing interpretation of the effects of our corrupt politics upon the immigrant. Others will doubtless find it much too roseate. What of those immigrants, they will ask, who were already fitted for the proper performance of the duties of American citizenship? Doubtless the number of such was large, particularly among our earlier accessions from western Europe. Many of this better class of immigrants must have been debauched by contact with corrupt influences, and even those who rose superior to such conditions must have found it an uphill fight. Even if instances can be cited where foreign masses subject to the worst political man-

[11] In his extremely interesting work on "The Anthracite Coal Communities," Mr. Peter Roberts takes a rather dark view of the political morals of the coal counties of Pennsylvania (pp. 316-42, 355-58), but it is easy to discern in his pages the emergence of political independence and higher forms of corruption which indicate better things for the future. *Cf.*, pp. 44, 45 and 47, 48.

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agement have nevertheless developed independence and organizations of their own, it is seriously to be questioned whether this development will continue. The new flood of immigration from southern and eastern Europe may progressively deteriorate, or remain a stumblingblock for a long time to come. There are some communities of native white stock in the United States where the buying of votes has continued through two or three generations, growing worse rather than better, until at the present time it seems to have become a fixed institution. In the opinion of many people a large part of the negro vote is not only corrupt but incorrigibly so. Altogether the facts are very far from warranting a reliance upon unaided evolution to work out the problem of electoral corruption. Even granting that the results already secured in this way are extremely favorable, it is probable that much better results might have been secured had the native American stock from the start lived up to the best ideals of republican citizenship. The immigrant might, for example, have been met and aided by institutions working unselfishly for his welfare, such as the church, the school or the social settlement, rather than by the lowest grade of party politicians working largely for their own private advantage. Doubtless this will sound like a counsel of perfection. So it certainly is as regards the past, but none the less it would seem our clear duty to take every care to educate properly for future citizenship not only such foreigners as we shall continue to admit, but also those of our own people who are exposed to corrupt influences.

To sum up the four lines of apology offered for political corruption, it may be noted that only two of them are so commonly entertained at the present time as to have any large practical significance. These are the first and second, namely, that corruption makes business good, and that it may be more than compensated for by the high efficiency of those who engage in it. The two remaining arguments, dealing respectively with the danger of mob

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rule and the possibly beneficent effects of further evolution, are extremely interesting; but for the present at least they belong largely to the realm of political theory. Not one of the four apologies, however, stands the test of analysis. The social advantages alleged to flow from corrupt practices are either illusory or minimal. On the other hand, the resultant evils are great and real, although, no doubt, they have often been exaggerated by sensational writers. Whether corruption be approached from the latter side, as is commonly done, or from the side of its apologists, the social necessity of working for its limitation is manifest.

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THE MEANING OF EXPERIENCE FOR SCIENCE AND FOR RELIGION.

FRANK GRANGER.

WHAT does Experience mean? In order to answer this question we shall not set about making a definition. Instead we shall take first a bit of experience, say the sound of a bell, and observe how this apparently simple occurrence is viewed by persons who approach it from different standpoints. Then we shall be better able to understand how experience as a whole is viewed from different standpoints.

You might consider the sound of a bell as a physicist, a physiologist or a psychologist. Perhaps you might begin by distinguishing between the hearer and the thing heard. But this distinction is not so important as might be thought at first. In fact, so far as hearing itself goes, there is no distinction. As Aristotle would say, "The faculty and the object of hearing are one in the act of sense-perception." What do we mean then when we say that we hear a sound? The nervous processes that go

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on in the ear or in the brain are not a sound. The vibrations of the bell and of the air, or other external media, are not a sound. It is not correct to say that we hear the vibrations, as though the vibrations were specially apprehended by hearing; indeed we become aware of vibrations by sight and by touch. It would be equally inaccurate to say that we hear the nervous processes which accompany hearing. Whether we look at experience as psychologists or as physicists or as physiologists, we diverge somewhat from the standpoint of the pure experience.

Now let us alter our phrase, and instead of saying, "We hear a sound," we will say, "There is a sound." We thus eliminate from the experience of a sound all that does not belong to it. And what we have just done for the experience of a sound we want to do for experience generally; we want to think of it as simply as possible by eliminating the superfluous. Scientific men have long proceeded in this way. They try to make their problems easier by dealing with one aspect of things at a time. But that is just what we failed to do at first. The word "sound" in its full meaning would mingle together physics in its reference to vibrations, physiology in its reference to the functions of the nervous system, psychology if we referred the sound to the experience of a particular individual. Some people think that this last reference gives us the real meaning of things. That is not so. We shall see that even psychology cannot claim to deal with the whole of experience.

Thus there are several aspects of even so simple a thing as a sound. And science does not deal with all these at once, but divides them up and allots one duty to one branch of science, say, physics, and another duty to another, say, physiology. Here is a great difference between scientific and ordinary methods. Usually we do not interest ourselves except in so far as these divisions concern the matter in hand. For example, a witness in a court of law, in giving evidence about what he has

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heard, will not mention these scientific aspects of the sounds in question.

Not only does science try to split up its problems in this way: it tries to get free from the standpoint of the individual, with his preferences and prejudices, to occupy itself exclusively with that which is common to all experiences, or at least that which is capable of entering into all experiences. There is a purpose in all this. No part of nature is of private interpretation, and by the coöperative use of knowledge it is possible to apprehend nature more fully. There are thousands of workers to-day all over the world, each trying to add something to the common stock of knowledge.

In this way it becomes more easy for the whole of our knowledge to be made one harmonious system, and thereby more easy to be grasped. The advance of science does not consist only in the apprehension of more details, but in grouping together or subordinating the details which are already known to us. In fact, this latter part of science which attempts to find out the meaning of things is perhaps more important than the other which is concerned with adding fresh facts. At an earlier stage in man's history he sought more knowledge, so that he might do his work and reach his purpose in the simplest way and with the least possible expenditure of work. And this is the way in which knowledge is viewed by most people to-day. But, for some, knowledge is become no longer a means, but an end. We seek the easiest ways of apprehending knowledge, as of old our forefathers sought the easiest ways of building or of growing corn. Science, then, tries to find the shortest way to the understanding of the whole of things just as, in practice, men seek to obtain control over the whole of the resources of nature. Hence it may be said that technical knowledge is first in the order of time. Knowledge for its own sake comes later. Science may conveniently be marked off from its synonym, knowledge, as *knowledge for its own sake.*

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We have seen what science is. Let us now consider how it comes to be, that is to say, how there come to be persons who are occupied in the pursuit of science. At first there were no men of science, only men of practice. If we study the coming of this new kind of man, we shall understand a little how the ordinary experience is transformed into the experience of science.

To-day, indeed, it is true that thought of a scientific kind is going on. But it was not always so, and some day this kind of thought may cease for a time, as indeed it almost ceased from the third to the fifteenth centuries. After all, very few people occupy themselves in this way. For example, the number of men in England who are occupied in physiological research is very small at present. And the majority of men view purely disinterested thought in any subject with suspicion, which passes upon occasion into dislike. And with reason. For scientific thought is not occupied with immediate needs. As Lord Macaulay pointed out with unconscious irony, voicing the feelings of many persons, thought never mended a pair of shoes. Scientific thought would cease to be such if it did. It is not its business any more than it is the business of chemistry to do the work of the violinist.

Scientific thought goes its way without asking whether its methods will satisfy daily needs. On the other hand, practical methods are often unconcerned about science. In fact many things are done best when they are done without thinking very much about them. This is the case with most games. So also the daily task, if it be a regular one, is performed almost unconsciously. Among the great mass of workers, it is only one here and there who reflects upon the methods of his work. In the East twenty centuries may pass without changing one detail in the grinding of corn, or the weaving of silk. In the West, in the Middle Ages, it was somewhat different. The development of building and of the other arts—sculpture, stained glass, embroidery—showed that practical inven-

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tion was alive. But in the absence of systematic thought the meaning of his practical methods escaped the worker.

But the thinker must have the opportunity of thinking. Enough has been said about the dangers of external interference, as if toleration were all that is required in order that there may be thinkers. This is a mistake. Leisure and the use of apparatus, including under this, instruments, books and the facilities of travel, are required for the pursuit of the several sciences. Certainly very simple apparatus has often been enough: that which was employed by a Faraday or a Fechner was made out of rough enough material. But the exact observation of minute processes or of processes involving the presence of unstable substances, cannot be carried on in a cheap way. They make demands which can only be satisfied at a considerable cost, as for example, in the study of radium. And since these sums of money do not promise any immediate return, there seems to be no place for research in the modern economic structure. The discoverer and the inventor usually spend their time, energies and money before they are in a position to gain any profit. The man devoted to scientific research may be said therefore not to be of this world. To this extent there is an interesting likeness between the prophet of science and the prophet of religion.

Again the scientific thinker must be willing not only to concentrate himself upon some special lines of investigation. He must also be ready to gain hints from all sorts of quarters. It is sometimes asked why men occupied with particular aspects of nature should stray beyond their own sphere. The answer is that we cannot say beforehand how far the sphere of a particular science may extend. Facts the most unlikely may throw light upon other facts, or, at least, furnish clues which ingenious minds may trace to their origins.

How then, you ask, can we distinguish between one kind of inquirer and another? By the special aspect of facts in which he is interested. As we have seen, physi-

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ology deals with one aspect, psychology with another, chemistry with another and so on. Physiology does not confine itself to animals, but extends its survey to plants and latterly even to the functions of certain inorganic substances; everywhere, however, it is dealing with one aspect of the facts.

Now the life of Jesus and the history of the Christian Church are facts. And like other facts, they present many aspects. From one point of view they are facts in the history of man. And again, as we shall see, they have a bearing upon the meaning of nature. Thus the historian and the philosopher will have something to say about them. But because of the emotional interest of these facts, and their power over the course of human history, men are attracted to them who are not always sufficiently versed in historical and philosophic criticism. The eager journalist, like Robert Blatchford, marshals fragments of ancient controversies, and sees in them the ruins of the Christian system. Haeckel dismisses all of religion that does not fit in with a preconceived theory of nature. And Mach, from the standpoint of the physicist, fails to detect the character of the religious experience.

It would be well if religious persons took warning by the faults which they find in the critics of religion. At any rate many of the opponents of the Christian religion have been serious thinkers. But there is a region of thought in which conflict disappears, and in which the revelation of nature through science, and the revelation of man's life through the Christian experience are in their degree constituent parts of one harmonious process. It is only from so lofty a standpoint that we can hope to understand the true relation of religion and science.

Let us consider how far we may speak of science as revelation.

The several groups of scientific men—mathematicians, physicists, chemists, geologists, botanists, physiologists—are occupied in one work. They direct themselves to the several aspects of a universe of facts which is common

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to all: just as they were occupied with that isolated fact, the clang of the bell. And just as they help us to understand that single fact of experience, so they help us to understand the whole of experience. And they do this, finding out ways by which we may comprehend the parts of our experience more clearly and simply.

This may seem a strange statement to those readers for whom the different sciences are so many cumbrous and uncouth systems of expression. But, in truth, the difficult phrases which scientific men employ are a kind of shorthand. They express, in brief, groups of ideas which in turn stand for many groups of facts.

To this extent the sciences do serve practical ends. By making it more easy for the individual to understand that part of experience in which he is interested, they render his control of experience more complete. Hence the advance of science is partly measured by the extent to which it is simplified. For instance, the atomic weights of the elements have been arranged by Mayer and Mendelejeff in certain proportionate groups, and the members of these groups have been found to resemble each other in their chemical properties. Here we have a saving, an economy of thought, which answers to the labor saving of machines. For, after all, thought is a kind of work.

But this is not the highest conception of science. Amid the enthusiasm of discovery the scientific observer is rarely aware of the uses to which his discoveries may be put. The emerging of new aspects of things from their secret recesses smites the mind with awe, and the work of discovery is more than its own reward. The springs of feeling are touched sometimes, almost as in the case of the mystic when he feels himself to be absorbed in the object of his worship. "Men of science seek in all reverence to discover the almighty, the everlasting. They claim sympathy and friendship with those who, like themselves, have turned away from the more material struggles of human life, and have set their

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hearts and minds on the knowledge of the eternal." These are the words of the president of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, 1906.

There is a likeness, therefore, between the religious prophet and the scientific discoverer. Both classes of men declare a vision of truth, moral or natural; both have borne witness to the truth; both have suffered for it. And if the scientific discoverer—whether in the ancient world, an Archimedes or a Hero, or in the modern world, a Newton or a Metchnikoff—has needed for his work the instruments which only money can provide, we must not dwell upon this circumstance as if it in any way placed them below the abstract thinker or the seer. "He that increaseth knowledge, increaseth sorrow." Even with every help of apparatus and opportunity, science is found a hard taskmistress. Darwin, Huxley, Tyndall—to quote prominent names and omitting innumerable less known but not less great instances—pursued their vocation at the risk, and to the loss, of bodily health.

How then does science operating through many minds act as a revealer? On the one hand it shows the oneness of experience in the order of time or successive occurrence; on the other hand, in the order of space or of simultaneous occurrence. And when this unity of experience is viewed *dynamically*, instead of as a mere fixed unity, we find ourselves in the presence of one immanent and controlling power.

And first, as to the order of time. The aim of science is to break up the complex fact into the aspects or relations which constitute it. One way of doing this is to resolve a given fact into the processes out of which it has arisen. This is the method of evolution.

The importance of the evolutionary method for us at present is that it introduces a *dynamical* conception of the world in place of a *statical* one; in other words, it deals with a changing equilibrium of forces, instead of a uniform equilibrium. Instead of a world created once

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for all by a single fiat, it treats of things as though each fresh moment they formed a new system.

First the starry worlds have been regarded as produced from nebulæ by condensation. Then living creatures—both animals and plants—have ceased to be regarded as fixed species; they are now looked upon as stages in a development from more primitive forms of life. Now we are being taught that the very elements are passing phases rather than ultimate realities. Helium is no longer an independent element, but is produced from radium. And radium itself is formed probably by a transformation of uranium. Hence when the universe is analyzed into chemical elements it continues to show the development of the manifold from the simple.

Where are we to take our stand upon firm ground in a universe which is thus always changing? There can be but one answer. We must seek the *form* of this perpetual process. And this form, if we could but find it, must be such that each stage in the development of the world is real in so far as it is bound up with this ultimate form or scheme of things. Hence so far as the different branches of science express the stages of development in terms successively more simple and more illuminating, they bring us nearer to the power, the thought, which, to use a metaphor, looms behind the process of the world.

Yet such approaches to the ultimate solution of the riddle of the world are always imperfect. It is sometimes thought that physics, for example, deals with realities when it speaks of molecules, of forces, of ether, in certain ways. It is improbable that the behavior of the elements of nature is entirely, or even accurately, represented by these phrases.

Let us now consider what is meant by simultaneous occurrence as opposed to the succession of processes with which the method of evolution deals. Simultaneous occurrence is usually, but not always, occurrence in space. For example, toothache is simultaneous with certain

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nervous processes. But it is not certain that toothache is in space.

Noting this, by the way, we may say that in space nothing happens by itself. The movements of your hand as you turn these pages, change to a minute extent the center of gravity of the earth, and thereby of the solar system. The connection of events is almost as close in other respects—in electricity, for example. Hence we must not think about the course of the world's history as though it were made up of parallel isolated processes. Only in thought is it possible to isolate particular series of events, and to say that the earlier cause the later. For example, it is not correct to say that the weather makes the crops good or bad. You would leave out the soil, the use of suitable manures, the removal of weeds and fifty other circumstances. It is convenient, however, to consider the effects of the weather alone by supposing all the other circumstances to remain the same. But this is a pure supposition, and answers very imperfectly to the facts. It is more universally true to say that all things change together. Nothing exists or lives absolutely for itself. To return to our instance of a moment since, when you turn over these pages, you do not perceptibly alter the center of gravity of the world or even of the neighborhood in which you are. But if your neighbor was conducting delicate experiments with a pendulum, he would prefer that even such slight movements did not take place.

To resume: We have seen that the history of the world only has meaning so far as it is referred to a continuous scheme. And we have just found that the whole present texture of things is closely woven together. The two aspects of the world, the temporal and the spatial, are expressions of a single principle. Since this single principle finds thus much expression, it cannot be said to remain unknown, still less to be unknowable. In the presence of a power thus eternal and comprehensive, man falls naturally into the attitude of worship. Al-

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though this worship does not always take the traditional forms of religion, the enthusiasm which fires the discoverer and the experimenter is none the less of a religious character. The eclipse of science at the end of classical antiquity was strangely foretold in the familiar story that we owe to Plutarch: how that a merchant vessel was driven out of its course at the end of the Gulf of Corinth, and that the passengers who were on board heard a voice from the shore bidding them carry the news that the great Pan was dead. Pan personified to the Greeks the beauties and terrors of nature. In the spirit of this story it might be said that Pan is now alive again. Or to pass from ancient symbols, we might say that the divine principle in nature is now recognized, as never before.

As the Greek worshiper of Pan, along the heights and valleys of Arcadia, felt himself sometimes to be seized by the strange powers of nature, so the world, as interpreted by natural science, seems to absorb into itself the man who observes. Wordsworth, in "The Recluse," bridges over the interval which separates at first sight the poetic from the scientific apprehension of the world:

> "My voice proclaims
> How exquisitely the individual mind
> (And the progressive powers perhaps no less
> Of the whole species) to the external world
> Is fitted: and how exquisitely too
> The external world is fitted to the mind,
> And the creation (by no lower name
> Can it be called) which they with blended might
> Accomplish."

The somewhat prosaic ideas of Wordsworth are stamped with a more striking turn by Byron:

> "I live not in myself, but I become
> Portion of that around me; and to me
> High mountains are a feeling."

Here we get the explanation of a peculiar quality of Darwin's mind. Much has been made of Darwin's con-

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fessed lack of taste for poetry, as though his scientific pursuits had dwarfed his nature. His candor has been misunderstood. There is no general and widespread taste for poetry and the drama in England, and Darwin was almost certainly far above the average in this respect. But he seems to have found the deepest satisfaction in the presence of nature. And generally speaking, it is largely a matter of temperament whether the "admiration, hope and love" by which men thus live in the presence of nature find expression in devotional exercises or diffuse themselves through the whole waking life. Tyndall, when he ascended the Finsteraarhorn in 1858, was so profoundly stirred that for the moment the scientific observer was overwhelmed with religious feeling. "There was something saintly in the scene. . . . The radiance seemed to infuse a principle of life and activity into the mountains and glaciers, but still that holy light shone forth and those motionless clouds floated beyond, reminding one of that eastern religion whose essence is the repression of all action and the substitution for it of immortal calm."

We might go on gathering instances of such experiences—note the word—but that would not be enough. We need to seize upon the facts which are common to all of them. Why should the barriers between man and nature seem to disappear? These barriers arise for many practical reasons. The mechanical devices which enable man to control nature also separate him from nature. Let us try to put ourselves at the primitive, the natural position, which we have found to be resumed by the poets. The philosophy of Avenarius and of Mach is largely an attempt to give expression to this primitive aspect of experience. Mach, whose philosophy is exercising a great though little-noticed influence in England, has recently published a work, *Erkenntniss und Irrthum* ("Knowledge and Error"), from which I will take a short statement. "Let us consider the elements red, green, warm, cold and so on, however they may be named. These ele-

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ments so far as they depend upon external conditions are *physical;* so far as they depend upon internal conditions are *mental.* Yet in both cases these elements are given to us directly, and are identical. Thus the question about appearance and reality loses its meaning in this simple condition of affairs. We have before us, at one and the same time, the elements of the real world and of the self." "I live not in myself, but I become portion of that around me," says Byron. How nearly allied are these two utterances!

They are allied because they express allied states of mind. Unfortunately scientific apprehension is caricatured in the popular idea of science, which regards it as an accumulation of facts more or less useful. "The loftiest aim of all the sciences," says Comte, "is not to minister to the arts of life, but to satisfy the fundamental necessity of the intellect to know the laws of phenomena." The true scientific apprehension, in so far as it is sustained by feeling, is akin to poetic apprehension. Thus enriched it rises to the height of philosophy. For example, speculations like those of Mach belong to the borderland between natural science and philosophy.

In fact there seems to be returning that worship of nature which can now be traced in the light of research, even in the religion of Israel; a worship enlarged by the advance of science and purified by the spirit of Jesus. Such a worship is the complement of the Christian faith, and guards it from the heresy of Manichæanism. There is an old interpretation of the first verse of Genesis by which "in the beginning" is understood of the first principles of things. "In their first principles heaven and earth are made of God." Nor are there lacking prophets of this worship. If anyone wishes to burst the ties of mere convention and enter into this spirit, let him turn to Walt Whitman's "Specimen Days in America." Perhaps God is more truly worshiped at times in this way than by glib conversations with Him, when the lamp of life burns low and His face is but dimly seen. The serv-

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ants of the Temple are found in the porches, as well as in the Holy of Holies.

But we may not rest here. Nature as the poets and thinkers understand her, in the woods, by the rivers, on the mountains, over the sea, cannot be separated from human life. Poetry and scientific tradition are themselves the fruit of social life.

And yet the civilization which brings to us natural science and the poetry of nature, brings also the defilement of natural beauty. Greed writes itself across the landscape in the advertisements which haunt the railway lines. Uncleanly habits, as of an animal taken from its proper environment, turn the streets of English cities into slums. Man is at once greater and less than his kindred creatures. And the poet is left

> "Brooding above the fierce confederate storm
> Of sorrow barricadoed evermore
> Within the walls of cities."

The mystery of man's nature is itself the subject of a science—psychology. Psychology deals with events so far as they are referred to the individual who experiences them. And so it can stay for a moment and dwell upon the pleasure and the pain, the attainment and the failure, which are the private and personal aspects of visible history. The meteorologist calmly notes the passing storm. The psychologist will devote himself, perhaps, to observing and recording the grief and disappointment of the countrymen whose crops are destroyed. But psychology is something more than a mere collection of arbitrary definitions and casual remarks. Other people beside the professed psychologist can comment upon the feelings of the English farmer. Psychology is now passing among the experimental studies, and this is one of the most striking features in the progress of contemporary science.

In determining and measuring the qualities and amounts of sensation under given conditions, the experimental

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psychologist will probably modify the concepts which depend upon sensation. For, in the last resort, the fundamental concepts of physics and chemistry rest upon simple relations which can be immediately apprehended by the senses. This has been shown by Mach for the principle of the lever, and doubtless holds good also in other cases. "The human mind," says Ostwald, "handles abstract truths much less easily by themselves than with the help of an illustrative image."

But psychology does not give us the ultimate and complete expression of truth, any more than physics or chemistry. The terms and theories of psychology deal with but one aspect of experience, and have for their object to make that more comprehensible. But they cannot take the place of experience itself. Everyone who begins the study of psychology passes for a time under this illusion, and thinks that his descriptions reveal the hidden meaning of things. But all the familiar and even impressive terms, such as purpose, consciousness, attention, will—all these are imperfect and often transitory. Where now is the once magical term, apperception? Yet it would be a mistake to overlook the contributions to thought which have been made by systems now obsolete. Each method of interpreting experience so far as it has reached harmony with other methods must have embodied some permanent results. The psychologist can look back upon his predecessors, as the astronomer looks back from the system of Copernicus to the epicycles of Ptolemaic astronomy or the vortices of Descartes.

Now the interest of psychological controversies is so intimate that it is sometimes difficult to say whether they have lost their meaning or not. And so it may happen that dying systems may be galvanized into something like life. There is a land of shadows in which these phantoms move, the home of inarticulate thoughts and formless yearnings. Experimental psychology promises to shed light upon this region and to dispel its mists; not at once, perhaps, but in the end. For example, in many

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spiritualist meetings which are professedly devoted to observation of fact, there is an appeal to the feelings which is calculated to render impossible scientific observation. It is enough to compare observations taken under these conditions with observations taken in a psychological laboratory, in order to understand why the methods of spiritualists cannot lead to verified results.

In like manner "Christian Science" avowedly appeals to the feelings, and so far as the feelings accompany or control physiological states, to that extent "Christian Science" may and doubtless does produce tangible effects. But this method of appealing to the feelings is not at all that of science, whether "Christian" or otherwise. In denying the existence of those diseases which are due to parasites or to minute organisms, "Christian Science" reveals its own lack of any scientific character. For the human body and the bodies of other living creatures, with the diseases and pains attending them, are part of one experience. To deny part of this experience, is to deny the whole.

We cannot attempt to consider at length what is meant by the immortality of the soul. Something, however, must be said now about the permanence and independence of the soul so far as these are involved in the theory of experience which we have been considering.

The popular idea of the soul regards it as self-existing and everlasting. This is not necessarily the religious idea of the soul. The Christian conception subordinates everything to the will of God. And even if that will could be fully known, we are not in a position to say beforehand that it is anticipated by popular ideas.

There are certain facts, however, which may serve as clues to these problems. The soul does not seem to be self-existent. For in order to show that the soul is self-existent, we must certainly be able to show that it exists without interruption. Now sleep is not less a difficulty than is death itself to those who maintain the continuous existence of the soul. For it may fairly be advanced that

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there is a break of the soul's existence in dreamless sleep. Whether then we consider sleep or death, we find that the soul is not independent of other things. That is to say, the human personality is closely related with other things. Hence it is not a break in the unity of the world. And this is important for the system of thought through which the unity of the world is expressed.

Secondly, the soul is an imperfect unity. It is not one in the sense in which God may be said to be one. For it may be assumed that perfect harmony can only be reached in some wider system than that of which we are immediately aware; perhaps perfect unity demands nothing short of the whole universe. The human soul, however, bears many marks of discord. There are few persons, if any, whose purposes are entirely harmonious among themselves. Perfect oneness of purpose, of which formalist psychology knows so much, is an ideal to be looked for on a distant horizon. For clashing impulses seem to be characteristic of human experience as we know it. The curious instances of multiple personality —which should rather be called divided personality—are but extreme cases of what may be found in the average experience.

Where then is the dependence and imperfection of the soul to be remedied? When this need is merely contemplated, it seems to be satisfied in the ideal of God. When, however, this need is felt and acted upon, the religious experience begins.

Thus through the very consciousness of imperfection man gains an ideal which rises above and beyond experience. If man is dissatisfied with experience, dissatisfied with himself, he becomes aware of limits beyond which he would pass. And in so doing he reaches after a standpoint which is further on than that of science. In the passionless system of science, the beast of prey, the parasite, the germs of disease, are not condemned; they are described. Nor, on the other hand, is praise given to what we judge as noble: the apparent forethought and

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self-sacrifice which occur not infrequently in the animal world.

Just as science consists of perceptions organized into a system, so we may imagine these human ideals organized into a system. Such a system would present itself as some all-embracing purpose in which every impulse would find its proper place.

We can trace another parallel between science and morals. Just as science itself depends upon, and is sustained by, an ideal of knowledge which could only be realized through a perfect reason, so morals depend in turn upon this ideal of a perfect will, which if it is expressed at all, must be expressed through some all-embracing purpose.

Thus man may rise sometimes even above nature, even above that beautiful order of things into which the poet is rapt with ecstasy. For man, in so far as he becomes the judge of nature, rises above it. And since the spirit judges all things and is judged of none, to that extent it is free from the bondage of sin and death. The universe may fall upon man and crush him, but he is greater than an unconscious universe. It is only to a mind capable of approval and disapproval that the universe seems to groan and travail toward some high purpose.

Here we light upon the problem of evil. Evil is that which conflicts with such a purpose. And so far as the conflict is real, so far is evil real. Again, in so far as human beings share in this conflict and are conscious of it, they are separated from the rest of the world, which may contain elements of evil but unconsciously. And the word "sin" will denote evil consciously pursued.

Side by side with the problem of evil is the problem of ugliness. The problem of evil is more urgent, but it is not more real than the other. However, it has received less attention. Just as the system of science takes no account of moral good and evil, so it has no place for the notions of the beautiful and the ugly.

Perhaps the "beautiful" has arisen in the crafts

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through the contrast between purpose and execution. Hence there is a likeness between the beautiful and the good. For, as we have seen, the notion of the good seems to arise through the contrast between a need and its satisfaction. Hence the beautiful would be a kind of good. Where purposes are clearly attained without superfluous elements, where there is nothing discordant, the material in which those purposes are attained seems to gain the quality of beauty. On the other hand, the ugly seems to be found in a given material where the purpose of it is only partially attained. Few things are more beautiful than a machine in which, by gradual improvement, the superfluous has been refined away, and the required ends are attained by the most economical arrangement of the means. Hence workshops, machinery, factories, workmen's dwellings, are not always or necessarily ugly; but they are usually ugly in so far as they realize their purposes with a large amount of waste, or with an unsuitable handling of their materials. They are not the nearest way round to the proper conduct of human life. For they fail to embody the principle of "economy" in its concrete application. "Economy"—the direction of means to ends—is offended by too little no less than by too much. The complexity of modern life is such that its manifold purposes are not easily realized. For example, there is no satisfactory provision for leisure. The average of ugliness beyond which the modern city rarely advances is due to the fact that this aspect of things has not yet been systematically dealt with.

In considering these two problems of the evil and of the ugly, we have gone beyond the purely scientific view of experience. We have applied, in addition to the *judgment of fact,* the *judgments of value* both moral and æsthetic.

But we cannot leave such different methods merely side by side; we must seek to grasp them together in a single method. There must be some way of returning

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to the real experience from the special standpoint of the different sciences. They split up experience into parts, with which they are severally occupied. We need to reverse this process; to fuse again into one these various elements. "We hold the parts in our hand; only the spiritual bond is lacking."

Philosophy has this professed office, namely, to point out and to reconcile, where it is possible, any contradictions in the leading ideas of the different sciences, and so make possible a complete harmony. But what philosophy seeks to do of set purpose is done incidentally and roughly by poetry.

The poets dog the heels of scientific discoverers when they appear. We can trace side by side the building of the majestic structure of science, and the outlines of "that great poem which all poets, like the coöperating thoughts of one great mind, have built up since the beginning of the world." "An intelligent reader," says Palgrave, "will find the influence of Newton as markedly in the poems of Pope as of Elizabeth in the plays of Shakespeare." According to the estimate which we form of poetry and the poetic vocation, shall we be willing or not to find there an authority only second to that of religion. It may be convenient, however, to distinguish between the dream of the poet and the vision of the prophet. The ultimate harmony of which the poet dreams is seen by the prophet, and apprehended through faith by the common man.

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A SOCIALIST'S INTERPRETATION OF ETHICAL EVOLUTION.

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THE root of all Ethic is to be found in the feeling or alogical side of our consciousness. The moral *Trieb* is an ultimate and irreducible factor in the psychic system into which it enters. This *Trieb,* this impulse, consists in the determination of the individual mind to motives of action outside the sphere of its own circle of interests *quâ* individual, and, it may be, even incompatible with that circle of interests. But this irreducible potentiality of the "moral sense," regarded *per se,* is, for the thinker whose business it is to analyze the moral consciousness, no more than an abstraction. In order for it to become realized, it must acquire a determinate content, and it is almost needless to add that on the nature of this content the whole problem of Ethic, in the concrete, hinges. The original irreducible *Trieb* indicates indeed that the meaning and implications of individual life are not exhausted in the range of interests of the individual as such, *i. e.,* of the individual regarded as an automatic entity abstracted from the conditions of some larger whole of which he, the individual, forms part and parcel. But again, this alone, though as far as it goes a consideration of first importance (a distinct recognition of which is essential to all clear thinking on the fundamental ethical problem), does not of itself carry us very far. The nature of that larger whole into the organic system of which the individual enters as subordinate element merely, requires to be determined, if we are to analyze his ethical consciousness, no less than does the ultimate end which this ethical consciousness of the individual presupposes.

Now in all its manifestations and throughout all its phases of development, morality is concerned directly

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or indirectly with the relation of the individual to society, although in certain phases, to be referred to presently, this relation has become so indirect and attenuated as to be in appearance little more than rudimentary. Briefly stated, the following represent, I think, the chief and most salient phases under which the ethical consciousness has manifested itself:

1. In the earliest dawn of the moral consciousness, the larger whole in which the individual instinctively feels himself as a subordinate element and which he instinctively regards as his truer and larger self, is the society or kinship group—the horde, the tribe, the clan, the "people"—out of which he has arisen and in which his whole being centers. At this stage the individual has not yet become conscious of himself as such; he merely represents, in his person, the kinship society. He is not conscious of himself as a personality in our sense of the word. Hence for him, for the tribesman or clansman of early humanity, all conduct has for its end the welfare and glory of the kinship society. In this stage, therefore, conscience or the moral consciousness realizes itself in an instinctive, although narrow and crude, *social* ethic.

2. As civilization supervenes on the conditions of early society, more and more undermining its institutions and sapping the old ethical sentiment which corresponded to them, the center of gravity, so to say, of the moral consciousness becomes shifted. The larger whole which furnishes the ultimate object and sanction of the individual conscience gradually changes. The issue of this change is, that from being the social body, out of which the individual arose and in which in early society he very literally lived and moved and had his being, it becomes the divine essence or spiritual principle of the universe with which the soul of the individual human being is conceived as standing in a more or less mystic relation. The welfare and glory of this mystic relation becomes for the new religio-ethical consciousness the primary consideration, the ethical relation of the individual to his fellow-men

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and to society becoming indirect and subordinate. The view just expressed represents at least the theory and ideal of the phase in question. The differentiation and ultimate separation of ethics from religion belongs to the stage we are considering. The ultimate appeal is now directly from the individual soul to God, as representing the order of the universe, and conceived of in direct relation to the individual soul, and no longer to tradition and custom as representing the continuity of social and tribal life. In so far, therefore, as the theory of this form of the ethical consciousness obtains, the basis of morality has ceased to be *social* and has become *individualistic* on the one side and *mystical* on the other. Where, however, as is often the case, the religio-mystical side has fallen into the background or is absent, so far as practical relations are concerned the sanction and goal of conduct are alike frankly individualistic. The individual is now conscious of himself as a self-centered personality. The ethical value of conduct is no longer gauged by a crude and half-unconscious feeling for social utility, but by a more or less conscious theory of personal happiness, either in this life or one after death. The individual thus becomes the center of ethical conduct. Of course all morality, however conceived, is concerned either directly or indirectly with social obligations. Such is the case, therefore, even in the stage of ethical consciousness in question. But here the relation of the individual to society is conceived of from a totally different point of view from that of the ethics of primitive kinship or tribal society.

The first of the above two organic phases of the ethical consciousness to which we have referred is realized, in its purity, in that prehistoric human world which is the special domain of the modern science of anthropology. The gradual transition from the tribal or communal ethics of the early world of barbarism to the individual and introspective ethics of the later world of civilization and history, may be seen in the institutions and

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intellectual progress of all the historic races and is traceable even in the barbaric civilizations surviving in the present day. The point alluded to is brought out (to cite the most recent and certainly one of the most masterly products of modern English classical scholarship) in Dr. Farnell's "Cults of the Greek States," notably in the case of the Delphian Apollo cultus (*cf.* Vol. II, pp. 210-213, also Vol. III, ch. 2, on the Eleusinia[1]). But to the historical and anthropological student it is unnecessary for the purpose of this essay to dilate at length on the historical instances of the transition from the ethics of the tribe, the clan, the people, to that of the individual soul and the higher supernatural power to whom it owes allegiance, or to indicate in detail the steps and accompanying changes by which this transition was signalized. It suffices to remind the reader that, at a certain stage in social progress, the old religio-ethical system which in various forms dominated the prehistoric world and the earlier periods of history and civilization themselves, loses its savor and becomes meaningless and even morally repellent to the new religio-ethical consciousness. The typical historic expression of the transition spoken of would probably be regarded as embodied in the Hebrew race and enshrined in the books of the Old Testament, with the change there indicated from the Jahveh of ritual and burnt-offerings, the symbol of the intertribal unity of the Israelite people, whose care is for the political and social whole—Israel—to the Jahveh who rejoiceth not in burnt-offerings and sacrifices but who is the searcher of hearts, the symbol of the new ethical aspirations of the individualized Israelite of the later time.

3. But there appears yet another stage of the ethical consciousness, emphatically modern but as yet inchoate

[1] The criticism might perhaps be made that Dr. Farnell hardly brings this crucial point into sufficient proportional relief in his treatment of the evolution of Greek religio-ethical thought as against other subordinate changes.

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and difficult to define in precise terms. It differs alike from the old tribal or communal ethic of the elder world and from the individual-spiritual ethic which succeeded it. This new phase, one might term a Humanist Ethic, or the Ethic of Human Solidarity. The sanctions of this latter are utilitarian—in the highest and widest sense, indeed—but they *are* utilitarian, and they are so with a full and definite consciousness of the implications of that word. Their ultimate appeal is to social progress, as interpreted in the light of what is, at basis, the old revolutionary principle of liberty, equality, fraternity, in its modern applications. Hence, as I have just said, the new ethic in question is emphatically utilitarian, but its utilitarianism is definite and conscious. In this respect it differs from the early communal ethic of group-society which was also social as regards its object, but was more instinctive than consciously definite, and operated through naïve and animistic conceptions without a recognition of its own implications. In addition to this, its object is no longer confined to a kinship-community, as was the ethic of the early world, but is coextensive, *mutatis mutandis,* with the human race and even, in certain respects, with all sentient beings. It differs, needless to say, from the individualist-introspective ethic in that it is social, not individual, in its immediate object, and that it is not through the short cut of mysticism that it seeks the pathway to its end, but in the creation or in the furtherance of the evolution of a free and equal human society. In this object and in the high utility which this object implies it finds its ultimate sanctions. Its minor and everyday manifestations take the form of the prominence of the notions of comradeship, loyalty to principle, integrity (apart from supernatural sanctions); keenness of sympathy, sensitiveness to injustice in all its forms; and finally, of the continual application of the touchstone of social-utility to test the goodness or badness of any given line of action or mode of conduct, this being its only ethical standard.

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The foregoing seems to the present writer to represent the three chief phases exhibited by the ethical consciousness in the course of its evolution up to date. Absolute precision, of course, is not to be expected in dealing with these matters. There is much overlapping, and the precise boundary lines between one phase and another are not always clear. There are also subordinate cross-divisions. But, broadly speaking, I think the outline given will be found to correspond, even more than roughly, with the facts of human evolution in the sphere of ethics. Now the last mentioned and most recent of the phases of ethical consciousness I take to represent the ethical standpoint of Modern Socialism. At present it is, of course, by no means confined to conscious and avowed socialists. But none the less does it represent the ethical attitude of the vast majority of socialists throughout the world, and the only possible standpoint on which a Socialist code of morals can be based.

It is necessary, before going further, to discuss the bearing upon ethics of the theory agitating the thinkers of the Socialist party throughout the Continent known as the "Materialist Doctrine of History." This doctrine has for its originators the late Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. The best short exposition of its general principle is given by Marx himself in the introduction to his work, "Zur Kritik der Politischen Economie." This is so important for an understanding of the socialist position generally that I give it in full. It is as follows:

In the social production of the environment of their life, human beings enter into certain necessary relations of production that are independent of their will, and that correspond to a determinate stage of development of their material productive forces. The totality of these relations of production form the economic structure of the society, the real basis upon which a juridical and political superstructure raises itself, and to which determinate forms of social consciousness correspond. The mode of production of the material life of society, conditions the socio-political and intellectual life-process generally. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of their development the material productive

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forces of society come into contradiction with the existing relations of production, or, to speak in juridical language, with the conditions of property-holding, under which they have hitherto worked. When this is the case, the forms of development proper to the productive forces become suddenly transformed into fetters for these forces. An epoch of social revolution is then entered upon. With the transformation of the economic basis, the whole immense superstructure sooner or later undergoes a complete *bouleversement*. In considering such revolutions as these, one must always distinguish between the material revolution in the economic conditions of production, and the juridical, political, religious, artistic or philosophical, in short, the ideological, form, in which mankind becomes aware of the conflict and under which it is fought out. Just as little as one can judge an individual by what he thinks of himself can we judge such a period of revolution from its own consciousness alone. On the contrary, we must rather explain this consciousness by the contradictions obtaining in the material life of the time, in the conflict existing between the social forces of production and the social relations of production. A social formation never passes away before all the productive forces immanent within it have had time to develop themselves, and new and higher relations of production never establish themselves before the material conditions of their existence have already been formed within the womb of the old society. Hence mankind only sets itself tasks that it can accomplish, for if we consider the matter carefully we shall find that the problem to be solved never arises except where the material conditions of its solution are already present, or at least where they are already in process of realizing themselves. In their broader outlines, oriental, classical, feudal and modern modes of production may be designated as progressive epochs in the economic formation of society. The *bourgeois* relations of production are the last of the antagonistic forms of the social process of production, antagonistic, not in the sense of individual antagonism but of an antagonism arising out of the social conditions underlying the life of individuals. They are created by the productive forces developing themselves within the womb of *bourgeois* society, which forces create at the same time the material conditions for the resolution of the antagonism thus created. With the present social formation, therefore, the introductory period of the history of human society is closed.

The above is the classical formulation of what may be termed the orthodox Socialist doctrine of the philosophy of history, as accepted in its main features by the bulk of the Socialist party throughout the world. It is scarcely necessary to say that ethics, as pertaining to the ideological side of human affairs is, as regards its evolution, explained by the doctrine in question with reference to the economic phases of the various epochs

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of social progress, and, more directly, as the outcome of the class antagonisms which are the immediate product of these economic forces and relations.

Now of the enormous amount of truth contained in the above doctrine no impartial student of history can be in doubt. The fact of the change which takes place in all the relations of human life, be they intellectual, æsthetic or moral, concurrent with, or following close upon, any great change in the mode of the production and distribution of the wealth of a given society, is undeniable. Marx was the first thinker to recognize this crucial truth of social progress. It is now taken account of by all historians of importance. The only question that may be raised is as to the universal applicability of the category of cause and effect to relations between the material-economic basis and the "higher" aspects of human life—a universal applicability, which is apparently assumed by Marx himself, and certainly by many of the present day exponents of the doctrine in question. That a direct causal connection is legitimately traceable in a large number of cases where it is least suspected not only by the ordinary man but also by many who lay claim to the appellation of thinkers and scholars, is undoubtedly true. Yet without in any way denying or minimizing this truth, it is also, I think, arguable that the totality of social progress cannot be interpreted by any theory of economic fact as the *sole* determining cause, in the sphere of intellectual and moral relations. This position has been maintained on more than one occasion by the present writer, both in this country and on the Continent, as against the partisans of the more strictly orthodox Marxian doctrine. The position I have contended for finds throughout human development *ab initio* a double line of causation, that of material, chiefly economic, condition, and that of human intelligence *per se,* or psychological condition. Progress has two roots, not one. Each of these constitutes a causal series of its own, but it is in the reciprocal action *(Wechselwirkung)* of both these

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elementary series on each other that the reality we call human evolution, or social progress, is constituted. This modification of the Marxian doctrine as originally formulated is, I think, necessitated by a more thoroughgoing analysis of the whole conditions. To enter more fully upon the larger question in all its ramifications would, however, carry us outside the scope of the present article. Let us see the bearing of the foregoing considerations on the problem of ethics, properly so called, in its relation to the general theory of modern socialism.

Ethics, *i. e.*, the principle of moral relation, is, we have said, always concerned, directly or indirectly, with the social relations of men. This is so even under the second phase of the ethical consciousness alluded to in the earlier part of the present article. The concern with human relations it is, which, in the first place, has come in the course of evolution to mark off the sphere of ethics from that of religion. Even where most under the domination of mystical-religious influences of an introspective character, the ethical consciousness does not cease to concern itself, indirectly at least, with the relations and conduct of men with each other and toward society as a whole. It therefore behooves us to consider the essential element in all morality, *i. e.*, in any theory of the duty of the individual toward the society of which he is a member, or, it may be, toward all other sentient beings outside himself. This theory need not be explicitly present as such to the ordinary mind; it may be rather instinctive than explicitly conscious. But it is there none the less as the background of conduct.

Now there are certain lines of conduct which are essential in all societies whatever, however rudimentary their organization may be, while others vary from age to age and from one form of social organization to another. The first represent the root principles of ethics, while the second are, as we may term them, the phenomenal applications of those principles as determined by the conditions of the society in question. The prob-

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lem here is to find out the most general conception, so to say the common denominator, in regard to which all other ethical notions are derivative, together with the principle which that conception presupposes. Can we arrive at such a ground-principle? I think we can, and that, in accordance with the hints of Aristotle and the Greeks, we may track down all ethical notions to being ultimately applications, direct or indirect, of the conception of justice or equity.[2]

If it be asked from what the concept of justice or equity itself is derived, the answer is: It has its root in the principle of sympathy. But sympathy is, *au fond,* an *alogical* principle. It cannot, any more than any other emotion as such, be reduced to logical terms. It is not translatable into thought except in a symbolical manner. Justice, or equity, on the other hand, is essentially a principle of relation, in other words, *a logical* principle. Basing itself on the primal unreasoned emotional factor of sympathy as its postulate, this being the principle of all association in community whatever, justice formulates equality in some sense as the basis of social relations. (Aristotle speaks of justice as being "a sort of equality." The Golden Rule itself is but a statement of the principle in the form of a categorical imperative.) The principle of equality which is identifiable with that of justice applies in the first instance solely, or mainly, to the kinship group, be it larger or smaller, constituting the early tribal community. From this cause the notion of equality becomes obscured

[2] Exception is to be made here, it should be said, of notions special to the mystical-introspective phase of the ethical consciousness and concerning, not the relation of the individual to the society outside of him, but that of the individual to the Divine Being who is assumed to be revealed within him. For the essentially individualist morality of the mystical-introspective phase referred to, while recognizing and, in a manner, absorbing notions derived from the earlier social ethics of tribal humanity, often entirely changes their significance and incorporates with them, as having an equal or even higher validity, notions peculiar to itself. But to these we shall have occasion to refer later on.



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and often lost in the subsequent evolution of society, barbaric and civilized. The primal communal group of which equality was the essential condition gets broken up; individualism enters; distinctions of rank, of wealth, arise, largely owing to the introduction of the institution of slavery in the shape of captives, the members of alien communities taken in war, and other causes. Hence, as just said, the notion of justice, of equitable equality, though always remaining as the groundwork of the ethical consciousness, becomes obscured and distorted in various ways, lapsing for the most part into the position of a "pious opinion," an ideal which it is not even attempted to realize. Or again, it may be conceived as realized under forms altogether foreign to its original conception. With the enlargement and development in complexity of the economic basis of social life, the notion of justice, as above defined, undergoes strange metamorphoses, in accordance with the conditions based on class distinction. With the modification of the idea of justice, the keystone of the whole, all ethical conceptions become changed.

Still more important, perhaps, is the fact that what I have termed in the early part of this article the "larger whole," to which the individual looks up as at once his completion and the supreme end of his conduct, is no longer a natural society with which his whole existence is interwoven, but the supernatural divinity with whom his personality is supposed to stand in direct relation. Hence the ultimate ideal, the final test of all conduct, from being the maintenance and prosperity of a kinship-society, has become the will and glory of a supernatural being. The religious sanction of ethics, in other words, from being social and human, has become personal and theological. It is no longer social custom that decides questions of right and wrong, but sacred oracles, written or otherwise. This is so nominally, at least. But even if in the earlier stages of this phase of the ethical consciousness it is also largely so in reality, it is an obvious

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fact that during the period of civilization (as distinguished from that of the tribal society which preceded civilization) it is the exigencies of the dominant classes of a given society which mainly determine the whole detail of its rules of conduct. It is the morality which is most conducive to the maintenance of the prevailing form of class-society which is covered by the theological sanction and enforced by law and public opinion. That included in this class-morality of the civilized world we should find principles of justice common to all forms of society, goes without saying. But even these are interpreted or explained away in a sense favorable to the needs of the dominant class-society, whenever they come into conflict with the latter. This is one of the important derivative truths emphasized in the doctrine of history proclaimed by Marx and Engels.

The later aspects of this second phase of the ethical consciousness—individualism—which is largely coterminous with the history of civilization up to its latest development in the "Manchester school" doctrine of nineteenth century capitalism, exhibits various and some even apparently contradictory aspects. The ethics of primitive society was, as yet, undifferentiated from its religion. Both were alike social and this-worldly, rather than personal and other-worldly. The transition from early social conditions to those of civilization is everywhere characterized in proportion to the completeness of the change, by the separation of aspects of human life into distinct and often opposing interests. This appears in the material as well as in the intellectual and moral worlds. In the last-named, upon the demarcation of the natural from the supernatural order and of the human from the divine, the subordination of the former to the latter logically followed. To early man the gods were one with nature, and their relations similar to those of human society, or, at least, there was no clear line of cleavage between the two. In the same way every member of the tribal community was at once master and servant, the

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equal of other members of the tribal whole, having a share in the communal possessions and a voice in the ordering of affairs, but at the same time owing allegiance and duties to the tribe itself. With the full disruption of the tribal idea by civilization, a form of religion, as already remarked, obtains, which claims the individual soul for its own province and human morality for a mere department of that province. At the same time with the division of society into classes, in the main into a possessing class and a non-possessing class, religion itself becomes a mere servant of dominant class-interest and fashions morality accordingly, though without, of course, entirely suppressing the notion of equity as its basis, the latter always remaining as a background, however obscured in practice.

In accordance with the foregoing, every social formation, every economic change, implies a modification of ethical no less than of religious conceptions. Thus what was ethically defensible to a feudal baron of the fifteenth century was not so to a non-conformist manufacturer of the nineteenth century. What represented equity to the latter may be viewed with abhorrence by the socialist conscience of the twentieth century. The striking illustration of the interdependence of ethical ideas with the whole social and intellectual life is afforded by the results of missionary efforts to impose a *bourgeois*-Christian standard upon savage races. The savage taken out of tribal conditions, even though they may be of a more or less debased sort, does not really appreciate the introspective and personal morality proper to Christian civilization, the net result being that having shed, at the instance of the missionary, his tribal ethics and not assimilating the mixture provided for him by his new father-in-God, he ceases to have any moral principles at all. The converted Kaffir is proverbially to be shunned so far as intimate personal or business relations are concerned. A corresponding phenomenon may be observed in certain anarchists who, while having broken with the

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morality of the *bourgeois* world and being unable to act up to a socialist ethic, partly owing to the conditions of the existing *bourgeois* society not admitting it, and partly owing to their not having themselves grasped the real distinctions between the two, considers himself justified in committing deeds oftentimes of the most undoubtedly criminal character. (This remark, I may observe, is made without prejudice to any view we may hold as to the justifiability of a "terrorist policy" under certain circumstances, which is another question.)

One of the characteristics of the ethical theory proper to the period of civilization is the double character of its individualism. In its original form, as based on mystical religion, it was introspective and mystical in its character. And this character it has continued to retain nominally up to the present day. But with the growth of the world of modern industry and commerce, another individualist morality has grown up beside it, based on the Manchester-school formula, of "every man for himself and the devil take the hindmost." The original notion of justice which the so-called "ethical" or "universal" religions had taken under their ægis in their own way is here almost completely cast to the winds in favor of the principle of frank self-seeking. This principle is only modified by the sheer necessities of even a commercial community, for no society whatever can hold together without a recognition of the ethical principle of equity in some shape. This Manchester-school conception of individualist ethic, although only formulated first in the early nineteenth century, has been present tacitly, though not avowedly, in different guises throughout the whole period of civilization. For the mystico-introspective ethic was too indirect in its relation to everybody social life to influence the conduct of the mass of men continuously. Hence the attitude of these so-called "spiritual" religions, of which Christianity is the typical expression, though equally individualistic in its own way, was, more often than not, in practical life a dead letter,

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and its place taken by this other individualist attitude of mere personal egoism.

We have spoken of a new ethical attitude which has begun to show itself, more or less noticeably, within the last generation or thereabouts. It consists in a rehabilitation of social life as the sphere and object of ideal (or "religious," if you will) sentiment and its resulting ethical principles of conduct. Hence it is, as already said, utilitarian, but in the broadest sense of the word. As such it opposes itself to the narrow individualistic utilitarianism—the business-morality of the Manchester school. At the same time it is equally out of sympathy with the introspective-mystical frame of mind and the ethical attitude which immediately results from it. The self-communings and aspirations toward the supersensible holiness of an Augustine, or of the pietist generally in all ages, have lost their savor, nay, have no meaning for it. Its highest ideal is political and social rather than personal and spiritual. In this, its immediate aim is the realization here below of that notion of Justice which we have seen is the one immutable center in ethics, as being common, in some sense, to all phases of the ethical consciousness. This we may term the negative formulation by the *logical* understanding of the intrinsically *alogical* emotion of *sympathy*. But there is also a positive representation in the sphere of the same logical understanding of this basic emotion. It is expressed in the notion of brotherhood. This forms the more positive ideal which it is also the aim of the new ethic to realize. Finally, both of these principles alike presuppose freedom, *i. e.*, noncoercion from without, of the individual as of society, in the development of each.

Hence we have once more the old republical triune-principle of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity. This principle which I have endeavored to show forms the theoretical foundation of all ethical conduct it is which Socialism makes its own in a special sense. It does not do so merely in the sense of adopting it as an ideal to be

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striven for, well knowing the while that it is impossible of attainment—as a mere "pious opinion." In this sense it has been adopted by the old Republicanism. But Socialism claims for the first time in history to furnish the possibility for its realization. Hitherto material circumstance, economic condition, in short the constitution of society, have stood in the way of this and condemned it to remain no more than a phrase.

What I have termed the new Ethic, implicitly, where not avowedly and in so many words, bases the test of conduct and the standard of moral aspiration upon social utility. That this is so is illustrated by the fact that well-meaning people from out the various Christian sects are proclaiming "true Christianity" to consist, not, as was conceived aforetime, in a mystical relation of the individual soul to the Divinity, but in working for the amelioration of the masses and for a higher social state, it matters not what may be the means by which they think to further this state. The change in the attitude of the religious sects in this connection is very significant. It may be readily tested by opening a modern up-to-date book by a representative man of almost any of the leading Christian bodies, and comparing it with a corresponding book of homiletic reflections of a previous age, even of half a century ago, when the new wine with which it is nowadays attempted to infuse the old bottles becomes strikingly apparent.

This new or third of the salient phases of the ethical consciousness, which is noticeable in a vague and indefinite way amongst serious-minded persons in general, acquires in Socialism its full content and a definite meaning. Its negative side is as important to grasp as its positive —that which differentiates it from the other phases of the ethical consciousness, as the positive tendencies of its new point of view. Moral notions belonging to the earlier phases must inevitably, as survivals, tend to become rudimentary in this new phase, especially when the material conditions which it implies, and for which modern

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Socialism as a politico-economic movement stands, shall have become realized.

This point is important in view of the accusations brought by politically interested persons against socialism, anent "Atheism" and "Free Love." Absurd as the statements often made by these enemies of socialism are in themselves, yet the fact that they are sufficiently plausible to be worth making at all is due to their having a certain basis of truth. For example, on the one side, socialism, it is alleged, involves Atheism. On the other hand it is pointed out with perfect truth that no declaration of speculative belief or disbelief is demanded of socialists by any party-program. But this disclaimer, although technically correct, does not really dispose of the question. The fact remains, not merely that the whole tradition of Socialism and of the popular proletarian movement which is the material basis of Socialism, as it is understood to-day, is anti-theological, but that the whole theoretical foundation on which Socialism is built up is that of modern science, with its sole recognition of fact and law, and the supreme authority of human reason operating on the results of experience, in the affairs of human life. Hence it is necessarily altogether outside the introspective supernaturalism which has played so prominent a part in various periods of civilization. No less is it outside the naïve supernaturalism of primitive man. This attitude it shares in common with what is known as the "modern spirit" and modern thought in general. What distinguishes Socialism in this respect is that while the average cultivated *bourgeois* finds it necessary to give a certain outward and formal homage to creeds and cults which no longer represent his real convictions, the Socialist frankly recognizes the intellectual change that has reduced these to absurdity. The hypocrisy and lip-homage of the *bourgeois* in this connection, largely the result of the notion that the old creeds are necessary bulwarks of existent society, is naturally repellent to a socialist who aims at the radical transformation

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of existent society. The difference in this respect between the Socialist and the average educated *bourgeois* is not so much one of real conviction as of the import of that conviction in practical life. In a word the Ethic of Socialism has not only no need of a personal Deity, but may well find a personal Deity in the way. Hence naturally it cannot admit religious dogma to be either necessary or desirable for "the masses."

Similarly as regards the question of so-called "Free Love." The theological ethic of introspection, whatever form it took, has always regarded sexual relations, as such, with repulsion and hostility. On the precise grounds and origin of this attitude much may be, and has been, written. But these do not concern us here. It suffices for our purpose to note the fact, which is incontestable, and to point out that the reasons for this attitude unquestionably flow from the general speculative position occupied by introspective mysticism. Now principles of conduct originating in a speculative position that has been abandoned naturally lose their force. But there is an additional reason, corresponding to that just mentioned as regards traditional creeds, why existing *bourgeois* society should cling to these principles even apart from the speculative theory which is their only logical support, and that reason is—setting aside inherited sentiment—purely economic in its nature. A distinction has never yet been drawn between the sexual relation *per se* and its social results in the bringing of new members into the community. It is here that the politico-economic significance of the matter comes in. In a society based on private property-holding, it is clear that the production of offspring must be taken cognizance of, or regulated, with a view to the cost of maintenance, etc. The confused state of public opinion as to the true meaning of sexual ethics is appalling. The average man mixes up sentiment derived from the introspective-theological *Weltansicht* with considerations having the reason of their being in the

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exigencies of modern capitalistic civilization. Yet to attain a scientific view of the subject, the first necessity is to clearly distinguish the several strains which go to make up the sentiment of existing public opinion on the subject. If we do this with impartial care we shall probably be driven to the conclusion that the sexual relation *per se,* like any other animal function, does not really come within the province of ethics at all, understanding by ethics the new phase of the ethical consciousness for which the standard of conduct is direct social utility. As tested by this standard, I repeat that the sexual relation *per se* would seem to occupy neutral ground. Of course any action, however neutral in itself, may readily, owing to conditioning circumstances, be brought into the sphere of ethical judgment and thus take on a definitely moral or immoral color, as the case may be. And so it is here. The most obvious and comprehensive of these conditioning circumstances in the domain of sexual conduct is, of course, the production of offspring. The difference between the logical attitude of the older introspective-theological ethics as regards this question, and the logical attitude of the new social ethics, lies in the fact that for the former the sexual relation was *per se* moral or immoral, while for the latter it only becomes so *per aliud, i. e.,* owing to conditions external to itself as such.

The change implied in the aim of social democracy involves then the shifting of ethical judgment in various directions. For example, so far from, as is sometimes alleged, tending to weaken the moral responsibility of the individual, it will tend in many ways to give it backbone. As things are in the present social order, organized, as it is, for the *coercion of men* rather than the *administration of things,* on a bureaucratic basis, we find the bureaucrat or functionary separated into two moral selves. His character as man is entirely severed from his character as functionary. Now a socialistic society organized primarily for the *administration of things* rather than

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for the *coercion of men* would have naught of such a severance as this, which is repellent even to the aspirant to such a society. We often hear it said, in exculpation of some act of intrinsic cruelty or injustice, as dictated, it may be, by law, policy or expediency, such a one "was only doing his duty" (as judge, military commander or what-not). A socialist would not recognize official "duty" as ever having the priority over human conscience or ethical duty. The judge who deprived a fellow-creature, brought up before him in the course of his functions, of liberty or life because an evil law he was supposed to administer made him do so, there is little doubt would be execrated by a healthy socialist public opinion. The public opinion of the *bourgeois* world, by way of exception, sanctioned this ethical position on one memorable occasion. I refer to the trial and execution of Fouquier Tinville for the part he had taken in his official capacity as *procureur* of the Revolutionary Tribunal, in giving effect to Robespierre's law of Prairial during the Terror. In this case, owing to the exceptional circumstances, it suited the book of the dominant classes to act in opposition to the principle of ethical duality usually invoked by them. This they carried to the length of criminally arraigning Fouquier Tinville, refusing to accept his plea that he acted as ordered by his government in accordance with the duty imposed upon him by his office. That they should have done this is extremely significant as a precedent.

The above is only one among many instances of the manner in which the new ethic—the Socialist Ethic of human solidarity—would traverse the judgments and distinctions prevalent in the world of modern Capitalism. The latter has molded the plastic substance of the individualistic ethic as handed down to it, for its own purposes. There are many other ways in which present-day moral notions must inevitably be modified, as the reader will see for himself. I have merely mentioned this one as indicating one direction, at least, in which increased

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responsibility would be placed upon the individual conscience.

To sum up in a few words the leading positions of the foregoing argument: The moral impulse, as such, is irreducible to anything beyond itself. It is an alogical ultimate, indicating that the meaning of the individual human being is not exhausted within his own personality but reaches out beyond this as an element of some larger synthesis. The nature of any system of ethic is determined by that of the larger whole into which the individual conceives himself as entering, and which he feels to be his truer life, in relation to which he, as an individual, is subordinate.

There are, in the evolution of the moral consciousness, three distinct stages traceable: 1. The ethic of early tribal society, in which the object of the moral relation is the community, of which the kinship-group is the type. At this stage the individual is merged in the social group to which he belongs. 2. Concurrently with the break-up of group-society and the rise of the autonomy of the individual, the moral basis gets shifted. Ethics, instead of implying the relation of the individual to the society without him, tends to become, primarily at least, based on a relationship between the individual, conceived now as a spiritual being or soul, and a spiritual Divinity supposed to reveal himself directly to this individual soul. Ethics now separates itself from religion, while at the same time its ultimate sanction rests in religion. This stage I have termed the individualist-mystical, or the introspective. Its ethical ideal is *personal holiness* as opposed to the older tribal or civic "virtue." As a consequence, in proportion as the mystical or religious sanction is absent, or fallen into the background, does all ethics in this stage tend to become dissolved into mere atomistic individualism. The latter finds its classical formulation in the doctrine underlying the Manchester-school of economics. This second phase of the ethical consciousness has obtained, in one or other of its forms, up to the present day.

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A change, however, is even now making itself felt. 3. The change in question consists in a view of ethics as essentially a social matter. In this respect it represents a return to the view of the early world. But it is a return on a higher plane. The present social ethics has for its object not any limited social whole such as that of early man, but humanity as such.

We have directed attention to the Marxian doctrine, the so-called "materialist theory of history," in its bearing on ethics. The point of view as regards the detail of conduct in each social formation, we have found to be as pointed out by Marx, dictated mainly by the interests of the dominant classes in any given society, though purely ethical conceptions may also react on the economic society itself.

We have traced the fundamental idea at the basis of conscience and of moral conduct to be that of equality or of justice. This again we have pointed out as the root-principle of the revolutionary trinity—Liberty, Equality and Fraternity. But this idea of justice itself we have traced back to its origin in that alogical somewhat, or feeling, termed *sympathy*. This emotion is immediate and absolute, and hence inexpressible in any logical formula.

As to this new ethical attitude we have referred to as already showing itself in modern thought and feeling, and which we have forecast as indicating the dominant trend in the Ethics of Socialism, we have seen it to be the recognition of social and political life, as the object and as embodying the only sanction of conscience. Under Socialistic conditions, as we belive, this fact will be formally acknowledged, and what I have termed the third phase in the evolution of the ethical consciousness will be definitively affirmed. What the detail of the canons of action will be under the new conditions, we cannot, of course, foresee with any completeness. This much, however, we may venture to predict—that some courses of conduct which are to-day regarded as coming within the

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purview of ethics, will cease to have any moral bearing in the society of the future, while other courses of conduct, now regarded as indifferent or even ethically justifiable, will be condemned by the moral law of the time to come.

E. Belfort Bax.

London.

AN EXPERIMENT IN SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS EDUCATION WITHOUT CREED LIMITATIONS—THE ALPHA UNION.

W. R. HUGHES.

WE still use battlefield words to describe the joy of life which comes with personal strivings and advances. We only count to have known what living means in those fields of life where we have ourselves been in the charge and carried the sword unsheathed. The average man turns away from what he believes to be the socialist scheme of life because he sees in it a discharge from this war, which he believes must ever be fought for bread, as for any good thing. In the intellectual world we welcome the fight more eagerly still. There we have the children of our brains to defend; every blow is for our own hearth-fire. And while in this battle we must cling to our own positions more closely than on any other field, we can see here more clearly that gain follows apparent disaster, and that it is by the sword-strokes on both sides that the sparks of truth are struck out. We see, too, that here, in constrast to the industrial battlefield, the foe we smote down yesterday returns undismayed to the attack to-day.

Yet while we know that progress demands the clash of efforts and ideas, we know also that the joy of the fight is only one of the joys of life, and perhaps is the joy that is nearest to a pain. We live also by comradeships, sympathies, agreements, loves. So the varied question ever

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arises: Cannot we mark out our battlefields with plain-set boundaries, and outside those limits meet as friends and comrades? Rather, cannot we see to-day that though we still must fight, yet every honest warrior is on the same side? Or cannot we now at length cease to use our battle-field metaphors? Cannot all our mappings and chartings of the fields of life find us some common and neutral ground, however scanty or empty it may seem at first, where we can rest together and be friends? Ideally the answer is simple. There are few who would not be ready to allow that men, even merely as similar creatures, apart from any theory of brotherhood or organic union, will in some things agree that they are going about the same business. Yet to many a man the fighting side seems to collect all the interest and tang of life. Or we may say that with such a one the strength of the current of his life seems conditioned by the narrowness of its channel. One dogma, perhaps, forms the right bank, and another the left, both too high to be overpeered; yet without them it seems as though the waters would be lost in the sands. A converse type seems to find truth almost too readily in apparently diverse directions, and tends to indirection through too great a readiness to find agreements with others.

We must recognize that each stream of individuality, though it come from the same source, must have its own definite channel, and that these channels will be infinitely diverse. Some will seem to us to wander in circles, and some to head away from the sea. Yet in each may flow the same element, from the great deep to the great deep. Especially shall we find that full agreement cannot be hoped for when we come to the basal beliefs which a man holds about his own place and purpose in the scheme of things. Great men and movements for which the world is ripe, may seem for a time to carry all in their train. Societies and religions, national and continental, may arise and collect their millions of adherents. But, as formal systems, they carry the seeds of their own decay.

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As the number of followers increases so does that following tend to become more nominal, and so do divisions tend to arise. Or glance through the differences that mark the religious principles and guiding ideas of your own little circle of friends and see if you can combine them in one formulation, without destroying for each the warmth and reality that distinguishes his form from all others. On those fundamental principles, steeped in emotion and inexpressible in any form of words, it is both impossible and undesirable to seek for any formal or detailed agreement. Yet we may still ask whether there is not room for an auxiliary machinery for bringing into contact with each other all those who recognize an agreement behind creeds and an essential similarity in experiences of widely differing form. How narrow or definite need an agreement be to bind in comradeship and common work? We know that great men leap over all the barriers, and take the world for their parish and all men as brothers, in fact as well as name. And among the rank and file also, in every body and locality there are many who know well that they are ready to work and to commune with any honest man or woman, whether inside or outside the particular tabernacle to which chance or personal ties have bound them. And if inside churches and societies there are so many whose faith and sympathy are wider than their creed, so also there are many who have refused to join these churches or societies because they find no living power in the watchwords of the sect, and yet who are longing for definite work and comradeship.

Societies and communities aiming at some looser and yet deeper unions are constantly arising, usually on a small scale and in the train of some outstanding personality. Transcendentalists, universalists, mystics, unlabeled souls of insight and sympathy, are found in all quarters. It may be that the course of time is to bring some more permanent means of uniting, for effective common work and growth, all these and other floating

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units. If that is so, and the uniting principle is found expressible in terms, we must recognize that individual lives will still usually demand a plus of personal religion of private form. This will usually be connected with another personality, for a form of words will not take the place of a mother, nor a principle of a saviour. At the same time the uniting belief must be such as to be consistent with and included in each of the more definite formulations.

By some such line of thought we are constantly being led to inquire what is the most definite and at the same time widest statement of guiding belief which will bring together the largest number of real thinkers and workers in the world. Each of us will try to answer the question by analyzing first of all his own fundamental guiding principles and studying the growth of his life and personality; and next by comparing (probably with the aid of a framework provided by the reading of books on comparative religion or the varieties of religious experience) his own history and experiences with those of other men, so far as they can be understood by him.

The Alpha Union is a young society which tries to formulate an answer to the question, and has already set to work to test its solution. Before describing the history of the inception and aims of the Union, let me give at once the foundation of agreement on which it seeks to build. The Alpha Union is an educational union founded on the acceptance by its members of the belief that man is an essentially spiritual and progressive being, and aiming to make this the common and leading principle in working out, theoretically and practically, the development of the individual in the common life. The society is necessarily educational because of the nature of this fundamental agreement. It can also at once be labeled as a society of faith, optimism and anti-materialism. It is also at least capable of including in its ranks all those who have interpreted their own wider development as a growth into or a union with something beyond the material or

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limited individual man—be that something beyond called God, or the Over-soul, or Humanity.

The history of the origin of the Union is an interesting one. To begin at the beginning, we must go back to the year 1851, when there appeared a book by Edward N. Dennys called "The Alpha: or First Mental Principle and Truth-Guide to General Well-being and Progress—a Revelation but No Mystery."[1] This was evidently the work of a man of fine spirit who had set himself to think out from the beginning the problems of life and knowledge, and had succeeded in satisfying himself that he had arrived at simple and rational solutions. The book is cast in the form of a romance, but soon develops into an attempt to formulate the principles of true philosophy in a series of propositions based on the self-consistency of truth. Then follows a number of discussions on various points of metaphysics, religion and ethics which are often valuable, and always in advance of the common opinions of his day. The first suggestion of the Alpha Union occurs in this book in a passage where the author appeals for the formation of a holy league or brotherhood to give to the ignorant and friendless that education or religion which alone will show them the way to rise from their degradation.

The character and teaching of Edward Dennys had a great influence on the late Antony S. Swinton, whose name is chiefly known as the founder (in 1881) and one of the chief supporters of the Land Nationalization Society. Mr. Swinton shared Dennys' view that no social reform was of any permanent value unless it was the outcome of a spiritual view of life. On his death, in 1905, it was found that he had left a sum of £3,000 to his executors "to be expended at their discretion in establishing an educational union on spiritual principles of life as, for example, shown in Dennys' 'Alpha.'" Mr.

[1] Copies of the sixth edition of "The Alpha," issued in 1903 by Williams & Norgate, can be had post free for 2s. 6d. from the Alpha Union, Letchworth (Garden City), Herts, England.

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Swinton also expressed his wish that the chief direction of this work should be undertaken by one of the executors, J. Bruce Wallace, who for many years had been teaching on similar lines with much influence. This task Mr. Wallace undertook, and to him the Union largely owes its present form and tendencies, as well as a great amount of the good it has already accomplished.

The trustees who are administering the fund have already inaugurated the Union, and have explained their ideas as to its scope and objects in an explanatory pamphlet.[2] After an account of the origin of the trust, the pamphlet goes on to make clear that the union aims at spiritual catholicity. It is not a church or federation of churches, but wishes to be an influence which shall help to quicken with a common spirit of new life all churches and societies of which its members form part. In many different ways men and women are brought to the point at which they realize that they are children of an eternal spirit, and can only find life by working in harmony with the evolving process of that spirit; and in many different ways do they describe that consciousness of larger life. When such a faith or consciousness is reached communion and common work become both possible and necessary. The Alpha Union seeks to make channels and instruments for this common work and growth. For, combined with a deeper realization of what man is, comes the quest for a manner of arranging relationships of men on this planet more worthy of the dignity of his spiritual nature. The Union asks for no political uniformity from its members, but expects them to agree at the least that a social system so imperfect and unbrotherly as that of our western civilization must be replaced by one which looks upon the unfoldment of what is involved in every man as its one worthy aim. "In brief," to quote the pamphlet, "the Alpha Union will endeavor to help peo-

[2] A copy of the third edition of this pamphlet (in English or French) can be obtained post free for three halfpence from the Alpha Union office, Letchworth (Garden City), Herts, England.

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ple to clearer thought on both spiritual and social questions. Its members will be banded together primarily for promoting their own and each other's education, and the education of as many as they can influence, in the true understanding of life and in the consequent power to draw upon the Infinite for a life of service worth living.''

The first means used to start the Union was the wide distribution of this pamphlet among those who were thought likely to be agreed on the spiritual basis. No attempt was made to collect a large membership in any wholesale way. The organization is not to be an aggressive one, but aims at providing a means of bringing into contact, or the chance of contact, as many as possible of the progressives of different places and environments, and allowing their grouping or common action to develop as time may suggest. This effort to enroll sympathetic and active members is still going on, and a first list of members (for circulation among themselves only) has been issued. The number of members at present is between seven and eight hundred.

Three other educational instruments have also been brought into use. The Union has a periodical organ in *Brotherhood,* a monthly magazine which has been published regularly for the last twenty-one years by J. Bruce Wallace, in the interest of a peaceful social reconstruction. It has long been treasured by many for its lofty tone and its suggestiveness, and now finds fresh use as a medium for the suggestions and discussions of the members of the Union.

Then the Union has also made good use of the happy means of education known as the summer school. Three of these gatherings were held last summer and were very successful. Two of them (one at Montreux, Switzerland, and the other at Aberystwyth, Wales), were devoted largely to theological discussions and the social message of Christianity, and attracted a great many whose interest in such subjects had been made real by the influence of that tendency in modern Christianity which is typified

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by the Rev. R. J. Campbell's "New Theology." The other and longer school was held at the Garden City, Letchworth, and was devoted mainly to psychological and practical social discussions. At this first Garden City the Alpha Union has for the present fixed its headquarters. There it has had the use of Miss Lawrence's remarkable building known as "The Cloisters," an open-air school designed to provide a fitting home for students of the laws of rational life. Very marked has been the way in which the summer schools already held under the auspices of the Alpha Union have sent the members away full of enthusiasm and fresh ideas, which have been worked out in unexpected ways to fit the conditions of various localities.

Thirdly, the Union is collecting a library of books on all subjects which are deemed to be cognate to its aims. Already over a thousand books have been obtained on such subjects as religion, psychology, ethics, theosophy, mysticism, child-study, social reconstruction and so forth. Members or groups of members are thus put into communication not only with each other but with the seekers and teachers of all times. This library seems to be the only one in England of its kind, and the aim is to make it as inclusive as possible.

With regard to the future development of the Union, it will no doubt at first be largely along the lines already indicated, with perhaps the addition of a little more publishing activity. It is essentially an educational union. But education includes doing, experiment and failure, and experiment and success; so it is expected that other work than that of the study already mentioned will naturally be undertaken by members of the Union, arising out of their common interests or sympathies. No attempt will be made to control any such activities by the central organs of the Union. The formation of groups, either local or for some common object, is encouraged, and several groups have already been formed. Any work they may wish to do must be done entirely on the re-

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sponsibility of the group which, of course, may be increased to any extent from the general membership. In this way it is hoped that the dangers, such as the stifling of minorities, which accompany too detailed an organization, may be avoided.

The Alpha Union has already attracted to itself many (largely young people) who have found it difficult to get elsewhere spiritual comradeship and help, together with sufficient freedom of inquiry. These include some who have been attracted by the glamor of eastern thought; others who have found no help in circles of evangelical thought, which seem to them to belong to a past age; others again who have felt a salvation not out of personal sin, but rather into the earnest social life that is striving toward a new birth for society; there is again a large group of over seventy ministers and clerics (largely from "new theology" circles) whose progressive sympathies have drawn them into the Union. The colorless name which was only chosen for the society because no other that was not clumsy suggested itself, is already taking on the color and warmth that dear associations bring. And if this article is the means of directing any new minds and energies into helpful opportunities of working and growing together, its aim will have been accomplished.

W. R. HUGHES.

LONDON.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

COURS DE MORALE THÉORIQUE ET PRATIQUE. Par L. Dugas, Docteur ès lettres, Professeur agrégé de philosophie au lycée de Rennes. Paris: Henry Paulin et Cie, Editeurs. 1906.

This book (462 pages) aims at being a handbook of moral instruction. The author points out that he does not wish to preach or to edify. He desires "sans soucis de l'édification" to have to do "avec la préoccupation unique de la vérité." He divides his book into two parts. The first he calls "Morale théorique," the second part he calls "Morale pratique." He defines "la Morale" as "la détermination des mœurs idéales, non l'observation, ni l'explication des mœurs réelles." It is a normative science; it lays down rules, while psychology reveals laws. Logic is the science of normal thought; "la Morale" the science of the normal will.

Historically, ethics ("la Morale") has not been independent of metaphysics and religion, but logically and "en droit" it is independent, if by that is meant that it has a method of its own distinct and proper to itself. But ethics and metaphysics act and react, limit and complete each other. In support and elucidation of this M. Dugas remarks: "La Morale, par exemple, doit changer, suivant qu'on croit ou non à l'immortalité de l'âme, au libre arbitre," etc. He further defines "la Morale" as the science of the good (*la science du bien*). The good is an end, and as such, ideal; not empiric and not real.

It is, however, obligatory, and therefore in some degree real. It is grounded (*a son principe*) in human instinct, and is an inspiration and impulse of the heart. The good is ideal in that it is never completely realized, but it is obligatory, and therefore realizable. We learn what it is by being it. "Selon le mot d'Aristote, on devient cithariste en jouant de la cithare." All art is a product of Nature. Good customs existed before systematized morality, which was instinctive before it was rational. Reason reflected on morality and thereby transformed it; out of that which was a generous impulse of the heart reflection made a duty; reason defined, fixed and universalized the good. To elaborate a science is not in the deepest sense to create

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it; the first inspiration, the true invention, came from elsewhere, "du génie spontané, de l'esprit qui souffle òu il veut." It is from a natural impulse of the heart, from a natural love of the good (*sentiment du bien*) that we get the idea of value. This sentiment or natural impulse of the heart toward goodness has a rhythmic development, now full of aspiration, now full of weakness. It is this sentiment, freed from its weakness, which is the ground of morality (*principe de la morale*). Reason does not create this sentiment, nor direct it from the outside; but it enables it to become consistent with itself. The reason, moreover, with which "la Morale" has to do is not so much abstract reason, as practical reason embodied in the experience of life. The moral sentiment formed and developed in the school of life, brought into order and enlarged by reason, is the ground of morality (*principe de la morale*).

Ethics ("la Morale") is then a complex science at once deductive and inductive. Deductive in that it lays down rules and draws conclusions from them, inductive in that it starts from the observation of human life and has regard, in its application of its rules, to sociological and psychological facts. But above all it is dialectic in its method; that is to say, it pushes its principles right back to their source in feeling (*sentiment*); it establishes a standard and vindicates this standard in face of the facts of individual and social life.

This is, almost in his own words, M. Dugas' synopsis of his point of view. He divides his treatise into two parts: (1) "La Morale théorique," by which he explains that he means the theory of duty in itself, the definition of the ideal of conduct for man in general; and (2) "la Morale pratique," by which he means the delineation of duties, particular ends of conduct, a man's duty toward himself, toward his fellows, toward his family, toward his country.

M. Dugas begins his examination of "la Morale théorique" by asking, What is the good? and how do we recognize it? And by way of answer he asks another question, What is the moral conscience in its nature, history and worth?

The moral conscience is one form of our self-consciousness; objectively it is our recognition of the good; subjectively it is our resolution to do or be the good. M. Dugas does not hold that conscience, either in the form of the consciousness of the good or in the form of the good will, exists in all men. There

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are some men "atteints de cécité morale, denués de toute idée de bien et de mal," who yet devote themselves to the culture of the arts and sciences and who are good citizens and good husbands and fathers simply because they like it. Such persons can commit crimes with no sense of guilt and without remorse. The normal conscience is a natural gift—like the perception of beauty—it is developed and illuminated by education; and the good will, in the sense of the resolution to be and to do the good, is the result of habit working on the original gift. So that conscience is at once natural and acquired, its principle or ground exists in human nature and is developed, trained, enlightened and perfected by education and experience.

He then proceeds to analyze the good; rejects hedonism and utilitarianism, but points out that Will opened a "door of escape." Through this door we proceed to the solution that happiness is "un mot magique qui soulève les âmes," but we achieve it best by not thinking of it. Happiness is sought by all men, but all have not the same nature and therefore cannot achieve happiness by the same means. What is desirable is not to fight against that instinct, but to raise our conception of happiness. The question is not whether to seek happiness or not, but where to place happiness.

The chapter which follows, on "Morale du Sentiment," is peculiarly characteristic of M. Dugas' method and position. He defines the "Morale du sentiment" as the "Morale altruiste." He considers this in three different forms: Sympathy, love of approbation (*l'honneur*), and pity. In considering sympathy he quotes at length from Adam Smith, but concludes that sympathy cannot be the adequate "base" of morality; for (1) at times morality requires that one should outrage the feelings of others; (2) the ideal spectator in sympathy with whom Smith describes the moral man as acting, is none other than the man's own conscience, while (3) to found morality on sympathy in Smith's sense is to reduce to nothing conscience, and is to conceive of morality as the result of society (*la vie en commune*) rather than its principle or law.

A great amount of space is given to the examination of the sentiment of honor as a base of morality. "L'honneur" is defined as love of approbation, and is said to be composed partly of fear of public opinion and partly of self-respect. A very high value is given to it in the moral life, but on the whole it is said

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to be, together with sympathy, the objectification of conscience, or the recognition which a man looks for but on which he does not necessarily rely.

Schopenhauer's doctrine of pity has a short examination. Pity, M. Dugas decides, is indispensable to morality; but the selection of it alone as the source of morality he finds arbitrary.

Chapter V gives us perhaps best of all the central conception of M. Dugas' system, and indicates at the same time most clearly the limitation of his thought. The chapter treats of Duty in itself (*le devoir lui-même*). The word Duty is equivocal; it may mean "the thing due," "the good," or it may mean duty "in itself"; that is, "the law that commands us to do the good."

Duty in itself is the law of the individual conscience. "Conscience," says M. Dugas, "does not limit itself to the recognition of the good; it prescribes it and constitutes its law." Rejecting the Kantian conception of duty, as well as the criticism thereof by Schopenhauer, he accepts with whole-hearted approval the following from Höffding: "The idea of duty, as Höffding has well said, cannot be the primary idea in morality. 'Duty is practically a demand (*pose une exigence*), and this cannot arise apart from the idea of end. The idea of end is therefore primarily in morals, and ethics should begin by postulating a conscience which accepts that end.'" The moral end being given, duty presents itself as the command to aim at that end, and persistently to follow it. There can be no conception of end to which this notion of duty is not necessarily attached. It expresses the necessity of detaching one's self habitually from the inclination of the moment, and devoting one's self habitually to an idea prescribed by reason. Duty (p. 73) is to feeling what reason is to instinct; it replaces it without destroying it. Feeling (sentiment) is a natural impulsion, blind and fugitive; duty is the will enlightened and rationalized; feeling is an isolated fact; duty is the law, the orientation of the whole life forever fixed in the direction one time indicated by feeling. From this it follows that duty is not the whole of morality, but represents the stage intermediate between instinctive morality and morality acquired, become the habit of acting according to reason, an observance of duty which thinks no more of duty but has become natural, and is that which Aristotle calls virtue.

In the chapter which follows on the relation of duty to hap-

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piness, we get incidentally a fuller definition of the good than was given us in the chapter devoted to that conception. If happiness be taken for the end of life and duty for the obligation to follow that end, the happiness which is meant must be that element in happiness which lies within our control, and not "happiness in general," which is largely the result of circumstances. It must, moreover, be that happiness which our reason shows us to be best, and not the inclination of the moment. Happiness thus understood is the good. But does this good consist in the fullest life and highest culture of the individual, or in the life that is happiest, though modest and humble? Is it perfection that we aim at or happiness? Happiness we are told is a condition which aspires ever to surpass itself; perfection or the desire for the better is an element in happiness; it is, indeed, of the essence of life. On the other hand, progress is not in itself a good; it must be conceived as producing happiness, or it does not commend itself to us. So that the good is really a synthesis of activity and happiness, of progress and order. We now see that the good is not an intuition *a priori,* but a product of human wisdom, evolved by experience and reason.

Such, M. Dugas says, is the form of the good. To its content he devotes three and a half pages. Is it the perfection of the individual considering society as his milieu? Or the progress of society, considering the individual as its agent? The answer is: It is neither. The individual and society exist "l'un par l'autre and non l'un pour l'autre." The good, however, is said finally to reside in personality, which is alone capable of feeling pleasure and pain, and is the sole vehicle of conscience; and as such it is individual, but as the individual can live and develop only in society his good has always a social aspect.

Thirty-six pages are devoted to the analysis of the idea of responsibility, but of these only a very small portion is occupied with the question of moral freedom. It is taken almost for granted that a man is responsible who in his act is free from external constraint, or from abnormal personal condition (as sleep-walking or mental derangement), and who is aware of what he is doing. Responsibility is relative to freedom of the will and degree of the intelligence. The greater part of the discussion addresses itself to such questions as: To whom are we responsible? and, In what does responsibility consist? By this

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latter question M. Dugas seems to mean, what do we pay, or win, in case our act is judged good or bad. For he replies, "Responsibility consists in merit or demerit, or in the sanctions, pain or praise." There are three tribunals before whom a man is judged. These are the legal court, public opinion and his own conscience. Of these a man's conscience is the ultimate, not only as the only judge who can wholly know the quality of a man's act, but also as the sole and adequate ground of the man's acceptance or rejection of the justice of the "sanctions" of the courts or public opinion. Finally, says M. Dugas, responsibility is nothing but the feeling of our personal worth diminished or increased, or the feeling of the justice of the sanctions by which our merit or demerit is confirmed.

It has at times an effect almost suffocating to have so much time spent in considering the question of merit or demerit. But it would be unjust to M. Dugas not to say that he points out that as morality develops and character is ennobled, less and less thought is bestowed on "merit" and "sanction." He also attributes the recognition of the justice of sanction in the case of punishment to the sense of the need of the expiation of personal guilt, and remarks that this is necessary to the man's moral regeneration. This is a remarkable statement in a treatise as studiously non-religious as it is non-metaphysical in its ultimate arguments.

The first part, "Morale théorique," closes with a chapter on solidarity, which is part of the analysis of responsibility. Throughout this chapter M. Dugas seems to write with strong feeling. He is incensed at the effect of the modern doctrine of solidarity which, in emphasizing the thought of the individual as a product of his time, race and circumstances, tends to relieve or rob the individual of merit or of blame—in a word, of responsibility. He denounces "la théorie de la réversibilité des fautes et des merites" (Joseph de Maistre) as "simplement monstreuse." The true sentiment of solidarity is for M. Dugas, but an extension of individual responsibility, as in the perception of the law of inheritance and in the observation of the "repercussion" and action and interaction of social facts. An individual is not responsible for any social consequences of his act except in so far as he foresaw and willed those consequences. A society is not responsible except in so far as any group of persons wills an act which was fully understood and willed by

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each member of the group. Moreover solidarity is reciprocal, in the sense that a man only owes duties to others if the others recognize and discharge duties to him; and can only claim with justice his rights when he is discharging all his duties.

It would be perhaps unjust to call M. Dugas' system individualistic. But it is nevertheless true that his warmest enthusiasm, and he is very enthusiastic, is always called forth by the individual aspect of morality. Certain points in his thought, moreover, give the impression that his conception of the individual is perhaps to some extent atomistic. The center of his system is the individual conscience. This is not regarded as the result of the interaction of human minds (society), each individual point of consciousness being an identical power of self-distinction and self-identification depending for its being as much on the not-self or the other-self, as on the self (if there is any sense in which the self exists apart from the not-self). Society may educate (for M. Dugas) the individual conscience. But the conscience is something "given."

It is perhaps this same element in his thought which enables him to talk of natural-right as *le droit de l'homme*, "en tant qu'homme, non en tant que citoyen d'un état" (p. 235), and which causes him to found natural right, not on anything which can be found in the *nature* of man, but on that which is most "mysterious and unknown" in him, *viz.*, on his possibilities of development. Very abstract and negative is his idea of liberty: "Liberty is the right to do anything which is not injurious to others" (p. 234). Very abstract and empty is his notion of duty-in-itself as abstracted from all particular duties. In discussing and defining duty-in-itself, M. Dugas inevitably makes this unfortunate term assume a number of different meanings. At one time it is the perception of any good, at another the perception of the morally good, or that which the man has learnt to judge morally desirable. At another time it becomes the moral imperative, that is, the logical necessity of a conscious creature aiming at a goal. Yet again it is the trained habit of aiming at the goal of the good, and finally the good will or the good character of the man in whom this habit has become "second nature." M. Dugas does not use this term "second nature." But it seems to express his thought. Nothing could be further from his thought than the idea that in

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the thoroughly moralized will the man has simply found his own true nature. The law of conscience, "Thou shalt do the thing thou seest to be good," is never represented as the ultimate and inevitable necessity of human nature as such. It is not represented as involved in the judgment "this is good." It is never represented as the inevitable condition of the man's realizing his nature as a member of a community.

"La Morale Pratique" contains a multitude of wise and balanced judgments. But they impress one, when they are really practical, as the judgments of an enlightened common sense, rather than as the outcome of any particular philosophical principles.

The style of the book is throughout delightful; many passages in the second part are of an almost passionate eloquence.

MARY GILLILAND HUSBAND.

London.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, AN OUTLINE AND SOURCE BOOK. By Edward Alsworth Ross. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd.

This book is described by its author as "the pioneer treatise, in any language, professing to deal systematically with the subject of social psychology." It is the first text-book written for students by a teacher of the science indicated by the chapter headings: "Suggestibility," "The Crowd," "Mob Mind," "Conventionality," "Custom," "Compromise," "Public Opinion," and the like, and as an introduction it has several merits. It is easy reading, fresh, vigorous and provocative. Every chapter is crammed with illustrations from the most varied sources, and ends with a collection of delightful "exercises." We quote at random, "Does the science of history foster the conservative spirit?" "Compare the big university with the small college in power to form and refine the student," and "Trace in detail the route by which a Parisian style reaches your neighbors." The illustrations look sometimes as if they had hardly been sufficiently sifted and tested; there is a suspicious-looking statement in the footnote to page 217, and the author quotes sometimes from second-rate or fifth-rate writers without making his own estimate of the matter sufficiently distinct; instance pages 162-3, 177-8, 306. But in the present state

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of the science, and for the purpose of an introduction, the number and variety of his selections is a fault on the right side.

Professor Ross asks for criticism and his book is good enough to deserve it. Two points in particular strike the reader. The first is the imperative need of better arrangement. The contents of the chapters not only overlap but are inextricably entangled with one another, whilst the summaries and marginal headings of the same chapters often emphasize the looseness of the internal cohesion of each. Yet of course difficulties of arrangement are the chief difficulties of the science as a whole, and the present writer, after a good deal of thought, is quite unable to suggest any definite plan by which improvement could be made. The second point is the general impression which the book leaves, of too close an approach to a "thin rationalism." Every here and there we find statements which tend the other way, but they are not numerous or emphatic enough to balance the rest. One significant phrase is found on page 296: "After a mind has been purged from all regard for prestige, imitation proceeds on a rational basis." Another is on page 197: "Imitation marks the outcome of a spirited struggle" between parent and child. Custom "cakes round" and confines us: "a religious ferment emancipates souls, but out of it dogmas soon crystallize and close in upon the mind." Are these metaphors equal in all-round truth to the older one of the skeleton which the living body forms within itself? The last three pages of the book are in this aspect the worst, and they are very bad. What one desires throughout is a more constant recognition of the value of custom and convention in forcing every individual to begin at something near the full height of his race; of "heterogeny of ends;" of the complexity of human motives, and the finer motives and love of finer things growing up behind the shield of behavior enforced by other means. Above all, we desire more emphasis on the nature of individual freedom, as it is found in the man who has entered into the whole of the spiritual heritage which his world has to give, who possesses it because he is possessed by it and can now grow in it and beyond it. The lack of such constant recognition and such emphasis is the chief fault in the book.

HELEN WODEHOUSE.

University of Birmingham.

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ENTWICKLUNGSWERTTHEORIE. ENTWICKLUNGSÖKONOMIE. MENSCHENÖKONOMIE. Eine Programschrift von Rudolf Goldscheid. Leipzig, 1908. Verlag von Dr. Warner Klinkhardt. Pp. xxxvi, 218.

The present volume, while it is designed as part of a general treatise laying the foundations of sociology, may very well, the author thinks, stand as a whole by itself. It is directed especially to those interested in economics; and, since he takes the foundation of sociology to be economical, this means that it contains his distinctive doctrine.

The "development value" referred to in the title, while it is meant to be understood in an economic sense, is conceived as the end of all social effort. "Development-economy" means that the end is to be arrived at by the most economical methods. "Economy of men" indicates that some better mode of progress must be right than the unexampled work of human life, of human health and of human capacity for individual development that goes on in the capitalistic order of society. Selection by elimination of the unfit is a crude and primitive method of social advance. The Malthusian basis of Darwinism must be transformed. Instead of saying that excessive production of lives is checked by destructive agencies, it should say rather that great rapidity of multiplication is the means by which a species preserves itself from extinction when the destructive agencies to which it is exposed are many and powerful. To lay stress on this kind of selection is to make evolution a conservative principle; maintenance of an existing type being regarded as the best possible result. Darwinism rightly interpreted is revolutionary. Its essence is in the doctrine of variability. Positive new values arise from time to time, not in "evolutionary" fashion if this is taken to mean that they arise as from a germ in which all can be seen prefigured, but "epigenetically." Epigenetic production of modifications that cannot be foreseen gets freer play when the waste involved in the primitive kind of struggle diminishes, when lives are regarded as themselves "values" and preserved as such. Capitalism, with its looking to external goods, neglects the lives that produce those goods. What is material to it in regard both to goods and to lives is that they should fetch a price, should yield a profit. "Price" is its determining concept.

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The determining concept of the newer socialistic economics must be that of value as distinguished from price. And values are not only material but also intellectual or spiritual. These last are the higher values.

Thus brought together, the general views seem to me not to constitute an economic theory in the ordinary sense, but rather a kind of evolutionary ethics with economic application. Sometimes the author seems to be on the point of admitting this; but again and again, in his anxiety to meet "non-moral" advocates of capitalism on their own ground, he insists that he is not surreptitiously introducing ethical considerations, that all his positions are ultimately economical, that the capitalistic economy is therefore upheld from its own principles. Man himself is an economic value; the products of intellectual work are economic values. Economy implies reference to an end and not only to an ultimate end, but to a system of coördinated values in relation to this. The ultimate end is that the power of the organic over nature should be heightened. This is not to be achieved by recklessly sacrificing individual lives for profit with mere substitution of the manufactory for the arena. In the process of modern industrialism the quality at once of the products and of their human producers is lowered, only their quantity being increased. But to approve wasteful methods of this kind, which have no use for the finer products, is not necessarily "ethics;" for an ultimate value with a system of coördinates is implied in all practical judgments.

To this I take the reply to be that the highest system of coördinates relative to practice, whatever it may be, needs a name, and that the name for this can only be ethics. The rule for action cannot even be called sociological; for sociology is a descriptive or explanatory science, not a nonactive science or a practical art. What real advantage is there in trying to substitute some other statement for this if it is perfectly sound theoretically? To neglect the distinction between ethics and politics (arts or nonactive sciences), sociology (the science of the whole of society), and economics (the science of the industrial mechanism), can result only in confusion. If we like, no doubt we can interpret all social phenomena with reference to "wealth" in some sense; but is there not danger that in the long run the gainers by the confession would be the representatives of the narrower doctrine? Economical terms may

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be stretched for a time, to conciliate a fashion for which "efficiency" is a more inspiring word than humanity or justice, but sooner or later they will revert to their obvious meaning.

But the present period, the author would reply, is preeminently occupied with the economic aspect of life; and his view, it must be allowed, gives him an opening for effective polemic. To a considerable extent he can retort with success on the narrow economists. What is now called industrial "production," he shows, is very frequently destructive, not only of human lives (a matter of comparative indifference to capitalism) but of the stored-up resources of the planet. Energy is being converted, with utter disregard of real needs as long as profit can be made, into its unavailable forms—forms which at least will never be available again for human life on earth. Now this is, in a true and obvious sense of the term, "uncommercial." If it cannot be called "uncommercial," this accentuates the difference between the economics of "price" and of "value." "Price," the author recognizes, is fundamental for the present industrial order. An account of the causation of events in the existing world of commerce can be given in terms of it. But, he goes on to show, this does not mean that no other system of economic science is conceivable. A different ordering of social ends or values would necessarily require a different science of means. This it has been his aim partly to work out. That the conception here is quite sound I admit; only the science in question appears to me in both cases alike subordinate, not the supreme social science. And the new economics must evidently remain extremely vague until the new humanistic order exists to which it has to be conceived as subordinate.

As regards methods of advance to the better order, I do not find any very definite scheme. The ideal system is to be international, and on this ground is opposed to "political," in its sense of "national" economy. For the struggle between nations for dominance is to be substituted emulation in the production of higher economic values. This is regarded as a necessary condition for the application of the true system of economic means as between individuals within the same nation. Individual freedom being recognized as an "economic value" of the highest kind, there can be no thought of a jealous social supervision over the means employed by each person. What is to be aimed at is the formation of a feeling of responsibility in relation to

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economic development. Yet private property, both "individual" and "national," is excluded from the ideal order. Here difficulties present themselves on each side. How is the distribution of tasks to be carried through in the absence of individual property without a very coercive form of social organization? And, on the other hand, if appeals to "moral conscience" have failed, is an appeal to "das entwicklungsökonomische Verantwortlichkeitsgefühl" likely to be more successful?

With the general spirit of the book I am in agreement; but it seemed desirable to draw attention to some points of theoretical difference, the solution of which, the author will agree, is among the things that have the highest social value.

T. WHITTAKER.

London.

THE SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM. The Gifford Lectures, delivered in the University of Aberdeen in the year 1907. By Hans Driesch, Ph. D. Vol. I. London: A. & C. Black.

This volume deals entirely with the Science of the Organism. It is the first time that the Gifford Lectures have been given by a biologist, and it will not be surprising if one hears people complain that the first year's course seems to be irrelevant and to add nothing to our knowledge of natural theology. The critics, however, will be premature in forming such a judgment in spite of the fact that the whole of the present volume, as well as the first half of the next, when it appears, will be found to discuss purely biological topics. This apparent irrelevancy is inevitable, for the lecturer can only explain the philosophical implications of biology to an audience which has some knowledge of the general results of that subject. It will, therefore, be only in the light of the Philosophy of the Organism as presented in Volume II that anyone is capable and qualified to discuss the value of the present lectures. The aim throughout the whole course is the Philosophy of the Organism, and in all the chapters devoted to biology proper the materials are selected and arranged, not according to the manner of biological text-books, but according to the bearing they have upon philosophy.

In the introductory program the author indicates the general

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plan of the lectures, as determined by their philosophical aim. Biology proper has three aspects—*biological laws, biological systematics, and biological history.* In their present state of development, no conclusions really useful for philosophical discussion can be gained from the two latter branches. In consequence they are treated in this volume merely as a second appendix to the nomothetic work. The book is further planned out in relation to the three different kinds of fundamental phenomena which living bodies invariably present. They are all specific as to *form,* they exhibit *metabolism,* and they *move.* Of these characteristics, organic form and organic movement are most intimately associated with philosophical questions, form particularly occupies the very center of biological and philosophical interest. Volume I is, therefore, mainly concerned with the nomothetic study of the science of living form. To this two appendices are added. The first treats of the physiology of metabolism, or what is commonly called the physiology of the vegetative functions; the second deals primarily with systematics and leads on to a sketch of biological history, the theory of evolution and the logic of history in general. The lectures of 1908, and the corresponding Volume II, will complete the Science of the Organism with the study of organic movement. Dr. Driesch will then present his Philosophy of the Organism as the result of this scientific analysis. It is very unfortunate that the table of contents gives absolutely no clue to the arrangement of the work. The latter would gain much in intelligibility if the table were made to indicate the general plan of the lectures, as stated later. So far as Volume I goes, the only result of philosophical significance is the concept of the autonomy of life, "autonomy" in the sense of being subject only to the laws of one's own being and which, in tribute to the genius of Aristotle, the author calls "Entelechy." The conclusion arrived at is, therefore, that biological events are specific and elementary in their nature; they cannot be explained by chemistry, physics or any type of mechanism. Of this two proofs are given, the first in conection with the study of organic form, the second in connection with the study of inheritance.

It would seem to be essentially the function of the biologist to criticize this volume. He would doubtless deal fully with the author's brilliant researches in experimental morphogenesis, as well as with his conclusions on such subjects as Darwinism

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and Lamarchism, both of which theories he regards as failing all along the line. The philosopher could have little to say except upon the subject of the first few pages. He would certainly deny the right of physics to be described as a true philosophy of nature, as he would deny that it is within the legitimate sphere of chemistry to advance an ultimate theory of matter or of biology to solve the problem of the relations between mind and body. In the well-known words of Mr. Bradley, "When phenomenalism loses its head and, becoming blatant, steps out as a theory of first principles, then it is really not respectable. The best that can be said of its pretensions is that they are ridiculous."

It will only be possible at the end of the second year's course to determine whether we must render any gratitude to Dr. Driesch for strengthening that spiritual view of the universe which already owes so much to the founder of the Gifford Lectures.

M. Lightfoot Eastwood.

Bolton, England.

The Concepts of Philosophy. By Alexander Thomas Ormond. New York: The Macmillan Co.

To many of those who have been steeped in the *minutiæ* of recent philosophical discussion, Prof. Ormond's book will appear refreshingly old-fashioned—old-fashioned in its form and method, if not in its insight. The fact that nearly all of our current philosophical writers are academic teachers who must not trespass on their colleagues' fields, has caused the disappearance of the old idea of philosophy as a *Weltanschauung* or as the completed and criticised system of human knowledge. It is assuming more and more the humbler position of a particular discipline dealing with certain technical problems such as the nature of truth, the relation between ideas and reality, etc. To Prof. Ormond, however, philosophy is not one among a number of sciences, but rather the synthesis of metaphysics and all the special sciences with religion. Indeed it is the very specialization of the sciences, leading as it does to an "eclipse of faith in the unity of truth" and to a disintegration of the elements of culture, that calls for philosophy as a "discipline whose special business it shall be to investigate the grounds and prin-

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ciples of the whole body of truth with a view to its unity and meaning as a whole" (p. 3).

Prof. Ormond writes in a leisurely fashion, and his volume contains over seven hundred pages. It is divided into three parts, called respectively Analysis, Synthesis and Deductions. The first part is intended to establish the standpoint of metaphysics; *viz.,* that of consciousness. The whole and part relation of mathematics proves itself inadequate as an ultimate explanation, and gives way to the category of ground and phenomena in physics. The latter in turn leads to the category of purpose, "a term which connects idea with interest and will, and through these with realizing efficacy" (p. 59). The second part of the book surveys, from this standpoint, the fields of physics, biology, psychology, sociology, ethics and religion, and attempts to build up the doctrine of an eternal consciousness as the ultimate principle of unification. The third part contains the applications of this view to the doctrines of nature, of God, of men, of human destiny, etc.

In the philosophy of religion which is thus developed, ethics does not play a very important *rôle.* It forms no part or stage of Prof. Ormond's dialectic; and the two chapters devoted to strictly ethical problems might have been omitted without materially affecting the main argument. Nevertheless these two chapters contain some very important discussions, and are typical of Prof. Ormond's method.

He begins by pointing out that the ethical is a form of the reflective social consciousness. As society develops, ideals become more definitely conceived and subjective selection assumes the more complex forms of satisfaction and dissatisfaction. These involve judgments of approbation and disapprobation. Ethical judgments are a species of the genus judgments of approbation and disapprobation. The differentia is to be found in the fact that the ethical ideal differs from other social ideals by its authoritativeness and by the fact that it imposes itself only through the assent of our own will (p. 341).

From this point of view are discussed the three fundamental categories of ethics, *viz.; ought, right and good.* Prof. Ormond accepts the Kantian analysis of the ethical judgment as unconditionally obligatory, and rejects the current evolutionist explanation which develops its imperative character out of various forms of objective control, such as the sanctions of the state,

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the force of public opinion, etc. It is undoubtedly true that objective controls tend to become also inner and subjective but this does not explain the categorical or unconditional character of the ethical judgment. In his own explanation Prof. Ormond starts out with the recognition that in its general form the sense of obligation is a late development of the moral consciousness. "Conscience must wait on a fully developed social consciousness." But even in the most undeveloped societies the pressure of the moral imperative shows itself in certain concrete situations. Instead, therefore, of giving us a deduction of obligation in general, Prof. Ormond takes two virtues, *viz.*, justice and truthfulness, and attempts to derive their categorical character from the nature of the social consciousness itself. "We feel the obligation to be just because justice is an immediate implication of our social sense of community." The "equating social self" requires "that all units shall share equally in this common life and interest" (p. 351). Similarly truthfulness arises from the demand of the social consciousness that our legitimate expectations shall be fulfilled (*ibid.*).

The categories of *right* and *good* are concepts of the content of ethical obligation. "In its details obligation enjoins justice, truthfulness, honesty and the rest. But as a whole and in its unity it enjoins an ideal of action which, taken as a whole, embodies the conduct of an ideal self" (p. 354). The right is the codification of the kinds of conduct thus enjoined. The good, on the other hand, is a category of feeling; and its content may be summed up in one term, *viz.*, happiness. The difficulty that happiness and misery in themselves are wholly non-ethical is met by identifying the ethical good with "the whole body of the desirable so far as it is not inconsistent with the law of righteousness" (p. 356).

After thus explaining the social roots of ethics Prof. Ormond turns to the ultra-social or transcendent springs. Although he accepts the Kantian account of the moral judgment, he rejects the Kantian explanation of it, *viz.*, the distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal self. Holding as he does that all ethical concepts "arise as functions of the developing sense of the community," he believes it impossible that they should ever be completely free from the taint of relativity. "In order that this relativity may be cured and our ethical concepts founded on a solid basis, . . . we need an appeal to some con-

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sciousness in which the social movement as a whole stands ideally realized, or at least a consciousness in which its movement as a whole is not determined by accident or blind fate'' (p. 362). This kind of consciousness is, of course, found only in the God of theism. Prof. Ormond contends that the fundamental problems of ethics, *e. g.*, that of freedom, cannot be solved without recourse to the God idea.

The science of ethics, according to Prof. Ormond, cannot be a natural science (*i. e.*, one that explains phenomena by the principle of natural causation), because that would deny freedom. He admits that conduct is influenced by biologic heredity and physical environment. Temperature, food, etc., do influence the will and the emotions. But when one resists the inclinations of self-interest and refrains, for instance, from an advantageous lie, natural causation cannot be said to have been effective. Prof. Ormond feels so confident of his easy and complete victory over naturalism that it would be a pity to point out the glaring inadequacy of his argument. One may, however, point out that there are too many concessions to the enemy to justify his claim of having administered a Waterloo to naturalism.

While denying ethics to be a natural science he admits that morals are subject to evolution, and therefore come under the categories of variation, selection, etc. But these categories must be construed in terms of reflection and will, and not in terms of natural causation. Thus, while there is a law of social heredity, each generation handing over to the next its institutions, laws, etc., ''the new generation *chooses* what shall be the effect of its social inheritance.''

The metaphysical world presupposed by the field of ethics is admitted to be one of pluralism, for there is no duty that is not the duty of some individual. Moreover, these individuals are not isolated, but are related by their social nature. This pluralism, however, is soon declared to be insufficient, because the social consciousness is relative, and therefore fallible. Hence, we must assume some ''divine intelligence in the world as the ground and guarantee of its moral order'' (p. 389, *cf.* 395).

Prof. Ormond's general position may not unjustly be characterized as eclectic, with its basis in Scotch idealism. So far as his treatment of ethics is concerned it manifestly suffers from its complete subordination to metaphysical considerations, as, for instance, in his making the practical category of freedom

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entirely dependent on the metaphysical shibboleth of *vera causa*. In common with other theologians he also tends to conceive the field of ethics rather narrowly. This is shown in his treatment of sin, which he does not regard as an ethical category (*cf.* p. 543). One cannot, however, but entertain profound admiration for the doughty idealism that does not shrink from surveying the whole field of human knowledge and which boldly traces the all-comprehending ethical purpose which unifies the chaos of experience.

MORRIS R. COHEN.

New York.

TYPES OF TRAGIC DRAMA. By C. E. Vaughan, Professor of English Literature in the University of Leeds. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1908. Pp. vi, 275.

Professor Vaughan takes a wide view, ranging from Æschylus to Browning, Ibsen and Maeterlinck. Indeed perhaps the view taken is almost too wide, so that it has been impossible to give more than a sketchy outline in certain of the cases. The leading theme is the change from the Classical to the Romantic Drama; this, it is held, coincides in the main with the change from the outward to the inward, that is, with the shifting of interest away from those simpler elements in human nature that can be expressed clearly and symbolized readily by action, on to those subtler, more complex movements of the soul that can only be indicated in speech and sometimes escape speech itself. These are not Prof. Vaughan's own words, but this seems to be his drift. With this change of interest he connects the change from the simple, compact type of drama, marked by an admirable plot (using "plot" in the wide sense of the word, including "situation"), to the looser structure adopted by Shakespeare and the Romantic dramatists in general. Such a structure gives room for all kinds of episodes and scenes which do not, perhaps, help on the actual story or illuminate the external situation, but which do throw a penetrating light on the inner recesses of character. It was this prevailing interest in the subtleties of character that, above all, led to the revolt against the "unities." This is a fruitful idea; for it does seem clear that these laws, even when not interpreted pedantically, would fetter the full manifestation of character, especially char-

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acter in "its capacity for growth or decay," "the highest and at the same time the most tragic" of all its qualities (p. 150).

Prof. Vaughan gives, very rightly, much space to the Greek drama. He is most in sympathy with Æschylus, whom he calls the greatest master of dramatic *situation* that ever lived, an illuminating phrase. But one is inclined to quarrel with him for his treatment of Euripides. He only understands that most human poet's effort "to bring the drama nearer to the actual interests and emotions of his own day" (p. 64); he says little or nothing of his passionate religious preoccupation, nothing of his passionate reaction against the cruel mythology that had come to him from the past. But this is surely the keynote of play after play, and if we do not catch it we are lost. In different ways Prof. Murray and Dr. Verrall have both called attention to this all-important feature. To miss it in Euripides is to miss the point of many of his most effective situations; and leads almost inevitably to the old injustice of saying that "the dominant note in his dramas is the love of effect: that, so long as an effect was obtained, he was comparatively indifferent as to the means by which it was secured," etc. (p. 81).

In connection with the whole question of character, Prof. Vaughan has some excellent remarks on "keenness and soundness of moral judgment" as "among the qualities that are indispensable to a great dramatist" (p. 57). This recalls Swinburne's admirable passage about Shakespeare's "implacable and impeccable righteousness of insight." And it suggests to a reviewer that the real and fatal weakness of Calderon (whom Prof. Vaughan discusses at considerable length) lies in his perverted notions of "honor" and "religion." It may be presumptuous in one who has no knowledge of Spanish to express an opinion here, but this is certainly the impression left by the translations; and Prof. Vaughan's eloquent advocacy does nothing to dissipate it: perhaps he did not intend that it should.

London. F. MELIAN STAWELL.

MEMORIALS OF THOMAS DAVIDSON. Collected and edited by William Knight. London: Fisher Unwin, 1907. Pp. x, 241.

The reader who does not mind taking some trouble to make the acquaintance of a remarkable man will find this an interesting book. But he must take some trouble, for it is not a

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biography, but a slovenly compilation; a jumble of reminiscences by various hands (among them a chapter by Professor William James), thrown together on no plan and interspersed with fragments of letters and summaries of several of Davidson's writings. As an instance of the lack of discretion with which the work has been done the first appendix may be mentioned. This consists of the prospectus of a lecture course on the origins of modern thought, followed by a list, which occupies nearly five pages, of books recommended for reading. It would have been more amusing, to say the least of it, to have printed instead an act of "Themistocles," the five-act tragedy which Davidson left in MS. The book abounds in misprints and has no index.

Thomas Davidson was born in 1840 of Scottish parents in humble circumstances. He graduated at Aberdeen in 1860 and began life as session clerk and schoolmaster. Too restless for these occupations, he went to America in 1863. He appears to have taught at Toronto and St. Louis and to have held for a short time an examinership at Harvard. But the trammels of academic life were always distasteful to him, and already in the early '80's we find him alternating between London and Italy. In Italy he plunged into the study of Rosmini (he occupied a villa at Domodossola, near the Rosminian monastery) and held friendly communication with Pope and Cardinals at Rome; and in London he founded the "Fellowship of the New Life," a body from which the Fabian Society sprang by schism in 1884. It was in that year that he founded the New York branch of the fellowship, of which his College of the Breadwinners (a system of lectures to East Side Russian Jews) was a later offshoot. In 1888 he began at the New England town of Farmington the "Summer School of the Culture Sciences," which in 1891 was absorbed in his summer school at Glenmore in the Adirondacks. Davidson died September 14, 1900. These are the chief landmarks in a life which included periods spent in most of the European capitals as well as visits to Greece, Constantinople and Egypt.

The analogy which his friends constantly use to describe him is that of some wandering scholar of the Renaissance—a romantic, heroic figure, immensely learned, burning with spiritual zeal and brought by his migrations in the serivce of the Muses into contact with eminent people all over the world. The range

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of Davidson's learning was certainly remarkable. Besides being a classical scholar, at home in archæology and widely read in philosophy and its history, he was proficient in most European languages and acquired some Arabic. He actually published few books. Speech was more natural to him than writing, and articles and lectures than systematic works; but, short though it is, the list gives some idea of his versatility. It includes books on education (Greek Education and Rousseau), a treatise on the Parthenon frieze, Prolegomena to Tennyson's "In Memoriam," translations of Rosmini and of Scartazzini's "Handbook" to Dante, and a book about Rosmini's philosophy. In his later years he specialized on medieval thought, and had projected a large work on that subject which he did not live to complete. The metaphysical, almost mystical, enthusiasm which pervaded all his acquisitions of knowledge completes the comparison with some such Renaissance figure as Giordano Bruno. Yet in other ways he was essentially modern. For one thing, it is significant that he took no interest in science; none but "culture subjects" attracted him, an attitude of mind inconceivable in the Renaissance. Again, in spite of his dislike for university routine, his work, as was inevitable in the nineteenth century, was done among what may be called the semi-academic section of the middle classes. Three centuries earlier he might have found his disciples among noblemen and princes; but, as it is, the "later nineteenth century ethical movement," of which Davidson was a pioneer, is composed of people in fairly comfortable circumstances, drawn from the middle class and the better-off section of hand workers, who attend lectures and usually have some kind of connection with the life of universities. Such were the students at his summer school, where the instruction appears to have been of the type now given at university extension summer meetings; and to this class, too, belonged the group of young men whom he inspired in the early '80's to form the Fellowship of the New Life in London. The period (as witness the "æsthetic" movement) bristled with similar groups, formal and informal, in which the principle of cohesion was the desire to raise society to a higher level, and it is only an accident that entitles this particular short-lived association to be remembered. Its formulæ, with their insistence, due to Davidson, on the necessity of perfecting individual lives and of a "metaphysical" basis for social regeneration,

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have now at most but a personal interest as a revelation of their author's character; but they produced a result of some importance, inasmuch as the more practical members of the fellowship, growing out of harmony with the founder's individualism and finding little profit in his metaphysics, broke away and formed the Fabian Society. Though there is irony in this play of circumstances by which a stalwart individualist and contemner of modern economics thus became the cause of the Fabian policy of insinuating collectivist doctrine into English politics, the incident shows how much may be accomplished by a visionary, provided that he is in earnest about his ideals and has the power of exciting enthusiasm and affection in others.

S. WATERLOW.

Rye, England.

DECADENCE: HENRY SIDGWICK MEMORIAL LECTURE. By the Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, M. P. Cambridge: University Press, 1908. Pp. 62.

Why do communities decay? Mr. Balfour suggests in this lecture that in cases like that of the Roman Empire the ordinary political causes assigned by historians do not account for all the facts, and that some obscure cause, analogous to senescence in physical organisms, is at work. This cause we can only call decadence without further explanation. It is impossible, however, to say whether decadence is more or less normal than progress; all we can be sure of is that some races (such as those of the East) are constitutionally incapable of advancing beyond a certain point. As for western civilization, Mr. Balfour thinks it likely that the modern alliance between science and industry has introduced a new social factor which is perhaps strong enough to counteract any tendency toward decadence that may exist.

Mr. Balfour makes for his discourse the apology that it is tentative and interrogative and does not pretend to be an adequate treatment of an interesting theme. It is indeed often desirable—on an occasion commemorative of Henry Sidgwick it would be peculiarly fitting—that one who has studied a subject should make known what he thinks about it even when his conclusions are provisional or incomplete. Mr. Balfour's apology has all the air of being the apology of an inquirer in this

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dilemma; but what it really covers is a quite different kind of "tentativeness"—that, namely, which consists in making remarks at large on a vaguely defined subject; and consequently it is best received in silence.

S. WATERLOW.

Rye, England.

ANTI-PRAGMATISME, *Examen des droits respectifs de l'aristocratie intellectuelle et de la démocratie sociale.* Par Albert Schinz, professeur à l'Université de Bryn Mawr (Pennsylvania). 1 vol. in-8° de la *Bibliothèque de Philosophie contemporaine.* Paris: Félix Alcan, éditeur.

The book is divided into three parts.

The first is a criticism of pragmatism from a philosophical standpoint, which Emile Boutroux, the well-known author of *Science et Religion,* characterized as "très net, très vigoureux, et qui apporte de la clarté dans une question très embrouillée." Instead of summarizing Prof. Schinz's whole argument, let us only call attention to the distinction which he considers fundamental and is the cause, according to him, of the whole quarrel about pragmatism. On pages 26 to 36 he distinguishes between what he calls "scientific" pragmatism and "moral" pragmatism. James and his followers have tried hard to identify their cause with that of the recent school of Poincaré, in France. A law, an idea, is not true or false in itself, but only relatively to us; it is true, or rather becomes true only when it yields results to the investigator. Prof. Schinz says that, thanks to the vagueness of the word "result," pragmatists have been able to impose upon us this identification, but as a matter of fact there is incompatibility between Poincaré and James: Poincaré means an idea is true when it yields *scientific* results, while James (without saying it explicitly, but it is the spirit of all his writings on pragmatism) really means that an idea is true when it carries with it valuable *moral* results. So, of course, there is an abyss between the two conceptions. Poincaré never had the remotest idea of allowing any moral preoccupations to interfere with the search for truth.

Whether James would admit that this interpretation of Schinz is correct, I do not know. I doubt it very much. But certainly the arguments brought forward here and elsewhere

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in the book that moral and even religious preoccupations are back of all of James's pragmatism sound plausible enough. As a matter of fact, although in somewhat different forms, the same reproach is made to James by writers on the continent, Höffding, Boutroux and recently Rey, in his *Philosophie moderne* (pp. 28-42). James will probably some day answer at length that ever-recurring argument.

It is impossible here to take up the discussion of James's theory of truth as criticised by Schinz. The latter offers the following dilemma: either you accept the moral criterion of truth as more important than the rationalistic criterion or you do not. If you do not, but admit that an idea must first be rationally true anyway, then what is the use of a new philosophy, since in this case pragmatism only repeats what science always held? If you do accept the moral criterion as more important than the rationalistic one, then it is true you create something new—but you simply reduce philosophy to *moral* philosophy, which, of course, is intolerable.

The chapter devoted to what Prof. Schinz calls "Le cas Dewey" was published in the *Journal of Philosophy* in New York. To go into that criticism would lead us too far.

The second part of the book takes up this question, If pragmatism is so hopelessly weak from a logical standpoint, how can we explain its great success? Observing that pragmatism has found followers in America chiefly, and, even there, mostly among non-philosophers, Prof. Schinz explains that pragmatism is a philosophy that will satisfy a democratic country, and that really the writings of James show plainly that he himself favored pragmatism above all as a reaction against philosophies which were discouraging or morally fatal to the masses of our democratic epoch. Schinz goes so far as to say that pragmatism will finally win, and perhaps *ought* to win, "not because it is true, but because it is false" (p. 209). Truth is not good for the masses; they cannot assimilate it, and they make bad use of it. Moreover, science rests entirely on the idea of determinism of phenomena, which, of course, is bound to kill energy and all sense of responsibility in the people. Society is, after all, more important than scientific truth. Therefore let us choose society with untruth rather than truth with anarchy. The reason why Schinz calls his book *Anti-Pragmatisme* is therefore not because he objects to a pragmatic

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philosophy; the masses need it, on the contrary. He only objects to having this philosophy called *true* philosophy. He deplores that we should be forced to keep truth from the people, but sees in it a necessary result of modern conditions, or, more plainly, of democracy, which he assails bitterly whenever he can. There is, he says, an automatic law to the effect that the more democratic we become the more it will be necessary to conceal truth from the people; the freer people become, the less free philosophy will be.

In the Middle Ages philosophers were free; to-day they are not. The second chapter of Part II illustrates this. Scholasticism meant that there was a philosophy for the masses, it was a body of doctrines useful to society, and which was given out as truth—and philosophers, besides that, were free. When Descartes and Bacon freed philosophy from the church, they took the first step to make it a slave of public opinion, which, all considered—if we understand Schinz right—is a servitude worse than the first. The stronger public opinion became, or, again, the stronger democracy became, the more the necessity grew to express only such theories as were useful to the masses, as were moral. The content of this chapter—which I consider the most interesting in the book for the philosopher—is summarized in this formulæ: Scholasticism treated philosophy as a servant of theology—*philosophia, ancilla theologiæ*. Pragmatism treats philosophy as a servant of ethics—*philosophia, ancilla ethicæ*. Or, in other words, pragmatism is modern scholasticism, and scholasticism was middle-age pragmatism. Pragmatism is the logical outcome of a movement that began at the dawn of modern philosophy; three great names mark three important stages of the evolution, Pascal, Rousseau, Kant. All three, opposing practical reason to pure reason, are the forerunners of James.

One point remains obscure, however, in all that: the relation of the pragmatic methods to the pragmatic theories obtained by the method. Schinz seems to consider them inseparable. James has objected to it. And, in fact, we can conceive very well of a man using the pragmatic methods and being an atheist. If, in his eyes, society might be better organized on atheistic than on religious principles, he could hold this view and still be a pragmatist.

The third part is a rapid sketch of Schinz's own views of

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society. He emphasizes very strongly the disadvantages of democracy, and is rather pessimistic. According to him, society has gone too far into popular government to make it possible to go back. We must swallow it all. Here I notice, however, a contradiction. One chapter of Part III is called *Salut possible, mais improbable,* meaning that salvation from the process of leveling, which makes democracy a mediocracy, is hardly to be expected. Yet, in Appendix B, *Literature and the Moral Code,*[1] he develops the idea that if the elites of all nations were to unite for common action they might well counterbalance at least some of the worst effects of democracy.

Whatever one thinks of the author's own ideas—which are not those of everybody surely—he has certainly been more outspoken in dealing with pragmatism than most critics so far. To say the least, his book will set many readers thinking. The refutation of Schinz's views belongs by right to those who have been rather mercilessly attacked in "Anti-Pragmatisme."

ALFRED BERTAUD.

Chaux-du-Locle, France.

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[1] Appeared as an article in INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, July, 1906.

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

THE INTERNATIONAL
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JULY, 1909.

MORAL EDUCATION: THE TASK OF THE TEACHER.*

J. S. MACKENZIE.

THE work of this League has made considerable progress since the time of our last annual meeting. The importance of moral and civic education, in some form or other, has become more and more widely recognized, especially through the publication of the admirable "Reports on Moral Instruction and Training," edited by Professor Sadler, and through the influence of the first International Congress. The controversy turns now rather upon methods than upon the general principle; and it is becoming more and more apparent that the problem upon which we ought to concentrate our attention is that of the training of suitable teachers. It is satisfactory to know that the League has decided to take vigorous action in this direction. This is not a direction in which I can pretend to be able to give advice that would be of any value. I can only emphasize its importance, as I have done before, by calling attention to the difficulties that stand in the way of efficient moral teaching.

A convenient starting point may be found in some discussions that arose at the Congress, and that have subsequently been carried on in various places. In particular,

* Presidential address to the Moral Education League, February, 1909.

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I may refer to a striking article that was contributed to the London *Daily News* by Mr. J. L. Paton, the head master of the Manchester Grammar School, immediately after the meetings of the Congress; and which, I believe, sums up very well the difficulties that are most prominently in the minds of many practical teachers. There was at the time a very effective reply to Mr. Paton's strictures in a letter from our energetic secretary; but it may not be amiss to take some further notice of the points that he raised, and in all that follows I shall have his criticisms a good deal in my mind.

Mr. Paton prefaced his remarks with a somewhat sweeping assertion, which, if true, would certainly be fatal to the efforts of our League. He asserted roundly that virtue cannot be taught at all;[1] and he supported this contention by the old argument that, as he put it, "it is a commonplace of history that men eminent for their goodness have sons who are, if not equally eminent for their badness, at any rate, not above the average level." This seems to be taken from Plato's *Protagoras,* where, however, it is evident from the context that it is rather political capacity than goodness in its more modern sense that is primarily in view. In neither case is the argument very convincing. The instances referred to can hardly be taken as normal. *Fortes creantur fortibus et bonis;* and it is surely not all a matter of heredity. The influence of the father can generally be traced in the son. There were two Pitts, and there have been two Gladstones and two Chamberlains; and there is the remarkable family of the Cecils. And certainly from my study of biography, I should be disposed to conclude that most good men—as well as most good politicians—have had good fathers, and still more uniformly good mothers. When Mr. Paton's own biography comes to be written, I should suppose that some reference to his ancestry

[1] Perhaps what he meant was that it cannot be taught by means of set lessons alone—a view with which I should certainly be disposed to agree.

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would not be altogether out of place. But, even if we allow that there are a considerable number of exceptional cases, it would still be open to us to inquire whether those fathers who were so "eminent for their goodness" were also eminent for their skill in teaching young children. If not, the utmost that would appear to be established by their failure is that example is not enough without precept. It might, indeed, be urged that what is brought out by this argument is the necessity for a more systematic teaching of morality than that which can be given even by the best of parents. At any rate, I am convinced that it is a good argument for the importance of having our teachers of morals thoroughly trained. It certainly does not show that virtue cannot be taught; but I think it does in some measure show that it is not altogether easy to teach it.

Now, the question I wish to raise here is: What are the chief difficulties in the way of moral education? In a previous address[2] I called attention to certain difficulties connected with the uncertainty of ethical principles. I hope I may assume that this particular kind of difficulty is not now very widely felt. Professor Sadler, in his singularly well-balanced "Introduction to the Reports on Moral Instruction and Training," gives a judicial summing up in favor of the view that the recognized moral principles are sufficiently coherent and well established to admit of being effectively taught to the young. His words are: "In every country there is an ideal of personal and of civic obligation which may be taken as a basis for school teaching by adherents of almost every school of thought." I believe that this cannot be seriously disputed;[3] and certainly the authority of Professor Sadler ought to carry weight with all who are interested in educational problems. I accordingly set aside this particular

[2] INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, April, 1908.

[3] It may be noted that Mr. Paton, in the article to which I have referred, does not appear to suggest any difficulty of this kind. He rather emphasizes the obviousness of the distinction between right and wrong.

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difficulty; though, as I urged on the previous occasion to which I have referred, it is undoubtedly one of the considerations that make the need for a careful training of our teachers most conspicuously apparent.

What I wish specially to consider on this occasion are some difficulties that have recently been raised with reference to the attempt to teach morality directly and systematically, even on the assumption that the teacher has a sufficiently coherent view in his own mind as to what the essential principles of morality are. As far as I can judge, from what I heard at the meetings of the Congress and from what has come out in various recent publications, it would appear that the objections that are now most prominent in the minds of the majority of those critics who have given any real attention to the subject are based (1) upon the conception of contrariety on "contrariant ideas"; (2) upon the view that it is impossible in practice to make any separation between moral education and religious education. It is on these two points that I intend in what follows almost exclusively to dwell.

The former point is certainly one of considerable psychological interest; and it has been brought out in a highly instructive way by Mr. Keatinge in his valuable work on Suggestion, of which it is the negative aspect. In general, of course, the doctrine of Suggestion is entirely favorable to the work of our League. Nothing could be more encouraging to the teacher of morals than the conviction that every idea that is brought vividly before the mind tends to work itself out in act; and this is what modern psychology is making more and more apparent, not only with reference to human life, but to that of the lower animals as well. The mind, in all its aspects and in all the stages of its development, is essentially dynamical; and all its ideas are forces. But there is a natural dialectic in the human mind, and to some extent in the animal mind also; and this is what is emphasized in the doctrine of "contrariant ideas." As the mind develops, it begins to react more and more upon the sug-

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gestions that are brought before it, and at certain stages tends to resist them. We see this to some extent even in the life of animals, the most familiar illustration of it being in the case of "our brother," the pig. And what is urged by some of the critics of moral education is, in effect, that the presentation of moral ideas to the minds of the young is to a large extent a casting of pearls before swine. They are sure, sooner or later, to turn and rend us. It is contended, at least, that there are certain stages in the development of the young at which it would in general be true that to set moral principles emphatically before them is just the way to insure that these principles will not be followed.

Now, it cannot be denied that there is some truth in this doctrine; and it is a truth that ought to be borne in mind in all departments of education. "Determination is negation." The growth of individuality means to some extent the growth of a power of resistance to foreign elements, the development of the faculty of saying, "No"; and this is an element of character which it would assuredly not be wise to disregard. It is strongest in the strongest natures; and there are stages in the growth of personality at which it is specially important that it should be encouraged. It was something of the same sort that was in the mind of Plato when he spoke of the stage of development at which young men are like puppy-dogs, delighting in tearing everything to pieces that comes in their way. A man of any force of character is generally against the government until the time arrives when he enters into his own kingdom; and this attitude of resistance often appears at a comparatively early stage. This fact has perhaps been too much forgotten in many of our educational methods. Too often, instead of stimulating an interest in children, we may be stimulating a disgust. We know how Byron acquired an inveterate dislike of Horace from the way in which he was drilled in his poetry at school; and probably most of us have had an experience of a somewhat similar kind. Perhaps the sons referred to by

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Mr. Paton, who were so "eminent for their badness," may have been cases in point. Their fathers' goodness may have been a little too insistent. The sons may have felt that, if they were to have any self-respect, they must strike out on a different line.

There is undoubtedly a certain degree of contrariety or "contrariousness" in human nature, as well as in the nature of pigs. But, after all, people do somehow manage to drive their pigs to market; and I think a skillful teacher need not despair of leading even his most refractory pupils—provided, at least, they are not stupid, as well as obstinate—into some degree of decency of behavior. The difficulty I fancy, comes in chiefly with teaching of a too purely hortatory type, or again with that which is too purely negative. To say that a man or a boy is *not* to do something is always of the nature of a challenge. It is putting an obstacle in his way; and what an obstacle suggests to a mind of any practical activity is that it has got to be removed or overleaped.

I believe that the use of the terms "direct" and "systematic" in connection with moral education has a good deal to do with the raising of objections of this particular kind. To teach a thing directly and systematically, it should be remembered, does not necessarily mean that we are to try to force it down people's throats. Geometry is usually taught directly and systematically; and I believe it has sometimes been taught in such a way as to rouse a certain degree of contrariety. If a pupil were told that he must believe that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, he would be very likely to proceed at once to find out reasons for denying it. But the skillful teacher knows how to avoid this. He does not tell his pupil what the angles are equal to: he rather suggests methods by which the pupil may find it out for himself. This is the secret of all good teaching; and it is a secret that was known, with regard to the teaching both of geometry and of morality, as far back as the time of Plato—probably even farther. It is certainly known to

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most of the members of our League; and it is not to their methods, but rather to the more old-fashioned methods of some of their opponents, that objections of this kind could most properly be raised.

It is possible, however, to press even this point too far. I have sometimes heard it urged—especially by those who are concerned with the teaching of very young children—that the child must be taught by means of direct injunctions, and that to lead it to deliberate is only to suggest doubt. Probably the methods must vary a little at different stages of development. But even older children are sometimes more impressed by a "straight talk" than by more insidious methods of suggestion. Few people, whether old or young, like to think that they are being got at indirectly from behind. My own belief is that the skillful teacher, like the skillful pig driver, would sometimes be poking on his pupils pretty directly, and sometimes leaving them rather to find their own way along.

Those who urge this difficulty about contrariety seek in general, as I understand them, to throw discredit on the systematic teaching of morality, and to maintain that it ought to be entirely incidental. On this I may just say a word or two. It is sometimes contended that all the teaching in a school should be moral teaching; that the ethical element should enter into all the lessons, into all the games, into all the discipline, into all the organization of the school. This is undoubtedly a fine ideal; and it is one that may very well be realized in such a school as Rugby, under such a master as Arnold. It can hardly be so easy in a day school, and especially in a school with large classes and elaborate time tables. In such schools everything that is only incidental must tend to be crowded out. Nor can I altogether believe that even under the most favorable conditions the teaching of conduct could, without serious detriment, be treated as entirely incidental. Its position in the school may be, to some extent, compared with that of the mother tongue. In a sense, almost all lessons may be said to be lessons in the use of the

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mother tongue; but our language would surely not be very thoroughly learned if there were never any direct and systematic teaching of it. So I should think it must be with morals. It may be that in a well-organized and well-conducted school the time devoted to it need not be very great; but I am convinced that there ought at least to be certain occasions on which the principles contained in the incidental teaching of it could be brought to a head, summed up and driven home.

On the whole, then, I conclude that the general principle of Suggestion cannot fairly be used as an argument against the attempt to introduce the systematic teaching of the principles of moral and civic obligation into all our schools; provided always that it is fully recognized that in different kinds of schools it may have to be introduced in different ways. There are, however, some important general lessons that we may learn from the doctrine of Suggestion. The following, I think, are some of the chief of them:

1. Moral teaching should be concrete, carrying a direct suggestion of something to be done, not a mere statement of general principles or reflections on life.

2. It should, as far as possible, be positive, rather than negative. To call attention to a wrong action is often to suggest what might not otherwise have occurred to the mind; and may tempt the young inquirer to give it at least a trial.

3. It should be practicable. Remote and inaccessible ideals carry no direct suggestion; and what is not, in Aristotle's phrase, πρακτον και κτητον ανθρωπω, is always apt, by a kind of reaction, to be classed as a kind of "sour grapes."

4. It should, as far as possible, be of the nature of an auto-suggestion, seeming to be a discovery of the child himself and to issue from his own spontaneity.

5. It should be adapted to the stage of development of the mind for which it is intended.

6. It should be in harmony with the actions of the teacher himself. I think this is important, though pos-

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sibly not as important as some are apt to suppose. Plato thought that a good doctor should not have too robust a health; and I am not altogether sure that some human weaknesses may not occasionally be an advantage in the teacher of morals. Some pupils are more ready to profit by the faults of their teachers than by their own. To take conspicuous instances, have we not all learned something from the ill temper of Milton, the arrogance of Johnson, the complacency of Wordsworth, the tempestuousness of Carlyle, the waywardness of Ruskin, as well as from the great merits of these men of genius? There is often something repellent in a teacher whose limitations we cannot discover. Human nature is apt to suspect that when a man has no imperfections to display, he has all the more to conceal. Still it is in the main true that a man's teaching is not likely to be very effective if it is not illustrated by his conduct.

I am well aware that there is no novelty in any of the points that I have now stated. They are fully recognized in the literature of our League. But it is well to remind ourselves of them from time to time, if only for the purpose of suggestion. They are sometimes in danger of being dropped out of sight in practice. So long as we bear them well in mind, we need not be afraid to persist in our efforts to introduce the systematic teaching of morals in all schools. For indeed "there is a general agreement among experienced teachers," as Professor Sadler says in his admirable summing up, "that direct moral instruction, when given at the right time and in the right way, is a valuable element in moral education." But the cautions that we have to note ought to convince us of the necessity that some strenuous attempt should be made to educate those who are to undertake this work, so that they may know both what are the right things to teach, and what is the right time and the right way.

I now pass to the other leading difficulty in the way of systematic moral education. The one that I have just been referring to does not constitute a serious objection,

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but only presents a caution—a very necessary caution—with respect to the choice of the most suitable methods. The view that morals cannot be separated from religion raises a much more serious difficulty, for we all know the almost insuperable obstacles that stand in the way of any national system of education with respect to the latter. If the teaching of morality must wait till we have decided how we are to teach religion, it would hardly be a problem with which the present generation could profitably concern itself. Now, there is undoubtedly a sense in which it may be allowed that morality is inseparable from religion; but it is important that we should rightly understand what that sense is, and that we should distinguish it carefully from other senses with which it is in danger of being confounded. I cannot hope to draw this distinction with any thoroughness in such an address as this; but a few remarks about it may perhaps be useful.

We might conveniently distinguish three different ways in which the relation between religion and morality may be regarded. Religion may be regarded (1) as furnishing us with the authority on which morality depends and the chief sanctions by which it is supported; (2) as leading us to a view of the universe by which the significance of the moral life is made apparent; (3) as an expression of the moral life itself, if not even its flower or finest product. I may illustrate what I mean by these three ways of regarding it, by a reference to Wordsworth's "Ode to Duty," perhaps the best expression of the religious aspect of morality that we have in our literature.

The first line of that poem—"Stern daughter of the voice of God!"—recalls the thunders of Sinai, and impresses upon us a view of duty that has often been taken, and that is sometimes thought to be the specially religious view. For it is remarkable that, when people in our country think of morality in relation to religion, it is generally the Old Testament that they have in their minds, rather than the New—the Ten Commandments, rather than the Sermon on the Mount. Yet it is surely evident

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that religion itself, in its higher developments—in such forms as Christianity and Buddhism—passes completely away from the conception of external sources and external sanctions. Christianity, in particular, with its idea of love as the basis of all real obligation, is as much out of harmony with any such conception as modern ethical science. When Kant says [4] that a system of morals based on theological sanctions "would be directly opposed to morality," he is hardly going beyond what is contained in the spirit of Christianity itself, as interpreted by the most spiritual of its exponents. It is not to the mandates of the Deity, still less to hopes and fears of what may happen in a future life, that they make their appeal, but rather to the love of God and men and to the law that we find within ourselves.

I suppose what I have now stated would be pretty generally allowed. It seems to be thought by some, however, that children at least stand in need of sanctions of a more external kind; and it must be admitted that the highest kind of moral appeal may not always be intelligible to the young. I only urge that an effort should be made to lead them gradually up to it. And even in the earlier stages of their development I doubt whether an insistence on supernatural sanctions would be of any real moral value. The authority of the teacher or parent seems to me in general to be a safer court of appeal than one that is shrouded in mystery and vague terror. In any case, such external appeals could only be suitable for the very young; and even with them I should hope that it would nearly always be possible to give some indication that the authority of the higher power rests on a rational foundation and not merely on superior force.

Here, however, I feel bound to notice once more the article by Mr. J. L. Paton, to which I have previously referred. There are some extraordinary statements contained in it, which, I trust, do not represent views that

[4] "Metaphysic of Morals," Ch. II.

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are widely held by the instructors of the young. He states, for instance, that "none of the great ethical teachers have appealed to reason; they have taught that the basis of right action is faith in the Unseen." Mr. Paton does not say who are the great ethical teachers whom he has in his mind; and I certainly cannot imagine who they can be. Obviously they are not the strictly philosophical teachers; and yet surely some of them might fairly be described as great. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Spinoza, Butler, Kant, J. S. Mill, H. Sidgwick, T. H. Green, have surely some title to be regarded as considerable teachers of ethics; and they all appealed to reason. And even if we turn to teachers of a less strictly philosophical type, we at least do not find in general that they appeal to supernatural sanctions. When Wordsworth says that

> "One impulse from a vernal wood
> May teach you more of man,
> Of moral evil and of good,
> Than all the sages can;"

it is perhaps his intention to throw some discredit on the ethical value of mere reason.[5] But it is to nature and to the human heart that he makes his appeal. Even Carlyle seems to put his trust mainly in the insight of the man of genius, while Ruskin appeals to a sort of æsthetic perception. Indeed, even the more definitely religious teachers, such as Christ, will generally be found to give some reason for their injunctions; and, when they give no definite reason, they nearly always present us with a striking illustration which makes their meaning equally apparent. The moralists who are not thinkers are seers; and they try to make us see as well. If they seem to appeal to the "Unseen," it is to be suspected that it is only the blind who think so. Here, no doubt, as elsewhere, "the

[5] Contrast, however, the last lines of the "Ode to Duty"—

> "The confidence of reason give,
> And in the light of truth thy bondman let me live."

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eye sees only what it brings with it the power of seeing;" and it is just this power that we have to do our best to develop. To cultivate a genuine moral insight is certainly the highest aim of all.

"No man," says Mr. Paton again, "can prove to me that I ought to love my neighbor. What reason suggests to me as my duty towards my neighbor is rather what the little girl answered the curate, 'to keep an eye on him.' Still less can reason prove to me that I am bound to love my father. Put me in the position of Tito Melema, and reason will make me behave to my father as Tito behaved to Baldasarre."

It is certainly very sad that reason should have taught Mr. Paton so little. But has he ever given it a fair chance? Reason does not teach anyone without some degree of effort. Has he studied the arguments of the best writers? His contention seems to be based upon the supposition that it is reasonable to pursue our own happiness, but not to pursue the good of others. I should have thought that even the reading of Butler's "Sermons" would have gone some way to disabuse the mind of such a supposition. If Butler does not suffice, the arguments of Kant, Sidgwick, Green and others ought to carry some weight. But perhaps what Mr. Paton means is that the reason of an uninstructed person does not teach him so much. If so, this would seem to be an argument for making some effort to give instruction. But surely what is commonly called the "Golden Rule" appeals to the reason even of a very young child. As soon as we recognize that other persons are Egoes as well as we, pure Egoism has not much of a foothold in reason. If Mr. Paton's reason cannot carry him as far as this, I cannot but think that it must be a strangely constituted reason.

I urge, then, on the whole, that we ought to set aside the view that morality is dependent on religion, in the sense that it is in need of some external authority for its validity or for its sanctions. But there is another view of the dependence of morality on religion that is deserving of

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more serious attention. Returning to Wordsworth's "Ode," we find these lines a little later, still addressed to Duty—

> "Thou dost preserve the stars from wrong,
> And the most ancient heavens through thee are fresh and strong."

What I take to be implied in this is the view, as it has been put, that "morality is the nature of things"; or, in other words, that there is a moral order in the universe, and not merely a moral law in the reason or conscience of humanity. There is involved, of course, in such a conception a particular type of metaphysical theory—Idealism of some form or other. Now, I believe it to be of the greatest importance that some theory of this kind should, if possible, be established. The need of it is felt most deeply by the deepest minds. Without some such theory, the life of man must seem to be at war with the world in which he finds himself. The "moral order," as Huxley put it, would seem to be irreconcilable with the "cosmic order." There are few more pathetic records in modern biography than the account of the unsuccessful efforts of Henry Sidgwick to find a basis—by psychical research, or otherwise—for the belief in such a moral order of the universe. Without it he rightly felt that the ultimate foundations of morality were insecure. It may fairly be maintained that the man who is without some such belief has no real religion; and that the man who has such a belief has all the essentials of religious faith. In this sense, therefore, I should be disposed to admit that morality rests upon religion.

Nevertheless, I would still urge that the building up of such a belief is naturally subsequent to the growth of moral convictions. We must know what we mean by morality, and we must know what we mean by a cosmos, before the problem of the place of morality in the cosmos can have any real significance for us. It is enough for the youthful mind to begin to build up some rudimentary knowledge of the processes of nature, and at the same

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time to cultivate a consciousness of the simpler forms of moral and civic obligation. Unless it is very unhappily placed, it is not likely to become aware of any antagonism between the two forms of knowledge that it is thus acquiring. The time will come soon enough when nature will present herself as "red in tooth and claw," and when the attempt to do what is seen to be right may appear as a struggle against hopeless odds. Then it may be hoped that the "years that bring the philosophic mind," to which alone such problems are clearly presented, may also produce the means for their solution. No doubt the wise teacher will be trying to prepare the way for this also; but it does not seem to me that it is specially a part of moral education. I should be glad to see some beginning of religious education, as well as of moral education, in our schools; but it seems to me that in their initial stages they can more easily be kept apart than in their later development. It is only the more advanced religions that are specially moral; and I believe it is only to the mature mind that the moral significance of religion, or the religious aspiration that is latent in morality, becomes fully apparent.

There is, however, still a third sense—and I think an even better sense—in which it may be maintained that morality is essentially religious; *viz.,* in the sense that goodness is an element—and indeed the most vital element—in that which we take as the ultimate object of our worship. This sense also seems to me to be represented in Wordsworth's "Ode to Duty." The passage occurs just before the lines that were last quoted.

> "Stern Lawgiver!—Yet thou dost wear
> The Godhead's most benignant grace;
> Nor know we anything so fair
> As is the smile upon thy face:
> Flowers laugh before thee on their beds,
> And fragrance in thy footing treads."

What this is intended to bring out, as I understand it, is the intrinsic beauty and charm of moral principles, when

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rightly regarded, apart from any external authority or support; what the Greeks expressed by calling moral excellence το καλον. To one who has gained a true insight into the significance of moral ideas, as the wings on which the human spirit sustains itself in its forward flight, they appear as something that has a supreme worth in itself, and as deserving to be ranked with all that is best and brightest in the universe. To say this is, I think, to say that our attitude toward them is, in the best sense of the word, religious. They are something that we, in the most whole-hearted way, worship and admire.

Now, I think it is important that morality should be regarded in some such way as this by the teachers of the young. They ought not to regard it as a set of conventions by which our life has to be painfully hedged in, but rather as the breath of life itself. I think it is here that we might take a lesson from Japan. France and Japan are probably the two nations—unless China should also be included—that have made the most definite beginnings in the way of direct and systematic moral instruction. In France, as I gather,[6] it is not as yet in the highest degree successful, and largely from the lack of the religious spirit to which I am referring. In Japan, on the other hand, that spirit is present in a very marked degree. The teaching of moral ideas there is not religious, in the sense that they are connected with supernatural sanctions; nor yet, I think, in the sense that they are connected with a metaphysical theory of the universe. But certain important moral conceptions, especially that of self-devotion to the common good, are associated in their minds with the idea of the sacredness of the empire and the perpetuity of family life. How potent such influences may become, recent events have conspicuously shown. That in some other respects the moral ideas and practice of the

[6] I take my impressions mainly from the statements contained in the second volume of the reports on "Moral Instruction and Training in Schools," and from accounts in various other publications. I have no first-hand knowledge on the subject.

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Japanese are comparatively undeveloped, which, I believe, is true, only makes it the more apparent how effective certain limited conceptions can be made, when they are associated with objects to which the highest value is attached.

I am not prepared to urge that we should imitate the Japanese. There is an inevitable narrowness in that particular kind of devotion. I believe the time is past when either the family or the nation could fittingly be taken as the highest object round which our feelings of devotion could gather. The modern European has learned to think of a larger world. But it would be well to consider whether this larger outlook could not be made to yield for us a somewhat similar enthusiasm. I am inclined to think that it could; and I believe that the way to do it is by the association of moral teaching with all that is best in the study of literature and history. Our English literature is singularly rich on the ethical side. Shakespeare, Milton, Wordsworth—indeed, all our leading writers at nearly every period—are moral teachers. Our historians also are well used—perhaps almost too well used—to point the moral. Then we have the great literatures of Greece and Rome, which, when properly treated, are a never-failing source of moral strength.[7] Modern literatures are in general less reliable; but, of course, we must not forget the Jewish literature, which also contains a history; and on this it may be desirable to make some special remarks.

Certainly the Bible can hardly be ignored when we are dealing with methods of moral teaching. Indeed, it belongs to English literature, as well as to Jewish; and its influence pervades the work of nearly all our writers. Now, from what I have already said, it must be obvious that I would not urge its use for the purpose of finding a supernatural sanction for the moral law, or even for that

[7] On this point, as well as on many others connected with the teaching of morality, I may perhaps be allowed to refer to the little book on "Hegel's Educational Theory and Practice," by Mrs. Mackenzie.

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of providing children with a ready-made theory of the universe. Such theories are too crude to stand the stress of the experience of life. Nor, again, do I think it should be used, to any great extent, as supplying lessons in history. Its history is too remote and too uncertain to be of much value for children. Its importance lies mainly, I believe, in the fact that it conveys moral lessons in an imaginative form, and with a directness and fervor that are almost unique in the literatures of the world.

I am well aware that some are disposed to think that the use of the Bible is liable to perpetuate the wearing of what Carlyle described as "Hebrew old clothes." I have a good deal of sympathy with this fear. It would not be easy to overrate what morality has suffered in this country through being associated in men's minds with superstition and hypocrisy, or, at any rate, with "creeds outworn." We can hardly mention moral principles without reminding men of Pecksniff; and this may be due in part to the exotic character of our moral conceptions. Still I for one am certainly not anxious to see the Bible banished from our schools. Even Hebrew old clothes are better than no clothes at all—better perhaps also than some of our flashy newer garbs. And I can hardly believe that our danger at the present time is in the direction of falling back on any antique superstition. There is perhaps as much superstition in our time as in most others; but at least it is more diversified. And we should remember that a great deal of the Bible is directed against superstition—often against those very superstitions that have been based upon it by the makers of our creeds and rituals. In the moral teaching of the Bible, at any rate, there is a great deal to which even the most modern mind could not well take exception. Such a story as the Parable of the Good Samaritan is an admirable model for the moral teacher; and it does not contain the slightest reference to any supernatural authority or sanction. It illustrates very finely the application of the principle of suggestion.

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The question raised—Who is my neighbor?—is not answered in any set terms; but a striking story carries the lesson home, and makes an answer superfluous. We are left with the conviction that we see the answer; and that what we see is of supreme importance.

I should be inclined to think, however, that the greater part of the Bible could only be used, with much advantage, for the teaching of children who are already somewhat mature. Its atmosphere is too remote for a very young mind; and most of its teaching is of the nature of general inspiration as to the aims of life, rather than definite lessons on particular duties or virtues. It presupposes, for the most part, the general content of the moral life; and is mainly concerned with the purification of our motives and the raising of our ideals. It should certainly be preceded by teaching of a more definite and simple kind. I am bound to admit also that there are special practical objections at the present time to the use of the Bible in moral education. It might tend to reintroduce the religious difficulties into our schools.

In dwelling, however, in this way, upon the importance of using history and literature for the purpose of moral education, it is very far from my intention to suggest that the teacher should be debarred from conveying moral ideas by means of other subjects, or from using more modern instances for their illustration; and, in particular, from drawing his illustrations directly from his own experience and that of his pupils. I have already urged that moral lessons should be concrete, vivid and close to life. "A living dog is better than a dead lion;" and even the humblest of teachers, when he speaks from the fullness of his heart and the depth of his personal experience, may be more impressive and convincing than all the power of Moses and the prophets. We should start from the living present; but we should also be conscious of having the Worlds and the Ages behind us.

But it is just here, alas! that we come again upon our most fundamental difficulty. How are we to get these

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living teachers, who can be trusted to deal with the subject in such a spirit as we desire? It seems almost as if we were in want of a new species of teacher. Now, we understand that new species are not special creations, but may be produced by careful selection and rearing. This is, I think, the main task to which our League must now address itself; and I am glad to find that it is already girding up its loins. As the elder Cato went about declaring, "Delenda est Carthago," so it must be our business to be constantly urging—"The teachers must be trained." Without adequate preparation of the right sort of teachers, it is useless—it may even be worse than useless—to multiply our syllabuses and our text-books. I am truly delighted to see so satisfactory a production of these instruments for our work. I am convinced that they are, for the most part, excellent; though there is still room for improvement, both in number and in quality. But tools alone will not serve our turn. We must have the skilled craftsmen to use them. In the midst of all the controversies about the organization of our schools, and about the nature of the work that should be done in them, while fully recognizing the importance of system and mechanical aids, I am yet more and more convinced that the last word of wisdom in all such matters is to be found in the simple dictum: First train your teachers, and then trust your teachers.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

CARDIFF, WALES.

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MORAL EDUCATION: THE TRAINING OF THE TEACHER.*

MILLICENT MACKENZIE.

ANY consideration of "the task of the teacher" naturally suggests the further problem of "the training of the teacher." It is happily no longer necessary, as it was not many years ago, to plead the importance of training. We have come to believe in the born teacher in the sense only in which we believe in the born doctor or nurse. Some are clearly more fitted by nature for one sort of work than for another, but all need that careful preparation in theory and method, and that guidance and demonstration in practical work, which help to develop in shortened time such power and skill as could otherwise only be attained by long experience and at the expense of those practiced upon.

The problem, however, which now confronts us is not that of the general training of teachers, but rather that of the need for a special preparation for a particular aspect of school work. Some may urge, indeed, that there is no need for special treatment, that the importance of moral education is already sufficiently emphasized in every course of professional training, and that every teacher worthy the name is striving to develop the moral character of the pupils intrusted to his care. But this is true only in a certain restricted sense. The main business of the day school, at least, has been regarded as intellectual and technical education, any ethical influence or training being but incidental. However, there are signs of a complete change of attitude in this respect, and it may almost now be said that moral education has entered on a new phase of existence and that a new demand in reference to it will in future be made upon the schools. No longer is

* A paper read to the Moral Education League at its meeting in London in February, 1909.

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it to be carried on, as it were, incidentally, through the influence of the teacher, formation of right habits and the use made of chance occasions which arise in school life for pointing certain moral lessons. We are on the eve of having systematic ethical teaching introduced as a recognized part of every school curriculum. Whereas, in the past, only those who felt a special aptitude for the work took part in it and any attempt at direct moral teaching was regarded more or less in the light of an experiment, in future, ability to give such teaching may be regarded as a necessary part of the equipment, if not of every teacher, at least of a certain proportion of every school staff.

The position with regard to the equipment of such duly qualified teachers is really very grave, much more so than if it were merely a question of the addition of an extra subject to the curriculum.

If, for instance, it was decided that every child should learn French, there might be some difficulty in obtaining a sufficient supply of competent teachers, and for some years to come a certain number of children would be badly taught. Still no very great harm would have been done; life can be well lived without French, and although regrettable, it would not be a very serious matter if some children came to dislike the subject owing to its faulty presentation. But moral and civic instruction being intimately concerned with life and conduct, would almost certainly, in the hands of incompetent teachers, lead to the rousing of contrariant ideas in the minds of the children, with disastrous effect on their future lives.

Moral education is concerned not with one subject amongst many, but with the whole attitude toward life in its manifold relations, and this implies not merely that a certain definite course of direct instruction shall be given, but that every subject shall be so taught as to bring out its moral significance.

It is therefore so obvious that there is an immediate, and probably a rapidly increasing, need for a supply of

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teachers trained in the best methods of dealing with this important aspect of school work, that there is some danger of our forgetting that supply does not necessarily or even usually create demand. Nor even does the need, real as it may be, insure that the demand is forthcoming. Many seem to believe that if once training colleges could be induced to take up the question of systematic moral education, its success would be insured. A little reflection will show that this would only be very partially true. Our schools are already staffed, and not only with teachers who have been trained on different lines and who might even be unsympathetic in the matter, but largely with those who have had no systematic training for their profession and who may perhaps be altogether doubtful of the value of any such general or special preparation for teaching work. It is obvious, therefore, that we cannot expect that young teachers, fresh from college, will be able to accomplish much in the schools at first. In most cases they will be under authority, with practically no responsibility in regard to either curriculum or methods, and it is only too probable that long before such responsibility comes to them, they may have lost their first freshness and enthusiasm.

Without, therefore, desiring for one moment to minimize the importance of enlisting the training colleges on the side of moral education, it must be realized that our task neither begins nor ends there. We need to consider the preparation, not only of our future, but also of our present teachers, and we may go farther and say that no real demand for systematic moral education, and teachers to undertake it, can be said to be established until the country is thoroughly roused on the subject, and parents and education authorities combine to insist on its provision.

In considering, therefore, the question of how best to prepare teachers for the task of moral education, we must distinguish carefully between the preparation which may suitably be provided for students in training colleges and

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that which is possible and desirable for those already in the teaching profession. Further, it is necessary to note that at the present moment teachers must, as a rule, be given the *material* for moral instruction as well as be trained to use it. Most of them (and this is true of non-teachers also) would own that such ideas as they have in relation to moral and civic life have been picked up, as it were, incidentally and in no special order or connection. No wonder that many shrink from attempting to impart ideas which they only possess in chaotic and imperfect form, and upon which, indeed, they themselves have never been taught to reflect. In years to come when, as we hope, children will have received systematic moral teaching throughout their school career, the state of affairs will be different; but at present both students in training and teachers in the schools really require some regular instruction in ethics and civics before they can be expected to show an interest in or aptitude for giving such instruction. We have then to consider three distinct problems, *viz.:*

1. How to create an effective demand for teachers properly trained to undertake both direct and indirect moral and civic education.

2. How best to prepare students in training colleges for this work.

3. How to help those already in the teaching profession to prepare themselves to meet these new requirements.

1. The demand for a supply of properly equipped teachers must not be confused with the demand for moral education itself. The latter has already arisen and is likely to become more insistent every year, but there is unfortunately a mistaken idea abroad that every teacher can undertake moral and civic instruction, even without any previous preparation We have already tried to show what might be the disastrous results of such an assumption, and no efforts should be spared to bring home to education authorities, parents and the general

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public the extreme importance of having such teaching organized on right lines and placed in the hands of really competent persons from the start. The board of education could exercise pressure in this direction by requiring that every recognized school should have at least one member of its staff fully prepared to undertake the organization and carrying out of such teachings. The Moral Education League can do much also by emphasizing the importance of this demand through public lectures, discussions and the circulation of literature dealing with the matter.

2. Training colleges, even if they desire to do so, will hardly be able to deal effectively with the training problem until some definite encouragement is offered or indeed some pressure is brought to bear on them by the training college regulations and syllabuses of work and examination. The board of education, the universities and other bodies responsible for drawing up such regulations and schemes of study should be approached in order that the necessary changes may be effected.

As few students come to a training college properly equipped with the necessary preliminary knowledge it will be requisite, at least for the present, to provide opportunity for the study of ethical and social problems in relation to education. It is quite unnecessary that the course of study should be severely academic in character. Discussions would prove of more value than set lectures, and students should be encouraged to read and think for themselves. In the present transition stage many training colleges would no doubt welcome offers of an occasional lecture from outside, or of some one to open a debate on social or economic questions from time to time.

We must next consider what real preparation for actual teaching can be given in this connection. In the first place it must be noted that the recognized preparation in child-psychology and general theory of education is of the utmost importance. The teacher who really understands the working of the child-mind and has made a

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thorough study of educational theory should be in a position, on the one hand, to avoid rousing contrariant ideas, and on the other to realize the importance of developing moral character and the best means of securing this end.

The general and special methods of giving moral and civic instruction must be studied in the light of educational theory. It is usual to distinguish between direct and indirect instruction, but it is often hard to do so, for certain subjects, *e. g.*, history, may be used both directly and indirectly for the purpose.

Students in training should have opportunity of observing lessons given by competent teachers, and where a demonstration school is attached to the college the full organization of moral and civic education can be studied at first hand.

Actual practice in this kind of teaching should be arranged for in schools of the district. If this were done under proper supervision there might even be considerable demand for short courses of such carefully prepared lessons in schools situated near the college, especially during the next few years before the schools are properly staffed to meet the new demand.

In addition to such training as might be given to all students, training colleges would be well advised to induce some to specialize in this direction. A demand for such specialists for training college demonstration purposes, for organizing and correlating the work in large schools or in groups of schools, and indeed for pioneer work in all directions, may be said to have already arisen, and will be very pressing in the near future. Students who have given particular attention in degree or other academic courses to mental and moral science, sociology and education or some of these, might with advantage both to themselves and the cause of moral education be induced to devote themselves to such specialist work. Indeed, there are few ways in which training colleges (both secondary and elementary) could give more present effective help than in preparing and sending out for work a body of

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such specially trained teachers, who would be able to inspire confidence, demonstrate clearly what can be done, foster and help to organize the tentative efforts of the first critical years and help to guard against the making of serious mistakes.

While dealing with the question of training college work it may be desirable just to touch upon what is felt by many to be a serious difficulty, *viz.*, the relation of moral to religious training. Those colleges which give and prepare teachers to give definite religious instruction, may at first tend to regard purely moral and civic education in the light of a competitor if not of a supplanter. That this is not the case is apparent when one reflects that the truly religious life must be founded upon and can, indeed, only reach its full perfection on a foundation of the moral and civic virtues. There can be no antagonism between the moral and religious life, but rather each supports the other. Those colleges, on the other hand, which are restrained by constitution or charter from giving religious instruction, should welcome such an aid to right living and serious purpose in life and work as will be afforded by the careful study of ethical principles and their application. Such study should go far to counteract any danger of over-emphasis of the intellect at the expense of the emotions and the will, and to restore the balance between academic preparation and the problems of real life.

3. With regard to those already in the teaching profession, the all-important task before us is that of rousing them to real enthusiasm on the subject. If once this could be done, the rest would follow, for these teachers being for the most part either trained and experienced, or at least one of these, they only need to become thoroughly interested in this new view of moral education in order to achieve more or less success in giving it effect. Lectures and demonstration lessons followed by discussions should be arranged for where possible, and education authorities might usefully provide such opportunities for their teachers.

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Reading and discussion circles for the study of questions relating to ethics and citizenship might be organized even in country districts and need not be confined to teachers only; indeed, they would often prove of more interest and value if others were encouraged to join. Summer schools, organized at garden cities and elsewhere, could be arranged so as to afford opportunities for both theoretical and practical work, and at the same time interchange of thought amongst those interested in ethical education and who, coming from different parts, perhaps even from foreign countries, would have varied views and experiences to contribute. Short vacation training courses might also be conducted either at such summer schools or at some of the training colleges. These might be usefully subsidized by education authorities, either directly or by granting exhibitions for the purpose to their teachers.

The need of wisely increasing the literature of the subject must not be forgotten. More books are required both for students in training and for teachers already at work, and it is of the utmost importance that this literature should be of the very best. If only we could rouse our foremost thinkers and writers on ethics, sociology and education to take up the matter seriously, we should soon have the necessary books to help forward this great attempt to raise the whole moral life of the nation. Without a sound attractive and varied literature the movement lacks one of the greatest elements of success. Even the few books we already have need to be more widely known, and further efforts should be made to circulate and make them available to teachers all over the country.

In these various ways we may hope to secure a band of skillful and enthusiastic teachers who will promote the cause of moral education and share in the building of that great temple of a perfected humanity which, in all its glorious beauty, we as yet realize but in dreams or see as in a vision from afar.

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SOME CRITICISMS ON THE NIETZSCHE REVIVAL.

HERBERT L. STEWART.

READERS of the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS must have observed the attention which has lately been devoted to the ethical teaching of Nietzsche. With the editor's permission I propose to deal with the subject from a point of view very different from that of recent contributors. Articles have appeared by Miss Mabel Atkinson, Prof. A. C. Pigou and Mr. A. W. Benn, all alike suggesting a view of Nietzsche's place and value in the history of thought which seems to me astonishing and impossible. I use the word "suggesting" advisedly, for it is true that no explicit estimate of Nietzsche has been offered to us; but in the essays to which I allude it is at least suggested that he is a misunderstood and neglected genius in moral philosophy, and that he has real instruction and guidance to give us if we had only ears to hear. Monstrous conceptions such as the Superman, sheer misunderstandings such as Nietzsche's view of the place of immortality in an ethical system, are recounted to us as words of special illumination, and passages are quoted from his literary remains (embodying some of his most grotesque and repulsive paradoxes) as suitable texts for spiritual meditation. I feel that this paper is to some extent a polemic against an indefinite and therefore elusive opponent, but it seems best to deal directly with some characteristic Nietzschian opinions as expressed by himself and quoted by his admirers; if they mean to endorse these opinions my criticism will be relevant to themselves.

Let me say at once that the value of Nietzsche as a moral philosopher is in my judgment quite insignificant. Nothing, I believe, quite so worthless as "Thus Spake Zarathustra" or "Beyond Good and Evil" has ever at-

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tracted so much attention from serious students of the philosophy of morals. On his artistic excellence I offer no criticism. We have high authority for supposing that a temperament is artistic in proportion as it is neurotic. But there is such a thing as the scientific study of the phenomena of the moral life, and here, at all events, it is of some advantage to be calm and dispassionate—in a word, to be sane. For my part, I can obtain very little guidance from the "intuitions" of a singularly ill-balanced mind pronouncing on the deepest problems of morality without having ever realized either the complexity of the moral facts or the true "sting" of the moral problem.

I select three points which recent writers have made conspicuous:

I. The conception of the "Superman."

II. Nietzsche's view of "other-worldliness."

III. The alleged affinity between evolutionary ethics and the ethics of Nietzsche.

I.

The conception of the Superman has unquestioned elements of value; but in those aspects in which it is valuable it is no original discovery of Nietzsche, and in the sense in which it is peculiarly his own it is not merely untrue—it is antithetical to truth. It is an assertion of the worth of physical well-being and of the fierce joy of physical life; it is a protest against the unhealthy perversions of the ascetic ideal, against those whose conception of sainthood makes everything earthly seem valueless or worse. It is a call to grapple with the countless preventable evils of our time and a reproach to the morbid "other-worldliness" which remains apathetic to the woes of life, making its insignificance an excuse for its squalor and misery. Further, the conception of the Superman who is yet to come suggests a thought which those who have forgotten their Plato sometimes call

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"peculiarly modern"—I mean the responsibility of each generation for those who are to be their successors. This is a burden which increases with every increase in our acquaintance with the laws of life. We know more fully to-day than men ever knew before the extent to which the physical and material well-being of posterity is under our control. With every advance—provided it is not one of purely speculative interest—in physiology, in sociology, in economics, in any science that illumines any region of man's life, our responsibility for the next generation becomes more serious and complex. But these are among the trite commonplaces of ethical thought, and it was scarcely for their sake that Nietzsche has burdened our philosophical vocabulary with a new word. It is to the use he makes of this conception in formulating the moral end that I draw special attention. This is clearly indicated in the following passage:

> I teach you beyond-man. Man is a something that shall be surpassed. What have ye done to surpass him?
>
> All beings hitherto have created something beyond themselves: and are ye going to be the ebb of this great tide and rather revert to the animal than surpass man?
>
> What with man is the ape? A joke or a sore shame. Man shall be the same for beyond-man, a joke or a sore shame.[1]

The point of this passage is sufficiently clear. Everything exists for the sake of something else higher and better than itself, and its characteristic excellence is constituted by the efficiency with which it subserves this end. To this rule man can be no exception—his value is found in the extent to which he prepares the way and hastens the coming of the Superman.

I notice here, to begin with, the sublime faith in final causes, the conviction that nature has throughout a purpose, which is doubtless perfectly sound but ludicrously inconsistent with the Nietzschian metaphysic. He does not, indeed, say that things exist *in order* to pave the way

[1] "Thus Spake Zarathustra," I, 3.

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for better things—he says simply that they *have* done so; but he bases an argument regarding the true function of man on this analogy, and the inference loses any force it may have unless the historical fact is the expression of the inward nature of things. This is a sort of teleology, and there is no sleight of tongue by which an atheistic view of the world can be made to bear a teleological construction.

But this is only one of the minor incoherences. The really striking novelty is that the moral end—by which presumably the fact of moral obligation is to be explained—is gravely asserted to be the subservience by man of a purpose wholly extrinsic to himself. I am nothing but a *means*—a "bridge," as Nietzsche picturesquely puts it, to beyond-man.

This thought seemed to its author a stroke of such unparalleled genius that, had he not forsworn all superstition, he would have claimed it as a special inspiration from heaven. It seems a pity that he cannot adore himself as a divine favorite and the custodian of a secret from on high without compromising, in a measure, that originality which must owe nothing to either God or man. One can well imagine the fury with which, in another mood, his sense of personal majesty might have repelled the suggestion that man can be other than an end unto himself. It would be easy to compose a Nietzschian declamation against "man as means" on the model of the famous refutation of theism which Prof. Pringle-Pattison has called a "logical gem." "To lay bare to you, friends, my inmost heart, *if* there were gods, how should I bear it not to be a god? *Therefore* there are no gods." His ambition has surely fallen far when he is content to be a "bridge."

It is precisely in that respect wherein man *differs* from the rest of the universe that we find the nerve of the moral life. We may readily grant to Nietzsche that the well-being of all things depends upon the efficiency with which they realize their purpose and that man himself is

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a further illustration of this general law. But there is a fundamental distinction between a purpose existing *in* me, and a purpose existing *for me*. For those creatures which are here only that they may further an end beyond themselves there is no such thing as morality. But with the emergence of a rational self-conscious being we must have resort to a new category to describe his life. Anyone whose mind has not been corrupted by anti-theological prejudice can see that one means very different types of obligation when he says "a caterpillar ought to turn into a chrysalis" and "a man ought to support his children."

It is here that every ethical investigator who understands his work must find his point of departure; for even if, as in Greek thought, the category of "good" is substituted for the category of "right," the good is conceived as possessing its specific quality for all rational beings alike; the moral judgment claims in contrast to the judgment of feeling or taste an *objective* character. This point has been developed with his usual lucidity and power by Dr. Hastings Rashdall.[2] When I say, "This is a pleasant drink," my statement, as an expression of individual feeling, is quite reconcilable with the contrary opinion being entertained by some one else. But when I say, "This conduct is right," I certainly mean to imply that all rational human beings must, if they think correctly, be of the same opinion. The claim is an ambitious one—I mean that or I mean nothing. I brook no contradiction; I am not speaking of my private likes or dislikes —it is of the very essence of the moral judgment that it claims to be true for all mankind. It is useless to tell me that I have no right to express more than a personal opinion: it is really a matter of words—the "opinion" I express in this case is that a certain thing is true and *must be recognized as such by all rational human beings*, and such is not the "opinion" expressed by the judgment of taste.

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[2] "Theory of Good and Evil," Vol. I, p. 144, *seq.*

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This claim to objectivity may be an illusion. If so, it must be psychologically explained, but it is perfectly futile to affect to ignore its existence. It is the cardinal fact of the moral consciousness. Personally I hold that it is not an illusion; that it is vindicated by an examination of the relation of moral experience to the nature of reality; that such inquiry reveals the moral qualities as coincident with the rationality that belongs to the real through and through, and that the theoretical account of the empirical sense of obligation is the recognition by a free self-conscious intelligence of one type of conduct as rational—the response of reason within to reason without. While, however, I feel satisfied of the essential correctness of this view, I admit that a strong case can be made out in behalf of a different theory of obligation. One may argue that the moral judgment is neither more nor less objective than the judgment of taste, if he puts the matter as follows: When I say "this painting" or "this piece of music" is beautiful, I do not simply affirm regarding my *individual* feeling; I mean not only that an agreeable experience is aroused by the artistic product in me personally, but also that all other persons of a certain type of education and culture will—within limits of individuality—be similarly affected. And I mean still more. If some one else tells me that he derives more pleasure from the pictorial advertisement of a patent medicine than from an old master, or from a street organ than from cathedral music, I do not merely remark that "there is no accounting for tastes" —I certainly claim for my own taste a *higher value* than I allow to his; if asked wherein does the superiority consist I should perhaps be at a loss to reply in terms that my questioner would understand—or it may be in any terms at all. But I should not for that reason be at all shaken in my conviction that my taste is "right" and that his is "wrong."

Now is this a true analogue of the moral judgment? Eminent authorities would support the view that it is a

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perfect illustration—that the moral judgment resembles the æsthetic in that both are "judgments of value"—the the "good" and the "beautiful" are alike ultimate conceptions. Nietzsche, in so far as any coherent opinion can be gathered from him, would, I suppose, simply call the moral a form of the æsthetic judgment. If he were asked to explain why, as a matter of fact, one uses stronger language and applies stronger measures to the man who has a taste for theft than to him who has a taste for street organs, I can scarcely imagine what oracular response Zarathustra would give. Probably that we have no more and no less right to coerce the one taste than to coerce the other, and that the only account to be given of coercion at all is the lunatic's explanation of the restraint under which he had to live: "I thought the world was mad—the world thought I was mad—and the world was stronger than I."

Now we may say either one thing or the other about moral obligation. We may say that the last analysis reveals an ultimate judgment of value which it is idle to scrutinize further and that every deliverance of conscience is just an instance of valuation of which no intellectual account is either producible or desirable. The fact that this system of values is objective must be reconciled with the actual differences of opinion and still greater differences of conduct by supposing that men frequently do not inquire with sufficient care what it is that conscience approves, and still more frequently misreport its voice—they are deceivers, or they are self-deceived. On the other hand, we may insist that only rationality is in its own right objective, and that the objectivity which we attach to feeling and every other aspect of the non-rational is simply "held in fee." Whether, for example, the ground in reason is producible or not there *is* an inner rational ground why an old master ought to take precedence of a newspaper drawing.

But what are we to think of a man, described by Mr. A. W. Benn as a "truly ethical genius," who has written

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volumes of declamation against the whole ethical thought of the past, but who has not one lucid word to say on this supreme issue of ethical controversy? A distinguished writer of this generation has told us that while he had all his life been attracted by the study of art, morality was always to him quite uninteresting. But—more merciful to his contemporaries than was Nietzsche—he refrained from writing about it. Whether "interesting" to certain minds or not, the phenomena of the moral life are complex, variable in detail, yet in a sense constant and of extraordinary persistence throughout human history. We know to-day how to characterize those eighteenth century writers who were content to explain religion in every form as the invention of priests for their personal aggrandizement. And now that which his eighteenth century predecessors had preserved as holy amid the wreck of popular superstition—the sublime reverence for the moral law—is found by Nietzsche to be of equally ignoble origin and destined to an equally scornful repudiation!

Mr. Benn has put the matter quite frankly: "Whether his charges have or have not been made out is a question irrelevant to the present discussion. What interests us to observe is that at any rate it did not lie in the mouth of a professed immoralist to make them. *For they involve the assumption to which he is not entitled, that there is such a thing as moral obligation.*" . . .[3] (The italics are mine.)

Now I am not here quarreling with Nietzsche simply for the denial of moral obligation. What I complain of is that having denied it he does not carry out his denial in a coherent or systematic way. The whole harangue by Zarathustra about the ideal Superman and his claim upon our enthusiastic effort can live only for those who surreptitiously introduce conceptions whose validity Nietzsche has himself destroyed; for the Nietzschian who thoroughly understands his master's metaphysic there

[3] INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, January, 1909, pp. 205, 206.

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could be no hollower rattling of dry bones. He might well retort thus: "What is the Superman to me that I should work for him? If I am a mere link in an endless chain—a member in a series whose existence is justified only by the preparation it makes for the member that is to come—then I will reverse the customary exhortation. I have not to rise worthy of my high calling. I have to descend to my appropriate degradation. Carry your talk about duty for duty's sake to the old man who had not yet heard that God is dead. You speak an unknown tongue to one who understands himself as a mere product of a ruthless cosmic struggle and who knows that nature cares nought for him. If the ape is my true analogue I claim at least the privileges of the ape—I will bestow as much forethought on the quality of the race that is to come as was presumably expended on the human species by its hairy ancestry." And the disciple who thus refuted his master out of his own mouth would be entirely justified. If I do not find the Superman a worthy ideal or recognize in him any binding authority over me, Nietzsche cannot utter a word of censure without denying implicitly his own theory. For my own part, if I had accepted the Nietzschian theoretical basis and were either appealed to or rebuked in the name of Superhumanity, I should hear the appeal unmoved and the rebuke unchastened. For I candidly admit that in that case, if my self-sacrifice would call into existence legions of Supermen, I would refuse to make it, and I can conceive of no censure that a consistent Nietzschian could pass upon me. Possibly he might parody the Stoic formula, saying mournfully, "*Nempe hoc indocti; Nietzschius non dicet idem.*"

II.

I pass on to speak of Nietzsche's attitude toward immortality and its ethical significance. I quote two passages:

> Beyond-man is the significance of earth. Your will shall say: beyond man shall be the significance of earth.

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I conjure you, my brethren, remain faithful to earth and do not believe those who speak unto you of superterrestrial hopes! Prisoners they are whether they know it or not.

Despisers of life they are, decaying and themselves poisoned, of whom earth is weary: begone with them!

Again:

I love those who not seek beyond the stars for a reason to perish and be sacrificed, but who sacrifice themselves to earth in order that earth may some day become beyond-man's.[4]

The postulate of immortality seemed to Emmanuel Kant a necessary implication of the moral life. It is rejected with horror by the fine spiritual intuition of Neitzsche as fundamentally selfish, coarse, commercial. I commend this to the attention of anyone blessed with that sense of humor with which we cannot dispense in even the most severe philosophical reasoning.

The view of Nietzsche on this matter is by no means unusual to-day, particularly amongst those whose knowledge of the history of ethics has been gathered from occasional articles in the secularist magazines. In these deliverances the maximum of blasphemy is commonly combined with the minimum of information. The "postulate of immortality" which seemed valid to such thinkers as, for example, the late Dr. Edward Caird, is declared by these revolutionaries to be nothing but a piece of ignoble bargaining; it means, "I will not do my duty unless I am paid for it"; it means, "I care nothing about right and wrong except in so far as one course of action will in the long run serve my own selfish purpose." And in contrast to such a spirit of profit and loss they strike an attitude meant to be heroic—declaim about duty for duty's sake and try to believe that in some way or other they resemble Prometheus at the rock.

The argument for immortality derived from the moral consciousness is no doubt open to discussion; but the

[4] "Thus Spake Zarathustra," I, 4.

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man who thinks it may be dismissed as a product of "other-worldliness," or that a commercial transaction offers even a faint analogy to the moral postulate, simply does not understand what the argument means. For, to begin within, that which is an indispensable element in the justification of an action need not be present at all to the mind of the agent. The nutrition of the body is the *rationale* of eating; but which of us thinks of this in obeying the impulse of hunger? Even if the attainment of eternal happiness were—as it is not—the motive of virtuous living, we are justified by analogies on every hand in supposing that the ultimate purpose need never come consciously before the mind at all. It is thus no refutation to tell us that the good man in ordering his life takes no thought for the policy that will "pay" in the world to come.

But, further, the whole conception of "payment" is foreign to the spirit of the moral postulate. In vindicating the distinction between right and wrong we claim to have shown that the moral order is the rational order, and that there can no more, under the same set of circumstances, be two courses of conduct equally right than there can be two systems of belief equally true. "Morality reigns at the heart of things"—which is another way of saying that God is moral. It follows from this that the strivings of the moral life cannot be in the end a failure—that he who follows that duty which is in the last analysis but an aspect of the nature of things must in a rational universe, guided by a rational will, find at the long last that his work has not been in vain. But who shall say—except in moments of unusual insincerity—that a moral struggle, lasting a few short years, where a moral hero has spent his strength for nothing more than to diminish in an infinitesimal degree the blemishes of the physical order—and this at the cost of immense personal sacrifice—then passing away into the darkness of annihilation; who shall say that this is other than failure or shall doubt that life is tragic precisely in so far as it

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is heroic? For my own part, if I began under Nietzsche, I should certainly end under Schopenhauer.

The argument proceeds by stages; we show first that the universe is through and through rational, implying a rational intelligence, then that of this rationality the moral order is one phase or aspect, and finally that a moral God cannot fail so to order the world that the moral life shall not be in its very nature a sheer tragedy.

Now where is the mercenary element in this? I do not live an upright life *in order* to be rewarded, but I do emphatically claim that if in doing duty for duty's sake I am merely approaching more or less quickly to the final debacle, then my whole view of the rationality of the world is shaken to its foundations.

This deduction of immortality may clearly be attacked in any of its stages. It falls through if anyone can show that the universe is not really rational, that rationality can ultimately be divorced from personality, or that the feelings and impulses we call morally good are not at the same time deducible from the "nature of things." But to repudiate it as a piece of coarse commercialism indicates a total misunderstanding of its purport and implications. For myself, I am old-fashioned enough to believe that you cannot eliminate the hope of immortality without taking out the very backbone from the structure of moral experience.

There is no metaphysical system which invalidates the belief in a future life and which does not at the same time—for those who can think out consequences clearly to the end—make short work of moral distinctions. And it will, I believe, invariably be found that he who can combine such speculative doctrine as that of Nietzsche with a genuine recognition of the moral order does so only by introducing unconsciously in the process of his thought some notion borrowed illegitimately from elsewhere. At all events, amid many speculative differences, this inward connection seemed certain to Leibniz, to Kant, and in our own day to Hermann Lotze, and I sug-

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gest to the Nietzschian revivalists that a conclusion common to these three thinkers cannot be either obviously ridiculous or obviously ignoble. Of one thing I am sure—it requires more serious refutation than is to be found in a *bon mot* of George Eliot or George Meredith.

III.

The admirers of Nietzsche claim on his behalf that in the idea of the Superman he has merely worked out the implication for morals of natural selection and of the survival of the fittest; and they apparently suppose that their master's ethic is entitled to the same authority that is conceded to the doctrine of evolution in general. It would undoubtedly transform their position if it could be shown that Nietzschian moral theory is an integral part of Darwinism and its corollaries. But while points of superficial resemblance are not wanting, and while the Superman is sufficiently similar to the evolution goal for us to recognize the Spencerian conception of which it is the caricature, the points of difference between Nietzsche and Spencer are of enormously greater importance. The most obvious is perhaps this: if a theory of ethics could be shown to be in direct conflict with the moral experiences of mankind, to condemn as irrational sentiments and aspirations that have persisted throughout all ages and have won practically universal admiration—that fact seemed to Spencer a *prima facie* reason for suspecting the theory. It was not, indeed, in itself a sufficient refutation. He might himself be right while all mankind besides were wrong. But while the theory was not on that account to be summarily dismissed, it was at least to be rescrutinized. He is everywhere at pains to show how the actions and feelings which win approbation are also, generally speaking, such as evolution, properly understood will vindicate. Not so Nietzsche. I sometimes think in reading his books that if he detected himself giving unconscious support to an *accepted* belief he would

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immediately set about repudiating it. The discordance of a theory with common opinion and practice was never, to his mind, an argument *against* it, but rather a most potent argument *for* it. One is unwilling to speak quite plainly on this matter; and I should not have written in this strain if an attempt were not being made to remove Nietzsche from the sphere of mental pathology, to which he belongs, into the sphere of moral philosophy, with which he has little concern.

In the Romanes lecture of 1893 Huxley contended that if the moral code is to be formulated in terms of evolution, then the ideal of conduct must necessarily be egoism sheer and unmitigated. He argued that, on that supposition, the "milder virtues" must be condemned as possessing no survival value, that the "fittest" is identical with the "best," and that if natural selection is to have her perfect work, every type of altruism is an obstacle to moral progress. His conclusion was that ethical man is not to be explained as a mere product of the cosmic process. But from the same premises Nietzsche draws a very different inference. He has at least the courage of his convictions:

> The weak and ill-constituted shall perish: first principle of *our* charity. And people shall help them to do so. Sympathy thwarts on the whole the law of development which is the law of selection . . . nothing in our unsound modernism is unsounder than Christian sympathy.

For my part, if we grant the standpoint that is common to Huxley and Spencer, I hold that Spencer's rejoinder to this misreading of evolution is wholly justified. For those very milder virtues, which evolution is alleged to condemn, are themselves products of evolution, if we take account of the struggle for existence not only among individuals, but among communities. Altruism as a principle of internal cohesion imparts strength to the tribe just as egoism is of value to the individual. And, further, the period during which the thoroughly egoistic man has an advantage, even in the struggle for his own life, is a passing period in human evolution; when

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society has emerged from the militant into the industrial stage other qualities acquire survival value. And the whole contention of Nietzsche is surely rendered sufficiently absurd when we observe that those very qualities which evolution, on his theory cannot produce, have steadily grown stronger and wider in scope throughout the actual evolution process. He would doubtless reply, "That is because we have artificially interfered with the working of natural selection." And, pray, are not those impulses and motives by which this interference was prompted themselves products of natural selection? The man whom Dr. Tille has glorified as the first thoroughgoing Darwinian can scarcely deny this. The question of Spencer remains as unanswerable for Nietzsche as for Huxley. "If ethical man is not a product of the cosmic process, what is he a product of?" And finally I ask what possible meaning even a Nietzschian can affect to discover in the statement that I *ought* to work for the coming of that toward which, and toward which alone, I am bound to work by my very nature and whose realization is an integral part of a fatally determined evolution process.

The cynic, interested in tracing the ironies of history, could surely find unworked material in the course of philosophical speculation. How often has it happened that a violent reaction against a particular type of thought has ended in giving us simply a disguised form of those conceptions that it had so scornfully dismissed? Nothing could be, at first sight, more alien to the system of Herbert Spencer than the scholastic doctrine of substance; yet in what respect is the power behind phenomena, the unknown and unknowable reality-in-itself exempt from those difficulties which make the notion of substance untenable? It is of no consequence whether we call it substantia or quidditas or power, the thing is the same; it is a real *behind* appearances, not immanent *in* appearances; as such it reproduces all the old problems of inherence, and in this way Spencer's affinities are to

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medieval not to modern thought. Something similar may be said of Nietzsche. It might be supposed that at this time of day every ethical system must at least affirm an autonomy of the will. And no writer pays to such a conception more devout lip homage than does Nietzsche himself. Yet what is the ideal of the Superman but an ideal related in a purely external way to the will which it is to control? The good at which I am to aim is not *my* good—it is an end absolutely cut off from my personality. And as such it has all the blemishes of a new heteronomy of the will. This gives no place to any rational significance for moral obligation or moral objectivity, and he who says that Nietzsche has not destroyed, but merely revised the conception of duty, is dealing not in meanings, but only in words. If I have to choose amongst heteronomies I will certainly not choose this one. The devout Mohammedan could face the extreme of suffering or danger with the words, "It is the will of Allah—the will of Allah be done." There is an element of majesty here; but to my mind there is nothing majestic, but rather something ridiculous in affecting to be consoled with the reflection, "It is the coming of the Superman; let the Superman come."

It is, of course, very difficult to say what transformation we should all undergo if this type of doctrine became dominant. But one thing we might fairly hope for —that even if we were forced to accept the Nietzschian negations, we might be delivered from the Nietzschian cant. I have always been much struck by Mr. Bradley's definition of pessimism—more forcible, I admit, than elegant—"Where all is rotten it is a man's work to cry stinking fish." In such tragic circumstances under Nietzschian guidance, we should rather invent palliating phrases, linguistic caricatures of the watchwords of departed faith. For my part, I will learn none of the shibboleths. If Nietzsche takes from me the God of Christianity, I will at least pay no homage to the hideous, misshapen idol which he offers in exchange.

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When Zarathustra opens his rhapsody on the mock sanctities of his own creed, I will rival, at least in vehemence, the disgust with which he has trampled upon holy ground. I will have none of the "consolations" with which he has burlesqued the assurance of faith. If he takes from me the "sure and certain hope," I will not pretend to have found a substitute in some sickly phrase about "living in the race" or about "lives made better by our presence." I will call it the thing it is—the hollowest cant of a canting age. Perhaps, in speaking the truth and calling the cosmic process by its right name, one may find a last desperate exhilaration.

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PROBLEMS OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE.

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THE serious student of "the social mechanism which constitutes the social order" must approach problems of life and conduct in the modern world in the spirit of scientific inquiry and with avoidance of dogmatic theorizing, depending for solution of the most difficult of those problems upon the testimony of human experience as that is interpreted by trained intelligence and disciplined judgment. It is in that spirit that the problems of marriage and divorce are approached in this paper, and certain basic considerations are summarized at the outset as follows:

First, Marriage is a social institution, with a natural history of development, to be studied, therefore, as all other social institutions should be studied, for actual testimony of human experience concerning what may be decided upon as right, wise and socially desirable under present conditions. "Marriage," says Westermarck, "is a product of social experience." It has assumed one

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form or another as varying social needs have seemed to demand; it has been changed from one form to another as other social changes have seemed to require.

Second, it is generally conceded that the family is the most vital and fundamental institution in society. It is, as Dr. Small well says, "the agency by which the individual is socialized," the innermost social group by means of which individuals learn how to live together in a social world. It is the focal center of those elements of constancy and of progress in human experience the action and interaction of which secure the spiritual evolution of the race.

Third, the family in some form is now accepted as the primitive social group, the nursery and kindergarten of the race in its discipline toward coöperative action. We must remember in this connection that, as Staarcke says, "Marriage is rooted in the family, not the family in marriage." That is to say, the human race did not first build up the union of the sexes upon an increasingly higher plane, and then, as a secondary process, build up the family group of parents, children, brothers, sisters, grandparents, etc.; on the contrary, humanity developed the family group as its first attempt at social order, and then fixed its ideals, customs and laws of marriage according to the varying requirements of family life.

Fourth, the union of the sexes and the initial family tendencies have a biological as well as a sociological background, proving that nature has ordained their strength by the depth of their foundation in the life-processes. "Marriage," says Howard, "does not belong exclusively to our species." We reach in beasts and in birds conjugal affection of a high order, and also, in some degree, that perpetuation of the conjugal relation for the benefit of offspring which is the most substantial and enduring bond of the human family.

Fifth, we now see that the development of the family has not been in straight lines of evolutionary sequence, each culture-stage exactly corresponding in its domestic

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relationships to an appropriate general social order. Varying pressure of economic, political, religious and social influences have produced variations and reactionary conditions in marriage, child-care and other domestic concerns. This makes a special study of the institution of the family, apart from, while connected with, all other social institutions, necessary to a clear understanding of the historic background for modern analysis. In general, however, we find "the horde or mother-right" the chief if not the universal primitive form of the family. As Lippert says, "The mother and child were the simplest elements of the oldest organization of society." It is to be noted, however, that what has been called the "Matriarchate" is not the feminine parallel of the "Patriarchate." The mother-right was not that of a personal despot like the Roman father; the mother-right was social, a definite expression of tribal unity through blood relationship, as expressed in the vast and widely diffused system of the "totem." No doubt the simple, obvious bond of blood first "set the mold" of family allegiance. The more abstract conception of relationship which founded the patriarchal family, that which, as Æschylus makes Apollo say, "established the male as the generative source of offspring," led to the headship of the chief father over the collective family group and paved the way for an imperial state of masculine rule. The later ideal conception of dual parenthood, with reciprocal rights and obligations between the married pair, and of both in respect to their common children, has been long struggling, under different types of the family order, for a more intelligent and complete recognition.

Accepting these general outlines of past development, we see clearly that we are to-day inheritors of all the ideals, customs and laws which have outlined the experience of the race in respect to family life. We find imbedded in our modern laws traces of the most ancient sanctions and prohibitions concerning marriage, divorce and the care of children. We find in the persisting

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statutes defining "lines of consanguinity" and of "racial intermingling" beyond which no man or woman can go in contracting legal marriage, the residuum of the "totem" and other prescriptions so early established by rigid custom. We find in the male headship of the family (so strongly intrenched in law that in less than twenty of the commonwealths of the United States is a mother's equal control of the children even now assured) a clear repetition of the patriarchal ideals of the family which for so long placed not only the children but the wife under the absolute power of the father.

Again, we have in connection with our marriage services, lay and clerical, remnants of "wife sale," a custom nearly universal in some culture-stages of the race. "Who giveth this woman to wife" and "With all my worldly goods I thee endow" echo the changes from the payment of money for the bride from the groom to the father, to the payment by the groom to the bride of a sum which, although he could use its income freely, he must preserve in principal as a "dower" (a species of widow and old-age insurance), and which, when divorce began to be allowed the wife, might be ordered returned to her by the court as a protection against poverty. In other portions of modern marriage services we find traces of the opposite stage in marriage custom—that in which the bridegroom was paid for marrying the woman instead of paying for the privilege; the "marriage portions" settled upon American girls who marry foreign noblemen being a picturesque example of this survival.

In many forms of marriage service in our modern composite society we have a clear and definite survival of the Roman patrician ideal of marriage as a sacrament of religion, in which the sole basis of descent of name and property and sole symbol of family autonomy, is an indissoluble bond of wedded allegiance. Latin Christianity, which preserved this patrician ideal of indissoluble marriage and reconsecrated it in the name of the Christian church, now upholds it as the only true ideal for its

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obedient followers. We have, on the other hand, many reminders at the present day of that opposite type of marriage ideal and ceremony, that which was "bred in the bone" of all peoples of Teutonic stock; namely, the ideal of marriage as a "private contract," a purely "family concern." This Germanic ideal expressed itself in two rituals; the first, the legal contract which alone gave validity to the union, the "Be-wedding," or betrothal, in which the father or guardian or several kinsmen of the bride safeguarded her interests financially and otherwise, especially when the groom was to take her "into another Thane's land"; and the second, the "Gifta," or nuptials, in which the ritual expressed the more spiritual element of the union. When in Germanic civilization the daughter acquired a veto power respecting her father's choice of her husband, and later even a chance for self-choice, the sentiments of the "Gifta" expressed this change, and the ritual could be led by either the father, a chosen guardian or an "orator" selected for his ability to lead the responses with distinction; but in any case the important words must be said by the man and woman concerned most vitally in the transaction, and by both in exactly the same formula. The responses of the English church service, the simple formula of the Friends and many other elements of modern marriage forms are reminders of the old Teutonic "Be-wedding" and "Gifta" now consolidated into one ritual.

The childishly romantic "elopements" of the present day hark back still further in primitive instinct to the ages of wife-capture or to the "rescue of the fairy princess" of the days of chivalry, and are evidences of an ever-recurring revolt against the ideal of social obligation in marriage which, under every form of social order, has appeared as the expression of an extreme individualism.

Rooted deeply in our religious inheritance is the noble Jewish ideal of marriage as a holy estate, to be honored above all other forms of human relationship. This ideal

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has survived the attacks of the asceticism of early Christianity and emerged without a permanent smirch from the era in which, as one of the fathers of the church said, "All those are urged to marry, and those alone, who are unable to bear the superior state of virginity and are not restrained therefrom by solemn vows."

We have clear evidence of the antiquity of state control over marriage in the requirement, almost universal in modern society, to secure a "license to wed" and the issuance of a certificate referring to the legal quality of the act of marriage. We have not kept the clear, simple and positive affirmation of the sovereignty of the state in domestic concerns which was established by early forms of Protestant Christian civilization; and we have not yet achieved in a uniform marriage law anything so progressive and socially unifying as that which the genius of Cromwell gave to the brief reign of the English Commonwealth. The early settlers of America, however, preserved clear traces of this statesmanlike statute in the requirement that a magistrate of the state should alone have power to legalize marriages, they being so jealous of the prerogatives of the civil government in this particular that they would not allow a minister to "preach a sermon" on the occasion of a "great marriage," lest he detract from the civil dignity, although he might be "present and make a short exhortation." We have not kept the exclusive magisterial function in the marriage ceremony, but we do require that the minister shall recognize his power to legalize the union of a man and a woman as a *delegated* one, and to say "by the power vested in me by the State I pronounce you husband and wife."

In retaining the Germanic ideals of the private nature of marriage and the sovereignty of personal choice in wedlock, we have yet not lost sight of the primitive function of the family as the seed-plot of civic institutions. Martin Luther said of marriage, "It is the source of domestic and public government, the foundation of human

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society, without which it would fall to pieces." This view has been built into our own social ideals and customs; but we have added a far more tender consideration for the needs and wishes of each member of the family than has been shown in any previous social order, and we are more jealous of the rights of each individual as a unit of society than of the strict autonomy of the family group. This consideration for the individual is giving us greater freedom within the family, and greater ease of separation from the family for those desiring social rearrangement.

The physiology of the family is far more important, be it remembered, as an object of study than is the pathology of marriage. Even in acute social disease the attention should not be concentrated upon symptoms of disorder, but constantly fixed upon standards of social health. We need give, therefore, but a few words to the summing up of the course of historic evolution in the matter of separation and divorce of married couples.

In some forms of primitive society divorce was easy for the man, impossible for the woman; in some, easy for both; in others, possible for neither. In the patriarchal family of legal headship vested in the father, divorce could not terminate the religious marriage, but there were ways by which the husband could be relieved of conditions which proved intolerable to him. In most forms of social order, domestic conditions, religious ideals and economic restrictions have united to make it difficult, when not impossible, for women to escape from matrimonial bonds found irksome; and in most forms of social order arrangements have been made to relieve men, either legally or by social permission, from the effects of a serious mistake in marriage. Of late we have grown more tolerant of divorce. Women have gained power to manage their own lives outside the marriage bond, which enables them to seek divorce at will; and we are witnessing an increase in domestic changes which to many seems socially dangerous. On the other hand there is a

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growing feeling that the spirit rather than the letter of the marriage vows should be conserved, and although all do not agree with Milton that "divorce is equitable," few are sure that legal dissolutions are always wrong.

From this tangled mass of tradition and custom, from many periods of confusing inconsistency between ideals and practice, we have come to our modern problems of marriage and divorce. We are now imperatively called upon to evolve a definite, conscious, ethical ideal of the family suited to our present conditions in respect to all other social relations: an ideal which shall guide us in making our laws in the United States more intelligible, more consistent, more uniform, and which shall aid in making our family life more effective for social ends. We have now, as a means to this end, to study, in a freer state than has before been known, the fruits of this mingled social inheritance in the family order; to preserve such elements of past laws and conditions as suit our present needs, to reject all legal enactments and traditional customs which are outgrown or socially obstructive, and to adopt a radically constructive attitude toward the most vital of all human institutions. The standard which must guide us in this process of utilizing past experience for the benefit of present and future life is the same standard we have to apply to all social institutions; namely, the standard of social serviceableness, in the high sense of that which is conducive to the spiritual evolution of the race. In applying that standard we must ask first, What are the objects of the family? and second, How may those objects be obtained in modern social conditions?

The first object of the family is the protection, nurture and development of child life, the process which insures the continuance and the improvement of the race.

The second object of the family is the external but necessary arrangement by which matters of name, descent, the holding and transfer of property, and the economic support of dependent persons are held in the

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autonomy of a well-knit group, in the midst of a larger social organization less concerned with the welfare of the "solitary set in families."

The third object of the family is the moral discipline of its members, by means of the closest and most affectional of ties, in the direction of coöperative capacity as members of the state and of society at large.

The fourth object of the family, and the most modern one, is the development of a free, self-disciplined, personality, in its members, as a needed preparation for the rapidly increasing democracy of the modern social order. This last and most modern demand upon the family places upon all ethical leaders of the present time a peculiar task of attempted reincarnation of old sanctions for conduct in new forms suited to the new educational, industrial and political conditions.

How may we work toward these objects of the family if we accept them as vital and to be sought after?

First, the primal object of the family, the well-being of offspring, can alone be secured in the present, and in any future in sight, as it has been in the past, by a measurably stable family life, attained by a frank and obedient acceptance of marriage as having more than personal significance, that is as being a matter of social concern. Marriage is that central element of sex-union required and developed by the family in accordance with commonly accepted beliefs concerning the objects of the family. Marriage must therefore be looked upon as a subordinate element of the family order, rather than as a purely individualistic contract. Legal separation and divorce are the means by which pathological conditions of family life are regulated in the interests of accepted social organization and accepted claims of personal justice; and therefore separation and divorce are elements of the family order and not purely individualistic terminations of personal contract. We cannot, therefore, accept as valid Milton's ideal of marriage as an arrangement solely for the happiness of men and women. Society

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in our modern world, more than in ancient times, has to pay the penalty for the wrongdoing, the mistake, or the incompetency of the parents of children. Marriage is, indeed, the highest means we have for securing the happiness of the majority of human beings; but the happiness of each and all who are married is not alone the end in an institution upon which we depend as a channel for life's progressive currents. Therefore any form of excessive individualism that ignores or evades social control of marriage, any childish rebellion against the hardships of the legal bond, any revolt of personal whim or selfishness that could not safely become the rule for the majority of humanity, must not be allowed to secure for individuals exemption from social obligation in the married life. Hence we must seek to secure in some form consistent with our modern political and ethical ideals, a form of social control of the family which shall be more efficient than our present confused and hesitant direction. As a first step in that tendency teachers of ethics and religion must place clearly before all sorts and conditions of men and women the supreme need and righteousness of some form of social control of the modern family. With the common acceptance of that ideal the method of its application can be developed with comparative ease.

It should be more clearly understood that our own is the first form of civilization that has tried in any large way the experiment of placing the entire burden of the success of the family upon the characters and capacities of two persons. In primitive social orders, and in the older civilizations, each married pair and their children were sustained, disciplined and controlled by the collective family order in which they lived. Now we trust two people in early youth, undisciplined, undeveloped, perhaps deficient in mental, moral, physical or economic power, to marry as they will; bear children without let or hindrance; take care of them or not as seems desirable or possible to them; separate with ease, with or without legal procedure; and the burden of all the failures in mar-

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riage is placed directly upon society as a whole. The consequences of this daring dependence upon individuals in the family life have brought us to the point where we see clearly that what society accepts in its results as its burden, it must control as its right and duty.

What social institution do we now possess equal to the task of social control of the modern family? But one—the state.

The old tyranny of tribal custom is gone; the later despotism of the patriarchate is no more; the unquestioned rule of rabbi and priest no longer exists; the family bond is already stretched to cover so wide an area of personal choice that it cannot hold firm against unsafe or unwise choices. The modern state has absorbed within itself the "mother-right" and the "father-rule," the church control and the educational standard. The modern state is the final appeal in individual need and the ultimate authority in social conduct. Of all modern social institutions the state alone is now powerful enough, definite enough and ethical enough, to accept for all mankind alike the responsibility of care, control and development of the individual life. It is therefore the only institution powerful enough, definite enough and ethical enough, to really control, in the interest of social progress, the family, which is the first and most vital agency by which the individual is rendered fit for society.

The most important thing, therefore, for the stability of the family and for the better securing of its primal object of child-care and nurture is insistence upon a *uniform civil marriage service.* This should be conditioned upon previous application for license, proper delay in securing evidence that there is no impediment to the marriage, and as careful preliminary inquiry in all essential matters as may be possible. This civil marriage should be limited in form to such words as persons of all religious faiths could conscientiously use; should be performed in such places as would safeguard privacy and protect from all trivial and coarse associations; should

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be performed only by special magistrates set aside for this important function and capable of properly representing the dignity and power of the state. It was a backward step in the United States when religious ministers and civil magistrates were put upon the same plane of authority in respect to marriage, even although a civil license was demanded as a preliminary to the nuptial ceremony. We are too divided in ideal and practice in the religious world to-day, we are too deficient in a common standard of what a clergyman should be and do, we are too lacking in ethical unity in church creeds for any church or all the churches in Christendom combined to safely acquire a right equivalent to that of an officer of the state in a matter that concerns the whole of society in such vital fashion as does the organization of family life. It is natural that churches which, like the Jewish, have brought down through the ages the judicial and mandatory powers of the religious ruler should hold on to the control of marriage and divorce. It is natural that the Roman Catholic Church, which absorbed the patriarchal forms from Roman civilization, should still feel it a duty to declare what constitutes true marriage. It is natural that a sect which, like the Friends, has made the church a form of social organization covering property, education and other concerns now generally absorbed by the state, should have taken upon itself the control of marriage, along with charity and reformatory work and all forms of social care for the fruits of marriage. But there is great inconsistency in younger sects, small bodies of ultra-protestants which base their union on personal faith alone, asking to be invested with state powers in regard to so important a social service.

In proportion as religion grows spiritual and individual, in that proportion it grows less ecclesiastical, and therefore less fitted for legal functions. The time has come when great divergence of religious opinion and much weakening of religious discipline make it necessary for social safety and progress that the state assume

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over all classes of believers and non-believers its rightful supremacy in this matter. Any chosen form may "solemnize" a marriage, and the more dear and intimate such ceremony the better. But one form should "legalize" marriage, and that the one by which society safeguards, defines and controls its most indispensable function of family life. For this form, however, we cannot use ill-bred magistrates of inferior courts who have perhaps gained their positions by political trickery; nor can we leave the details of such a ceremony to chance. The beautiful "Halls of Marriage" of some European cities might well be reproduced in the United States, and justices who were no longer capable of the hardest work of the courts, but who had proved themselves of most honorable character, be set aside for this task as a distinction of high social service.

If we could once thus establish the state in its rightful place of social control of marriage we could begin to do definite things now difficult, if not impossible, to attempt, in order to render the family more stable than it is now. The most vital treatment of pathological conditions in the modern family is not to tinker with divorce but to take radical measures to prevent so many people from marrying who should not marry, and whose parenthood is a social danger and disgrace. The stability of the family depends not solely or chiefly upon keeping people together who have married, but in removing from the currents of family descent the poisonous elements of physical and psychological degeneracy. Experience has proved beyond the shadow of a doubt that the largest producing cause of human misery and social retardation is the marriage and breeding of their kind of the feeble-minded, the epileptic, the victims of diseases induced by vicious lives and those of degenerative psychosis tending toward insanity or crime. We have more of these degenerates, comparatively speaking, than preceding civilizations, because we keep them alive where under harsher conditions nature would kill them off more quickly. We are there-

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fore under bonds, if we would not have our growth in charity hinder our progress in health and power, to see to it that these unfortunates do not "bring forth seed after their kind." The state of Indiana has led the way by its statute declaring that "No license to marry shall be issued where either of the parties is an imbecile, epileptic, of insane mind; or to any male person who has been within five years an inmate of any asylum or home for indigent persons, unless it satisfactorily appears that at the time of application for the marriage license the applicant is able to support a family and likely to do so; nor shall any license issue when either of the contracting parties is afflicted with a transmissible disease or at the time of making the application under the influence of intoxicating liquors or narcotic drugs." The other way of approaching the end of protecting the family against degenerative influences is to place in permanent custodial care all those proved unfit for life and therefore unfit for marriage. Unfortunately we have only about one-tenth of those needing such custodial care now protected in an adequate manner; but example is setting in that direction. A tendency also is now started toward the sterilizing of vicious and criminal persons who cannot well be kept in permanent custodial care, but should not be allowed to taint the social fabric with their degenerate lives. In increasing measure we must use the power of the state to remove from the problems of marriage and divorce those hopelessly pathological elements known to be most inimical to the welfare of offspring and the health of the social body.

Second: the family autonomy in relation to economic conditions must be adjusted to quite new social demands. The granting of property rights and contract powers to married women, inevitable as a result of new conceptions of individual rights, has disarranged the old and simple plan of placing both financial power and economic responsibility in the hands of the male head of the family. The whole question of financial responsibility of men and

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women toward their "other halves," and of both parents toward their common children, as well as the larger question of economic family responsibility for the care of the aged and helpless members of society, must come up for careful reconsideration now that women have "bank-books" and minors have "pay envelopes." "Non-support" is often given as a reason for divorce; doubtless oftener than is honest, as the charge often covers more serious offenses against the marriage covenant. The laws under which divorce is granted for this cause, and those by which "alimony" or "separate maintenance" are secured, have not been adjusted consistently to the new financial independence of women, and work injustice, sometimes to men and sometimes to women, and often to the children involved. Again, the fact that women, whether married or single, when doing their work outside the home receive salary or wages, to hold or expend in their own right, reacts upon the labor of the housewife within the home in a way not always favorable. Perhaps no one thing of such external nature would tend more to the stability and happiness of average family life to-day than some form of legal and just appraising of the services of the house-mother in the home. The large area of domestic labor which has been absorbed by the new machine-dominated industry offers wages to women secured by law. The economic value of the house-mother in those forms of service which have not, and perhaps never can be rendered strictly "productive" in the usual sense of that word, the economic values of intelligent saving, wise spending, the conservation of mental and physical force through family protection and increased happiness, this is not recognized as having any market value. The poet says of a woman, "The charm of her presence was felt when she went." The economic value of the house-mother's service is felt when she dies, or falls ill and the price of her substitute or substitutes is reckoned! The married state has now to compete in attractiveness to women on its economic

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side, and for the first time in any large way, with independent earning at some congenial specialized labor for which opportunities of training are offered to girls on all sides. If the persistent devotion of women to the more diffused, and yet seemingly vital processes of intensive family service to husband, children, the aged members of the family and the general home-making, are to be retained, they must come at last to be reckoned at some definite value which will give women a share in the current family income as well as give her responsibility with man for the common family needs.

The third object of the family, that of the moral discipline of its members as preparation for larger social coöperation, is now subject to many demands for readjustment, both of ideals and customs. Sociologists are now telling us that the home was never, relatively to other social forces, so weak in power over the individual life. Certainly many elements of common environment assail the integrity of parental control and the established standards of the home. In the first place ours is a fluid civilization. Those older stays for wandering fancies and weak wills which inhered in a fixed order of things have been taken away and one must carry his conscience with him on his travels or lose it altogether. Family affection no longer nestles about familiar places in the case of the multitude. The "flat" on which the city family perches for a year or less is not the aid to settled habits that the old homestead was. Again, in this more migratory family life of the present day the parents are not left in seclusion to impress their own ideals and standards upon their children. The adult world of thought and action has access to children and youth as never before, through the newspaper, the varied entertainments, the public library, the street sights and sounds, the very school itself; so that the shielding of childhood and youth from prevailing world currents to which parents may object is more difficult than ever before. Again the democratizing of the family, rightly in-

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sisted upon as essential to our present political conditions, has its own dangers; and there must be earnest and intelligent effort to prevent the payment of a price of change more costly than is required. When there was one family head, discipline was comparatively easy to secure along accepted lines. Now that there are "two heads in council," and that even the children are consulted in their own upbringing (as befits potential citizens), it is far more difficult to decide what one should try to accomplish in parental control, as well as far more difficult to accomplish that which the parents really attempt. Moreover, without intending that particular result, the modern conscious effort toward social improvement is forcibly lessening the trust and confidence of many children in the wisdom and power of their parents and often prematurely depriving them of that ancient safeguard against evil. For example, all enlightened communities are now engaged in a warfare against bodily weakness and disease. In that warfare a certain standard of cleanliness and decency of living is being enforced through the activities of the boards of health. This requires certain radical changes in the ways of living of many people, especially of newly arrived immigrants. A significant illustration of the effect of this activity in behalf of health is to be found in the story of little Anita and her mother. In the fine new public schoolhouse which Anita attended there were baths and all manner of devices to attract to cleanliness. But Anita refused them all. Whereupon a note was sent to Anita's mother explaining that all the children must take a bath at least once a week in the fine equipment of the school. Whereupon Anita's mother sent the following note: "Shall I unsew my child out of the warm woolen clothes I have sewed her into for the winter? No, I will not. Water on the bare skin in winter is not well. She shall be warm and she shall not be wet. I am a good mother. Besides, she goes to school to learn books and not to be washed, and she can learn books if she is dirty." We are all con-

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vinced that Anita should be washed, and that very strong moral suasion must be brought to bear to secure that result. But the conflict between the teacher's standards and those of the mother must weaken Anita's confidence in her mother's judgment; and when she gets her "working papers" and her own "pay envelope" at the early age of fourteen she will very likely despise her mother's genuine wisdom of life in ways she most needs to guide and protect her in the industrial struggle. These dangerous chasms between the children and the parents must be bridged so far as possible by a finer technique of social service than we have yet acquired, or we shall sacrifice too many personal lives in the processes of social advance.

The fourth object of the family, the development of an efficient personality in each of its members, is also subject to new social demands in ways that give the thoughtful much anxiety. The thoroughgoing and wholly consistent democratization of the family in respect to its adult members is an essential in this process of development of personality, and the democratic state cannot be fully developed until a democratic family insures an interior training for citizenship. In an aristocratic *régime* one commanding personality at the head of both the domestic organization and the political body may be sufficient to serve as a model for subservient imitation by the mass of people, within and without the home. On the other hand, in a state which demands self-control, self-direction, self-support and self-expression from every normal adult person in its constituency, in order to secure its own ends of progressive political association, the family must be organized in such fashion as to develop these qualities in each of its members. The democratization of the family, therefore, is the spiritual equivalent of political democracy. As such it is inevitable and wholly desirable; but its initiation causes some "growing pains." It is in this area of the development of personality that tendencies develop toward increased divorce. Women are now seeking divorce in larger numbers than men. Under

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almost every form of marriage men have found a way to mitigate for themselves the tragedy of an undesired domestic bond. Women until these later days of democracy have never, except for short intervals and under unusual conditions (such as those attending the decline of Roman civilization), had freedom of personality either in or out of marriage. As in the phrase of Dr. Johnson, so in law and public opinion, there has been always "a boundless difference between the infidelity of man and woman" which forced women to endure in their husbands that which, manifested in themselves, would have freed their husbands from all marital responsibility. In like manner the self-assertion of rights which in man has been one of the priceless assets in the growth of personality, in woman has been considered a perversion of nature; because until freedom for women was possible there could be no wholesome avenue of social expression of woman's individuality.

To-day the ancient object of the family, that of moral discipline for social ends, and the modern object of the family, that of the development of personality for the uses of a democratic social order, are both concerned in lifting the standard of sexual morality, equally for men and for women, to a higher plane. In this process women in their new freedom will not endure the unspeakable indignities and hopeless suffering they have been compelled to endure in the past. That last outrage upon a chaste wife and faithful mother, enforced physical union with a husband and father whose touch is pollution and whose heritage to his children is disease and death, will less and less be tolerated by individual women or by an enlightened ethical standard. In so far as the increase in divorces is a testimony to this movement of women to refuse marital relations with unfit men it is a movement for the benefit of the family and not for its injury. Hence it is as idle as the blowing of the wind for any solemn company, composed wholly of men and chiefly of ecclesiastics, to pass resolutions calling for the reinstatement of

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an indissoluble marriage bond and for the subjection of wives to their "conjugal duty" whatever their feelings or condition may be. Permanent and legal separation is now seen to be just and necessary in cases of moral delinquency. Whether such separation shall include power of remarriage is still much mooted in many quarters. It would seem wise to infer from all that one knows of social changes that there must be many methods of readjustment tried before we shall secure such a uniform law as will do justice both to the individual life and the social claim; and that hence dogmatism is out of place and careful treatment of each case as it arises, on its own merits, is the safe and helpful method. The tendency, however, in all fields of thought and effort is away from "eternal punishment" here or hereafter, and in the direction of belief in the power of self-recovery and of trying even vital experiments of life over again in hope of a better outcome. It is likely that marriage and divorce will prove no exception to this hopeful tendency of moral endeavor. Moreover, so far the testimony of actual life in the countries where no remarriage is allowed shows a lower standard of marital faithfulness, of child-care and of the conservation and culture of the moral nature of the members of the family group, than is shown in the countries that grant absolute divorce for serious causes. The number of divorces and remarriages in our country, although showing considerable marital unhappiness, is not large enough to indicate any widespread social disease. And even if such serious conditions were indicated the chief reliance for cure must be upon the moral development of men and women rather than upon the external pressure of laws. It is true, however, that while proper self-assertion and regard for personal dignity and the conservation of true personality may lead to proper changes in marital relations, the self-assertion of the foolish and the selfish, and the undeveloped may lead to marital changes which are unnecessary and harmful, The social need in respect to divorce to-day is not to try

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to hold together by main strength of law and public opinion those who cannot be either morally helpful to each other, truly devoted to the children's welfare, or happy themselves in their present relationship; the social need is rather to prevent separations of married couples on trivial grounds of pique, sudden temper, childish whim or the mere suggestive power of newspaper scandals. The social need is not for the immediate working out of all details of a uniform law, while yet rapidly changing social and industrial conditions make variety of experimental treatment of cultural value; the social need is rather for a legal provision everywhere which will secure more deliberation before action, more accessible counsel of the wise and good for the foolish and confused, more patient waiting, more earnest trial to "patch it up" and "go on" even when things look dark and threatening. It is becoming more and more the custom to establish special courts for particular classes and kinds of adjudications; such as the "children's court," the "industrial arbitration court," etc. It has been suggested, and wisely, that there should be a "court of domestic differences," a special legal hearing for those seeking separation or divorce. Into such a special court, founded upon some law giving the state power to exact a deliberate and dignified method of discussion before action, thus preventing haste and vulgar publicity, the "probation system" might be introduced; separation securing immediate relief when necessary, but divorce allowed only after patient effort, under the direct control and aid of the court, had failed to render the union successful. Passion and selfishness have put asunder many a couple who could have won a lasting happiness together through ethical discipline and wise help in their time of need.

To many observers the modern increase of divorce is not only an unmitigated evil but a sign of abnormal development in women, and hence a symptom of extreme social disease. It is certainly true that the present condition of women marks an unprecedented social revolution.

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From the position of a minor they have assumed more and more the place of a citizen; from a condition of "status" they have passed to a condition of "contract." Equality of opportunity in education; freedom of choice in employment; economic independence and complete property rights; the manifold diversions of a newly acquired social freedom; the emancipation of the home from the work-demands of the handicraft stage of domestic labor, and the effect of machine-dominated industry to give women's work a commercial value; the state appropriation of "women's organic office of teaching" and the consequent employment of thousands of women as public officials in the schools; the new delight, often almost an intoxication, of free expression of personality in artistic and intellectual fields heretofore closed to all but an infinitesimal fraction of womankind; the splendid enthusiasms for social uplift which the modern power of women opens to their consciousness, with the new opportunity of pouring into service for the public weal women's age-long accumulations of social sympathy—all these things give women a new, and to many a perilous, power of self-assertion. That the great mass of women are still so humbly patient at the old tasks, that they still unquestionably place the welfare of children and even of husbands and the aged and sick of their families before the full realization of their own personal wishes, is proof that the nature of women is essentially social, and their bent unconquerably toward the perfection of family life. It could not be, however, that so radical a change in the lives and conditions of all "human beings of the mother sex," most intimately connected with the central values of family life as they are, should be effected without some disturbance of that part of the social order we call the family. As in all forms of social disturbance incidental to increase in democracy, however, the way out is the way on, not the way back.

The great demand to-day is for a reincarnation of the old sanctities of life in new forms. The old ideal of mar-

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riage as a sacrament of religion has still its place; not in the old form that elevates one church ceremony above all other rituals and denies the right of adult human beings to free themselves from intolerable conditions after certain formulæ have been pronounced; but in the new form that makes marriage a spiritual bond and its end the moral culture of the race.

Marriage is indeed, as many ancient peoples believed, a free and private contract; but not one that concerns two people alone, to be formed and dissolved without regard to any law but that of personal happiness. It is private and free in that it has to do with those mysterious yearnings of the inner life that point out from a world of friends the one elect and solitary mate, and thus ordains selective affection as the supreme guide to marriage.

Marriage is a social arrangement for the initiation of individuals into the social order and the old social control of its vital relationship must persist, therefore, in forms suited to modern conditions; but the family witnesses more than an external order; it is the tie that binds one generation to another in the spiritual unity of the race.

Marriage is a school for the development of personal life; it must hold within it more and more room for equal rights, mutual concessions and justly balanced activities; but the family is more than a school for even the finest individuation; it is the innermost temple of sacrificial service of one loved one for another, and in its companionship is wrought that sacred alchemy of unselfishness by means of which "they that lose their lives shall find them."

It is in the reincarnation of all those spiritual ideals of the race that have embodied themselves in the nobler forms of family life in the past that the composite social order of this modern era must find its own true and consistent ethical laws of the family, of marriage and of divorce. This is the vital task of enlightened and consecrated leadership.

ANNA GARLIN SPENCER.

NEW YORK.

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WOMEN AS CITIZENS.*

MARY GILLILAND HUSBAND.

IN face of my undertaking to speak this morning on women citizens, I find myself somewhat in the difficulty of the boy who promised his naturalist club a paper on the snakes of Ireland. His essay consisted of these words: "There are no snakes in Ireland."

In England there are no women citizens in the full meaning of that phrase. The earliest definition of citizenship of which I am aware occurs in the "Politics" of Aristotle. For Aristotle a citizen is a free member of a free community, with recognized right to share in the government. It is this share in the government that differentiates the citizen proper from the mere subject. All citizens are subjects, but all subjects are not citizens. For Aristotle, three classes of adult persons could not be citizens, *viz.,* aliens, slaves and women. England has long ago abolished slavery within her dominions on grounds of humanity. I do not mean because of humanitarian sentiment, but because of the perception that a human being *as such* is the subject of certain rights, of which citizenship is ultimately one.

Perhaps, too, there has been a glimmering perception of the truth that where duties are demanded of human beings, and recognized by them, there also reciprocal rights may be claimed and must be conceded. But England has not yet persuaded herself that women are fully human, and therefore capable of qualifying for the full rights of a fully human being. Public opinion in England is more and more demanding from women a recognition of their duties, as women, to the state. But public opinion does not yet fully perceive that the recognition by women of those duties carries with it a legitimate claim by women for the recognition by the state of their citizenship.

* A lecture given at Hampstead Ethical Institute, London, England.

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Till this claim is granted women remain politically in a state of subjection. Any service, then, which women in England to-day render to the state as such, they render out of pure charity. The state which denies to women the recognition of their rights of citizenship, and yet demands of them the recognition of duties of citizenship, is very much in the position of a householder who might appeal to his domestic servants to serve him out of charity. "You see," such a person might say, "I cannot get on without you. Your service is needed to make my life possible. This life, which by your service you make possible for me, is for the good of the community. You, as members of the community, participate in the good results flowing from my life. Let that be your reward. Be public-spirited, realize how much your labor for me is helping me to realize the common good of the community. Even your own personal comfort is benefited thereby: you have a better house to live in, and better food to eat. I, of course, see that it is necessary to feed you fairly well and make you fairly comfortable if I am to get the best out of you."

This is no fancy picture of such a householder as never was. On the contrary it describes a relation and an attitude which is exceedingly common to-day. It exists wherever an employer of labor, be he an individual master or mistress, or corporation, treats his workers merely as the instruments of his gain, the good of the workers being thought of only so far as incidental to the gain of the master.

In ancient Greece, where slavery was supposed to be a necessity of civilization, and was therefore thought of as a wholly moral institution, there was some excuse for such a relation. We find Aristotle actually pointing out that a master necessarily governs his slave in the first place for his (the master's) good and only incidentally for the good of the slave. He uses the slave as an instrument, and feeds him and cares for him only in so far as it pays him to do so. It makes the blood of a modern

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run cold to read this, not as a piece of vulgar, cynical commercialism, but in a treatise on what might be called the ethics of politics (if that be not tautological).

In how much has our modern practice advanced beyond the ancient theory? The money-wage which in the modern instances of the wrong relation between employers and employed is the only differentiation between our case and that of the Greek slave-holder, is determined simply by the competition of the open market. Now when starvation is the alternative to acquiescence, a man will be found willing to work not merely for money or terms which would enable him to lead a life fit for a human being to live, but even for money and terms which may insure him bare subsistence. The modern organization of labor is rescuing workers and masters alike from a condition of things many a time worse than the conditions of ancient slavery. Evil conditions, when they exist in modern industry, are possible simply because masters or householders have too little regard for the humanity of their workers. Neither masters of workmen nor mistresses of servants have thought often enough of their workers as human beings with a right to moral freedom, *i. e.*, as having a claim to be allowed the possibility of doing what they do "with a will," because they will it. They have not thought of their workers as having a right to a voice in determining the conditions of their work. Now when such masters and mistresses complain, as they very frequently do, that their workers do not work "with a will," that they do not consider the interests of their employers, as all faithful servants should, are they not asking simply for charity from their servants? When such masters or mistresses say: "These servants are my servants; they must do my will, or they must go. That is what they are there for; that is what they are paid for"; are they not using those servants as their instruments merely? Is not their moral attitude toward those servants identical with the attitude of the ancient slave owner toward his slaves? The root of the immorality is the

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same in both cases; it is that the "governor" does not recognize the governed as human in the same sense in which he is himself human.

There is the same root of immorality in the refusal of the state to acknowledge that women have a humanity which entitles them to their share in the government of the country. Such a state is practically in the position of the immoral householder. It says to its women, in effect: "We cannot do without you. You must do your duty by the state, for we shall not merely do badly without your help, but we cannot do at all: we shall cease to exist if you women do not enable us to do so." So women's capacity for motherhood is being acknowledged by public opinion to-day as a service without which the state cannot exist.

Not, be it observed, their human motherhood, not their capacity to bear and rear good citizens. This capacity can only belong, in its fullness, to women who are full-fledged, fully acknowledged citizens. Public opinion does not yet see that it is this human motherhood which is the unique service of women to the state, the highest possible service that ever can be rendered to the state by the most highly developed and most fully trained and recognized women citizens. Public opinion is far from seeing that only such women can bear their share in humanity's greatest achievement, the production of a noble race of fully trained and equipped citizens.

That it is not human motherhood, but merely bodily fertility, which is being emphasized at present, is shown in many ways. I shall name three of these. There are, as we are all well aware, many women who are refusing motherhood at the present time, because they are too selfish to incur its burdens. Now the public indignation which is beginning to find its way into newspapers and magazines is mostly leveled against the refusal of motherhood rather than against the character and life of which this refusal is a logical outcome. I have never seen it pointed out that the women to whom the passing personal pleas-

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ures of the moment are the chief end of life, the women who refuse to bear children because they would not interrupt their dancing, or their hunting, or even their factory and music-hall sociability, would be the worst possible type of mother. Personally I always rejoice to think that such women, by the very thoroughness of their selfishness, are imposing on themselves precisely the punishment which society, were it thoroughly moralized, would wish to impose on their type; *i. e.*, they stand out of the race, they do not carry it on. In the next generation we shall hope to have fewer of them. The bodily fertility of such women would not be desired by the public were it seen that only human motherhood is a strength to the state.

The inability to grasp the significance of this distinction is shown still more strongly, by such writers as Miss Florence Farr and Mr. Bernard Shaw.

Mr. Shaw's letter in *The Times* of October 5, 1907, came as a shock to many who had begun to hope that the author of "John Bull's Other Island" and "The Doctor's Dilemma" had been carried by sheer gift of genius far beyond the possibility of the lamentable lapses into moral quagmire and theoretic chaos which characterized his earlier work. It was a jar to find that, where questions of sex are concerned, the Mr. Shaw of 1907 is identical with the Mr. Shaw of 1891. In his "Quintessence of Ibsenism" (1891) Mr. Shaw had made the astounding statement that the main effect of Ibsen's teaching was "to keep before the public the importance of being always prepared to act immorally," and "to urge upon women that the desirability of their preserving their chastity depends just as much on circumstances as the desirability of taking a cab instead of walking." In *The Times*, 1907, Mr. Shaw urges that we must keep an open mind as to the comparative merits for English life of polygamy and monogamy.

On all matters of sex Mr. Shaw seems to be without structural thought, without any rational theory of development, and, what is much more fatal to a man of Mr. Shaw's gifts, without relevant instinct or insight. He

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produces the impression of being abnormal, subnormal, unmoral on these matters, a creature outside of humanity, and therefore not capable of touching us at our deepest and truest within this field.

Closely akin to Mr. Shaw's point of view is that of those who advocate the abolition of the family and the substitution of public nurseries run by the state on scientific principles. These people would propose to take the child from the mother immediately after birth—the average mother being quite incompetent to bring up a baby—and hand over the future citizen "to the state," *i. e.*, presumably to a big committee, composed of men. For, if mothers cannot be trusted to bring up their own children, how shall women be permitted to serve on these nursing committees? Or, does special insight on this subject belong to those who have borne no children? Shall this be, perhaps, the qualification for service on these committees?

The idea distinctly articulated by Mr. Shaw in his *Times* letter, and more or less distinctly perceived by the advocates of state-reared children is that we should breed a fine race of human beings as we breed prize oxen or horses. Have these good folk ever seen a stud book? Have they any idea that in order to rear even a prize calf you must leave him his mother? If you are a dairy farmer you may sacrifice the calf and divert the cow's milk to whereso-ever you will. But if the breed be your object you must spare the calf, or the foal, his mother.

It is playing it pretty low down on humanity to make its physical breed the consideration *par excellence* for society. But even taking these reformers on their own level, they wholly miss the point. You cannot breed a fine race physically on the terms.

The idea that the chief value of women to the state, the one indispensable function which women may discharge, is that they should submit themselves as the physical seedbeds of the race, is so revolting an idea, so degrading to our notion of womanhood and so degrading to the character of the man who harbors it, that I do not believe

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any decent human being will ever face the idea in its naked ugliness and retain it for a moment.

These proposals are indeed so ridiculous that we may be sure they will be extinguished at no distant date by the inextinguishable laughter of mankind. At present they hurt too much to permit of our seeing their comicality. Those who would abolish the family because it sometimes, or even often, fails of its ideal, are just like the man who, having suffered long from dyspepsia, comes to a doctor and asks to be cured. "What remedies have you tried?" asks the doctor. "Oh, I'm sick of remedies," answers the man. "I am still ill. I want a radical cure. I want you to operate on me, and remove my stomach."

I should like to recommend to all such abstract idealists the perusal of Mr. Meredith's "Ordeal of Richard Feverel." It is one of the most acute analyses, the most triumphant *reductio ad absurdum,* ever penned of the follies of such abstraction.

On the first page of that book there appears a saying which is perhaps more frequently quoted, and certainly more frequently misquoted, than any other saying of Mr. Meredith's. From a "selection of original aphorisms by an anonymous gentleman, who in this bashful manner gave a bruised heart to the world," we read: "I expect that woman will be the last thing civilized by man." Now it is this bruised gentleman who is the especial butt of Mr. Meredith's wit: it is his abstractions that are reduced to absurdity by the comic spirit incarnate in his book.

The fact is, truth is to be sought in the opposite direction: that is, it is more nearly true to say, "Man will be the last creature civilized by woman." Women, it is alleged, began civilization by instituting agriculture; they carried on civilization, it is alleged, by taming wild animals for domestic use, by inventing the domestic arts and domestic economy. Whether these allegations be substantiated or not, it is certain that during the whole long length of their mutual history (for man fortunately cannot claim

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to be of older descent than woman), woman has been the center of, the central force of, and the central test of man's civilization. She has been the test of civilization, because so long as men give what they give only because they cannot help giving it, because they are compelled thereto by superior physical force, they do not give as civilized beings. Woman never can compel man to give her anything by physical force: she gets what she wants from man either by appealing to the best, or to the worst, in him. She appeals to the best in him when she appeals to that in him which enables him to recognize the rights of other men *qua* men. She appeals to the worst in him when she appeals to his appetite or to his vanity. The woman who insists upon the equality of her humanity does her plain duty by herself and by him. She appeals to the best in man and develops, as nothing else can, his humanity. The woman who consents to have her equality of humanity denied, provided she is petted and spoilt and indulged and excused from responsibility, establishes thereby that relation between the sexes in virtue of which men naturally and inevitably use women for their pleasure and chuck them away like a sucked orange when that pleasure is exhausted. Thereby the man is brutalized and debased even more than the woman he uses.

A Jewish friend once said to me that every country had the Jews that it deserved: it is a well-known political saying that every people have the government they deserve. Perhaps it is equally true that the women of any given country or time tend to get the men they deserve, and men tend to get the women they deserve, too.

I said that woman was the center and central power of civilization. She is so merely because she is the center of the family. A man goes and comes to his work and his labors under the sun, but he ever returns to the woman as his center and the focusing point of all his activities. Children come and grow, and go to form their own centers; the mother remains. The man grows old and ceases

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from his work, and returns finally to the woman, who is the permanent and abiding center of his life.

The family is the social unit because it is the smallest effective group of human beings. Each is necessary to the other; each alone is a mere fragment of humanity, neither self-sufficient nor self-reproductive. The family, Aristotle says, is the state in miniature. As its life is in quality and government, so will the state be in quality and government. "The vice of our housekeeping," says Emerson, "is, that it does not hold man sacred. The vice of government, the vice of education, the vice of religion, is one with that of private life." Professor Bosanquet in his "Philosophical Theory of the State," points out that the members of a family, by participation in and support of their mutual needs and necessities, develop that quality of character without which states cannot exist; that is, the capacity of seeing and living for a common good. No state, not even a community of persons, can exist except the members of it can have an interest in common which they are willing to support. This perception of a common good which all are willing to support is easier in family life than in any other conceivable group of persons, human nature being constituted as it is. For, a human being is an animal organism, having in it the capacity to develop a soul, *i. e.*, to become really human. The family is unique in the completeness with which it links the natural organism and its needs to the needs and conditions in which alone soul, *i. e.*, real humanity, can develop. It is "a natural union of feeling with ideal purpose." It, and it alone, takes up the needs and promptings of a man's natural animal body and by linking these to a plan of life and subordinating them to a permanent interest in which others are concerned, with an absolute reciprocity and equality possible only in a monogamous family, it transforms them and makes them part of the plan of a human life—makes them, indeed, what otherwise they cannot be, human characteristics. Thus the transition is made from the animal or appetitive soul or conscious-

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ness to the spiritual, or human, and religious soul or consciousness.

In conclusion: I appeal to women. Remember, there are two dominant impulses in political life to-day. One is the passionate desire to raise and humanize the lives of the workers; the other is the passionate demand by women for the recognition by the state of their full humanity. Chaotic thinking and misunderstanding of both impulses are conspiring to-day to lead an attack from both sides on family life. I appeal to you as women: defend the family, become aware of its value and of its unique function. It does not matter if anyone should say that women are incapable of profound and accurate thought: it does not matter if in any particular case that should be true. You are, if good women, capable of profound and true instinct in this matter, and instinct far more profound and true than any mere intellectuality can be, an instinct which is the outcome of the experience of countless generations of good women. This is an instinct of faithful, tender attachment to the permanent center of monogamic family life. This faithfulness of attachment is instinctive in all good women. It is achieved by men with difficulty. It is the result not of any special virtue in women, but is the outcome of the conditions of motherhood, the long and tender and unique relation of the mother to her child, both before and after birth. Do not be afraid to be true to that instinct and to say what all the strongest thinking and most capable men are saying with you. The homes are the center of the morality of the nations. Do not forget that it is your part as women to civilize man, by helping him to subordinate his animal instincts to the good of a permanent human center, and, in and through it, to the good of the whole community. Make that center worthy of the best; think of it as the center of the life of the state. Demand from the state recognition of the equality of your humanity with that of the men who are your contemporaries; assert your right to your full citizenship; claim your right to your share in the

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government of your common life. Do this not because the home is too narrow a sphere for your talents or unworthy of the highest service of highest womanhood. But do it for your homes' sake. You need that recognition as educative to your own conception of home life, as reminding you that "the most private is the most public energy." You need it that you may remember, and help others to remember, that within that home you can never live for yourself alone; you can never permit yourself to be used as a mere instrument to a man's pleasure or comfort, or as a mere source of future life: but that within that home you are copartner, fellow-worker, equal half of that dual human personality, man and woman separable only that their union might become spiritual. Only thus can we compass humanity's finest achievement, a noble human race.

Ask this, then, and aim at this, not from vanity or self-seeking, but from love of that holiest, tenderest center of all good life, your home and the man's and the child's. For—

> "The woman's cause is man's: they rise or sink
> Together, dwarf'd or godlike, bond or free."

Let humanity stand at last on its two feet: "let religion cease to be occasional; and the pulses of thought that go to the borders of the universe, let them proceed from the bosom of the household."

MARY GILLILAND HUSBAND.

LONDON.

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THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY.

FRANK SARGENT HOFFMAN.

THE moment we begin to reflect on the matter we cannot help seeing that the right to property is one of the most sacred rights of man. We cannot imagine a people so degraded as to be entirely devoid of the idea of property, and no community has ever enjoyed prosperity or attained a high degree of culture where the idea was held in slight esteem. Indeed, we may justly measure the progress of a people in civilization and true worth by the clearness with which they apprehend this idea and the completeness with which they apply it to the ownership and use of every commodity that ministers to human need.

But sacred as this right is, we greatly err if we suppose that the ground of the right to property is first possession. No man gains a just title to a thing simply because he came upon it before some one else. If a person to-day should discover a new island in the Pacific he would not for that reason have a right to undisputed possession. Suppose a band of shipwrecked sailors should be cast upon its shores. He could not justly claim that the fruits and springs and other means of subsistence he found there were exclusively his. The new world was not the property of Columbus because he discovered it, nor did it belong exclusively to the scattered bands of savages that occasionally roamed over its surface. Possession and use of a thing can never be an ultimate ground of ownership. Something else must come in to determine whether or not that possession be just.

We should equally err in maintaining that the right to property is founded upon a decree of the government. "Property and laws," says Bentham, "were born together, and will die together." The same erroneous view is advocated by Montesquieu. In speaking of the way

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men have come to adopt a civilized mode of life he says, "The political laws gave them liberty; the civil laws, property." A natural consequence of this doctrine is that what the statute could make it could at any time unmake. It necessitates the view that there is no ground for the right to property back of the decrees of the government. If this were true justice would have no place in determining the possession and use of property. All would be settled by an arbitrary fiat. The most industrious would have no more of a claim upon property as a reward for their industry than the most indolent. The governors might at any time decree that all property should belong to themselves alone, and no voice could justly be raised to call the act in question.

Nor is the real ground of property its utility. True, no community could exist without property. True, no community has been able to thrive without individual property. But that only shows us a result of property, not its ground. All we can claim from the standpoint of utility is that the excellent effects of property corroborate the rightfulness of its possession and use.

The primary and distinctive ground of property is labor. Property may be defined as the fruit of human labor. If there were no men in the world, there would be no property. Man alone is the creator of all property. Before him there was scarcely anything but matter. By his labor he imparts an interchangeable value to things, and this is the beginning of his progress. Man is capable of civilization because he can produce wealth. Other animals are swifter in the chase, better protected from the cold and better armed for strife. But they cannot produce property and therefore cannot advance beyond a certain fixed limit. They can be property, but not the owners and controllers of property. Man, however, because he is active, intelligent and free; because he is a person, can so impress his personality on the objects of nature about him by his labor as to acquire a just title to property. In a highly civilized community there is

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scarcely a clod of earth or a leaf that does not bear that impress.

Thus we see that the maxim, "To the doer belongs his deed," is as true of property as of morals. Whatever a man produces by his own powers is ethically his, and his claim to ownership should be respected against all comers. His natural right to anything comes from the labor he has expended upon it, and is determined by the extent of that labor. Whatever laws the civil power may make concerning the possession and use of property it can never justly ignore this right and treat it as though it did not exist, any more than it can justly ignore any other natural right.

But a matter of supreme importance to a thorough treatment of our subject is the fact that a natural right is not of necessity an ultimate right. The natural right to property, like the natural right to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness," is never an absolute right. These rights one and all may justly be sacrificed in case the needs of the community require it. If a man's life and liberty are at the disposal of the body-politic, how much more is his property? The true state is an organism and individuals are the members of that organism. The state is the unit, the individual a fraction of that unit. The well-being of the organism as a whole is the thing of greatest moment, and should be the point of view from which to treat the various parts. In the normal condition of affairs the lungs and the heart are best developed by developing the whole body. Every human being finds his true place in the body-politic and the true sphere for the exercise of his natural rights only in his connection with his fellows in their corporate capacity as a state.

The natural right to property therefore is ultimately resolvable into a state right. The people, as an organic brotherhood, are to decide what disposition is to be made of all property. While the good of the individual and the preservation of his right to the products of his labor are of great importance, the welfare of the brotherhood

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as a whole is of far more importance, and should be the point of view from which the laws controlling the possession and use of property are finally determined. The good of the brotherhood as a whole is rarely in collision with the best interests of its individual members. The laws of property that a state enacts will seldom need to set aside the natural right to property, but will almost always confirm and strengthen that right. But whatever the laws may be, they should never fail to be founded upon and to accord with the following fundamental maxims:

1. The supreme ownership of all the natural sources of property is with the body politic. The land, the water and the air and all that they contain are the common possession of the race. They are under the supreme control of the whole people in their organic capacity as a state. Inasmuch as the support of every man is derived from the soil, the very existence of the state would be imperiled if the supreme ownership of the soil were not vested in the state itself. That the community, and not the individual members of the community, originally owned the land is one of the best attested facts of history.

Indeed, no state has ever given up that ownership. It has only allowed individuals under certain conditions and limitations to possess and use its territory. If a state should unconditionally give up its control it would thereby cease to be a state. Its sovereignty would be gone. It would lose the very thing that makes it a state, and instead of one state, as many states as there were individuals would suddenly spring into being.

If a state at any time adopts this system of individual control of its territory, the titles to the land are derived from the state, and each citizen holds his land ever subject to the control of the state. Whenever the land of the community gets into the hands of the few to the exclusion and injury of the many, or whenever the good of the state for any reason requires it, these titles may justly be revoked and individual control abolished. The

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state is constantly doing it in the exercise of the right of *eminent domain,* and never was doing it to such an extent as at present. We have every reason to expect that as the needs of intercommunication increase and the people become better acquainted with the many injurious effects of the present system, individual ownership will be much further limited. It is vain to argue that any system of land tenure is of necessity the best system. The state should change its system with the needs of the people and keep it as nearly as possible in harmony with those needs.

2. The state has the ultimate control of and responsibility for the methods of acquiring property. If the sources of property are under the supreme control of the state it is easy to see that all property derived from those sources should be under its control also. No individual can justly take any of the materials of wealth without the consent of the state and by his labor make them his property; and the state can never rightly give this consent except with the limitation that the ultimate ownership and control of all property is with itself. While the state, therefore, fully recognizes the natural right to property that comes from labor, it cannot regard this right as absolute, but must itself determine in what way and by what means property is to be acquired. It must prescribe the legitimate spheres of labor and check the useless and wicked expenditure of labor. It should prevent by every means in its power the acquisition of property by trickery, by chance, by counterfeiting, by combining to force up prices without increasing values and by immoral practices of every sort.

Any system of acquiring property not based on labor cannot contribute to the well-being of man. For the only thing that is worthy of reward is work. It is a sound principle of statecraft as well as of morality that he who will not work shall not eat. As President Hyde has well said in his excellent little book on "Practical Ethics," "An able-bodied man who does not contribute to the world

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at least as much as he takes out of it is a beggar and a thief." The fact that the government of a state has adopted in one set of circumstances certain regulations for the individual accumulation of property and has found them to contribute to the general welfare, is no sufficient reason why they should be continued at another time under a different set of circumstances. When a country is new with much to be done and few to do it, laws concerning the accumulation of property may with reason greatly vary from what they should be in a country where the conditions are just the opposite.

3. But the body politic is not merely the supreme power for determining the ways in which property can be acquired. It is also the supreme authority for determining how it should be used after it is acquired. No individual member of the state has a right to use his property simply as he pleases. If he pleases to use it for the injury of the state, to degrade and demoralize his fellows, the state should put a limit upon his use and, if necessary, deprive him of it altogether. The principle of confiscation is a clear recognition of this right. All nations agree that if a citizen uses his property to abet the enemy in time of war, he has violated the first principles of government. He has by this act cut himself off from his normal relation to the community and deprived himself of the advantage that before belonged to him as a member of that community. The original condition upon which the state allowed him the control of his property has disappeared and his individual right to the use of it has disappeared also.

Any crime of any character constitutes a sufficient reason for the state to limit the use of property, and the more serious the crime the greater may be that limitation. Incorrigible criminals of every description should not be allowed in any degree the free use of property; for they constantly show by their repeated acts of lawlessness their unworthiness of such a trust. Property that is devoted to a good end and is accomplishing a worthy

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purpose in one generation may not do so in another. The state, therefore, should never allow property to be devoted for an unlimited period to the promotion of any enterprise. At any time when the state discovers that the welfare of the people is not furthered by such an enterprise, it should see to it that the property that supports it is devoted to some other end that does promote that welfare.

The doctrine of the inviolability of vested rights rests on a false conception of the right to property, and before the true conception has no foundation whatever. The true state will never allow any individual, or collection of individuals, to hold and use property any longer than such holding contributes to the common good. The moment it ceases to do so that moment the vested right becomes violable. The government of one generation can never unalterably bind a future generation as to its use of property. It can never grant a franchise for the use of property that a future generation cannot annul, or make a contract that a future generation cannot break. The word "forever" in any document concerning the possession and use of property is a pure fiction. The sooner it is read out of court the better.

The fact that a government has once allowed corporations to be formed for the investment and use of property, is no reason why they should be continued in existence when they cease to promote the public welfare. It is not only the right but the duty of the state to legislate them out of existence when it becomes clear that some other method of holding and using property will better further the well-being of the people. The laws concerning the use of property are just as subject to change as those concerning the acquisition of property, and it is the duty of the state through its government to have them changed whenever it is evident that the good of the organism as a whole requires it.

4. What we have said concerning the accumulation and use of property is equally true of the transfer and descent

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of property. Here also the state has the ultimate and supreme control. For there is no way of making property contribute to the welfare of the community as a whole, or of its individual members, unless the state has the right to determine what power of transfer the holder shall have as between himself and his contemporaries, and how far his acts shall control the use made of his property by the generations that follow him. All contracts, bequests, deeds of sale, wills and the like must therefore be subject to the authority of the state, and if made without that authority must be regarded as having no binding force.

To what extent a dead hand should be allowed to hold property or a dead brain to control it is in our day a serious question. It is perfectly clear that no such bequests of property should stand if they plainly interfere with the progress of humanity. But if the state sees fit to grant the privilege on the ground that labor will be more effectually stimulated thereby, it should at least be a limited privilege. For no man can possibly foresee what will be the need of all coming generations, and thus he cannot in any sense possess a right to say what disposition shall be made of what was once his property to supply that need.

The superstitious reverence that many still have for the dead hand and brain would disappear in the light of a true conception of the sacredness of contract. Living beings alone can make contracts. A dead person cannot make a contract with a living one, or a live person with a dead one. A father while living cannot make a binding contract for his own children even after a certain period. Honor and reverence are due to all the worthy who have preceded us, but these things can never rightly be made a matter of contract. The wealth of the past would be of comparatively little value if we did not constantly renew it. There can be no moral obligation therefore upon the state to have property descend exactly as the fathers desire. The wealth of any generation is to be

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used preëminently for the good of that generation, to supply present needs, to establish and maintain the ideas of the present, not to keep alive and extend the exploded notions of the past.

Many of the conditions attached to bequests under our present system are frequently more honored in the breach than in the observance. Clauses in wills are often justly declared null and void by the courts because they require the legatee to do something that is counter to "public policy." The state has not only the right but the duty to assume the full control of the bequests and legacies of any institution that has outgrown its usefulness, as well as one that is supporting practices or promulgating doctrines that are injurious to the public good. It should devote them to some other purpose that meets the needs of the present and advances the civilization of man.

Under our present conditions an inheritance tax righteously administered may reasonably be expected to afford us a measure of relief. The state should never do anything to deaden the enterprise of its citizens, but should encourage in every way the discovery of new and easier methods of providing for the needs both of mind and body. But when for any reason the wealth of the community has become concentrated into the hands of a few, injury to the public well-being of the most disastrous character is almost sure to follow.

No tyranny is so dangerous to public life and morals as the tyranny of money. For there will be little virtue left in a people whose actions are determined for them by dollars and cents. One of the imperative needs of our time is an effectual check upon the amazingly skillful and elaborate devices now so common of getting possession of the property of the country without rendering an equivalent. There is every reason to suppose that a limit upon the power of inheritance will be such a check. The government, being finite, may often be unable to discover to what extent an individual has brought under his control the property of the country. At his death this is far

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less difficult. If the courts were empowered to assess and collect an inheritance tax graduated in amount according to the needs and conditions of the legatees, the evil effects of vast fortunes continuing in the hands of single individuals would be largely mitigated.

We should greatly err in our conception of this matter of a tax on large inheritances if we thought it collided with all inheritance. It is only an attempt to discriminate between just inheritance and unjust. There is nothing in this position that needs to antagonize the views so well expressed by Charles Comte, who in combating the extreme opinions of some of his contemporaries on this subject that no inheritance is justifiable, says: "If I wished to refute the errors borrowed from the Abbé Raynal, concerning the right of children to enjoy the goods left by their parents when dying, I could not help calling attention to the fact that the family spirit is one of the principal causes of the production and preservation of wealth; that a man, to insure his children a living, performs labor and undergoes privation, to which no other consideration would induce him to submit. I would point out to my readers that if the wealth of a man were not to pass to his descendants . . . he could derive scarcely any real advantage from his property, even during his lifetime. I would show to them, finally, that a nation in which children were excluded from succeeding to their parents would, in a very few years, fall a great deal lower than the inhabitants of Egypt under the domination of the Mamelukes, or the Greeks under the domination of the Turks."

We may give full consideration to these views and still hold that under certain conditions a limitation should be put upon the inheritance of these "goods," and that the case of vast fortunes is one of those conditions. In the United States the laws of the several commonwealths in almost every instance already forbid the willing of property beyond two generations. Still greater limitations under the present circumstances would undoubtedly

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impede the development of a plutocracy and conserve the general good. A large inheritance tax on all sums over a certain maximum descending to a single individual and a gradually diminishing tax on all sums down to a certain minimum, as the circumstances and needs of the legatees shall warrant, would do much toward mitigating the gross injustice in the distribution of property nowhere more strikingly and painfully apparent than in those countries where wealth most abounds. For, as another so truthfully expresses it, "Every workman must be constantly reminded of the fact that while numbers are unable to obtain a sufficiency of the necessaries of life, others have so much superfluous wealth that they are able to squander it in useless and mischievous luxuries and never devote themselves to one hour of useful employment."

As matters now are the time ought not to be far distant when our national revenues should chiefly be derived from inherited wealth. Those who have been allowed to get possession of the property of the country should at least pay the taxes of the country. Unjust taxation is one of the chief evils of our time. The rich can, and generally do, escape their share of the burden. Under our present system it is such an easy thing for rich men to evade the payment of taxes that even the best of them can hardly resist the temptation. The poor man with just money enough to own his home can conceal nothing, and has no palace in the country where, for the purposes of taxation, he can take up his legal residence.

The present system is so manifestly vicious and leads to such a marked oppression of the poor that every voice in favor of the righteous use of property should be raised against it. Lord Asquith's plan of mitigating the social evils of England at the expense of inherited wealth should have the hearty support of ever right-minded man in the kingdom, and should be copied in every other land.

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THE ETHICAL ELEMENT IN WIT AND HUMOR.

BRADLEY GILMAN.

MOST men would rather be called knaves than fools; and most men would prefer to be thought lacking in the color-sense, or the music-sense, to being thought lacking in a perception of wit and humor. The keenness of a man's sense of wit and humor is not to be gauged by the loudness or length of his laugh; for that "outward and visible sign" is largely determined by the character and condition of his nerves. A smile on one man's face may signify as much mirth as a prolonged peal from the lips of another.

Some men and women "see the point" of a joke readily, yet enjoy it less than does their neighbor who has need to have it explained to him; the perception of the comic element in life is quite different from the enjoyment of it; the man who enjoys it is likely to be a man who enjoys many other things also.

In order, however, that every reader's *amour propre* may be given due consideration, the assumption of this article shall be that all who read it have at least a normally keen appreciation of "the comic," whatever its guise, and whether appealing to the mind through the eye or the ear.

For purposes of analysis wit and humor may be considered as essentially one and the same; humor is "the comic" with a flavor of kindliness added; wit is "the comic," impersonally presented, or sometimes cutting a cruel path, like a knife-edge, to its goal; one essential element underlies both wit and humor; most "quips and cranks," most jokes and funny stories, may be thrown into either the humor-form or the wit-form, by the addition or subtraction of the kindly element. When Talleyrand said, "Language is given to men to conceal their thought," that is wit; because it is " the comic " pre-

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sented impersonally; but the task were easy to build this *bon mot* into a structure of incident, with the proper *dramatis personæ,* and thus make of it a more human and a technically humorous story.

The "average man," the "man on the street," if told that his perception—and in fact, his enjoyment—of wit and humor depends greatly upon his ethical nature, upon his sense of truth and reality, would probably feel, on the instant, mildly complimented; on second thought he might dissent, saying that humorous people often are heartless, and that the habit of seeing the funny side of things tends to make people superficial and unethical. But there is a third and deeper stage of reflection to which this article seeks to lead him.

If this "average man" were asked to explain the nature of wit and humor, very likely he would reply that it rests upon a perception of incongruity; but this is hardly more than a *lucus a non lucendo.* It leaves the problem about where it found it. What does he mean by "the incongruous?" or by "incongruity?"

Thus every witticism, joke, humorous situation or funny story is a statement—by speech or act—which contains two centers, as does an elipse; an ordinary statement of fact has one center, like a circle; but the witty saying or the humorous story has two centers or foci, and one of these is Reality and the other is Falsity; but both of them appeal to the listener or spectator for his approval, his confirmation. In the presence of this dilemma, the mind, the perception, "wanders," as Emerson expresses it in his essay on "The Comic," "from the rule to the crooked lying fact." The more exact statement of this would be that the mind or inward eye wanders from the "crooked lying fact" to the "rule," for it is the "crooked lying fact" which is first and directly given us, and the "rule" we ourselves furnish a moment later.

To illustrate, and condensing the well-known story used by Lincoln, in a political campaign, to lay bare the vacillations of a shifty rival; said Lincoln, "He is like a man,

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up in our country, who went out deer-hunting in a dense fog; he saw, dimly, some animal in the distance, but was uncertain whether it was a deer or his neighbor's cow; therefore he fired, cautiously, so as to sort of hit it if it was a deer and miss it if it was a cow." The two centers of this elliptical statement are, first, the implication that a man could so shoot as to accomplish this dual feat; this statement, this center, is the "crooked lying fact" of Emerson. The second center is the affirmation, made by the listener's totality of experiences of projectiles, that a man cannot possibly accomplish such a feat. This second affirmation is "the rule" of Emerson. We promptly apply it to the first plausible statement, overpower that pretender and feel joy in our victory; this joy of conquest is the essence of the pleasure which we always derive from "the comic." It varies with moods and conditions; but, in the last analysis, it is the elemental joy which results from the successful exercise of power. This joy is the "sense of superiority," which the philosopher Hobbes pointed out, in wit and humor; but Hobbes erred in asserting that this superior feeling is exercised by one person over another; it is not; it is the joyful use of reality, by a person, to overpower falsity.

Another illustration — the famous and characteristic story of dreamy, unpractical Shelley, at a time when he was deeply interested in the problem of immortality. One day he met a nursemaid wheeling a very young child in a perambulator; the poet reflected, "Here is a little soul, recently come to earth, out of the great unknown preceding human life; perhaps he can tell me something about the great unknown after human life; the two realms may be one and the same." He accosted the infant, twice; but, of course, gained no response; only a blank infantile stare. "Alas! alas!" commented the disappointed poet, turning away; "how very reticent these little creatures are!" Disregarding the minor accessories of this incident we find the two centers of attention to be these: First, the implication—amounting to an assertion—that

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a babe in arms could reveal the great secret if he chose; this is the "crooked lying fact," so-called. Second, the "rule," the absolute truth and reality, derived from our experience of infants, the certain knowledge that they cannot possibly do this thing. With this "rule" we conquer the "lying fact"—which is really not a "fact" but a pretentious implication—and our conquest gives us joy.

Every witticism, or humorous narration, or situation, every appeal of "the comic," through the visual sense or visual fancy, or the aural sense or aural fancy, all these phases of wit and humor can be divested of their minor details, and their two centers, or foci, brought to view; one of these foci is a falsity, an untruth, the other is a fact, a reality, an ethical verity; and the "ethical element in wit and humor" is the conquest of an error, a falsity—usually bolstered into pretentious strength by plausible surroundings—by the truth, as established in the mind of the listener or spectator through past experience. The pleasure which we derive from "seeing" a joke is not unlike the pleasure which Conan Doyle attributes to Sherlock Holmes; it is, indeed, a detective's triumph at unraveling deception and establishing truth.

Nearly all the philosophers before and since the days of Democritus, "the laughing philosopher," have attempted to solve this problem of "the comic." Many of them have frankly confessed their inability to reach a solution. Some have reached and rested upon the halfway word "incongruity." Arthur Schopenhauer penetrated very deeply when he asserted, in sufficiently technical German fashion, "The essence of the ludicrous is in the attempt to subserve a particular case under a general concept where it does not belong." This abstruse statement is no more than Emerson's "crooked lying fact" seeking a shelter under the mantle of "the rule."

We now go one step further, and assert that it is the *attempt* of the pseudo-fact, the *pretense* of the false thing, which arouses the full weight of our intellectual and ethical condemnation, as we crush it with the bulk or

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body of truth which we already possess; the mere presence of an article in the wrong place does not arouse in us this ethical element. For example, a misplaced figure in an arithmetical problem, or a slipper in one closet rather than in another, does not arouse it. Those objects have no volition, and could not have willed to misplace themselves or pretend to be rightly placed; only when volition enters, or can be attributed to an object through personification, does the field of unethical conduct open and the possibility of ethical condemnation arise.

For instance, I once came, suddenly, at a lonely spot on the seashore, upon a donkey standing in silence and gazing out over the ocean. At once I smiled; why? Because the place and the attitude of the creature indicated or asserted that he was gazing with tender or exalted sentiment at the wide, watery expanse, as a human being might gaze. That was the falsity, which came first to my mind; and it was promptly conquered by my general knowledge that a quadruped, and especially of that kind, could not feel the emotion which his posture implied. Again, crossing the street of the city I am startled by a loud deep "Honk;" and I leap to the sidewalk, believing I have narrowly escaped death under the wheels of a "forty-horse-power" automobile; but when I turn and look, a grinning, small boy on a bicycle passes me, blowing deep notes of warning on a horn which was indeed made for a large motor car. I, too, laugh; for the deep bass of the horn asserts magnitude, power, peril, but my visual sense assures me of the contrary, and my body of general knowledge crushes the pretentious, mendacious idea aroused by the ominous sound.

It may be urged that the pointing out of this ethical element in wit and humor does not fully explain the mystery of it; that it does not explain the great emotional disturbance which takes place in the mind of the observer or percipient. To which this rejoinder may be made that an essentially comic idea upsets our equilibrium much more at one time than it would at another; at both times

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we would "perceive" it, we would "see the point"; but at one time the muscles of our face and throat would react much more vigorously than at the other time. The difference in intensity between these outbursts is largely a difference in the degree of our nerve sensibility; the clever comedian in vaudeville knows well that if he can once arouse our nerves and muscles he can keep them active with only half his previous effort.

Furthermore, in all good story-telling the simple elemental joy of detecting and overpowering a pretentious falsehood by our "body of reality" is vastly augmented by the introduction of the psychological element "expectancy." The skillful *raconteur* arouses the interest of his listener, holds that interest—which can be expressed in terms of nerve-force—in suspense, makes it cumulative, and almost hurls the listener's sympathy and approval and judgment in the direction of the "crooked lying fact." Therefore considerable effort is involved, and a veritable though instantaneous battle is fought, as the listener asserts himself, backed by his experience and knowledge, subdues the pretentious fact, and recovers his ethical equilibrium. For example, many extremely funny stories may be told to us in a condensed form, and cause hardly a smile; but when expanded by a skillful narrator, who stimulates our interest and arouses our nerves by using "expectancy" and "suspense," we are in such a state of emotional tension when the denouement arrives that this nerve-force, long pent up, must find an issue in muscular action usually facial.

The range of our ethical judgment in the field of "the comic" is largely determined by the body of knowledge which we have acquired by our experience of life; if our past experience has never furnished us with the knowledge which is needed to crush the pretensions of some newly asserted fact, we do not crush it, we do not "see the point," and we do not smile. For example, when an American visitor to England refers to the state of Kentucky as "that fertile, prosperous region where the corn

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is full of kernels and the colonels are full of corn," he must not be surprised if his jest is received by his English listeners with blank faces; they have not "seen the joke," because they have not the knowledge of American life needed to correct the pretentious and "crooked" fact. The blankness of their faces by no means argues a density of mind; for they laugh heartily over the pages of *Punch,* a publication which most Americans find dull, because they have not the requisite knowledge of British affairs with which to combat and conquer the pretentious fallacies therein offered.

This which I have called the "ethical element in wit and humor" may be illustrated by the physical phenomenon of the leaping spark of an electric battery. As before stated, any simple assertion of indubitable fact is like a circle, and has one center; whereas a witty or humorous assertion is like an ellipse, with its two centers. These two centers now may be likened to the two poles of an electrical battery; the interest of the listener or spectator is led up to the pretentious fallacy and there suddenly left alone, as at one of two electric poles; but it at once leaps, like the spark, to the other stronger pole of established fact; and this discharge of nerve-force overflows along nerve-trunks and branches, finding outlet in muscular actions. Often the mendacious assertion is so plausible, is so intrenched in favoring conditions, that the listener's mind returns, and for an instant again accepts it; and again the electric-like leap of judgment is made, to the pole of undoubted fact, established by experience. Thus are explained the recurrent waves of laughter which follow an especially "good joke;" and an especially "good" joke is one which compels the longest possible leap of the largest possible spark; it is the conquest of the most formidable fallacy which, though formidable, is yet obliged to bow before the still stronger "ethical element" in our perception of wit and humor.

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PHILOSOPHIE DER WERTE. Grundzüge einer Weltanschauung. Von Hugo Münsterberg. Leipzig: J. A. Barth, 1908. Pp. viii, 481.

The kind of "value" with which Professor Münsterberg is concerned in this book is something which he calls "unconditional," "absolute" or "universally valid" value. And the following seem to be some of the chief things which he wishes to say about it.

He assumes, apparently, that nothing can have any "value" at all, either "conditional" or "unconditional," except what "satisfies" (or the satisfaction of?) some volition. But it is, he thinks, certain that we do not find *unconditional* value wherever *any* volition is satisfied. On the contrary, he thinks that there are two kinds of volition—a kind which he calls "personal" (and sometimes "selfish"), and a kind which he calls "pure" or "superpersonal;" and what *merely* satisfies a "personal" volition, or any number of personal volitions, is, he thinks, *never* unconditionally valuable. We have an "unconditional value" *only* where a superpersonal volition is satisfied; but here, he thinks, we have it *always*. That is to say, we have an "unconditional value" wherever, and only where, a superpersonal volition is satisfied.

But which of our volitions are "superpersonal"? Professor Münsterberg thinks he can point out one which is. We will, he thinks (he seems to think we *all* do), "that there should be a world"—an "independent," "self-subsistent" world. And this volition, he holds, is certainly "superpersonal." Here then is one superpersonal volition. And this one, he seems to hold, is not *merely* one among others. *All* superpersonal volitions seem to be somehow included in it; every volition which is superpersonal at all is a volition "that there should be a world." At all events their relation to it is such that none of them can be satisfied, except where this one is satisfied. We have, therefore (he seems to think), an unconditional value wherever and only where the volition "that there should be a world" is satisfied.

But this volition may, he holds, be satisfied in a good many different ways. To will that there should be a world is, he seems

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to hold, the same thing as to will that our experiences *(Erlebnisse)* should not be *merely* experiences; and this again is the same thing as to will that each should "recur in a new experience" or that there should be a "relation of identity" between it and another experience. And wherever a volition that one experience should "recur identically" in another is satisfied, there, he seems to hold, our volition that "there should be a world" is satisfied and we have an unconditional value. We have, therefore, an "unconditional value" wherever, and only where, a volition that one experience should "recur identically" in another is satisfied.

And he often seems to speak as if such a volition were satisfied wherever one experience *actually does* recur identically in another; and as if, therefore, whenever one experience actually does recur identically in another, this fact itself were unconditionally valuable. But this, I think, is not really his view. He means to hold, I think, that our superpersonal volition is satisfied, and an unconditional value realized, only where we are *conscious* in some way of the identical recurrence of an experience. An identical recurrence of which no one were conscious would, I think he would say, certainly not satisfy our superpersonal volition nor be unconditionally valuable. But, whenever we are *conscious* of such an identical recurrence, there, I think, he does hold that our superpersonal volition really is satisfied and we have an unconditional value. We have an unconditional value then, it would seem, wherever, and only where, we are conscious that one experience recurs identically in another.

Professor Münsterberg seems then to hold the two principles that unconditional value is to be found wherever and only where a superpersonal volition is satisfied; and that this again occurs wherever and only where we find one experience recurring identically in another. And he next proceeds to classify the cases in which, as he thinks, we do find such an identical recurrence. He distinguishes twenty-four such cases and devotes a section of his book to each. These twenty-four cases, he seems to think, are the only cases in which we do find an identical recurrence of the kind he means and are therefore the only unconditional values.

These twenty-four unconditional values he divides into four main groups, each of which contains six different values.

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The first group consists of six values which he calls "logical" values; and these six cases, he seems to think, exhaust all the cases in which "knowledge" is unconditionally valuable—indeed, he seems to think that they exhaust all the cases in which we have anything which can properly be called knowledge at all. These six kinds of valuable knowledge are, it appears, the knowledge of the existence (*Dasein*) or independent existence of "things;" the knowledge of the independent existence of other persons; the knowledge of the independent "validity" of some of our own volitions (*i. e.*, apparently, that they are superpersonal); the natural sciences: history: and finally "Reason"—under which title Professor Münsterberg seems to include, among other things, logic and mathematics. Professor Münsterberg seems to think that all knowledge of any of these six kinds is unconditionally valuable. Each kind must, therefore, according to him, consist in some sort of consciousness that one experience recurs identically in another; and it should be noted that the "identical recurrence," which he thinks he finds in each of these six cases, is in each case of a different kind. Thus the independent existence of a *thing* is, he thinks, constituted by the fact that the content of a particular kind of experience is *capable* of being experienced "by every conceivable subject;" here, therefore, "identical recurrence" means merely the *possibility* of recurring identically in the experience of every conceivable person. But the independent existence of a *person* is, he says, not constituted by this kind of identical recurrence. To say that a person "exists independently" is (it seems) to say that his will is *capable* of "taking up an attitude" (*Stellungnehmen*) to "every conceivable object," and here, therefore, though the identical recurrence again consists in a mere possibility, it is a possibility of recurring in quite a different way. Thus it appears that, according to Professor Münsterberg, when we know that certain kinds of contents are capable of being experienced by anyone whatever, this knowledge is equivalent to knowing that they exist independently and *is* unconditionally valuable; but if we were to know that a will was capable of being experienced by anyone whatever, this would *not* be equivalent to knowing that it existed independently and the knowledge would have *no* unconditional value. And similarly in each of the other four kinds of valuable knowledge, the kind of identical recurrence, in the knowledge

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of which (according to Professor Münsterberg) the value consists, seems in each case again to be specifically different. It is not necessary, I think, to give Professor Münsterberg's definitions of them all. But it should be noted that in the case of the natural sciences and history, the kind of identical recurrence which he declares to be essential to their value is such that only a small part of the knowledge in which those sciences actually consist, can, according to him, be unconditionally valuable. The discoveries of any of the natural sciences are, he seems to think, unconditionally valuable only where they consist in finding out that the *parts* of which a thing is composed persist unchanged even when the thing itself is destroyed. And in the case of history, he insists that unconditional value is to be found in it only where it discovers a certain kind of "connection" (*Zusammenharg*) between the wills of different persons. What kind of connection he means he never, I think, clearly explains; but it is plain that he means to exclude a great number of the connections which history actually does discover, since he insists that the connections he means are in no case *causal* connections. He holds, indeed, the extravagant view that a volition never is causally connected either with any other volition or with anything else, and he gives as a reason for this the assertion that no volition ever occurs at any time at all—that all are timeless; whence he infers that none can be causally connected with anything since causal connection involves succession in time.

His second group of unconditional values consists of six, which he calls "æsthetic values." These six, he says, are: A certain sort of "harmony" among *things*—found wherever we find beauty in Nature; Love (in a wide sense); Happiness (in the only sense in which Happiness is unconditionally valuable); and three forms of Fine Art, namely: Drawing, Painting and Sculpture *(bildende Kunst)*; Literature; and Music. Each of these is, he says, constituted by a certain kind of identical recurrence among the elements of some manifold; and, whereas in the case of the six valuable kinds of knowledge the kind of identical recurrence meant seemed in each case (as I said) to be specifically different; in the case of these six logical values it seems to be exactly the same. In each case, Professor Münsterberg thinks, it consists in an identity of *will;* that is to say, each element of the manifold must be willing the same result. This

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view, of course, involves the paradoxical assertion that mere things and colors and lines and words and musical notes, all of them really have volitions; since Professor Münsterberg does not deny that manifolds composed of such elements may have æsthetic value. And he does not shrink from asserting this paradox. He thinks, apparently, that he can soften it sufficiently by explaining that, though these things, in a sense, "really" (*wirklich*) do will, their volitions are not "real" in one of the senses in which we most commonly (he thinks) use the word; that is to say, they are not real in the sense of "existing independently," since (as he explained in the case of the second "logical" value) the existence of a will consists in its capability of taking up a volitional attitude to every conceivable object, and mere things, he thinks, can only take up a volitional attitude toward a single object.

So far I have imitated Professor Münsterberg in speaking as if he held that the mere union of the elements of a manifold by identity of volition were *itself* "unconditionally valuable." He constantly does, in fact, so speak, as if love itself or a work of art itself were the æsthetic values of which he is speaking. But this, I think, is not really his view. Here, as always, what he really considers to be unconditionally valuable is not, I think, the mere fact of identical recurrence, but only some sort of consciousness of it. And in the case of the æsthetic values he holds, I think, that a different kind of consciousness is necessary from that which was sufficient in the case of the logical values. We must, he seems to hold, apprehend the identical volition of the elements of a manifold with a peculiar sort of sympathy on the part of our own wills if we are to have an "æsthetic" value.

His third main group of "unconditional values" consists of six which he calls "ethical values." And these six are, he says: Growth (the growth of animals and plants), Progress (in human society), Self-development, Economic Activity (*Wirthschaft*), Law and Morality. In these six cases he speaks more constantly than ever, as if the things *themselves* and not merely the consciousness of them were unconditionally valuable; but even here, I think, he does not really mean it.

As for the kind of "identical recurrence" which is essential to these six values, he holds, I think, that it consists in each case in the fact that some entity actually does be-

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come that which it willed to become. Thus "growth," for instance, occurs where a flower wills to become a fruit and actually does become one; and the value of which he is speaking is constituted, he insists, not by the *result, e. g.* the existence of the fruit (though that may have unconditional value of another kind), but by the "transition" (*Uebergang*) from the will of the flower to its realization. It seems, however, to be doubtful, in some of these six cases, whether, in his view, we have the kind of unconditional value in question, *wherever* an entity becomes what it willed to become, *no matter what it willed.* He sometimes seems to speak as if he held that we do; but often again he seems to contradict this view and to insist that we have this kind of value *only* where what was willed was of a certain kind. For instance, he seems sometimes to hold that we have the value called "Growth" *only* where some natural object has willed to become serviceable to man and has become so; but sometimes to hold that we have it *whenever* it becomes what it willed to become, and he does not explain whether he holds that whenever it becomes what it willed to become it has also willed to become serviceable to man and has become so. Similarly in the case of human progress he seems sometimes to hold that it occurs, and is unconditionally valuable, wherever the will of a society that its members should will what it wills is realized; and sometimes to hold that it occurs *only* where the wills of the society's members are thus brought nearer to being "superpersonal" volitions, and in this case he definitely points out that the two views are inconsistent with one another, *i. e.* that where the wills of the members have been willed to become and have become in harmony with that of the society, it is by no means always the case that they are, therefore, nearer to being superpersonal volitions. Which of these two inconsistent views he wishes us to adopt I do not know.

The fourth and last main group of values consists of six, which he calls "metaphysical" values. And these, it would seem, consist in certain religious and philosophical "convictions" (*Ueberzeugungen*). These convictions must, according to Professor Münsterberg's principles, be again "convictions" of the "identical recurrence" of one experience in another; and one point in which they differ from the three kinds of value hitherto considered, seems to lie in the fact that they are found only where a value of one of these three former kinds is believed to

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recur identically in a value of one of the other two kinds. That is to say, we have a "metaphysical value" *only* where we are convinced that a "logical value" recurs identically in an "ethical" or "æsthetic" value; or an ethical in a logical or æsthetic one; or an æsthetic in a logical or ethical value. That we have metaphysical values *only* in such cases is, I think, plainly Professor Münsterberg's view. But whether we have them in *all* such cases is, I think, much more obscure. He seems sometimes to speak as if we had a metaphysical value only where *certain* kinds of logical value are united with *certain* kinds of æsthetic or ethical. Sometimes again, as if we had one only where *certain* kinds of logical value are united *both* with certain kinds of æsthetic *and* with certain kinds of ethical. Sometimes again as if there were only one metaphysical value, namely, the conviction that *all* values of all three kinds are united and recur identically in one another. And what he means by the identical recurrence of one kind of value in another is again very obscure. Sometimes he seems to mean that one kind of value recurs in another only where *everything* which has the one kind also has the other. Sometimes that the recurrence occurs, provided only that everything which has the one kind will ultimately have the other. Sometimes that it occurs, provided only that *some* things which have the one kind also have the other. Sometimes again that all may be said to recur in one another, provided only that all are creations of a single "fundamental will" or "super-ego." I gather, however, that he does believe that there is a God who insures the final triumph of "the good," and also that all values are creations of a single "fundamental will" or "super-ego," "in which" (and also "which") we all of us are.

Such seem to be some of the main propositions which Professor Münsterberg seems anxious to recommend.

It would be strange if, in so large a book, he said nothing whatever which was true or which could possibly be useful to anybody. And I suppose some of the things he says are true and may possibly be useful to somebody. But the number of such things seems to me to be exceedingly small. The greater part of his propositions are, so far as I can see, purely arbitrary fictions, which there is nothing to recommend either in the book or out of it except the fact that he himself has apparently come somehow, in some fashion, to believe them. How he himself

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has come to believe them true he does not explain, and still less how anybody else is to satisfy himself that they are so. Take first the proposition that we have "unconditional value" where and only where a "superpersonal volition" is satisfied. Does Professor Münsterberg think that this, as it stands, is a purely self-evident proposition? Or has he arrived at it by reviewing all the actual cases where he thinks he finds unconditional value and thinking he perceives in each that a "superpersonal volition" is satisfied? For my part, it does not seem to me to be self-evident, and when I review the cases in which I think I find unconditional value and in which Professor Münsterberg thinks he finds it, I find many in which, so far as I can see, no sort of volition is satisfied. Professor Münsterberg seems to suppose that we cannot believe anything to "exist independently" without having previously willed, in general, that things should exist independently; but such a volition, so far as I can see, is of comparatively rare occurrence, and where it does occur, does not generally occur till long after we have already attained beliefs in the independent existence of things. So, too, he seems to suppose that we can never find anything beautiful without having previously desired beauty in general; but, so far as I can see, the experience of beauty may, on the contrary, often precede the desire for it. It may, perhaps, be true in the case of every unconditional value which ever occurs that somebody, either before or after, has had a desire that that *sort of thing* should occur, and hence that every unconditional value "satisfies some volition," in the sense that it is the *sort of thing* that somebody at some time has wished for; but I think Professor Münsterberg means much more than this. He seems to me to be gratuitously supposing that volitions exist in cases where observation does not give the smallest reason to suppose that they do exist. And even if we confine ourselves to cases where unconditional values do satisfy some volition, what reason is there for supposing that this volition is a "superpersonal" one? Professor Münsterberg certainly means, by this supposition, that all volitions which are satisfied by an unconditional value have some other property which distinguishes them from all other volitions, *over and above* the mere fact that what satisfies the one class is unconditionally valuable and what satisfies the other is not. But so far as I can see, a volition which is satisfied by an unconditional value may be *in all other respects* precisely

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similar to one which is satisfied by what has no unconditional value. It seems never to have occurred to Professor Münsterberg that this is a possible view. He seems simply to assume that all volitions which are satisfied by unconditional values must have some other property *besides,* which belongs to all of them and to no volition except them.

Take again the proposition that we have an unconditional value wherever and only where we find an "identical recurrence." Does Professor Münsterberg claim that this is self-evident or has he arrived at this also by a review of all the cases where he thinks he finds unconditional value?

If we were to use the phrase "identical recurrence" in such a wide sense as to include every case which anybody would call a case of "identity in difference," then, I think, it may possibly be true that we have unconditional value *only where* we have an "identical recurrence." But if we give the phrase such a wide meaning as this, it seems plainly absurd to hold the converse proposition, namely, that we have unconditional value, *wherever* we find an identical recurrence; since an immense number of apprehensions, which seem to have no unconditional value, would in this sense be apprehensions of identical recurrence. But it may be doubtful whether Professor Münsterberg means to use the phrase in such a wide sense as this. The only clue he gives us to his meaning is by apparently holding that it is a relation which occurs in all the twenty-four cases he distinguishes *and* in no others. This is certainly not true of "identity in difference" in the widest sense, since that occurs in many cases which he does not include in his twenty-four; and it is, I think, also plainly true of no relation whatever, since there is no relation at all which is exhibited at the same time in all his twenty-four cases and *only* in them. The truth is, I think, that he does not use the phrase in any one fixed sense, but means by it different things at different times. And the only definite proposition which he is fairly constantly anxious to maintain is not that we have unconditional value wherever and only where we find an identical recurrence in any one fixed sense, but that we have it wherever and only where we find one or other of the twenty-four cases which he distinguishes. And both sides of *this* proposition seem to me to be plainly false: *both* that we have it *only* where we have one of his twenty-four cases, *and* that we have it *wherever* we find one of these.

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Take, for instance, his six logical values. He holds, apparently, that whenever we know that a certain kind of content is *capable* of recurring in any conceivable experience, this knowledge has unconditional value. But, granted that such a piece of knowledge has unconditional value *sometimes*, how can one suppose that it has it *always?* And then, on the other hand, he seems to hold that the knowledge of causal relations never has unconditional value. What could be more arbitrary than the distinction between the two cases? This kind of knowledge also, it seems plain, is in fact a kind of knowledge which sometimes, but not always, has unconditional value. Or take his æsthetic values. Here, perhaps, it may be the case that we have an æsthetic value *wherever* we feel a harmony between two different wills, though this is by no means plain. But what reason is there for saying that we have æsthetic value *only where* we feel such a harmony? Professor Münsterberg can, as we saw, maintain this result only by maintaining that colors and lines and musical notes all have volitions, and this seems to be a purely fantastic hypothesis which there is nothing in observation to support.

These two propositions, that we have unconditional value where and only where a "superpersonal volition" is satisfied, and where and only where we find an "identical recurrence," are, I think, characteristic specimens of the kind of proposition of which this book is full.

London. G. E. MOORE.

NATIONAL AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS. By Frederic Harrison. REALITIES AND IDEALS. By Frederic Harrison. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1908.

These volumes are the third and fourth of a series of essays collected and published by Mr. Frederic Harrison in the year 1907-1908. The essays have been collected from various sources. Most of them have appeared in reviews, English or American, or have been delivered as lectures, to the London Positivist Society, or on other public occasions. Mr. Harrison calls the collection a biographical series. The dates of their original composition cover a period of over forty years. They all represent a point of view that has altered little (or nothing) during all that time: the point of view of a Comtist who seeks to apply the prin-

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ciples and maxims of his religion to current events and situations, political, social or economic. To revise and reissue the occasional utterances of forty years is to apply a test against which nothing but the power of seeing things *sub specie æternitatis* could stand.

There are (at least) three ways of attaining to the point of view from which things are seen *sub specie æternitatis.* One is the way of the philosopher; one is the way of the artist; one is the way of a detached and wide-roaming intelligence and sympathy which gradually builds up a cultured and unbiased judgment, untroubled by any haunting whisper of an axe to grind in the way of discipleship or orthodoxy. This latter is the way one expects to find in this book. But it is a way which Mr. Harrison never permits himself to follow. He always has a thesis: he never forgets for one moment to be a disciple; nor does he suffer his reader to forget it either. If Comtism does not commend itself to readers of these bulky volumes as an ever present help in trouble it will not be for want of a brilliant exponent, a mediator between gods and men, ever loyal to the god, ever sympathetic to the men. But there is a haunting sadness in these pages, a sadness which seems to deepen with the years, and the reader cannot but suspect that Mr. Harrison perceives that he has not the ear of his time, that the Comtist, like the Rustic of Horace, "still stands by the river, while the river flows on and flows past him forever."

A Kantian or Hegelian thinker may try to cast light on individual problems by bringing the particular under a universal law or principle of reason or experience, but a Comtist must try to bring his particular problem under a particular maxim of Comte. This results sometimes in a curious grouping of particulars. We find such heterogeneous problems as: the possibility of a national church; the disestablishment of the church of England the veto on drink; the problem of elementary education: and votes for women are all solved for Mr. Harrison when he remembers that "Positivism is (p. 197), in its essence, a revival of the eternal problem, how to found a spiritual power apart from any material power. And on that ground it has steadfastly opposed all state religions, all compulsory orthodoxy, all enforced education, all morality by act of Parliament, and virtue appraised by the civil magistrate. It is for teachers, preachers and philanthropists to make men sober, chaste, temperate, unselfish and industrious."

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Mr. Harrison includes all women in the category of teachers. He says (p. 72), "The true function of woman is to educate, not children only, but men; to train to a higher civilization, not the rising generation, but the actual society." The assignment to women of this honorable function carries with it, in Mr. Harrison's judgment, their exclusion from political life, on the principle just quoted that "spiritual power" must be "kept apart from any material power." At this point, indeed, Mr. Harrison seems forced into what is surely an alarming position. "I am not," he says (p. 133), "for imposing on women any disability which I am not willing personally to accept. The worst of all despotisms, it has been said, is a *pedantocracy*—the rule of philosophers or moralists. . . . As for myself, in common with all those who charge themselves with political principle and the Ethics of the State, I have through life reserved myself to seeking to influence opinion, whilst keeping clear of political life. . . . Though I have been on the register of several constituencies both urban and rural, I have hardly ever voted in a parliamentary contest in fifty years." It is not easy to know whom precisely Mr. Harrison means by "all those who charge themselves with political principle and the Ethics of the State." If he means great and original philosophers we may perhaps dismiss our alarm. Such persons are not numerous, and are not likely to take the advice offered. But if it means that political sagacity and philosophic knowledge should ever be in inverse ratio to political action and responsibility then surely the utterance is the most pernicious *reductio ad absurdum* that ever befell a doctrine.

Mr. Harrison's reiterated insistence that teachers, preachers and philanthropists are to be the gods outside the machine—forever pointing out how the machine is to run, but forever out of the running themselves—is calculated to bring the godhead into derision more rapidly than any godhead or theology of them all.

It would be a mistake to conclude from what has been quoted above that Mr. Harrison bases his refusal of the claim of women to the franchise on the same ground as that on which he denies to himself the exercise of his citizenship. It is true he and they are both precluded, in his view, because they "*influence opinion.*" But while Mr. Harrison "seeks to influence opinion by charging himself with political principle and the Ethics of the State" women must do this "by diffusing the spirit of affection, of self-

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restraint, self-sacrifice, fidelity and purity. And this is to be effected, not by writing books about these things in the closet, nor by preaching sermons about them in the congregation, but by manifesting them hour by hour in each home by the magic of the voice, look, word and all the incommunicable graces of woman's tenderness" (p. 73).

So women are after all "teachers" only in the sense in which helpless babes and little, young, tender children have been, by the mute appeal of their helplessness, by their tender needs, their ignorance and "purity," among the most powerful influences in the humanizing of humanity. It is deeply true that women and babes have by their tender wants and mute appeals humanized men, have, shall we say, been "teachers" of men. (It hardly seems fully frank to use the word "teacher" with this significance.) It is also deeply true, nay, it is the profoundest truth about women, that the well of their widest influence and the spring of their highest inspiration lies in their unlimited capacity for self-forgetting devotion, and that they owe this spiritual power to the physical differentiation of their bodies, whereby they are capable of the supreme privilege of motherhood. But is this the whole truth? Are not women after all human, even in their motherhood? And can they not be human, and become ever more and more human in the quality of their devotion? Does it not matter to the community whether the devotion of women be "according to wisdom," so only they be devoted? Is there for Mr. Harrison the same deep "dualism" between human love and human wisdom, which he finds between "spiritual power" and "the power of the state"? Or, is it merely that he is thoroughly skeptical as to the genuine humanity of women, and thinks in his heart that their devotion at its best is akin to the devotion of man's best four-footed friend?

If only Mr. Harrison could see a joke!

Surely the smallest modicum of humor would have made him uneasy at the look of his final conclusion-of-the-whole-matter.

It is this: after many pages of wearisome reiteration of his opinion that women are incapable of forming a balanced judgment he concludes: "In an experience now of fifty years I cannot trust the judgment of even the most thoughtful women in all the matters of finance, armaments, alliances and legislation which make up national policy. To speak the truth, I only

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know one woman whom I would always trust to come to a right decision." How fortunate is Mr. Harrison to have met with even one woman of such remarkable gifts![1] One wonders whether the fortunate lady has, perhaps, had the advantage of being "influenced" by one of "those who charge themselves with political principle and the Ethics of the State"? Or, whether, by long and intimate association with one, who "after fifty years' experience," finds "almost nothing to qualify in the judgment . . . passed at the time on the great events and the dominant personalities of the nineteenth century," she has learnt those judgments by heart, and produces infallibly, affectionately and self-sacrificingly the right one, at each appropriate opportunity?[2]

The treatment of "Votes for Women" is more detailed, more remorselessly unhumorous, more naïvely self-revealing than that of any other subject in this "biographical series"; but its point of view is typical. The belief in the necessary separation of spiritual power from governmental power leads not only to the conclusion that love and wisdom are forever divorced from one another in their highest manifestations in human life, but necessitates Mr. Harrison's various conclusions: (1) that the Church of England must be disestablished; (2) that the idea of a National Church is a forever impossible dream; (3) that no goodness in motive, . . . should blind us to the monstrous wrongfulness of any attempt to suppress alcohol by law; (4) that compulsory education is a "fatal mistake"; and (5) that the secular solution is the only one in all primary state-aided schools.

Mr. Harrison ranges over a vast field in selecting the subject-matter of his various essays, but whether his subject be political, social, economic, literary or biographical, it is impossible to read his vivid and animated pages without feeling braced and enlightened, and mollified by contact with a mind rich in varied knowledge, alert and profound interests, and wide and penetrating sympathies. This is invariably true even when the reader differs profoundly from Mr. Harrison's conclusions, or

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[1] One wonders whether he has met with more than one man from whom he would always expect as much.

[2] It was surely unnecessary for Mr. Harrison to add that his friend "happens to be a resolute opponent of Votes for Women."

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when the subjects are such ancient history as the Franco-Prussian War, or the Bismarckian militarism, so controversial as votes for women, or so uninspiring as parliamentary procedure.

MARY GILLILAND HUSBAND.

London.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOYALTY. By Prof. Josiah Royce. New York: The Macmillan Co. Pp. xii, 398.

Professor Royce has published under the title of 'The Philosophy of Loyalty'' a course of lectures delivered before the Lowell Institute in Boston in the winter of 1907. The book, as the author confesses, while growing out of academic exercises and related to his professional work, is neither a text-book nor ''an elaborately technical philosophical research. It is simply an appeal to any reader who may be fond of ideals, and who may be willing to review his own ideals in a somewhat new light and in a philosophical spirit.''

The new light in which we are asked by Professor Royce to view our ideals is the spirit of loyalty shining as the central sun of the moral universe. All the lights that lighten men—as conscience, beauty, duty, truth—may be expressed in terms of loyalty. And the discovery of a simplifying, unifying doctrine of duty in these days of ''homesickness and spiritual estrangement, and confusion of mind about moral ideals,'' the author thinks a ''peculiarly precious mission.''

It seem to us that Professor Royce has fulfilled that mission in a peculiarly convincing way. His book is unique in title and purpose. His main thesis that ''loyalty to loyalty is the fulfilment of the whole moral law'' is at once startling and incomprehensible. But as the author goes on to explain how loyalty to the idea of loyalty is the fulfilment of every rational and satisfying desire of man, we see how the individual finds himself and makes valid and durable his very individualism only as a contribution to the total web of loyalties which weaves the visible pattern of this moral world. A life lived with no moral plan is at worst an anarchic animalism, at best a passive organism. True personality is reached only in dedication to a large ideal, which includes not our little self alone but all the selves that are seeking the expression of their personality through the ideal.

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Thus our lives are unified, truly vitalized, only as our individualism becomes a consciousness of our belonging to a great cause —only, in other words, as we become loyal to the ideal of loyalty.

After a discussion of the application of the idea of loyalty to some of our social and political problems in America, Professor Royce comes to what seems to us the central chapter of his work, namely, the metaphysical justification of the great cause of loyalty to loyalty as the only rational conception of truth. The chapter is a polemic against the Pragmatists, who are wittily characterized as "a group of philosophers who have of late been disposed to take truth under their special protection, as if she were in danger from the tendency of some people who take her too seriously." In a delightfully clear and forceful argument Royce shows that the sound part of Pragmatism, "namely, that all search for truth is a practical activity with an ethical (a useful) purpose," is an old lesson which Fichte taught many years before William James; and that the rest of Pragmatism, which implies that the individual exhausts truth in the expediencies of his own experience, is both unsound metaphysics and debasing ethics.

In a closing chapter on "Loyalty and Religion," Professor Royce restates the view of our moral relation to the unseen but real world with which the readers of his "The Spirit of Modern Philosophy" and "The World and the Individual" are familiar.

Professor Royce's books are always addressed to the serious mind, and sometimes even only to the highly trained philosophical mind. The present work seems to us a very happy statement of ethical and metaphysical matter of deepest import in language direct, simple, forceful and warm.

DAVID SAVILLE MUZZEY.

Ethical Culture School, New York.

THE PROBLEM OF THEISM, AND OTHER ESSAYS. By A. C. Pigou, M. A., Professor of Political Economy, Cambridge. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1908. Pp. 139.

Disciples of the late Professor Henry Sidgwick will be pleased with this little volume. Professor Pigou is one of them, and the same careful analysis and critical judgment that distinguished Sidgwick is noticeable in his disciple's work. The attitude of Professor Pigou toward Philosophical Theism is critical, and

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his conclusions are almost entirely negative. In the first essay (The General Nature of Reality) the contention that the world has no existence independent of a perceiving subject is examined, the objections to this view are neatly summarized and the conclusion reached that there is an independent reality, and space and time belong to it. The method by which our author (following the Hon. Bertrand Russell) dismisses the antinomies of Kant does not appear to me conclusive. The antinomies seem to be solved by the same kind of argument as Kant himself used, although it led him to deny the independent reality of these forms.

What is the content of space and time? Two answers are noticed, those of the Materialists and Spiritists respectively. "Materialisms that deny the independent reality of other minds no longer need refutation among serious men. The answer of Spiritism is better than the answer of Materialism, because what it asserts to be fact cannot be denied to be possible." But the arguments by which Spiritism seeks to prove that this is the case will not bear investigation. Positively, all that can be added is that experience suggests the existence of corpuscles, spirits of living men, and perhaps of animals, discarnate spirits of dead men and the supreme Spirit of God. He proceeds to examine the proofs of the existence of God in the second essay. The concept of a Supreme Spirit existing in time and space does not seem philosophically promising; nor does the definition of God as a powerful spiritual Being who wills the good, and who is sufficiently powerful to make good prevail over evil in the long run, seem likely to lead to fruitful results; and I cannot agree with Professor Pigou that this meager idea is what the Founder of Christianity meant and asked us to mean by "Our Father."

To establish the existence of God there remains—since the more strictly philosophical arguments have already been disposed of—the physico-theological proof, or the argument from design. This our author fully but briefly examines, and finds the "evidence weak and the conclusion doubtful." Value-judgments, it is contended, have no philosophical value. "There is no straight road from efficacy to truth." Value-judgments obtain significance because mixed up with arguments based on the *content* of religious experience. Religious experiences are important and should be treated in a scientific manner. Such treatment is difficult for many reasons, but it is not impossible, and

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from it we might be able to base valid arguments for the existence of God. Professor Pigou attaches much importance to experience in his discussion of other problems in this book. It is one of his fundamental postulates that "unless they are proved to be guilty, the apparent data of consciousness are innocent of fraud." So he credits the will with a limited freedom "because of the immediate awareness of freedom that is present in us at certain times. He maintains that "the only method of testing any proposition about things good in themselves is perception." And he perceives that pleasure, the good will, love, the character of a man's ideals and his attitude toward what he sees in persons and things are good. These elements may vary independently in any given consciousness, and no general law is discoverable which connects their variations.

We can only refer to the rest of the essays. Three of them, "The Problem of Good," "The Ethics of the Gospels" and "The Ethics of Nietzsche," have appeared in this JOURNAL. They are interesting studies, but partial in scope. The essay with which the volume closes is on the optimism of Browning and Meredith. The poets are said to "have an insight and a power of perception and a hold upon concrete reality" which the philosopher often lacks, but we cannot find inspired philosophic doctrine in their poems.

Professor Pigou evidently expects very little from the "thinker." His philosophical attitude is decidedly agnostic. Philosophy, as he conceives it, however, is a branch of logic; it is throughout concerned with proof. He does not place philosophers with the seers nor credit them with "perception." But his views, he reminds us, are tentative. And we may thank him for a fairly thorough, if summary, preliminary survey of some important problems.

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AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY. By William McDougall. London: Methuen & Co., 1908. Pp. xvi, 356.

It is not sufficiently recognized by some students of ethics that their subject-matter, human conduct in some of its phases, is at the same time being investigated by the psychologists with new and powerful engines of inquiry. Mr. McDougall furnishes

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us in "Social Psychology" with a method and with results of which all students of ethics may well take account.

And first as to the method. The author defines instinct as "certain innate specific tendencies of the mind that are common to all members of any one species" (p. 22). These instincts, directly or indirectly, are the prime movers of all human activity (p. 44), and the affective aspect of the operation of any one of the principal instincts may be called a primary emotion (p. 47). Not only does instinct thus account directly or indirectly for human feeling and action, but it is accompanied by a perceptual element which in like manner lies at the basis of cognition (*cf.* p. 29, *n.*).

It is from this standpoint that Mr. McDougall approaches the study of the emotions, and in so doing has formulated a suggestive theory of one of the most difficult parts of psychology. The primary emotions, we are told, are "the affective aspects of the operation of any of the principal instincts." It is obvious that comparative and evolutionary psychology will almost take precedence of introspection in such an inquiry. And the reader of this interesting volume will be struck by the material which is brought in from ethnological sources, much indeed from the author's observation. Proceeding with an analysis which is in the main convincing, the author finds that pleasure and pain are not in themselves springs of action (p. 43). Nor indeed is there any meaning in the common identification of joy or happiness with pleasure (pp. 150, 154). Another valuable distinction is that which separates the tender emotion from sympathy and treats the latter as a case of instinctive imitation (p. 92.).

My quarrel with Mr. McDougall will not be so much with what he says, nearly all of which I find excellent, as with some omissions to which he himself points.

In the first place, explanation by reference to instincts is a mechanical explanation so far as the individual himself is concerned. And yet for the individual "advance involves a progress from predominantly mechanical to predominant teleological determination" (p. 263). How is this to be reconciled with the statement that the strictly individual human mind, with which alone the older introspective and descriptive psychology concerned itself, is an abstraction merely and has no real existence" (p. 16)? Mr. McDougall (who writes under the influence of T. H. Green) omits the principles which are necessary for his

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exposition. These are the principle of individuation and the principle of catastrophic development as opposed to the quantitative and qualitative continuity, which is not, after all, essential to the theory of evolution.

Mr. McDougall has made some progress toward the desired end, namely, that psychology should become more largely a deductive science. But the generalizations about human nature which can be drawn from comparative and evolutionary psychology only carry us a very little way. And although experimental psychology gives definiteness to the subject-matter of which it stood, and still stands, greatly in need, even experiment does not carry us very far We are left therefore in this position: on the one side there are the more or less exact methods which are capable of furnishing generalizations more or less valid, while on the other side is the individual who is in each and every case an infinitely complex, and at the same time a unique, problem. Empirical generalizations, such as those which many writers upon education indulge in, are worthless for the simple reason that there is scarcely one of which its contradictory is not sometimes true. For example, Mr. McDougall (p. 250) describes the stages in a child's advance toward the higher forms of volition. Now, as against such a table I will set my own observation that some children from very early years exhibit a highly moralized nature. The grace and charm of such natures is violated and partially destroyed sometimes by the red tape which is the emblem of professional education. And the dismal product of the two is the prig (p. 257). As it should be a canon in ethics and education that the individual human being is a species, so in psychology it is a datum that the individual is unique. For it is inconceivable that there should be two indistinguishable personalities.

In the next place, Mr. McDougall goes far with his principle of continuous evolution when he says (p. 19): "So long as it is possible to assume, as has often been done, that these innate tendencies of the human mind have varied greatly from age to age and from race to race, all such speculation (*i. e.*, as to the history of institutions) is founded on quicksand and we cannot hope to reach views of a reasonable degree of certainty." Here I must venture to take issue with Mr. McDougall. The comparative method on which he lays so much stress has emphasized similarities to an undue extent, and it requires to be supple-

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mented by a critical method which shall mark out differences. Not only so, the comparative and evolutionary methods are merely useful ancillaries to the study of history; they are not history itself. Still less are these methods suitable without the great qualifications which it is the merit of Mendel to have discovered. I will insist upon one of them. "A great number of specific characters are without doubt definite: they are inherited as definite entities, and there can be no question that their first coming into existence was a definite event. Every year tends to increase the range of characters to which the conception of discontinuity has to be applied." (Lock, "Variation, Heredity and Evolution," p. 280). Human history like that of the earth is both continuous and catastrophic. Now, this individual element in human life is beyond calculation; it cannot be foreseen, though when it appears it necessarily falls within the categories of human apprehension. Genius bursts the bonds of every scientific convention. And here I seem to find an explanation of Mr. McDougall's attitude to earlier thinkers. The personal element is too much neglected, even for a "Social Psychology." Kant is dismissed with impatience (p. 7) as lacking in psychological insight. Nor can Mr. McDougall have realized the greatness of Aristotle when he speaks of the older moralists as treating the individual in artificial abstraction from the social relations through which his moral sentiments are formed (p. 229). And to apply this personal factor in a case mentioned by the author, namely, the instinct of curiosity: the proportion of individuals who engage upon scientific discovery in any society is relatively very small. Hence it is a misnomer to treat of such an instinct—if instinct it be—as a social quality. The conception of a hero, scientific or otherwise, therefore, still remains indispensable to the understanding of human history. And no study of social psychology can be considered as formally complete unless it examines the function of the individual as from time to time adding specific qualities, to use Mendel's suggestion, to the society in which he occurs.

With these qualifications (which are rather demands for more, than complaints about what Mr. McDougall has given us), "Social Psychology" may be recommended to students as an indispensable text-book.

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INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR WAR BETWEEN NATIONS. By Russell Lowell Jones, M. A. Rector's Prize Essay, 1907. St. Andrews: University Press.

This book is introduced by a preface from the pen of Dr. Bernard Bosanquet, in which he commends it as the work of a young graduate of St. Andrews and praises the straightforwardness and common sense which it displays. It contains a great deal of matter, mostly historical; indeed the chief difficulty in dealing historically with a subject such as this is just that it involves a survey of universal history. That the author has brought much industry to his task and that he has considerable analytical ability is quite plain. His views on the future of arbitration, and the limitations which should be placed upon the more extravagant judgments of the peace societies, are sound and practical, and if in no way original are well expressed and well supported.

"The wars of the future will be like the Russo-Japanese War in all essentials. When two nations are brought face to face; when the expansion of either means injuring the other, and both are equally determined to protect their trade interests and their markets, their political aims and ideals, then there remains but the sword to determine which shall go on. Arbitration can never decide these huge questions of progress and evolution. No arbitral court can say to this nation, 'Thou shalt retire,' and to that one, 'Thou shalt advance'; only time and war and industry and efficiency can, by complex action, solve these questions" (p. 236).

Save for such cases, Mr. Jones has abundant faith in the future of arbitration, mediation and diplomacy as methods of averting war, but the Hague conferences, which are dealt with at the end of the book, are very justly estimated by him as fixing for some years, if not in detail at least in outline, all that is possible, all that can safely be done at present. That, as the assembled nations of the earth recognized, arbitration in itself is inadequate to solve some questions; that the introduction of coercion would but set back the hands of the clock and deprive arbitral methods of their legitimate sphere and of all chance of enlarging that sphere in the course of time—all this is clear enough without the aid of universal history or evolutionary "sociology"; and Mr. Jones, when free from these

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troublesome companions and dealing with the modern and practical issues upon the footing of recent experience and common sense, is shrewd, readable and safe. He has not given so much independent thought as we could have wished to the further elucidation of the different methods of arbitration and the classification of the subject-matters for which each is most adapted. He does, indeed, enlarge on the utility of *commissions d'enquête* in such matters as the Dogger Bank affair, and he reproduces a fourfold division of the "objects" of arbitral judgments from another writer. He notes, too, in connection with Article 16 of Title IV of the first Hague convention, that the notion there expressed that arbitration is particularly adapted to solve questions of a judicial character (especially the interpretation of treaties) is really the converse of the older theory, according to which questions which did not seem fitted for a judicial, but rather for a "give-and-take," solution were deemed the most suitable for arbitration. Two facts are given as explaining this marked change—the greater efficiency of diplomacy and the development of international law. But, convinced as we are that Mr. Jones would have shed light upon this practical aspect of the subject had he dealt with it carefully and systematically, we are obliged to confess that he has not done so and that any useful remarks which he does make are unconnected and almost accidental. It is a misfortune, too, that the account of the second Hague conference, which is very meager, should have been written before the conclusion of its sittings, a fact which appears to have prevented a proper treatment of the Portuguese list of subjects with respect to which the *droit de force* might be waived and a detailed consideration of further subjects which might have been suggested with defined safeguards.

There are certain further criticisms which we cannot omit. Chief of these is that there is a great deal of positive disorderliness in the arrangement of this essay, and that we are driven from pillar to post with quotations from a few authors which might have been put in his own words when he agrees with them, or ignored when he thinks them wrong. We find the chapter on "The First Great Age of Arbitration" trailing off into an attempt to find a definition of arbitration. Interspersed with various historical discussions are opinions and judgments that might well have been kept until the history had

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been clearly exhibited and the subject was being treated otherwise. The "evolutionary" talk about the function of war and the "sociology" generally comes to nothing. In fact, the book needs "pruning" severely. It has the faults of most prize essays; that is to say, they are well known all the world over as a tantalizing kind of literature; and when the subject reaches out, as Mr. Jones's subject does, into all history, such faults become at once more noticeable and more inevitable. Despite them, this can be recommended as a good book on a most difficult subject, and one which is marked, as Dr. Bosanquet says it is, by learning, straightforwardness and common sense.

London. G. C. RANKIN.

SUGGESTION IN EDUCATION. By M. W. Keatinge. Edinburgh and London: Adam & Charles Black, 1908. Pp. 202.

Arising out of a study of hypnotic phenomena an increasing degree of attention has, in recent years, been given to an investigation of suggestion in the waking as well as in the hypnotic state. We now know that suggestion is a process constantly at work, that suggestibility is no longer to be regarded as an abnormal mental condition, and that while everyone is more or less suggestible, liability to suggestive influence varies from time to time. The importance of considering the value of suggestion as a factor in the educative process and in particular of estimating its efficacy as an instrument in character formation is at once evident. This task has been taken in hand by Mr. Keatinge in "Suggestion in Education," a book stimulating and instructive to a degree, and one which no student of education can afford to overlook.

Permeating an unusual amount of admirable psychology and suggestive discussions on points of method and classroom technique, the author's main thesis stands clear. Can education create? Can character be determined by school education? Both questions are answered in the affirmative, for any other answer must lead to educational pessimism. But from the outset the author discards the positions of Herbartianism as being based on a defunct and worn out psychology; ideas alone will not suffice for character building. An analysis of character from the physiological and psychological sides leads to an examination

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of method as a primary factor in the educative process, but again neither demonstration nor the method of strict heurism are found sufficient: they need a third factor, suggestion. "Method, then, as a whole comprises these three factors: demonstration, heurism and suggestion. Their proportions may vary, sometimes one, sometimes another taking the lead; but in all teaching which is to be effective, and especially for the guidance of conduct, suggestion must be given its due place." The author gives an account of hypnotic suggestion, compares with it suggestion in the waking state, and describes some experimental studies of suggestion in the latter state, conducted by Binet in France and by Sidis in America. Then follow two chapters devoted respectively to the Operations Preliminary to Suggestion and the Processes of Suggestion, that all teachers should read, no matter how little psychology they may have. Much of value will be gleaned from the next chapter on Suggestion and Imitation, while the remaining four chapters on Character, Method and Suggestion; Education as Creative; Some Practical Applications; and the Sanction of Suggestion, are all from the teacher's standpoint admirable. The section on the subconscious mind in Chapter VIII is one of the best parts of the book.

Perhaps it is only to be expected that the adoption for scientific purposes of a word so popularly used as "Suggestion" should make its precise definition a matter of some difficulty. No better evidence of the loose usage of the term is needed when, as the author points out, even so eminent a writer as Dr. G. F. Stout, is not altogether blameless, and the variety of meaning attached to the word by different writers is clear from quotations given in the first three chapters. This is doubly unfortunate. It confuses the beginner, and does not assist the expert. Among experts two parties are to be found: those who regard suggestion merely as a process, and those who, like the author, consider ideas themselves to be endowed with suggestive force. Which view is the more correct will doubtless be decided by further investigation; it is a matter for the psychologist and does not affect the educational application. It only remains to add that Mr. Keatinge has done very useful work in giving precise meaning to a number of terms which are generally used with much indefiniteness. Recognizing the undesirability of direct suggestion as not tending to strengthen personality, the author's

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plea is for a more extended use of indirect suggestion. His position can best be estimated by quoting him in connection with a moral instruction lesson on Temperance taken from A. Burdeau's "Devoir et Patrie"; "Systematic lessons in hygiene, or in elementary physiology may or may not be desirable; but it can be productive of no good to place before boys moral apothegms thinly disguised by an anecdotal or hygienic dress. If the lessons in hygiene are made hard or systematic enough, if the physiology is taught on sound and investigational lines, suggestions as to conduct may be made in this connection; but the one thing necessary is that there shall be a vigorous method, and that the boys' attention shall be diverted from the moral undercurrent." Excellent illustrations of this method in classics and literature teaching are given, but the above will suffice. Everyone interested in the teaching of morals would do well to read Mr. Keatinge's chapter, Some Practical Applications.

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ERRATA.

Page 380, 16th line from top—for "right" read "sought," and for "work" read "waste"; 19th line from bottom—for "it" read "we"; 3d line from bottom—for "material" read "essential."

Page 381, 13th line from top—for "upheld" read "refuted"; 19th line from bottom—for "approved" read "opposed"; 11th and 7th lines from bottom—for "non-active" read "normative"; 2d line from botton—for "confession" read "confusion."

Page 382, 15th line from top—for "uncommercial' read "uneconomical."



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